Winning the peace: strengthening peacebuilding through development and security.

It has been metaphorically called the "big handshake" and more frequently described as "the nexus" or "the bridge". The link between security and development has become popularized, but it has concurrently become a matter for conjecture. While roundly acknowledged as a fundamental pillar of the work of the United Nations, development is viewed by some as having been put into peril by drawing a link between it and security. Though this should not detract from the individual significance of either development or security, nuances are important. Development has always been a fundamental concern of the global institution and should continue to be based on ethical concerns. At the same time, experience has shown that sustainable development must be built on sound foundations, a component of which must be the security of individuals and the States in which they live.

In response to the changing nature of threats to international peace and security, the United Nations is seeking ways in which to adequately deal with both old and emerging challenges in order to responsibly fulfil its mandate. Globalization has brought people and States closer together, but it has also made us more dependent on one another for our well-being.

The nineties saw not only a growth in the number of United Nations peacekeeping missions but also in the breadth of their mandates. The traditional role of separating the sides of a conflict and then monitoring in accordance with the terms of the agreement was superseded. There was a gradual unpacking of the concept of State sovereignty and the acceptance that States also have responsibilities towards their citizens. As the decade went on, there was also an exploration of the concept of humanitarian intervention, its partial acceptance and the decline in the use of the veto. Regional interventions have also developed, such as the successful Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands being undertaken under the auspices of the Pacific Islands Forum and at the request of the subject country.

The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations--a response to the shortcomings of UN peacekeeping/peacebuilding operations in areas such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda and Somalia--made some important conclusions. Also known as the Brahimi Report, named after the Panel's Chairman, Lakhdar Brahimi of Algeria, it stressed that the United Nations should not simply take over pre-existing State institutions. It found that such institutions need to be strengthened and sometimes replaced by others, but never by the United Nations. For its part, the world Organization needs a clear vision of the outcomes it sought and a well-defined means of achieving them.

Time and again, the international community has experienced circumstances in which an end to active hostilities has been replaced by a period of neither war nor peace. The "conflict trap", (1) the possibility of relapse into conflict, is at its most insidious in the early days following the end of hostilities. The success of the United Nations in entrenching peace has been varied, and efforts of UN funds and programmes must be broad and integrated to deliver what is required. According to the report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, (2) the international community has not supported post-conflict societies in a coherent and effective way. From this conclusion has emanated the recommendation for the creation of a peacebuilding commission that would have just such a task.

A recent study by RAND (3) concludes that United Nations efforts at nation-building have been successful in circumstances where the environment has been favourable, most particularly the support of large powers, where there has been positive cooperation by neighbouring States and an appropriate balance of internal factors. This difficult to achieve scenario perhaps explains why the level of success of the United Nations in peacebuilding, although much increased in the post-cold-war period, has not been what many would have hoped. Post-conflict peacebuilding is but one of the areas within the activities of the United Nations where multilateralism and real politik meet.

A successful State provides certain essential elements to its citizens, which have been expressed in various ways, but in their essence are security, basic services, the rule of law and representation. When a State is unable to deliver these "ingredients", the possibility of a lapse into State failure and conflict becomes imminent. The circumstances of such failure can vary greatly. Sometimes its roots can be linked to a period of colonial rule and the failure to develop adequate democratic institutions grounded in the society and traditions. In such a case, State institutions formally exist, but in reality do not function in accord with their mandates, or not at all. On other occasions, the failure could be attributable to the domination of one group over another, so that State institutions have been subordinated to maintaining that imbalance. In both cases, and there are many other possibilities, the elements of sovereignty have been captured by an unrepresentative few for undemocratic ends.

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In the short run, security is reliant upon a functioning law and justice system. If the police or judiciary have become corrupted and have lost the confidence of the local populace, as will often be the case in failing States, the first efforts must be directed at remedying the situation. This will require cleansing the system of corrupt elements and rebuilding around a base of uncompromised officers with the assistance of outside advisers. Military involvement in peacebuilding should be limited to the extent possible to providing support to regular police forces.

State failure also often means a loss of control over public finances, both their capture and expenditure. Re-establishing control over this function will allow the State to ensure a basic level of service delivery, starting from the central ministries and building to line ministries and government authorities. The achievement of a secure environment and basic financial governance will support the growth of the productive sector.

At a much broader level, it is necessary to look at the entire system of the institution of governance. It is possible to observe the course of State failure through the gradual unravelling of its institutions. For example, a soundly functioning parliamentary democracy should have a reasonable equilibrium between the powers of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government. An imbalance in either branch can lead to distortions in power relations and affect the quality of the democratic system. Excessive power of the executive, for example, can affect government accountability. Increasing the representativeness of parliament, strengthening political parties and providing electoral assistance are some of the ways of addressing the imbalances.

Efficient enforcement and deterrent mechanisms, combined with civic education, can check corruption and other abuses of power in failing States. (4) The effectiveness of the three branches of government is closely linked to the counterbalance provided by accountability institutions. On the financial side, these might include a State auditor and a parliamentary public accounts committee. Other accountability institutions include an ombudsman as a check on the exercise of bureaucratic discretion and corruption agencies that investigate corrupt conduct by public officials. Transparency International, for example, has illustrated these interlinkages in the notion of a national integrity system. It presents as a powerful vision the link between sustainable development and accountability.

There are no illusions that building peaceful and stable States is an easy business. The institutions and systems of stable countries have been built over decades, if not centuries. To try to replicate this process over a short, intense post-conflict period with a fragile society is far from ideal. A detailed risk analysis and system of monitoring and evaluation must be put into place from the early stages of intervention. Indicators to measure social or economic progress are uncontroversial and relatively easy to define. The largely qualitative indicators to measure progress in governance pose challenges of their own.

While the United Nations must undertake its nation-building tasks, there must also be a parallel domestic constituency for reform. Local champions of the reform process are important. Respected at home and as supporters of the reform, they can be important interlocutors. On the one hand, they can play a catalytic role among the local population in supporting reform and also provide important feedback to the process. Early wins in security may build positive momentum, but later reforms, such as building an efficient and effective State administration or strengthening the accountability of government, will almost certainly impinge upon the interests of ruling elites who benefited from the previous state of affairs and therefore be more difficult to attain.

In order to be sustainable, reforms must be affordable and culturally appropriate. Assistance must be long term and targeted towards building local capacity. There is no easy exit strategy. The objective must be a system that will work when the consultants are gone. There is limited value in advisers who fly in and out if they are not backed up with local implementers who have primary responsibility for driving the reforms forward. The footprint left behind must be a small one. Government should be strengthened so that it could absorb the aid and policy assistance offered to it rather than be overwhelmed by it. The latter is one of the perils of externally driven State-building. Citizens must have ownership of the process and be free to shape it, so that it reflects their own understanding of the problems and their solutions.

Notes

1 Collier Paul, et al, Breaking the Conflict Trap, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2003

2 Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A more secure world: Our shared responsibility, United Nations, New York, 2004

3 James Dobbins, et al, The UN's Role in Nation Building: From the Congo to Iraq, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica. California, 2005

4 Peter Langseth, Rick Stapenhurst and Jeremy Pope, The Role of a National Integrity System in Fighting Corruption, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1997

Ivan Nimac is Deputy Permanent Representative and Charge d'Affaires of the Republic of Croatia to the United Nations. Being a dual citizen, he has also worked with the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Australian Agency for International Development on Pacific issues. Prior to that, he was Deputy Chief of Mission at the United Nations Development Programme's Resident Representative Office in Zagreb. Mr. Nimac has worked both in the field and at headquarters, in the developing world and in countries in transition, for national and multilateral development agencies.

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RELATED ARTICLE: The Croatian Experience: UNTAES 

The RAND Corporation's conclusions are borne out by Croatia's experience of peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities on its own territory. Of the missions undertaken on Croatian soil during the Yugoslav disintegration of the early 1990s, the United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slovenia (UNTAES) was the most successful.*

UNTAES came into existence in a political context vastly different from previous missions in the country. A basic framework agreement had been signed between Government authorities and the rebel Serbs, and the military situation on the ground had changed following the liberation of large parts of the Croatian territory in May and August 1995. Major international powers supported the reintegration.

As opposed to the preceding missions in the country, the UNTAES mandate was abundantly clear: its goal was the peaceful reintegration of the Danubian region into Croatian authority. In order to achieve this, a transitional authority was established pursuant to UNTAES. Although for different reasons, the mandate was agreeable to all parties, and the progress of reintegration also opened the way for the normalization of relations between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The reintegration mechanics, which were as challenging as its political dynamics, involved the police, local authorities, financial and monetary systems, social welfare and health, education and courts, transport and essential services. The Croatian authorities worked closely with the United Nations and ensured the timely provision of documents to the local population, thus integrating them into the administration system, leading to the local elections in 1997.

Of key importance were weapons collection and the demilitarization of the region. As UNTAES neared its conclusion, responsibility for security was transferred to the Transitional Police Force (TPF), which had an equal representation of Croats and Serbs. The TPF administration was initially done by UNTAES, eventually passing to the Croatian Ministry of the Interior. The Mission's mandate concluded on 15 January 1998 with the handover of administration of the Danubian region to the Croatian Government.

Following the successful conclusion of peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations in the country by the United Nations, Croatia has turned towards being a contributor to UN peacekeeping efforts. It now participates in 10 peacekeeping missions and carries out training for prospective peacekeeping contributing States. Eight years after the conclusion of the last mission on its soil, Croatia currently stands ready to share its first-hand experience in post-conflict peacebuilding and is a candidate for the Security Council at the elections to be held in 2007.

* Simonovic, I. and Nimac, I., UNTAES: A Case Study, Croatian International Affairs Review, Vol. 5, No. 14, 1999.