Winner of the 1995 Ziad Asali award for most outstanding student research.

MEMBERSHIP OF FOREIGNERS: ALGERIANS IN FRANCE 

HISTORY

In 1830, France, led by Charles X, defeated the last remaining representatives of the Ottoman Empire and conquered Algeria.(1) The French government subsequently colonized the country and exploited the Algerians by turning their once self-sufficient life style into one of cheap labor. They accomplished this by imposing the European ideal of individual land ownership over the old value of tribal rights over land. This enabled the white settlers to take and transform the land for the production of wine grapes to be sold in France and abroad, instead of growing vegetables and grains for domestic consumption. In 1930 Algerian national movements, such as the Association of the Ulemas de Ben Badis,(2) were the first political movements against French rule. Algeria in the 1930s was considered to be a metropolitan of France, and the French pushed their culture and everything that came with being a national. The statute of 1947 gave the Algerians the same political rights as the French, though they were never considered citizens.(3) The French language became an integral part of the communications in Algeria, and by 1961 Algeria supported more than one million French inhabitants. But economic and social conditions were unbearable for the Algerians; resources were changed by colonization, and forever altered by the Algerian revolution.

As devout Muslims, Algerians initially believed that God had meant for the invasion and subsequent changes by the sons of Ilja, a term used to describe French women.(4) In the late 1840s, with the words of such revolutionary leaders as Ibn Muhyi al-Din Abd al-Qadir, a momentum was beginning against exploitation. Abd al-Qadir not only aroused Algerian emotion and gave them unity, but also helped keep the tradition of oral history alive by composing such songs as the "Song About the Taking of Algiers": "Tyranny and injustice were the cause of Algiers' fall. . . . wine had been tolerated. . . . O my God! Restore victory to our flags, make our armies come alive again, and strike down the impure!"(5)

The momentum, aroused by people like Abd al-Qadir and by the national movements of the 1930s, led to the eruption of the Algerian War of Independence in 1954. The timing, being shortly after World War II and the same year France pulled out of Indo-China, was chosen purposefully. Pride and power were thus at stake for the French and its army initially took an extremely aggressive role toward the Algerian revolt. Strategically France was winning, but they lacked energy to fight a war and at the same time to deal with issues at home. In an attempt to regain some control, France elected Charles de Gaulle, military hero, as President. The new President wanted to move to more pressing political issues and to continue to recover from the economic devastation that still haunted France from W.W.II. The pied-noire(6) (referring to the European settler in Algeria) and soldiers alike were disappointed when de Gaulle decided to abandon Algeria in return for peace with the Accords of Evian.(7) The Algerian war for independence was concluded in 1962, though the Algerian struggle still lives on today.

PURPOSE

"One of the distinguishing features of European politics is nationalism, and consequently European states have always had minority problems."(8) Not only are nation-states less and less willing to make room for Eastern European immigrants, they are even more closed to the idea of sharing what little space they have with foreigners who are culturally, religiously, and racially different.

To the French, the Arab issue has changed with the years. After the Franco-Algerian war was over, the Algerians who fought for France (the Harkis) were not able to stay in Algeria. Afraid of being killed, tens of thousands left with the French soldiers.(9) It was seen as a moral obligation for the French to provide a safe haven for the Harkis. Another way Algerians entered France was by invitation. France faced many problems in the 1960s, among them was the need for workers to help build roads and railroads. The Algerians were willing to work for low wages and consequently were invited to France as temporary guests.(10) Some Algerians thought it their duty to aid their former patron, while others were attracted by the benefits.

Thus began the internal Arab issue. During the years of work on French soil, France itself went through political changes. In this atmosphere there developed a dislike for the immigrants, as the French decided they no longer needed the workers in their country. Though French governments attempted to send them back, many Algerians wanted to stay because of family already living in France and the relatively good economic situation. This internal issue led to inequities that France is now forced to face. These inequities were social, economic, and political that formed barriers for Algerians trying to make a life for themselves in the country that had been so willing to accept their labor. The cultural, religious, political, and economic dimensions of this situation are at the base of the myriad of problems France must now deal with in regards to the "membership of foreigners"; "because the most important right of an ethnic minority is membership in the society."(11) This article investigates the road the immigrants have taken until now, what has prevented them from becoming members of French society and blocked them from being considered citizens. We will evaluate the present Algerian condition and try and decipher who is responsible. We will look at social integration and conflict, economic concerns, and politics as three of the reasons behind the disparity of being Algerian, and trying to belong, in France. Finally, we will address these problems and pose possible solutions.

SOCIAL INTEGRATION AND CONFLICT

Immigration 

"They must assimilate."(12)

The influx of immigrants has strained France's welcome as never before. One in four French citizens is an immigrant or has a parent or a grandparent who settled from abroad. Polls show that more than 70% of the French complain there are "too many Arabs" and believe that foreigners threaten their livelihood and personal security.(13)

Between 1962 and 1968 the number of Maghrebin immigrants (from Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco) in France increased from 410,000 to 619,000, with almost 35,000 entering France per year. Between 1968 and 1975 there was an average of 70,000 Arab immigrants leaving North Africa for France each year. After 1975, because of the French economic crisis and consequent policy changes, the average fell to 43,000. By 1989 the total number of Maghrebin immigrants in France was greater than 1,416,000. The figure for 1995 is more than 1.9 million Maghrebin, including over 900,000 Algerians. Algerian immigrants as a percentage of all Maghrebin immigrants diminished during this period. In 1962 they represented 85%, in 1975- 63%, and in 1982- 56 %.(14) The chilling of Franco-Algerian relations after 1968 is the reason for this decline; not because the Algerians did not want to come, but because the French government would not let them. Today this phenomenon still exists with France issuing fewer and fewer visas to Algerians.(15) As one can see in Annex 1, the number of visas given to Algerians has fallen drastically since 1989, from 800,000 in 1989 to just under 100, 000 in 1994.

A survey on immigration in 1966 in the newspaper the Esprit revealed that Algerians were considered: "underhanded, lazy, aggressive, unclean, viscous, having a bad character, and being cruel ." A typical comment: "We don't want them to come in large numbers . . . because this could give birth to the problem of racism."(16) Algerians did and do continue to arrive, however, and from Southern towns to Paris suburbs, the impact on France of Maghrebin immigration has led to problems. As the Algerian men came to work in France, so did their families to visit, and finally with the intention to stay.

Integration

"The French . . . have a strong sense of who they are and who they are not. . . ."(17)

By the end of the "Gaullist decade" there was a public perception that immigration was contributing to a rapid deterioration in urban living standards and conditions, as well as posing a threat to national identity. "Many immigrant workers were living in urban enclaves in the worst housing conditions, making the 'immigration problem' look worse than it actually was."(18) These immigrants, many of whom were Algerian, came to be viewed as different and inferior because of their poor housing conditions and lack of education, among other things; it was a no-win situation for the Algerians. But it was France that did not have a specific immigration policy. It had no housing policy for the immigrants, other than "relocating" them which just created problems, and no specific education policy.

When comparing France with Germany and how each handled the education of immigrants, Germany geared its policy toward integration, whereas France changed little; expecting the immigrants to adjust.(19) Algerians were consequently characterized as leading this apparent deterioration of French society as ethnic ghettos grew and cultural differences were left to fester; this impression left France increasingly uneasy over the immigrant presence. By the early 1970s the Algerians had become scapegoats for a recession. France in turn attempted unsuccessfully to shut its doors to Algerian immigration. President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, trying to pressure foreign workers and reverse the migratory movement, ordered 35,000 Algerian workers per year to return home.(20) With Algeria reacting angrily, the French government then turned to bribery with promises of training and bonuses if Algerians would return home. Nothing worked, and France's temporary workers revealed their desire to be permanent residents.

France's concept of social integration is the Algerian's handicap: assimilation. "Within France there is an ideology of cultural conformity rather than cultural pluralism."(21) The French are not used to such diversity when confronting their own practices or beliefs, and are threatened by it; therefore they generally strive to secure the homogeneousness of their culture

The most apparent adjustments have occurred within the Algerian community itself. Half of France's two million North African immigrants were either born or brought up in France. Les Beurs, as they are called and as they now call themselves, are a group whose oldest members are in their 30s. Today Beurs have integrated better than their parents, particularly because they have taken the initiative. "The girls commonly want to escape the rigid life of their home background, particularly arranged marriages."(22) "They want to escape the traditional Muslim subordination of their sex."(23) Close to 80% of Beurs who marry take a non-Arab as their partner.(24) The French generally applaud this, but for the Algerians who look to achieve membership and not assimilation, integration is difficult.

Foreigners need to feel like members of their new country. Jeremy Hein, in his article "Rights, Resources, and Membership", identifies the essence of what the French call solidarite, meaning interdependence or mutual responsibility. He explains that, although in theory this is their official policy toward immigrants, in practice the word has not yet become part of the Frenchmen's vocabulary toward immigrants, especially Algerians and other Arabs.

Religion and the French School System

"The expression of Islamic based loyalties seems to confuse space, culture, and nation, and it has led some French to question the ability of North African immigrants to assimilate."(25)

With Islamic beliefs and laws incorporated so religiously into their way of life, clashing so forcefully with France's separation of state and religion, differences of opinion were bound to occur between the French and Arab communities. As the number of Algerian immigrants rose in France, so too rose Islam as a practiced "French" religion. Though Catholics remain the largest religious group, there are more Muslims in France than Protestants or Jews.(26) Mosques have appeared in old buildings or in apartment complexes (see Annex II). Eventually several mayors gave permission for mosques to be built, but it was never easy convincing the community to allow for Islamic places of worship in their towns. Recently Algeria received permission from the French government to build mosques, and Lyon just saw the unveiling of the largest mosque in France. Islam is in France and there to stay, with 3-5%(27) of its population professed Muslims (see Annex II). But what does this religious incorporation mean to the French? How do they view this change?

In mid-October 1989, a school headmaster in the Paris suburb of Creil, citing a ban on religious displays in public institutions, expelled three North African girls for refusing to remove their traditional Muslim head scarves that covered their hair, head, and neck. Many felt that a secular school system was no place to display religious convictions. Within days, the national press, major organizations representing populations of immigrants and numerous political leaders had issued statements about the incident, and had reinterpreted them in terms of historic French conflicts over church-state relations, ethnic pluralism and integration, Islamic fundamentalism, and even women's rights: "In authorizing the Islamic head scarf, a symbol of the submission of women, France gives full-power to fathers and brothers, meaning to the harshest patriarch on the planet. It is no longer the equality of the sexes and free will that make the law in France."(28) The rector of the Paris mosque, Sheikh Tedjini Haddam, and France's grand rabbi, Mr. Alain Goldmann, claimed the ban was an act of discrimination. Public opinion in France believed at the time that, "It was up to the immigrants living in France to make efforts to adapt themselves to French society even if they aren't able to practice their religion under the same conditions as in their original country."(29) However, French law neither enforces a dress code nor forbids religious insignia outright. These decisions are left to the school principal who is undoubtedly not a Muslim, and ironically commonly accepts such items as crucifixes and Jewish skullcaps among students. (Another decision left to the headmaster, perhaps illegally, is the practice of not allowing non-French speaking pupils into the classroom). Here we see the evidence of strong cultural clashes, and biases. The "Creil affair"(30) very quickly became the concern of the Minister of Education, and the issue was soon contested in Parliament. "In state schools, religion is meant to stop at the gate."(31) Such statements were frequently heard, because the strongest argument had to do with the question of a secular school system. Seventy-eight percent of the French public deemed it unacceptable for Muslim girls to wear scarves in school.(32) Somehow the French were worried girls wearing head scarves would stand up and start preaching Islam. The minister's decision to compromise and to permit the girls to wear the scarves if they insisted was hotly debated, and eventually was considered by the highest administrative court in France. The Conseil d'Etat decided to turn the decision back to local education authorities, which could decide one way or the other according to local circumstances and criteria established by the ministry. By late 1989, local school problems that involved integration could no longer be contained by the local administration system, and were rapidly pushed up to the national political level.

This struggle was followed by attempts for change in the Spring of 1990, when the French government tried to develop a consensus about the portrayal of the immigration problem. The Prime Minister asked for a meeting of all political heads, except those of the Front National, in order develop a program to combat racism. The opposition as well held meetings whose goals were to persuade public opinion on the immigration situation. Giscard d'Estaing promptly launched a national petition to hold a referendum to make naturalization legislation more restrictive (one of the proposals also agreed to by the opposition). At the same time that the debate over the girls was going on, at least two principals (one in suburban Paris, and the other in the south of France) were creating a new school issue by refusing to permit North African students to register for the new school year. Their stated purpose was to get the "attention" of national authorities, and to protest against the influx of North Africans into their towns (Le Monde, 17 and 26 October 1989).

The French think Algerians seek public recognition of their special cultural identity, along with their particular political and religious characteristics. What the Algerians need, however, from France is recognition that problems exist combined with an honest effort to help both sides come to terms with integration.

Racism Rampant

"The French could soon see in every Muslim a potential terrorist. . . . We are afraid of the return of the climate during the Algerian war."(33) (Dalil Boubakeur, the rector of the Paris mosque and France's leading Muslim cleric.)

With the attitude of an "invasion of Muslims"(34) spread across the pages of European magazines, Europeans continued to view the situation with fear for their national identity (see Annex I). French identity is far from being threatened, yet many youths and adults alike only hear what politicians tell them-your problems are their fault.

Racism has strengthened its following in France, one need only look at the success of the Front National (see POLITICS). This growing xenophobia is caused by the fear created by such events as the 1984 bombings in Paris, and the hijacking in December 1994 of an Air France jet. Fear of the unknown is manipulating the thoughts and actions of many French people.

In France, racist slander or publicly provoking racist hate crimes can result in a $50,000 fine and one year in prison. Even insults based on race, ethnicity, nationality, or religion are punishable up to $25,000 and a six-month term.(35) Conferences on xenophobia and racism, like the one held in the Fall 1993 sponsored by UNESCO and held in Paris, are becoming more common.(36) With such laws and attempts at educating the public, why do obstacles still remain for Algerians and other foreigners? One of the main problems is that the French simply feel they are different, viewing themselves at a certain level that does not correspond with the non-European Algerians. This attitude is not held exclusively for Algerians. Americans too are not European, and thus cannot be considered on the same niveau. France, in order to move into the Twenty-First Century, must put aside her ideal that one must be born of "Ilja" to merit French membership. "Today, with de facto settlements of migrants, France has to adjust [its] policies to promote permanent integration of the newcomers."(37) This can be done by examining how public and social boundaries affect the Algerians.

But France is not primarily concerned with civil rights and civic rights. The main concern seems to be the economy, especially when it is bad, and it is jobs, when they can not be found: this is what creates the momentum to run out immigrants.

Economic Concerns

"Because Europe looked too much to the economic factor, today Europe has to define her identity and cultural frontiers in archaic terms, where culture too often stands for race or religion."(38)

Economic concerns were what launched the invasion of Algeria. It was what caused the withdrawal from Algeria. It was what invited the Algerians to work in France. And it is today what continues to complicate Algerians' lives. De Gaulle said, "L'Algerie bloque tout."(39) By this he meant that Algeria was a colony which had become an intolerable drain on French resources and which prevented de Gaulle from embarking on the politics of grandeur he had taken office to pursue. This is why he abandoned the war. This, however, is also why he did not abandon Algeria's resources. De Gaulle neglected the terrible drain that France itself had on Algerian resources, human and material. France did feel somewhat morally responsible for the weakening of Algeria by the seven years of war, and put "special" importance on cooperation(40) (including financial, technological, and even military aid) after putting down its arms. From the French perspective the program of cooperation existed in order to help the two countries maintain their relations. But, it is most likely the vital raw material of Saharan oil and atomic testing sites that made friendly relations so important. "The former colonies were not only seen as providers of vital raw material but also as important centers of the French language and the French culture."(41) So began the attitude toward the Algerians: France needed resources, responsibility they could do without.

In the 1960s, France enjoyed unprecedented economic growth, which was due to its entry into the Common Market, or European Economic Community, in 1957. This enabled France to gain control in certain industries such as agriculture. These industries became known as "the new France".(42) But in the following years, not all areas of France flourished. The south-west was considered as the old "static" France, and there soon arose a struggle between the old and the new. This clash needed a scapegoat and the arriving immigrants were perfectly positioned in the trouble spots.

"The inflow of immigrants provided Europe with what economists have sometimes called an 'unlimited supply of labor'."(43) Although Algerians had been hard workers and very beneficial to French society, France was more concerned with the threat they produced than the labor they provided. The effect of immigration on the economy of a host country remains one of the most contested points in the policy community, which fears that immigrants will seize employment opportunities, lower wages, and drain social services. (Annex III) The people, whose jobs they challenged, however, were the blue collar workers. This group of people had the highest illiteracy rate, and posed the worst threat to Algerians concerning racist attacks. The jobs the immigrants, and most Algerians, took were jobs the French would not have done for the wage given. "North Africans are over represented in the lowest paid, unskilled jobs."(44) Algerians have also been hurt in another not so obvious way. This form of crime against the Algerians has come from the highest levels of government. Reasons for racism toward immigrants stem from "the current economic forecasts, the socio-economic characteristics of incoming migrants (race, class, language, and religion), the influence that an immigrant community may wield over the national political system, and historical attitudes toward these foreigners."(45) Some economists have argued that in the long run the fear of a minority majority may be more important than purely economic ones in limiting immigration.

France's weaker franc, unemployment, and budget deficit have continued to provide the noose for immigrants who have won top billing in the category "scapegoats".(46) Social and religious differences that mobilize racism, combined with economic frustration, has created a no-win situation. Algerians need to turn somewhere, they need some hope from those who can make the changes, and they need honest answers.

Politics

The first political issue that caused and continues to cause problems is that between France and Algeria. Certain ideas and suspicions were formulated during colonialism and the seven years of war that have been hard to break. Consequently there are attitudes that weigh down current problems. Algeria is trying to cope with fundamentalism and a civil war. Algerian men are being killed, and Algerian women carry capsules of cyanide or grenades to escape the living horror of group rape. And, "France is deeply involved in [this] civil war between Islamic militants and Algeria."(47)

In France, politics is playing its usual games. Many issues have been stirred up with the arrival of the new French President Jacques Chirac (who in 1980 aroused Algerians by proclaiming that certain immigrant fathers are a burden on French society as polygamists who collect several tens of thousands of French Francs by way of the allocation familiales, France's social service). Among the issues currently being faced are nuclear testing, the Bosnia crisis and French hostages, economic concerns and unemployment, and the rise of the Front National.

Part of the reason that Algerians lack membership in French society can be blamed on French politics. "Almost two decades ago there were two kinds of policy with regard to immigration: policy of entry, and policy of integration. Policy on entry was dominated by a small, mostly non-political group of decision-makers in Paris. Policy on integration was a bit more complicated . . . but the process seemed to be focused at the local level."(48) From the late 1960s to the 1980s, official French public policy created two categories: French nationals (by definition citizens) and non-nationals (by definition non-citizens). However, local political arenas were actually formulating their policies toward groups. These groups were broadly based on racial/cultural/religious (generally, ethnic) criteria, regardless of citizenship. Immigrants from European countries were different from Third World countries, and continental white citizens different from non-white citizens from the overseas departments and territories; "Moslems from all origins were treated differently from non-Moslems."(49) This criteria was used for such things as housing, schooling, and places of worship. The most visible issue of immigration in national politics after 1974 that divided the Conservative government from the Left opposition was the question of limiting the immigration labor flow, and attempting to expel immigrant workers without valid papers. This changed during the 1980-81 campaign as a number of Communist Party candidates coordinated programs designed to pit the French people against black and Maghrebin immigrants. Immigration then became an issue of party politics, and the party system changed its portrayal to that of ethnic danger to the French nation.

For many reasons, including the Left coming to power in 1981, government became more centralized. With decisions being handed down from Paris vis-a-vis the local municipalities, policies were no longer as much of a local concern as a national one. Social issues were pushed in front of the public eye like never before, via politicians and television. Contemporary politicians make themselves aware of their audience, and turn localized social issues into national political concerns in order to change the "decision making structure" to their favor.(50)

By the late 1980s, immigration was widely debated, and had become a major issue in electoral politics. It dominated the attention of both the public and political leaders. . . . The issue has been defined and shaped by the dynamics of national party politics. The interdependence of political and administrative actors at the local level tended to encourage agreement and minimize conflict. . . however, at the national level, the party system tended to accentuate the differences among actors, all of whom were seeking to increase or maintain their own support by using immigration as a weapon.(51)

The process of bringing immigration into the national arena mobilized a large audience that normally would not have had access to the arena of origin (the towns that had immigrant concerns). These conditions set the stage for the emergence of the Front National, which portrayed the concerns of at least some of the members of this larger audience by depicting immigration broadly in terms of national identity.

The Front National (FN) led by Jean-Marie Le Pen, a racist who was once fined for declaring that the gas chambers of World War II were an unimportant aspect of the war, rose in part out of this new immigrant fear fed to the French by politicians. The party was created in 1972, but did not attract national recognition until 1984 when the proportion of voters strongly attached to any political party declined. Originally the party was anti-Communist, but just before the 1980-81 elections it changed its agenda and stressed immigration. What the party has emphasized most in its propaganda has been the question of French identity, and the dangers of cultural and racial differences for the future of France. By adopting this platform, the FN has gained momentum and followers. By expanding the political debate of immigrant integration to broader questions of French national identity, the FN has forced other political parties to change their agendas, address these issues, and even place them as a top priority. By the presidential elections in the spring of 1995, 20% of the vote in some regions of France voted for Le Pen, who finished third

In June of the same year, the FN won unprecedented victories in municipal elections in three large towns (Toulon-170,000, Marignane-33,000, and Orange-28,000), and Nice, with a population of 346,000, fell to a former FN militant.(52) Other big towns in the south-east and south escaped coming under the control of the fanatical party only because of local pacts between the Socialists and the moderate Right. But in these towns the Front still won over a third of the final vote. In a 1 July survey of 1000 people, 26% agreed with Le Pen's ideas compared to only 19% in January 1994. The percent of people for which the FN "represents a danger for democracy" has diminished 5 points in comparison to 1994 (68%, compared to 73%).(53) "The Front National has already said it will use its powers, where it can, to practice what it calls 'national preference'. In other words, foreigners and naturalized immigrants will go to the end of the line for jobs, subsidized housing, social security, and so on."(54) The FN won because of strategy, emphasizing areas where rates of immigration and unemployment were high. Le Pen convinced many French that immigrants were the cause of high unemployment with such slogans as: "France for the French", "1.5 million unemployed = 1.5 million immigrants", and "Immigration = unemployment".(55) Even though the fact is that between 1982 and 1990 the number of Maghrebin in France increased from 1.367 million to 1.412 million, just 3.2% in 8 years.(56)

In August of 1995, Le Pen opened a summer school called, the Front National de la Jeunesse (FN for Youth).(57) It is located in Neuvy-sur-Barangeon and the school's goal is to teach young French the "value" of national preference. President Jacques Chirac responded to the FN concern by saying the country was "in a state of emergency".(58) He promised to introduce speedy and radical change, which could be hindered by the uncertainty and insecurity caused by problems of corruption and division in parties. Only time will tell what changes Chirac can offer to protect Algerians and deter the FN. Previous policies were tried and many failed, for example in the 1980s France attempted to introduce an integration policy to lessen the school failure rate and proposed "looking for a new solution based on cultural identity."(59) This sounds like a contradiction to their solidarity policy, but France went ahead and introduced partial education to immigrants in their own language; this policy thus secluded the Arab immigrant children from the French children. The response was one of anger, for Algerians felt that France was separating them instead of including them. They, as well as other foreigners, wanted to be seen as members of French society. How could they be seen as such when they were not being given the proper tools, or even the option of trying to utilize those means to achieve true citizenship? The immigrants needed to learn the French language and their children needed to go to school with French children to learn the culture.

Not only was school policy causing problems, but housing policy as well created more problems than solutions. Housing projects isolated Algerians from French society, thus allowing the French to view them as separate unlike immigrants not placed into these ghettos. This isolation, initially proposed by politicians as a means to control the large numbers of immigrant families "pouring" into France, eventually was furthered by the immigrants themselves because they simply had no other option. Although some Algerians were successful in integrating, others remained outsiders to the French community. One key issue for the French people is politics. This has played a large role in creating the sensitivity to the problems Le Pen has aroused. As immigration came into the spotlight in the 1980s, and particularly Maghrebin immigration, there was no need to push the French people very hard - for their precious, pure politics had been penetrated by a foreign element. It is easy today to persuade the French people that their country is in social chaos because of these intruders. And years after these issues were first raised, we see today Arab political parties nudging into the French political arena, and the French are fearing for their identity.

"The Beurs, or French-born Arabs, are coming out of the political shadows at last."(60) Currently a few immigrants have helped create a momentum for change, and now face the long, laborious task of breaking public misconceptions. In March of 1989, 572 Beurs sought seats on municipal councils, and approximately 390 were victorious.(61) A present day leader in the Arab struggle is Areski Dahmani, who heads France-Plus an organization whose priorities are to get young French Arabs to vote and to put Beurs in office. Dahmani is a believer in assimilation. His aim was to persuade more of France's 2.5 million Arab citizens to register to vote (approximately a half million did so by 1985), and to persuade politicians to find a place for them on their municipal lists. "For the Beurs, the path to integration is still full of obstacles . . . many candidates [meet] with harassment from racist opponents." Politics is the avenue for Algerians and other immigrants to claim their membership in French society, and the means to unite them in a common cause. "Through France-Plus and groups like it, young French Arabs seem to be facing the challenge from Mr. Le Pen's National Front".(62) Mr. Dahmani is a modern day Abd al-Qadir, as positions in public office could be the push needed to motivate Algerians to get involved, be heard, and stand up for their rights as members of French society.

The French have the necessary motivations to work toward a better relationship with Algerians living in France in that Algerians comprise one-fifth of France's foreign population. But France turned once again toward solutions of bribery as they had before in 1977, when in 1984 the government expanded its policy to reintegrate foreign workers into their countries of origin.(63) To expedite this new policy, France offered FF90,000 to 130, 000 ($10, 000 to $15,000) to those who would leave indefinitely; and from 1984-1986 the offer induced 5,000 workers to return home. In 1987 they tried again with the Documentation Francaise.(64)

France is a multi-ethnic society, and irreversibly so. With rising fears of dilution of their national identity, and a self-identity crisis, France is trying to purge itself of its foreign element. Fear has played a large part in this crisis. In December 1994 France was shocked by the high-jacking of an Air France flight by Islamic militants who blamed France for backing the Algerian government.(65) "Although most of France's 4m-5m Muslims remain studiously moderate, even docile, the French authorities are convinced that fundamentalists wield influence over a small but growing minority."(66) The goal of the French government - root fundamentalism out of every nook and cranny in France. Former Minister of the Interior Charles Pasqua declared, "Terrorize the terrorists!"(67) Paris' suburbs are continually raided, and on the French news one can see Arab fundamentalists being arrested by the French police.

In July 1995 an Imam, Sheikh Abdelbaki Sahroui, was assassinated in Paris. He was an outspoken opponent of the FIS (Front Islamique du Salut), and his followers and friends blamed Algerian terrorists for the crime. Dr. Dalil Boubakeur, rector of the Mosque of Paris, said, "This is part of the violent, vengeful, and repressive attitude abundant in Algeria".(68) So, the problem Algerians have in gaining membership in France is not simply one of internal politics, but external crises, tensions and relations as well.

CONCLUSION

By looking at the social, religious, and economic factors we have been able to peer into the life of Algerians living in France. We have seen confrontation, and very little tolerance. We have witnessed racism, and the shame it produces in France. Neither party is fully innocent or completely guilty, thus each community, French and Arab, needs to take on the responsibility of living together harmoniously. Perhaps France needs to publicly acknowledge the positive influences Algerians have had on the lives of the French.

Today the fear of fundamentalism is wide-spread because of attacks in the late 80s and the hijacking of an Air France plane in December 1994, and consequently, "fundamentalist" has become a label put on all Arabs. The French media is guilty of showing Arabs as a threat, and producing paranoia. These factors contribute to the common exclusion of Arabs and specifically of Algerians. France had taken advantage of Algeria, and now it should accept the responsibility of helping Algerians who have migrated to their patriarchal land. France can no longer attempt to ignore or try to suppress the impact that Algerian immigration has had on French society.

Before the Algerian war, Algerians oscillated between a fascination for the tools of modernization that France offered, and a rejection of the deculturalization that came with the French presence.(69) Now part of the attraction to France for Algerians are their historical and family ties, but they continue to reject deculturalization. The French-Algerian relationship can be defined by the term "cultural crisis". Each is experiencing its own turning point. Algerians see their economic, political and social situation is in shambles because of the ripping apart of their homeland by fundamentalists, and France faces its own political situation fed by Chirac, as well as the feeling that it is being disfigured by immigrants, fed by Le Pen.

Algerians need to gain a uniting spirit in order to claim the rights and the equality that is justly theirs. The best avenue is via such groups as France-Plus or other organized Algerian social groups. The French have built up many barriers between the immigrants in their slums and opportunity for prosperity as a member of French society. "French policy focuses on majority-group behavior and responsibility", but France needs to turn to the minority, the Algerians, because of the responsibility the French have to them, as well as to the explosive situation in their homeland and the unhappy FIS.

In Algeria today civil war has caused chaos. Because of tensions in their home-country, Algerians are seen by the French as potential time-bombs ready to explode at any minute. France feels it is in a difficult position and fear is guiding its moves. But most Algerians in France are more concerned about their French domestic problems. France must stop taking the perspective of them against us. It is also time for the French-Algerians to stand up for themselves and take on the struggle of gaining French membership, instead of waiting for the label to befall them from the mouths of the French. Change needs to begin somewhere. But for positive movement in every dimension of the social, economic, and political spheres both France and Algerians must realize their own responsibilities toward their relationship. Action must be taken to stop the momentum of fear that moves everyone apart, and begin focusing on the desire for a strengthened, united France; with French membership for all its parts as the means for this goal, so that all of France can regard itself as one Nation. Unfortunately, cultural barriers are not easily removed. However, the French and Algerians must stop focusing on tearing down the other's ways of life, and instead build on each others commonalties. It takes real courage to deny what you were brought up to believe, your culture and even yourself, and stand in the other's shoes; to let down the barriers, and try to understand one another for the good of the whole.

ANNEX I

Which characterizations best relate to Islam?

Peace/19% v. Violence/60%

Progress/12% v. Decline/66%

Protection of women/12% v. Suppression of women/76%

Tolerance/15% v. Fanatic behavior/71%

SOURCE: Image des arabes. Sondage sur l'Islam en France. Le Monde. 30 November 1989

ANNEX II

For or against or don't know, building mosques in France when Muslim believers request them?

For 33%

Against 41%

Don't know 26%

SOURCE: Image des Arabes. Sondage sur l'Islam en France. Le Monde. 30 November 1989

ANNEX III

To fight unemployment, what are the two solutions that seem the most efficient?

Send back immigrants 44%

Create jobs in public sector 40%

Reduce work hours and salary 33%

Increase purchasing power 24%

Decrease social taxes of companies 14%

SOURCE: La France et le monde arabe. Nouschi, Andre. Sondage SOFRES/1979

NOTES

1. Larousse

2. Ibid.

3. Schain

4. Zebrini

5. Ibid.

6. Grimaud

7. Ibid.

8. Evans

9. Grimaud

10. Kastoryano

11. Hein

12. Bistolfi

13. "The French Fear"

14. Nouschi

15. Special envoye, "Le nombre de visas..."

16. Ibid.

17. Peretz

18. McMillan

19. Kastoryano

20. Grimaud

21. Ibid.

22. "Jam for the Beurs"

23. "Behind the Yashmak"

24. "Jam for the Beurs"

25. Kastoryano

26. Larousse

27. Ibid.

28. Nouschi

29. Hein

30. "Behind the Yashmak"

31. Ibid.

32. Hein

33. "Deja vu"

34. Evans

35. Hein

36. Peretz

37. Kastoryano

38. Henri

39. McMillan

40. Grimaud

41. Zebini

42. McMillan

43. Kastoryano

44. Hein

45. Bistolfi

46. "Defending the Franc"

47. Riding, "France ensnared..."

48. Schain

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. "Clean Dirt"

53. Chombeau

54. "Clean Dirt"

55. Nouschi

56. Ibid.

57. Chombeau

58. "Clean Dirt"

59. Kastoryano

60. "A New Force"

61. Ibid.

62. "Jam for Beaurs"

63. Nouschi

64. Grimaud

65. Riding, "Paris's Defeat..."

66. "Fundamentally confused..."

67. Nouschi

68. Lamine

69. Henri

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Letitia Creamean is a December 1995 graduate of Illinois State University. She received her degree in political science with an emphasis in international relations. Ms. Creamean conducted the research for this article while an intern at the European Parliament. 25. Kastoryano