William Henry Seward, the Virginia controversy, and the anti-slavery movement, 1839-1841.

In the summer of 1839 Isaac Gansey, Peter Johnson, and Edward Smith, three African-American sailors from New York who worked aboard the schooner Robert Center, found themselves at the center of a dispute that reflected the growing controversy over the institution of slavery that would spark the Civil War some two decades hence. The incident began innocently enough when the ship arrived in Virginia in need of some repairs before continuing on to New York City. A ship's carpenter, a slave by the name of Isaac, was brought on board to do the work. As Isaac undertook his tasks, he spoke with Gansey, Johnson and Smith, who were the only three African-Americans sailors on the ship. In the course of their discussions, one of the three told Isaac that he was "foolish to remain in Virginia as he could get good wages in the north." (1)

After the Robert Center departed, Isaac was nowhere to be found and his owner John G. Colley suspected that his slave was on board the ship. Colley therefore sent two men north by express, hoping to beat the schooner to New York. They succeeded and when the Robert Center arrived, a search of the ship revealed that Isaac was hiding in the cargo of oak timber. The slave was sent back to his master. Colley also insisted that the African-American sailors be arrested and extradited, back to Virginia for having stolen the slave. The Lieutenant Governor of Virginia, Henry L. Hopkins, complied with Colley's request to ask for extradition. The request for extradition subsequently made its way into the hands of New York's new Whig governor, William Henry Seward. Ultimately, Seward's refusal to cooperate in the matter touched off a "Virginia Controversy" that would not only run through the duration of his two terms as governor, but eventually allowed Seward to establish himself as one of the leading opponents of the peculiar institution.

Seward's early relationship with the anti-slavery movement, however, was much more tense and uncertain than his later career in the United States Senate and as Secretary of State under President Abraham Lincoln would suggest. To be sure, neither Seward nor his political mentor and friend Thurlow Weed, the editor of the Albany Evening Journal, supported slavery, but during the uncertain political climate of the 1830s they had to calculate carefully the impact on their political prospects of too-close an association with abolition. Initially the two had been drawn into the anti-Masonic movement as a vehicle to challenge the dominance of Andrew Jackson's Democratic party. Seward enjoyed some success in this regard with his 1830 election to the New York State Senate, but four years later he was soundly defeated in the gubernatorial contest by the incumbent, William L. Marcy. With the anti-Masonic party wilting, "like a cabbage leaf in a warm summer day" (2) Seward and Weed opted to join the new Whig party. Similarly at this time, those opposed to slavery as well as those who viewed foreigners (especially Catholics) as a threat, also organized politically in the state; the fact that many Whigs also harbored abolitionist or nativist sentiments would continue to vex Seward during his four years as governor.

Seward's problems with the abolitionists first surfaced shortly after he received the Whig gubernatorial nomination in September of 1838. Although estimates of the voting strength of the anti-slavery movement varied considerably, most observers assumed that the lion's share of abolitionists--perhaps as many as 90% of them--normally considered themselves to be Whig and that the loss of their support could well doom Seward's second effort to defeat Marcy. (3) At the same time, however, many viewed abolition as a radical fringe movement, and a close association with it could well be more damaging than helpful. For Seward then, prudence dictated caution, which in practice meant a largely passive stance on the issue in the expectation that the Democratic Party's association with the slave-holding South would naturally incline abolitionists to vote Whig.

Unfortunately for Seward, Gerrit Smith, a wealthy and influential leader of New York's Abolitionists, was determined to force politicians to declare steadfastly their sympathies with regard to slavery. He made this manifest in September when several Whig leaders traveled to Utica to discuss politics with him shortly after the Whig convention. As Seward's friend Samuel Lyman confessed to the nominee after speaking to Smith, his principal

    anxiety is about the other ticket so far as the question of
    abolition is concerned. If we split on that the trouble will extend
    throughout the state [but] if we agree on that there will be no
    trouble anywhere ....
      It is in the power of Gerrit Smith to set this matter right or
    prevent difficulty throughout the state by talking with his friends
    here in the right way ... and a strong appeal will be made to him to
    interfere & prevent further disunion. (4)

Unfortunately for the Whigs, the abolitionist leader was not swayed and Lyman was forced to admit "Smith in his speeches takes strong ground. No man seems more obstinately determined to make their [sic] peculiar notions prevail than himself." (5) Instead of preventing difficulty, Smith and the abolitionists made it a certainty by deciding to pose three questions to the gubernatorial candidates: specifically, should the state of New York allow jury trials for fugitive slaves, permit free blacks the right to vote, and repeal the law that permitted nine months of slaveholding in the state? In a private letter to Seward, Smith wrote that he hoped that his answers "may be such as will gratify, abundantly gratify, the friends of impartial & universal liberty." He added idealistically that

    an elevated & decided ground taken by you at this crisis in behalf
    of human rights will endear you with the wise and good of all lands,
    and will under the defeat which may be consequent upon it, be
    infinitely more honorable that the success which is purchased by the
    betrayal of the cause of freedom & righteousness. (6)

The Whig candidate for Lieutenant Governor, Luther Bradish, without consulting Whig leaders responded affirmatively to each question. This put Seward in an awkward and potentially dangerous situation: if he mimicked Bradish, the Whigs would be strongly tinged with abolitionism, and if he did not, he would appear to be less opposed to slavery than his running mate. Seward sought advice on how to proceed, and a number of Whigs feared that his association with abolition would be fraught with peril. In particular, influential New York City Whigs, such as James Watson Webb, the editor of the Whig Courier and Enquirer, were bitter foes of the Abolitionist movement and Webb advised Seward that the abolitionists were "cunning and full of mischief." (7) Seward, caught between abolitionists and anti-abolitionists, attempted to find a compromise position on Smith's questions and he decided to answer positively only for jury trials for fugitive slaves as Webb suggested. (8)

Unfortunately for Seward, this was unacceptable to Smith and the abolitionists. They quickly published an extra edition of their newspaper, the Emancipator, just days before the November election. In it, Arthur Tappan, the chairman of the Executive Committee of the American Anti-Slavery Society, praised only Bradish, noting that the committee had unanimously adopted a resolution stating he was entitled "to the cordial support of abolitionists at the approaching election." Tappan was highly critical of Seward's answers because the Whig gubernatorial candidate

    shuffles, throws dust, strains reasons, and at last comes out in the
    NEGATIVE on two! The answer, as every careful examiner will see, is
    an effort to blind the abolitionists and do the work and get the
    favor of the slaveholders ... Every man who now votes for Seward
    plays into the hands of the mobocrats [sic] and their principles the
    slaveholders; swallows the bait they throw--and what will he gain?--
    The hook. (9)

Tappan also alleged that Seward's response had been concocted "'by and with the advice and consent' of certain political leaders in WALL ST., in this city, who are in fact the vice-gerents of the slaveholder ... the game of COL. WEBB and his pro-slavery allies is, to prevent the abolitionists from teaching the politicians a salutary lesson." (10) In an attempt to counter this blow, Weed did his best to drum up support for Seward from sympathetic New York City abolitionists. In spite of this effort, on the eve of the election, a discouraged Seward wrote to him to say "My mind is made up that the State is lost to us.... I am satisfied that the Abolition question defeats us." (11)

Fortunately for Seward, his pessimism was off the mark and he carried the state by some 10,000 votes. In retrospect it was clear that he had exaggerated the strength of the abolitionists and it was likely that the New York electorate, which had suffered greatly from the Panic of 1837, was looking for a political change to improve the economic climate of the state. But Seward and Weed had to recognize that abolitionism was unlikely to fade and could certainly pose a problem for the gubernatorial race in 1840: but how could they mend fences with the anti-slavery faction without being stigmatized as abolitionists?

The Albany Whigs responded on a number of different fronts. For his part, Weed embraced in the Journal positions that could only rankle the South, if not win over abolitionists completely. This was certainly the case concerning the Gag Rule tabling anti-slavery petitions that Democratic majorities in Congress had passed and President Van Buren had signed into law. On numerous occasions, Weed castigated the Democrats for:

    This gross violation of duty and patriotism--this monstrous stretch
    of Power--this bold invasion of the Rights of Man, has excited the
    apprehensions, startled the fears and aroused the indignation of the
    People! Members of Congress were not sent to Washington thus to
    spurn the Petitions of their constituents. These "sons of Levi" are
    taking too much upon themselves. Their daring attempt to trammel up
    the Right of Petition will be rebuked and resisted. (12)

In a similar vein, Weed championed the cause of the slaves of the Amistad. He argued that while the United States did recognize the right to hold slaves as property, "this recognition does not extend to Negroes stolen from Africa .... in violation of our Laws and of the Laws of most civilized Nations." (13) He admitted that he could accept the notion of slaves as property only in so as far as it was protected by law or guaranteed by the Constitution; he would go no further and asked, "if these men were unlawfully deprived of their liberty, was it not lawful for them to emancipate themselves?" (14) With Weed engaging pro-slavery Democrats in the Journal, Seward was presented an opportunity to burnish his own standing with the anti-slavery movement through his response to the plight of Gansey, Johnson and Smith.

On 30 September 1839, Seward rejected Governor Hopkins' request that the three sailors be turned over to Virginia authorities, citing the fact that the affidavit presented did not indicate the place, county, or even the state where the alleged felony took place. Had Seward stopped there, with what even he admitted might be considered merely "technical or captious" reasons, this episode would have been unremarkable, and an amended affidavit might conceivably have led to the approval of Hopkins' request. Seward, however, continued on to justify his decision further by allowing that even if the affidavit were sufficient

    in form and substance to charge the defendants with the crime of
    stealing a negro-slave from his master in the state of Virginia, as
    defined by the laws of that state, yet in my opinion the offence is
    not within the meaning of the constitution of the United
    States. (15)

He went on to explain that while the Constitution provided for the extradition of those accused of committing "treason, felony, or other crimes," in his opinion this only applied in cases where the act committed was considered a crime in the state in which the accused was found. Such obviously was not the case in the Empire State:

    I need not inform you, sir, that there is no law of this state which
    recognizes slavery, no statute which admits that one man can be the
    property of another, or that one man can be stolen from another. On
    the other hand, our constitution and laws interdict slavery in every
    form. The act charged in the affidavit, if it had been committed in
    this state, would not have contravened any statute, nor is it
    necessary to inform you that the common law, which is in force in
    this state when not abrogated by statute, does not recognize
    slavery, nor make the act of which the parties are accused in this
    case felonious or criminal. (16)

Needless to say, Seward's position provoked considerable controversy in the South and occasioned a lengthy rebuttal from the governor of Virginia. Hopkins, who wrote that he did "not mean to be drawn into a discussion of the abstract right of slavery,"--an issue he assured Seward "is not with the people of Virginia a debatable [emphasis in original] question"--marshaled extensive passages from Vattel's The Law of Nations as well as the writings of Chancellor Kent with regard to the extradition issue to buttress his demand that the alleged fugitives be returned. Undeterred, Seward rebuffed Hopkins yet again, making use of the works of the same authorities, supplemented by those of Grotius as well. (17) In so doing, he took much the same position vis-a-vis the institution of slavery that Weed had taken the previous month in the Amistad case:

    I must insist, with perfect respect, that the general principle of
    civilized communities is in harmony with that which prevails in this
    state, that men are not the subjects of property, and of course that
    no such crime can exist in countries where that principle prevails
    as the felonious stealing of a human being considered as property. I
    do not intend here to draw in question the wisdom or the virtue of
    those states which establish an opposite principle. (18)

Thus Seward and Weed indicated a willingness to challenge what could certainly be considered aggressive extensions of slavery, without challenging the peculiar institution itself, as abolitionists were wont to do.

The question remained, however, would these initiatives be sufficient to win over the abolitionists? Certainly some of Seward's correspondents hoped that this would be the case. For example, in January 1840 Ephraim Goss of Rochester suggested that the Governor send copies of his recently delivered Annual Message to the legislature--in which Seward had recounted his position on the controversy with Virginia (19)--to a number of abolitionists that he listed because they would "take it a great form to be noticed by the Governor and ... would be benefited by reading your correspondence with the Governor of Virginia." Goss felt that such a step was needed because "Gerrit Smith has been here recently talking politics. You will therefore see the necessity of the last request." (20)

Indeed, the activities of Gerrit Smith and some abolitionists suggested that they had not yet concluded that the Whig party of Seward and Weed was worthy of support. Most importantly, and of more than a little embarrassment to the Governor was the fact that although the state elections in November 1839 had gone well, the Democrats had managed to win two of the three State Assembly seats from his home county of Cayuga; this had occurred because on the eve of the contest, local abolitionists had split the Whig vote by putting forward their own slate of candidates. Christopher Morgan, Seward's friend and also a Whig member of the House of Representatives, wrote:

      There is no difficulty in accounting for our defeat. The
    abolitionists have withdrawn votes enough from the Whigs to defeat
    us. They have caused some Whigs to vote against us & have rendered
    many indifferent & they stayed at home. (21)

Additionally the abolitionists had also cross-nominated one of the Whig candidates, which "identified us in some degree, with the abolitionists & from this cause alone we lost votes enough to ensure our defeat." (22) Another resident of Cayuga County, William C. Beardsley, agreed with this interpretation of the election, and in a letter to Seward's secretary Samuel Blatchford, he angrily suggested:

    Our county was Whig & would have been Whig now if that damdest of
    all curses (political abolitionism), had not raised its satanic head
    among us--we did all that could be done to nullify it--we pocketed
    our consciences & allowed ourselves to be trodden in to the very
    earth for the success of our cause. But alas poor Yorick!... We
    lost entire [emphasis in original] votes in abundance by the cry of
    Nigger [emphasis in original]. (23)

While Seward in his reply to Morgan promised that he would "bring Cayuga out about right," (24) he had more to worry about than merely an independent abolition party: in the first weeks of 1840, rumors circulated that Gerrit Smith might enter into a political alliance with New York Democrats. Although Weed doubted that the party of President Martin Van Buren could "ride the slavery and anti-slavery horses," (25) just such a combination was apparently considered. The focus of this intrigue was the legislature's election to fill the seat in the United States Senate held by Nathaniel P. Tallmadge. The senator, an erstwhile Democrat, had broken with his party over Van Buren's banking policies, and he and other "conservatives" had supported Seward's election in 1838. A grateful Weed subsequently orchestrated an effort to have Senator Tallmadge re-elected as a Whig, much to the distress and disappointment of leading Whigs such as Millard Fillmore and Francis Granger. During the 1839 session, however, the betrayed Democrats were able to prevent the turncoat's success and no candidate received the necessary number of votes to be elected. The minority Democrats, anticipating a renewed effort by the Whigs to re-elect Tallmadge, apparently approached Gerrit Smith early in 1840 with the offer of their unanimous support in the election for senator if he could persuade enough Whig members with abolitionist tendencies to vote for him to thereby secure victory. The effort, however, failed as the Whigs remained true to their party and Tallmadge was re-elected. (26) Still this episode demonstrated that Smith at best remained aloof from Seward and in the worst case, was working to undermine the prospects of the Whig Party in New York State.

With that said, however, Seward was nevertheless confident of success as the 1840 elections approached. He could take credit for the state's improved economic prospects and the Legislature had approved substantial expenditures for the Erie Canal and rail net that were consistent with the party's advocacy of internal improvements. In February Seward wrote Tallmadge to say that there was no Whig in the state "who doubts our success by 20,000" votes, which would double his victory margin of two years before. (27) Weed was equally confident, writing on the eve of the election "our accounts continue to be good from all sources ... We have the most flattering assurances from Greene, Columbia, Delaware, Otsego, and Oneida" counties. (28) To be sure, there had been some problems during Seward's first term: his initiative to reduce legal fees had annoyed some lawyers and his advocacy of the use of public money to support Catholic parochial schools had aggravated nativists, particularly in New York City. The potential for serious harm, however, seemed remote; an attempt by some lawyers to deny Seward the nomination had failed and any defections by those hostile to foreigners might be more than offset by the votes of appreciative Catholics. There was even some evidence indicating that the anti-slavery initiatives had paid dividends. Henry Brewster Stanton wrote in February to say that he had read "with great pleasure" Weed's recent article on the right of petition and the Gag Rule and opined:

    If the Whig party in this state will stand by that article, in
    theory and in practice, they will easily maintain their
    ascendancy.... I honor the course Gov. Seward took in the
    correspondence with Lt. Gov. Hopkins. It will give him a strong hold
    upon the Abolitionists of this state. (29)

That same day Stanton wrote to Seward as well, praising the governor's stance on the plight of Gansey, Johnson, and Smith as "honorable to your head & heart." More important to Seward, no doubt, was Stanton's promise to publish the Virginia correspondence in a forthcoming edition of the Emancipator. (30) While these signs augured well, there was one sour note: Gerrit Smith himself remained aloof and chose to run against Seward in the gubernatorial contest. (31)

In addition to local politics, however, Seward and Weed also had to consider the impact that abolitionism, and their relationship to it, would have on the Whig party's prospects for the 1840 presidential election. In this regard, Henry Clay, a southern Whig and slaveholder, actively pursued the nomination, which opponents of slavery diligently opposed. Clay, who Fillmore reported, was attempting to make "everyone believe that Abolitionism is dead, and that he is the only man who can succeed" (32) against Van Buren, went so far as to tell Seward that "many Abolitionists had come to him confessing their Abolitionism but declaring their preference for and devotion to him." (33) The Albany Whigs, however, remained unconvinced; they feared a Clay candidacy would harm the party with anti-slavery voters and so they supported Winfield Scott's candidacy instead. The issue, however, remained a delicate one and prescient northern Whigs such as Edward Curtis reflected this in a letter to Weed offering advice regarding the Whig's convention in Harrisburg:

    Have we any delegate who can speak well [emphasis in original] for
    New York, & who will have sense enough not to awaken the passions of
    the South, by putting the principal objection to Mr. Clay on the
    ground of the reluctance of the abolitionists [emphasis in original]
    to sustain him? God knows there are other difficulties enough & that
    that need not be touched--that [emphasis in original] objective
    openly urged in the presence of Southern delegates will fix their
    adherence [emphasis in original] to Clay, & prevent [emphasis in
    original] any good will to Scott--I pray you to remember this in the
    counsels you give to our friends who are to perform inside of the
    convention. (34)

While Curtis' advice applied only to the issue of the nomination--won, of course, by William Henry Harrison--it certainly suggested a potential problem for Seward: would his festering and celebrated dispute with Richmond authorities over Gansey, Johnson and Smith cast Seward's Whigs as abolitionist, and thus cost the party Virginia's critical 23 electoral votes in what could be a close election in 1840? (35)

In this regard, Richmond politicians continued to denounce Seward in no uncertain terms; for its part, the Virginia Legislature had criticized Seward's explanation for refusing to surrender the sailors as not only "wholly unsatisfactory" but a "palpable and dangerous violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States." (36) In addition that body voted to coordinate its subsequent efforts against New York with the other slaveholding states and also requested that Seward refer the matter to the New York Legislature for review as well. There, the Whig majority in the Assembly referred the matter to its Judiciary Committee that concurred with the views Seward expressed; it also commended the Governor for the "distinguished ability" he had demonstrated in making them. (37)

No doubt pleased with the work of the Assembly, Seward also contemplated another response to Richmond. While a fresh rejection of Virginia's request was expected, the more pressing matter concerned the timing of its delivery: should it come before, or after, the general election in November? This issue was apparently discussed not just in Albany, but with other national Whig leaders. In September, Willis Clark wrote to Seward from Philadelphia to ask "when are "we" [emphasis in original] to have ... the Virginia letter" which he promised to publish. (38) Seward also solicited input from Daniel Webster in August saying "I should deem it a great favor to have your advice on the subject and any suggestions you may think proper to make concerning the manner in which it is discussed." (39) Some five weeks passed before "Black Dan" composed his reply:

    I owe you an apology for not having answered your communication
    received some weeks ago, but truly it has been impossible. My
    general health has not been good ... I hope you will suffer no
    inconvenience from permitting the papers to remain some time longer
    in my hands, the more especially as I am quite convinced that,
    taking a view of all circumstances, some longer delay is true
    policy. (40)

Seward apparently took the advice to heart. His lengthy letter, which covered much the same ground as his efforts of the previous year, was not sent until after Harrison's victory over Van Buren. (41)

Tempering, however, the impact of the national success of the party was the fact that Seward's political stock had fallen considerably. Some of Seward's initiatives had apparently alienated more voters than anticipated, and instead of increasing his victory margin, it was reduced by half when compared to 1838, which meant he had run substantially behind Harrison with the New York electorate. While much of the erosion was ascribed to the defection of Whigs with nativist inclinations, Gerrit Smith's independent candidacy certainly had not helped. What was even worse was the renewed prospect of an alliance against the Whigs by the Democrats and abolitionists; George Washington Patterson wrote to Seward soon after the election warning that "the plan now is to bring [Gerrit] Smith up as the next candidate for Governor, on the Loco [Democratic] ticket." (42)

Ironically, Virginia's elected officials offered Seward an opportunity not only to counter this threat by burnishing his anti-slavery credentials, but to in fact emerge at last as a leader of that movement. Incensed by Seward's intransigence and his refusal to turn over the sailors of the Robert Center, Virginia now undertook a number of retaliatory actions. First of all, the governor offered a reward for the seizure and return of Johnson, Smith, and Gansey, which, if it occurred, would violate the laws of New York. Second, Virginia passed a law that imposed what Seward termed as "invidious restrictions and onerous impositions" upon New Yorkers engaged in commerce with that state in an effort to pressure him to reverse his course of action on this matter. Finally, Virginia for a time had refused to extradite back to New York one Robert F. Curry, an alleged forger, until Johnson, Smith and Gansey were similarly extradited back to Virginia. Although Virginia's Governor John Patton ultimately relented to the extradition of Curry, in so doing he suggested that Seward treat the case of the 3 sailors as "altogether analogous" and he urged that they be sent south. (43)

Seward chose in the Spring of 1841 to reject defiantly the analogy in a way that could only win the approval of all foes of slavery. After recounting the origins of dispute to date, he acknowledge the differing positions regarding the peculiar institution, noting that in Virginia the opinion prevailed

    that men of a certain race and condition may be, and are, property
    and chattels, the subjects of purchase, sale, devise, and theft. The
    executive of his state, on the contrary, would have been faithless
    to the spirit of its constitution and laws, if he had not maintained
    that all men, of whatever race or condition, were men, and of right
    ought to be freemen; that every remedy for duress of a human
    being ... regarded him as a man, and not property, and that it was
    as absurd in this state to speak of property in immortal beings, and
    consequently of stealing them, as it would be to discourse of a
    division of property in the common atmosphere. (44)

Seward concluded his letter declaring that

    the experience of the people of this state has proved, at least to
    their own satisfaction, that neither public virtue not public
    prosperity has received any injury from extending, so far as has yet
    been done, equal justice to every class and every race of men within
    her limits. (45)

With this communication, Seward at last won the plaudits and support of leading abolitionists. Lewis Tappan, whose Emancipator had condemned Seward's response to the abolitionists' three questions before the 1838 gubernatorial election, wrote to say that he had read Seward's recent letter and had

    perused it with great satisfaction. Allow me to say, the sentiments
    do you honor as a magistrate and a man, & will gain the affection &
    confidence of a large number of your constituents who have not been
    regarded as particularly favorable to your administration. (46)

Former President John Quincy Adams was impressed as well and he had "no doubt that Governor Seward was perfectly right in his positions." (47)

Seward's weakened political position in New York most likely accounted for this bold statement; he and Weed no doubt calculated that at this juncture the support of the abolitionists would outweigh any defections that it might provoke. The confidence and support of the antislavery faction was not, however, substantial enough, to save his gubernatorial career; his rift with the nativists continued to widen, and with Catholic electoral support yet ephemeral, Seward decided in June of 1841 that he would not seek a third term. Even though he was returning to private life, abolitionists considered him virtually one of their own, and they unsuccessfully urged him to run for Congress in 1842. Similarly, his old nemesis, Gerrit Smith, told him that James Birney would step aside if Seward would accept the Liberty Party's presidential nomination in 1844, and four years later Salmon P. Chase of Ohio suggested that Seward should be their candidate in 1848. (48)

What, then, does this episode reveal concerning the early career of William Henry Seward? Should he be remembered merely as a cynical politician who trolled for the votes of abolitionists by manipulating the controversy with Virginia in a vain attempt to extend his gubernatorial career? The record does not support this view. It is critical to recall that Seward rejected the initial petition from Virginia in the autumn of 1839--arguably at a time when his political stock as a state, and even national, leader was still on the rise; he subsequently maintained this stance in spite of the advice from some political friends to divorce himself from abolitionism. To be sure, Seward's grounds for rebuffing Virginia evolved substantially--from those that were primarily technical and legal concerning the alleged crime and extradition, to a more forthright stance condemning the institution of slavery. The fact, however, that the rhetoric of the debate changed and that this might have aided Seward politically, should not obscure the fact that he remained steadfast throughout on the issue in question.

The ultimate fate of Isaac Gansey, Peter Johnson and Edward Smith is lost to history. We do know, however, that they were not returned to Virginia to face punishment for whatever role they played in the attempted flight by the slave Isaac. While these three sailors could thank William Seward for their freedom, the Governor had ample reason to be grateful to them as well: his steadfast response to their plight allowed him to win the confidence of the growing anti-slavery movement in New York State. Seward, of course, never became an abolitionist per se; the tinge of radicalism that led him to shy away from the movement early in his career and to keep it at arm's length for much of his time as governor, never completely dissipated. Still, while Seward would not accept a formal association with the abolitionists, he counted on the support of the foes of slavery when he resurrected his political career later in the 1840s. And while his presidential aspirations were not fulfilled, nonetheless for some two decades from the United States Senate and then as Secretary of State, the support of the foes of slavery was critical to Seward as he became one of the nation's leading figures during the ordeals of secession, Civil War and Reconstruction.

* Stephen J. Valone is a member of the Department of History, St. John Fisher College, Rochester, New York.

(1) William Seward to Henry Hopkins, 24 October 1839 in George E. Baker (ed), The Works of William H. Seward, (New York, 1853), II, 468. It should be noted that Seward's principal biographer, Glyndon Van Deusen, devoted only two brief paragraphs to this episode. See his William Henry Seward, (New York, 1967), 65-66.

(2) Horace Clark to Thomas Paterson, 6 January 1834, George Washington Patterson Papers, University of Rochester (ereafter Patterson Papers).

(3) Theodore Spencer to William Seward, 28 September 1838, William Henry Seward Papers, University of Rochester (hereafter Seward Papers).

(4) Samuel Lyman to Seward, 19 September 1838, ibid.

(5) Samuel Lyman to Seward, 21 September 1838, ibid.

(6) Gerrit Smith to Seward, 1 October 1838, ibid.

(7) James Watson Webb to Seward, 29 September 1838, ibid.

(8) Webb to Seward, 9 October 1838, ibid.

(9) Emancipator, 30 October 1838, Gerrit Smith Broadside and Pamphlet Collection, Syracuse University.

(10) Ibid

(11) Seward to Weed, 4 November 1838, Thurlow Weed Papers, University of Rochester. Hereafter Weed Papers.

(12) Albany Evening Journal, 7 February 1840.

(13) Ibid., 3 September 1839.

(14) Ibid.

(15) Seward to Hopkins, 16 September 1839, in Baker, Works of Seward, II, 451-452.

(16) Ibid., 453-454.

(17) Ibid., 465-466.

(18) Ibid., 466.

(19) Ibid., 221-223.

(20) Ephraim Goss to Seward, 29 January 1840, Seward Papers

(21) Morgan to Seward, 7 November 1839, ibid.

(22) Ibid.

(23) William C. Beardsley to Samuel Blatchford, 7 November 1839, ibid. He was even more blunt in a letter that same day to Seward in which he said "We can't succeed with it [Abolition] grafted upon our Creed. It must be lopped [emphasis in original] off else we must remain in the minority. By doing this we lose a small number only--by refraining we lose a large number." Beardsley to Seward, 7 November 1839, ibid.

(24) Seward to Morgan, 11 January 1840, ibid.

(25) Weed to Seth Merrill Gates, 3 February 1840, Weed Papers.

(26) See Isaac Bronson to William Patterson, 4 February 1840, Weed Papers and Godfrey Grosvenor to Seward, 4 February 1840, Seward Papers. See also the Albany Evening Journal, 19, 24, and 27 March 1840.

(27) Seward to Tallmadge, 13 February 1840, Seward Papers.

(28) Weed to Seward, 31 October 1840, ibid

(29) Henry Brewster Stanton to Weed, 7 February 1840, Weed Papers.

(30) Henry Brewster Stanton to Seward, 7 February 1840, Seward Papers. Seward granted the request by writing "send copy of message" on Stanton's letter.

(31) Albany Evening Journal, 7 August 1840.

(32) Fillmore to Weed, 26 December 1838, in Frank G. Severance, The Papers of Millard Fillmore (Buffalo, 1907), II, 180.

(33) Seward to Weed, 15 August 1839, Weed Papers.

(34) Edward Curtis to Weed, 18 November 1839, ibid.

(35) Virginia was third in the nation in terms of electoral votes in 1840 behind only New York (42) and Pennsylvania (30). Ohio was fourth with 21.

(36) Seward to Thomas Gilmer, 9 November 1840, in Baker, Works of Seward, 469.

(37) Ibid., 470.

(38) Willis Clark to Seward, 11 September 1840, Seward Papers.

(39) Seward to Webster, 25 August 1840, ibid. He added that he considered this "one of the greatest questions which has ever arisen between the States" and although stricken from the final draft, he also indicated that he would consider himself "deficient in effort to inform myself concerning it if I omitted to avail myself of any advice which I might properly seek."

(40) Webster to Seward, 29 September 1840, ibid.

(41) In spite of this precaution, Harrison still lost Virginia.

(42) Patterson to Seward, 14 December 1840, Weed Papers.

(43) Seward to John Patton, 6 April 1841, in Baker, Works of Seward, II, 498-499.

(44) Ibid., 496.

(45) Ibid., 501-502.

(46) Lewis Tappan to Seward, 27 April 1841, Seward Papers.

(47) Quoted in Seth Merrill Gates to Seward, 31 March 1841, ibid.

(48) Van Deusen, 67.

Stephen J. Valone*