Why do we have 20th century FSCM for a 21st century force?

Battle Log--12 October 2023: Additional engagements and losses anticipated due to a missed opportunity. At 0330, we failed to complete an immediate, time-sensitive strike on the enemy center of gravity. Joint and combined sensors precisely identified the target, long-range kinetic assets were available/ready and probability of kill was 100 percent.

The unexpected target location required reactive deconfliction of FSCM [fire support coordinating measures] and battlespace coordination requirements that delayed the attack--target escaped. Request follow-on forces soonest!

Many may find this scenario improbable. After all, with our technological advantages, superior precision weapons systems and drive to transform future capabilities, this scenario could never happen ... could it? Despite our strengths and the on-going efforts to transform the entire force, one topic remains neglected by decades of evolutionary thinking: FSCM.

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Today's FSCM originated in World War II and Korea and slowly evolved through the Vietnam era. Yet, while much has changed in the application of fires and fire support in recent decades, FSCM have evolved little since the 1970s.

Not only has the evolution of FSCM failed to keep pace with recent changes in the conduct of war, but also their applicability in a future transformed force is questionable.

Despite the Department of Defense's transformation imperative, there is little discussion regarding future FSCM. New concepts, ideas and ways of thinking about FSCM are long overdue to enhance future force capabilities and new dynamic warfighting concepts. A lack of debate will have tactical and operational consequences in the joint force and may cause unintended strategic consequences. A critical assessment of current and prospective FSCM will decrease the probability of future missed-opportunity scenarios.

This article does not provide answers. It outlines a brief history of our FSCM, addresses a few current issues and suggests ideas for new thinking about the future. Its purpose is to generate discussion to prompt new ideas that provide 21st century FSCM for a 21st century force.

FSCM History. To assess the future of our FSCM, one must understand where we came from in the last century. Surprisingly, very few formal fire support coordination centers (FSCCs) or FSCM were used in World War II. The need to integrate air and ground forces and increasingly complex combined arms coordination requirements mandated the creation of the FSCC and the first FSCM.

While "it was at Iwo Jima that the first Marine FSCC was established," (1) the US Army developed and experimented with similar concepts. However, the Army did not doctrinally acknowledge the FSCC until October 1953. (2) Although the Army was slower to officially employ the FSCC, its publication of Joint Air-Ground Action in July 1945 outlined the bombline concept that later evolved into what is currently recognized as the fire support coordination line (FSCL). (3)

The bombline (also called the bomb safety line) was the "line beyond which the air forces have freedom of action and behind which the air may attack only when certain conditions--to be determined by each Army--have been met." (4) While forces in World War II employed other coordination means, they were not well documented or understood outside of local unit standing operating procedures (SOPs).

During the Korean Conflict, the use of FSCM increased, but they remained loosely defined as doctrinal publications focused on the role of the FSCC and key personnel duties. In 1954, the Marine Corps doctrinally recorded FSCM concepts that emerged from the Korean War. Air and ground coordination challenges again prompted the development of new FSCM, such as "aircraft safety measures" and the associated concept of "restricted fire plans." (5) Restricted targets also made their debut. These measures evolved into the airspace coordination area (ACA), no fire area (NFA) and restricted fire area (RFA).

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Still, most FSCM were only part of unit SOPs vice service doctrine, and deconfliction was reactive and based on visual observation.

The most significant FSCM changes occurred during the Vietnam era as new challenges demanded new solutions. The terrain and faster aircraft rendered visual deconfliction between air and surface assets ineffective.

The "save-a-plane" program replaced the cumbersome restrictive fire plans to increase artillery responsiveness and protect friendly aircraft. This process required artillery units to transmit firing data (firing unit and target location, time of firing and max ordinate) to aviation controllers and pilots. It became the pilot's responsibility to avoid surface fires.

Additionally, the nonlinear conflict and requirement to minimize civilian casualties magnified the dilemma between the competing demands of safety clearance procedures and responsiveness. To offset the opposing demands, the 1st Marine Division area of responsibility (AOR) "was divided into three types of fire zones": no-fire zones, pre-cleared fire zones and specified-strike zones. (7) These were evolutionary steps in the development of NFAs, RFAs, and free-fire areas (FFAs).

More than any other conflict, Vietnam institutionalized FSCM and coordination procedures that remain relatively unchanged today. In addition to other FSCM, the restrictive fire line (RFL) and coordinated fire line (CFL) emerged as tools to help alleviate the safety-versus-responsiveness dilemma. The 11th Marines Commander accurately reflected the Vietnam-era fire support mindset when he concluded that the optimum coordination system was "balanced ... on one hand on the side of safety, and on the other, responsiveness." (8)

In essence, the Vietnam-era innovations fostered and perpetuated the acceptance of a trade-off mindset as the ideal way to conduct business.

By 1977, FSCM were formally included in service doctrine vice just unit SOPs. The Army and USMC doctrinal FSCM were almost identical and, for the first time, fell into either "permissive" or "restrictive" categories. (9) The USMC did not categorize FSCM until 1981 when it adopted definitions similar to the Army's: permissive measures would "facilitate the attack of targets" and restrictive measures would "provide safeguards for friendly forces." (10)

FSCM remained virtually unchanged throughout the 1980s, but new dynamics in the 1990s created unique challenges and a new approach to solving them. The mandated "jointness" of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, rapid technological advances and longer range weapons systems significantly impacted fire support procedures: the Tomahawk land attack missiles (TLAMs), multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS) and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Until this time, fire supporters had solved novel fire support coordination challenges by devising new FSCM and procedures using critical thinking.

However, a new problem-solving approach was adopted in the last decade. Rather than creating new FSCM or new ways of thinking, old concepts and some FSCM were merely redefined to fit the new circumstances--one notable exception is the battlefield coordination line (BCL), which I address later in this article.

As we look to the future, the challenges will increase. The impact of joint interdependent procedures, technological advances and vastly improved weapons systems will foster change at an increasingly faster pace. Simply redefining old tools and concepts will no longer suffice.

In terms of fire support coordination and FSCM, we must ask two very basic questions: How will new dynamics affect future fire support, and how will we provide solutions? Unfortunately, the recent approach has been a poor attempt to solve new challenges with old mindsets, and this approach has created issues.

Current Issues. Several examples illustrate the deficiencies of merely modifying old mindsets. The first issue is the way we categorize FSCM. It used to be relatively easy: they were either permissive or restrictive and directly associated with one of the two doctrinal reasons for employment (facilitate attack or protect friendly forces).

Recent refinements modified permissive and restrictive definitions; they are no longer intuitive or easy. Permissive measures no longer facilitate; they now "authorize the attack of targets ... if certain circumstances are met." (11) Likewise, restrictive measures no longer protect friendly forces; they "restrict the use of supporting arms." (12)

There are instances when supporting arms must meet certain circumstances or need to be restricted, but these vague definitions do not directly link measures to a specific reason for their intended use. In other words, the new definitions create situationally dependent gray areas that magnify the complexity of proactively integrating fire support.

Consider the dilemma: how should one plan? Should planners employ a permissive measure based on the belief (or hope) that the requisite conditions will exist to authorize the attack, or do they plan for the worst case and assume that conditions will warrant specific restrictions?

The point is that permissive and restrictive may no longer be useful or valid means to categorize FSCM. Does it really matter if an FSCM has a permissive or restrictive label? Do the new definitions add or detract from the complexity of the issues? Moreover, with the requirement for permissive measures to meet certain circumstances, these categories now assume a relative perspective. If an FSCM is permissive for one unit, can it also be restrictive for another?

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Specifically, is the FSCL permissive or restrictive? Historically, it has been a permissive measure. In the late 1970s, the FSCL was defined as "a line beyond which all targets may be attacked by any weapons system without endangering friendly troops or requiring additional coordination." (13) While it retained a protection feature, the primary purpose was to facilitate the attack of targets.

However, the new definition states, "the FSCL delineates coordination requirements for the attack of surface targets ... Forces attacking targets beyond the FSCL must inform all affected commanders ... to avoid fratricide." (14) The new definition does not facilitate; it delineates coordination requirements to prevent fratricide. In essence, it restricts some supporting arms.

The FSCL now fully assumes both permissive and restrictive aspects as one's perception depends on one's position relative to the safety versus responsiveness dilemma. Again the question: Is there any value added by using the new permissive and restrictive categories?

Another issue is how we think about FSCM in relation to battlespace and time. As noted, the BCL is the only major doctrinal FSCM addition in the past 30 years, and its inclusion into USMC doctrine was very contentious. At a major exercise in 1999, an evaluator (in a decidedly negative comment) noted that the BCL segmented the battlespace into smaller blocks that required frequent changes. His observation, although initially lost in the immediacy of the exercise, later provided great insight into our mental predispositions about FSCM, battlespace and time.

Our traditional mindset is comfortable with carving out large blocks of battlespace for relatively long timeframes. The approach denotes ownership of battlespace and is rooted in the old mindset that accepts safety and responsiveness trade-offs.

This mindset worked well for the planning process in single-service linear engagements (i.e., Cold War scenarios) with limited technology. It tends, however, to drive execution toward reactive deconfliction and excessive coordination that consumes too much time, especially between joint forces in a dynamic nonlinear environment. This ownership mindset and the mental barriers created by permissive versus restrictive obscurity will contribute to future failures if they are allowed to persist--much like the opening scenario of this article.

New Ideas. What should be the new mindset for the future? The transformation of fire support and FSCM will require new ways of thinking vice merely redefining old concepts. This new thinking may involve original FSCM concepts with regard to battlespace and time, the creation of new FSCM or new categories of old and new FSCM. Again, no answers are prescribed in this article, just new ideas for critical thought about the art and science of the possible.

In many ways, the institutionalized mindset that has persisted since the 1970s is now invalid. Previous technology limitations forced acceptance of an ideal system with the inherent trade-offs of safety versus responsiveness. New technological capabilities should foster innovative mindsets; the future ideal system should fuse competing requirements dynamically to offer multiple integrated solutions regardless of battlespace geometry. We must combine new thinking with new technology to eliminate the historical fire support dilemma.

In terms of battlespace and time, new command, control, communications, computers and intelligence ([C.sup.4]I) systems offer significant capabilities and opportunities previously unimaginable. We are no longer constrained by limitations on FSCM dissemination that predisposed thinking in terms of battlespace ownership to either facilitate attack or protect friendly forces. Technology allows us to reverse the old mindset. We must identify procedures to use small amounts of battle-space for short periods.

This concept suggests a greater degree of common sharing vice ownership of battlespace in the application of proactive integrated fires with a minimum, or even absence, of reactive deconfliction. Imagine a scenario where a future battlefield management system could automatically determine or predict vacant battlespace and permit fire support assets to use this space for limited periods. Depending on the capability, the FSCL, ACA and BCL could become obsolete or replaced by other measures that simultaneously facilitate the attack and protect friendly forces.

Granted, the full potential of this concept is difficult to grasp, especially if the thinking is constrained by the current list of FSCM. We should explore other methods of delineating battlespace to produce new FSCM that maximize emerging capabilities. Are there ways automatically and safely to open three-dimensional blocks of space at specific times to facilitate attack? This might require a dynamic fire support area (DFSA) concept.

Another idea may involve preplanned weapons and target pairing against critical enemy vulnerabilities to generate an on-call immediate clearance area, or ICA. This area also could be linked to a specific collection asset to maximize sensor-to-shooter and battlefield assessment linkages.

Another idea focuses on current FSCM procedures that require significant resources to create, implement and track countless protective FSCM (i.e., RFAs and NFAs). Some of these could become self-generating or eliminating measures that ensure protection based on their location relative to time and space.

As weapons become increasingly precise, integrated planning may increasingly dictate a specific weapons system against a specific target set for a specific time. A specified fire support area (SFSA) may provide a proactive solution that renders additional coordination or deconfliction unnecessary.

No doubt, many readers will find fault immediately with each of these new concepts. The essence of these measures, however, is not their feasibility; but their potential to stimulate thought about creating opportunity for success by leveraging future capabilities.

Finally, the problem of how to categorize FSCM remains. Any new thinking about the previously listed concepts will not make sense using a permissive and restrictive mindset. While the old mindset categorized FSCM according to what they did for us, perhaps the new mindset should categorize FSCM by their intended use: proactive or reactive.

The first set might include fire support integration measures (FSIM). These would be proactive, preplanned measures to eliminate or reduce reactive deconfliction, facilitating automatic engagement. The second category, reactive, might comprise fire support deconfliction measures (FSDM). These could be reactive or preplanned and held in an on-call status designed to facilitate a rapid and safe attack in unusual circumstances.

Considering the imperative to prevent both fratricide and collateral damage, it is possible that a separate category of fire support force protection measures is required. There may even be instances where new FSCM fall into more than one category, depending on their use or parameters.

All or none of these categories may be applicable in the future, but the fact remains that how we categorize FSCM will drive how we think about them and, ultimately, how we employ them. We must explore new ideas.

It is fallacy to assume that 20th century FSCM will meet 21st century requirements. Considering that the last significant evolution of FSCM occurred in the 1970s, our thinking is about 30 years behind. More importantly, without any additional thought about FSCM for the transformed force of 2015 or 2025, we will find ourselves with a 40- to 50-year cognitive deficit.

If the concepts outlined in this article appear outlandish or revolutionary, it may be worth considering that an FSCM revolution is required just to catch up with emerging transformation concepts. Future battles depend on today's critical thinkers. It is time to debate, write, propose, discuss and develop new FSCM concepts to ensure this alternative scenario.

Battle Log--12 October 2023: Commencing stabilization ops earlier than expected. At 0330, we completed an immediate, time-sensitive strike on the enemy center of gravity. Joint and combined sensors precisely identified target, long-range kinetic assets were available/ready and probability of kill was 100 percent.

The unexpected target location was immediately and automatically cleared by dynamic preplanned FSIM. Target destroyed, and enemy surrendering. Request redeployment instructions.

Endnotes:

1. Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth J. Clifford, USMCR, Progress and Purpose: A Developmental History of the United States Marines Corps, 1900-1970 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, USMC, 1973), 69.

2. J.B.A. Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower (Oxford: The Milltary Press, 1989), 270-1.

3. Joint Air-Ground Action, Ground Liaison Officer School Workbook, Part I, (Department of the Army: 1945), 123

4. Ibid.

5. Landing Force Manual 22 Coordination of Supporting Arms (Washington, DC: Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 9 August 1954), 4-4 through 4-7.

6. Major Gary L. Telfer, USMC, et al. US Marines in Vietnarn: Fighting the North Vietnamese-1967 (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, USMC, 1984), 216.

7. Graham A. Cosmas and Lieutenant Colonel Terrence P. Murray, USMC, US Marines in Vietnam: Vietnamization and Redeployment-1970-1971 (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, USMC, 1984), 305.

8. Ibid., 306.

9. Field Manual (FM) 6-20 Fire Support in Combined Arms Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 30 September 1977), 3-14 through 3-16.

10. FM 7-1 Fire Support Coordination (Washington, DC: Headquarters, USMC, 23 April 1981), 2-11.

11. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-16 Fire Support Coordination in the Ground Combat Element (Washington, DC: Headquarters, USMC, 28 November 2001), Appendix B.

12. Ibid.

13. FM 6-20 Fire Support in Combined Arms Operations, 3-15.

14. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-16, Appendix B.

By Colonel Gerald L. Smith, USMC

Colonel Gerald L. Smith, USMC, is a student at the National War College, Washington, DC. Previously, he was the Commanding Officer of the 5th Battalion, 11th Marines (5/11 Marines), 1st Marine Division, during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Other assignments include serving as an Instructor at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, Virginia; 11th Marines Operations Officer and Executive Officer, Camp Pendleton, California; Fires Officer of the I Marine Expeditionary Force (IMEF) Force Fires Coordination Center (FFCC) and Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) Test Bed, both at Camp Pendleton; Commanding Officer of Headquarters Battery, 12th Marine Regiment, and M Battery, 4/12 Marines in Okinawa, Japan. He holds a Master of Arts in Military Studies from the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. He will take command of the 12th Marine Regiment this summer.