Why Bosnia matters.

"I don't give two cents about Bosnia. Not two cents. The people there have brought on their own troubles" (New York Times, June 7, 1995). Probably no one has been as blunt about the war in Bosnia as columnist Thomas Friedman, but his sentiments are widely echoed in the press and in Washington. Though the United States has supported a narrow range of policies in Bosnia (sometimes at cross-purposes with one another, sometimes shifting on a daily basis), neither the president nor the secretaries of state and defense have set forth a consistent argument defending those policies or framing a clear statement of the real interests lurking behind them. The Bosnian government has the general support of the United States--that is, until conditions require a decisive move, usually military, at which point Bill Clinton shifts into neutral. The Congress--particularly in the person of Senator Robert Dole (R-Kans.) who appears more interested in checkmating Mr. Clinton than in stopping such aggression--carries on a campaign of partisan posturing that undercuts administration policy whenever it seems to be on the verge of achieving some consistency and coherence.

What are United States interests in Bosnia?

The United States has a vital interest in helping the United Nations to develop a competent and respected peace-keeping capability, especially since we will never again possess the hegemony conferred by the cold war. The end of the U.S.--Soviet "Pax Romana" will certainly encourage the eruption of many more local wars. It is in our national interest that they be contained and resolved quickly.

We have a vital interest in maintaining NATO's military capabilities; not only maintaining them, but being seen to maintain them. NATO is now the designated mechanism for drawing together, over time, the military forces of Eastern Europe and ultimately Russia into a coordinated and cooperative framework for keeping the peace over that huge landmass. To accomplish that, NATO's credibility and vitality must remain intact.

Both the UN and NATO have been seriously compromised in the former Yugoslavia; the end game there will very likely set the future agenda, enhanced or diminished, for both organizations. In that sense, we have interests in the outcome of the war in Bosnia. But Bosnia presents its own humanitarian and political interests to the United States. The president has not been wrong to press the case of the multi-ethnic, multi-religious, democratic Bosnian government over the ethnic nationalism and autocratic regime of Radovan Karadzic in Pale. Even more, the continuing siege by the Bosnian Serbs of Sarajevo, Tuzla, Gorzade, and other Bosnian enclaves is a violation of every moral and political declaration of human rights, which the United States along with many other nations has agreed to defend.

It is often argued that neither the UN nor NATO could have been effective in Bosnia, ever, because the Europeans themselves could not agree on anything except to contain the fighting and provide relief; hence their willingness to use and abuse the UN and to cobble a UN peace-keeping mission together with an arrangement for surveillance and air cover by NATO. But European indecision need not have been decisive. True, the UN mandate was limited, but early UN concessions to the Bosnian Serbs and the continuing countenance by UN officials of Serbian lies, thuggery, and violations of human rights have unduly drawn the limits ever tighter. No doubt Yasushi Akashi, the civilian head of the UN mission, has a tough job, but his appeasement of the Bosnian Serbs makes the conditions worse by prolonging the intolerable conditions under which Bosnians in Sarajevo and other enclaves must live. Instances where UN forces resisted, thwarted, or fought off Serbian aggression led the Serbs to back down. Unfortunately, Mr. Akashi never allowed enough of these restrained uses of military force. If the UN is to save its mission, this policy needs to change.

The rapid reaction force of some 10,000 combat soldiers scheduled to arrive in Bosnia this month can be an instrument of that change. The chances that it can work to bring peace are good, if it is allowed to function as a military force. It is worth risking failure (and casualties) to do so.

What can it do? The rapid reaction forces can protect the UN troops already there from being abused by the Bosnian Serbs. Through selective military responses, it can end the shelling and siege of Sarajevo and other enclaves. It can open the roads and airports so that a normal flow of food and supplies can reach Bosnia. But with the Un's own policy on the rapid reaction force still in flux, it is also entirely possible that its military capacities will be used only to extract the UN troops already there preparatory to a complete UN pull-out. If that proves the unfortunate end to UN efforts, then the arms embargo should be lifted and the Bosnian government allowed to acquire the weapons needed to defend itself.

A U.S. policy favoring the Bosnians should be defended by the president and supported by the Congress. Whether with the rapid reaction force or with the Bosnian government, the United States should vigorously support efforts to lift the siege of Sarajevo and help to piece back together a contiguous territory so that the Bosnian government can come to the bargaining table free of a Serbian diktat. The Bosnians have previously agreed to a division of territory that, while conceding more than half of Bosnia to the Serbs, will also allow the Bosnians to establish an independent and viable country.

The United States has a vital political and moral interest in peace making and peace keeping, in the short run and the long term. Today, that interest is challenged not simply by the war in Bosnia, but by the failure, thus far, of collective measures and mechanisms to bring the warring parties in Bosnia to a sustainable peace agreement. Tomorrow, that interest will be challenged somewhere else. The processes, procedures, and levels of cooperation that help, or fail to help, resolve the war in Bosnia, will have an enormous impact on sustaining peace--or fomenting war--everywhere.