Where does ABM Defence Stand?

For decades, defence against ballistic missiles was regarded as almost impossible and (in any event) unaffordable. The two super powers agreed to limit the use of ABM missiles to two point-defence systems. Now, encouraged by the proliferation of ballistic missiles and NBC warheads, the technology nettle is being grasped, but there are major funding and diplomatic problems.

When London was being subjected to attacks by the German Army's V-2 (starting in September 1944), the only possible means of active defence was seen as the massive use of anti-aircraft artillery. Fortunately, the V-2 had only a conventional warhead. World War II ended before trials began of what would (at best) have been only a partial counter to the ballistic missile threat.

The advent of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) led to the conclusion that partial defences were pointless, and that the only rational approach was deterrence through mutually-assured destruction.

The Treaty

Having built up an expensive arsenal of ballistic missiles, rather than face an economically-damaging arms race in the ABM missile field, Russia and America agreed in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to each restrict the use of ABM missiles to a single 100-weapon point-defence system. The Treaty permits ABM research, but prohibits the development, testing and deployment of ABM systems and components that are either space-, air-, sea- or mobile ground-based.

There are provisions for the Treaty to be reviewed and modified, and either side can withdraw from the Treaty after giving six months' notice, if it decides that "extraordinary events ... have jeopardised its supreme interests".

Although the point is often glossed over in current American discussions of the Treaty, each side promised not to deploy ABM systems for the defence of the territory of its country. It is interesting to note that in the discussions that led up to the Treaty, the Soviets (who had deployed such defences around Moscow four years earlier) took the view that, since ABM missiles are purely defensive, there could be no rational objection to them, whereas America argued that their deployment would be destabilising. The two sides now take precisely opposite views.

Rather than attempting to defend Washington DC (which would hardly have been a vote-winner), in 1975 America installed the Safeguard point-defence system consisting of a 100-unit mix of Spartan and Sprint nuclear-tipped ABM missiles at Grand Forks, North Dakota to defend a nearby ICBM site. However, Safeguard was decommissioned in 1976, partly because of concerns over the effects of the warheads exploding over US territory.

The Soviets had installed at four sites around Moscow the ABM-1 system with a total of 64 SH-01 Galosh ABM missiles. The SH-01 was a liquid-fuel missile with a one-megaton warhead, and it was to be fired from above-ground launchers. In the course of the 1980s the ABM-1 was replaced by the ABM-3 system with 36 exo-atmospheric SH-11 Gorgon (Russian name Baton) and 64 SH-08 Gazelle endo-atmospheric missiles. Some sources indicate that Vympel was responsible for both types. They are silo-fired, solid-fuelled and employ nuclear warheads (550 and 10 kilotons respectively).

America's Ballistic Missile Defense programme began in 1983 with President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, popularly known as "Star Wars") research effort. By that stage it was no longer necessary to rely on nuclear warheads: improved technology would allow the incoming missile to be destroyed by a direct-hit kinetic energy warhead (first successfully demonstrated by the US Army in 1984).

The Ballistic Missile Defense Organisation (BMDO) was formed in 1993, initially to lay the foundations for a Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (Gpals) system. However, this proved too ambitious, and the BMDO switched its funding priority to theatre ballistic missile defence (TBMD) and developing the technology for a National Missile Defense (NMD) system using ground-based missiles (rather than the space-based Brilliant Pebbles of SDI).

Post-Gulf TMBD

The early production Raytheon Patriot Pac-2 missiles had been used during the Gulf War, but only to limited effect. Initial US post-war actions took the form of improvements to the use of satellite data for missile warnings, modifications to the US Marine Corps Raytheon Hawk system and associated TPS-59 radar, the introduction of the Patriot QRP (Quick Response Program) and subsequently the Patriot Gem (Guidance-Enhanced Missile).

The latter was followed by the Pac-3 in 1995. The latest model is the Lockheed Martin Pac-3 Configuration 3, a hit-to-kill weapon that is scheduled for deployment in 2001. This latest development is much smaller than the Raytheon Mim-104, allowing 16 to be carried by each Patriot launcher.

It may be appropriate at this point to outline Russia's own TBMD actions that followed the Gulf War. Neither the Air Defence Force's Almaz S-300P nor the Navy's Altair S-300F systems (which both used the Fakel 5V55 missile) had been designed to intercept ballistic missiles. However, after the Gulf War, the S-300P was tested in the ATBM role. As a result of those tests, Fakel developed a new missile, the 48N6E, doubling the range from 75 to 150 kilometres. The resulting S-300PMU-1 (SA-20 Gargoyle) is claimed to be superior to Patriot in terms of deployment time, warhead effectiveness and minimum target altitude. The 48N6E missile is also used in the naval Altair S-300FM, which presumably also has a TBMD capability.

The latest of the S-300P series is the S-300PMU-2 Favorit (SA-20 Gargoyle follow-on) with the Fakel 48N6E2 missile and a range of 200 kilometres.

The Russian Army's Antey S-300V was required from the outset to have an ATBM capability. After the Gulf War, its Novator 9M82 (SA-12B Giant) missile was tested successfully against an SS-1C Scud-B. Growing interest in the ATBM market led to the improved S-300VM with 9M82M missiles and improved radars. The export version is the 200-kilometre Antey-2500, which is claimed to be superior to the Pac-3 in terms of area coverage and deployment time.

National Missile Defense

Returning to the subject of American developments, in July 1999 President Clinton signed the National Missile Defence Act to ensure the technology base for a shield for all 50 US states against a limited number of ICBMs fired by a rogue state such as North Korea, or launched accidentally or without authorisation from Russia or China.

The current phase of this "deployment readiness" programme aims to place silo-launched NMD missiles at a base in Alaska, clearly to guard against an attack from North Korea. The objective is to field 20 missiles by 2005 and a total of 100 by 2007. They are to be supported by advanced ground-based early warning radars in the US, and later in Britain and Denmark. Responsibility for the decision on deploying this very limited system has been ceded to the new Administration, hence the earliest possible in-service date is drifting from 2005 toward 2010. Total life-cycle cost for NMD Capability I to 2026 has been estimated at $ 36.25 billion in then-year dollars. The final phase (Capability III) involves the deployment of a total of 250 missiles at multiple sites in the US.

Boeing is the lead system integrator for the current five-year, $12.7 billion phase. In late 1998, Raytheon was selected to develop the Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle or ground-based interceptor, although Boeing is developing a back-up.

For the 19 scheduled tests, which had their first success on 2 October 1999, the GBI is powered by a two-stage payload launch vehicle (PLV), consisting of decommissioned Minuteman II second and third stages. The operational system will use a more powerful three-stage commercial launcher assembled by Boeing in association with Alliant Techsystems and United Technologies. This is due for test in early 2001.

Other elements of the NMD programme include a ground-based X-band phased-array radar, upgraded early warning radars and a space-based missile tracking system (previously Bright Eyes).

Deployment of the NMD would require re-negotiation of the 1972 ABM Treaty or, if Russia refuses to agree to the necessary amendment, unilateral US abrogation. There is considerable opposition to the NMD within Europe, which would not be unprotected, and is far more at risk than the US from Iraqi and Iranian missiles. It is argued that the US is exaggerating the ballistic missile threat from rogue states, that NMD is an inappropriate response, since chemical and biological WMDs can easily be delivered in a suitcase, and that the US (if ever it felt seriously threatened) would rely on a preemptive nuclear strike, not NMD.

It is further argued that the US would not stop at the Capability I NMD system, and that deployment of NMD would lead to Russia and China increasing their ICBM stockpiles, and undermine the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Unilateral US abrogation of the 1972 ABM Treaty might well lead to Britain refusing to sanction the upgrading of the Fylingdales radar site, which would have profound consequences for American/British relations. It might also oblige the United States to deploy some of the new radars on container ships.

Despite European hostility to America's proposed NMD, Nato has offered two $15 million 18-month design study contracts for a TBMD system to cover the whole Continent. It is reported that by the mid-December deadline bids had already been submitted by four multi-national teams, led by Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Science Applications International (SAIC) and Northrop Grumman's Logicon unit. It seems likely that these studies will suggest either the adoption of a US kill vehicle or the further development of the current Aerospatiale Matra Missiles Aster 30.

ABL

Since no defensive system is 100 per cent effective, two or three layers are necessary. In both the NMD and TMBD cases, the long-term US Air Force plan is to achieve a boost-phase intercept (BPI) by means of the airborne laser (ABL), mounted in a modified Boeing 747-400 freighter. The ABL programme is currently in the project definition and risk-reduction phase. This involves 80 firings against a variety of targets, ending with three Scuds in 2003.

Boeing is prime contractor as systems integrator, with TRW responsible for the laser and Lockheed Martin for the fire control system. If the project definition and risk-reduction trials are successful, the engineering and manufacturing development phase could begin in 2004, leading to the YAL-1A prototype and two production aircraft entering service in 2007, to be joined by four more by 2009. Aside from destroying missiles of various types, the ABL could be used for battle damage assessment, using its large telescope.

Thel

TRW is also responsible for the Tactical High Energy Laser (Thel) that is being developed as a joint US Army/Israeli Ministry of Defence effort to counter short-range missiles such as the 122 mm Katyusha. The laser is used in conjunction with Elta's EL/M-2080 Green Pine search radar and Nautilus fire control radar.

Thaad

In between the ABL and the low-endo-atmospheric point-defence Pac-3, theatre ballistic missiles may be intercepted by the US Army's Thaad (Theater High Altitude Area Defense), described as the world's first endo-/exo-atmospheric system. Among other advantages, its high altitude capability permits a shoot-look-shoot (S-L-S) engagement. The US Army is particularly interested in a high endo-atmospheric (40 to 100 km) intercept, since the air is so thin that the re-entry vehicle cannot manoeuvre effectively, but there is enough air for the warhead and decoys to be discriminated by infrared. The Thaad is designed to be air-transportable, only the launcher requiring a C-141, C-17 or C-5, whereas all the other modules will fit in a C-130.

Lockheed Martin is prime contractor for the Thaad. Tests for the project definition and risk-reduction phase began in 1995 and led to two successes, FT-10 on 10 June 1999 and FT-11 on 2 August 1999, the latter being the first exo-atmospheric intercept, at over 100 kilometres altitude. The $3.9 billion EMD phase began in early 2000 and will involve 30 to 40 firings. If successful, the first Thaad unit with the baseline C-1 system could be equipped by 2007 and fielded in 2008. The improved C-2 system with a more powerful Raytheon radar could be available from 2010. The US Army plans to buy 1250 interceptors with single-stage boosters and thrust-vectoring at a unit price of $1.8 million.

Meads

The US Army may complement the Thaad and possibly replace the Patriot with the Meads (Medium Extended Air Defense System). This uses the low endo-atmospheric (below 35 km) Pac-3 missile with an X-band datalink to communicate with the fire control radar, but is more mobile than Patriot and can thus be taken to forward areas. Launcher weight is reduced from 36 to 16 tonnes.

The Meads was designed to replace the Patriot, Hawk and Nike Hercules. It is being developed to meet joint US-German-Italian requirements by an international team that combines Lockheed Martin, Eads and Alenia Marconi Systems. It is intended to provide all-round defence against ballistic missiles, aircraft and cruise missiles. Under the agreement signed in 1996, America is to pay 60 per cent of development, Germany 25 and Italy 15.

It was originally envisaged that the Meads would be first fielded by Italy in 2005, but the United States has severely restricted funding and it is consequently now expected to enter service after 2010. Following a series of Transition Effort contracts, that for the three-year $200 million Risk-Reduction Effort was due to be signed in July but has been delayed by German indecision on the number of missiles required.

US Navy

The US Navy's lower tier system is Navy Area Defence, based on Aegis cruisers and destroyers, armed with the Raytheon Standard Missile (SM) Block IV. The improved SM-2 Block IVA will intercept at over 30 kilometres and has a side-mounted imaging-infrared seeker and a fragmentation warhead. Navy Area Defence is currently in the EMD phase. Production deliveries are scheduled to start in FY04.

The corresponding upper tier TBMD is known as Navy Theater-Wide (NTW), which is now in the production risk-reduction activities phase. It employs an exo-atmospheric interceptor, known as the SM-3 or SM Leap (Lightweight Exo-atmospheric Projectile). This combines the Standard Block IV airframe with satellite/inertial navigation and a third rocket stage (Asas: Advanced Solid Axial Stage) that boosts the 20-kilogram Terrier Leap kinetic warhead.

Japan, which has four Aegis destroyers and plans to acquire two more, is cooperating in the further development of the warhead system. When fully developed, NTW will make possible a two-ship defence system for the whole of Japan and South Korea against North Korea's No-Dong ballistic missile.

The NTW is scheduled to achieve operational capability (Block I) on the first of four US Navy cruisers in 2006, and this could lead to full capability (Block II) on seven more cruisers by 2012. Each will carry 20 missiles.

Arrow

Israel began work on a TBMD system in 1986, and accelerated this effort after the Gulf War, with America paying roughly half the cost. Described as the world's first dedicated TBMD system, the Arrow Weapon System combines the two-stage Arrow II missile produced by IAI's MLM Division, the Elta EL/M-2080 Green Pine L-band fire control radar, and the Tadiran Citron Tree fire control centre. IAI is also responsible for the launcher -- a towed, wheeled vehicle with six vertically-launched missiles.

The Arrow II differs from the Pac-3 in being a high endo-atmospheric area-coverage missile with a limited S-L-S capability, and a gimbal-mounted fragmentation warhead.

The next stage of development is Asip (Arrow Systems Improvement Programme), dealing with the challenges of manoeuvring warheads and decoys. IAI is hoping to sell to nations such as Britain, India, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey, working via a contractor such as Boeing, General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, or Raytheon. Israel can sell the radar and fire control separately, as the US does not have intellectual property rights.

In short

* "For decades the interception of long-range ballistic missiles depended an nuclear warheads. Now they can be destroyed by kinetic energy weapons"

* "The threat posed by weapons of mass destruction can be countered only by multi-layer defences"

* "America's proposed National Missile Defense system would require re-negotiation of the 1972 ABM Treaty or its abrogation by America. It could destabilise arms limitation efforts and lead to a major split with Europe."