When Will Iraqi Troops Be Ready.

After the most lethal string of attacks on Shi'ites since 2003, PM Maliki on Nov. 26 blasted politicians for divisions that encourage carnage and called for unity in the face of deepening civil war. "The ones who can stop further deterioration and bloodshed are the politicians", he said, adding that all must first realise there "are no winners and losers in this battle".

When Maliki met with President Bush in Amman on Nov. 30, both looked for signs that the Iraqi forces were closer to being able to ensure calm, without leaning on the US military. While the Iraqi police and army are dominated by Shi'ites, Iraq's forces may be the last, imperfect hope of preventing all-out civil war. But if the difficulties the US military faces in training Iraqi soldiers in Falluja is any indication, future stability is uncertain.

Despite three days of blanket curfew which has tempered revenge violence, expectations are growing that the death toll of more than 230 on Nov. 23 will prompt an irreversible slide. Even under the curfew, scores of Iraqis have turned up dead, in clear Shi'ite vs. Sunni murders. Mortars continued to slam into parts of Baghdad on Nov. 26. In a reflection of the popular anger over the killings, Maliki's motorcade was stoned and the PM jostled by fellow Shi'ites during a visit to the scene of the carnage in Sadr City on Nov. 26.

To better prepare Iraqi forces to deal with the escalating security situation, more than 400 US military "transition teams" are living with and advising Iraqi units across the country, including in Falluja, the former insurgent stronghold west of Baghdad. "I've seen progress go from OK to somewhat better, [but] we're nowhere near done", says US Army Capt. Jonathan Stewart, a member of the team advising the Iraqi Army's 1st Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 1st Division, deployed in Falluja. "These guys can fight, but in terms of logistics they need us", says Capt. Stewart, from Rogersville, Ala. "They are not capable of taking control of the fight".

US efforts to build Iraqi forces from scratch have been plagued by problems in the 3-1/2 years since US occupation authorities decreed the disbanding of Iraq's 400,000-strong military forces. Fledgling units have been targeted repeatedly by insurgents, resulting in the deaths of several thousand recruits. Sectarianism has defined some forces, too, as Shi'ite militiamen and Sunni insurgents infiltrated the ranks.

During times of unrest, entire units have simply melted away, rather than face down Shi'ite gunmen during a 2004 uprising in Najaf, south of Baghdad, and Baghdad's Sadr City, or Sunni militants during fighting that year in Falluja. "They could have very good military and police forces, but if the population is not behind you, it won't work", says US Army Major Patrick Semon, a Falluja-training team member from Pittsburgh, Pa. His team has worked with the Iraqi battalion for five months. Other US advisers began with the unit some 18 months before that.

In some areas of Falluja, such as Jolan, where insurgents are making a comeback, "they hate us all, Americans and Iraqi Army alike, [and] will cut your throat just as soon as look at you", says US Army Maj. Michael Mundell, from Radcliff, Ky. Other areas of Falluja, he says, range from "indifference to grudging acceptance, to 'Hi, how are you?'" But in Falluja, the Iraqi Army is made up largely of Shi'ites, and deeply distrusts the police - which are all local Sunnis. The first boot camp earlier this year, aimed at ushering Sunnis into the Iraqi Army and staged in Anbar Province which includes Falluja, was "disastrous", says one US Marine officer.

Of nearly 800 recruits in the five-week course, up to 500 decided to leave when they learned they could be deployed anywhere in Iraq, and not just Sunni areas, says the officer. The two or three subsequent classes have had higher rates of retention, but US advisers say many more troops are needed. "They don't have enough soldiers", says Major Mundell, noting that the 2,500 Iraqi soldiers in Falluja - at least, that is the number deployed on paper - should have double the strength to be effective. "We need another brigade in this city; another two brigades to clean it out [of insurgents]". But those numbers are not likely to change before US forces pull out of Falluja in coming months.

Except for the 11-man US training teams, less than 300 US Marines now work in Falluja. And already, for months, insurgents have targeted policemen - many of which have been slain - and Army units. The army positions are routinely mortared. A popular company commander was killed by a roadside bomb a few weeks ago, which shook up some units. One captain did not return to duty after his family was threatened.

A battalion surgeon was recently murdered, and when an officer went to identify the body, he, too, was shot. "These guys are never going to be a US infantry battalion, but they've got to be good enough", says Mundell. Major Semon says: "It can be successful, but they need more resources". The challenge is growing. Insurgent attacks have spiked in Falluja, as they have taken an increasing toll on Iraqis.