When Italy invaded Ethiopia ... 70 years ago.

The modern age in international politics could be said to have begun 70 years ago this month. On 3 October 1935, the Italians invaded Ethiopia (known then as Abyssinia)--just seven years after the two countries had signed a treaty of friendship. The fighting was over quite quickly, but one dream died that day and another began. After "Abyssinia", the "old certainties" no longer appeared to be nearly so certain. Clayton Goodwin reports.

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"Never again", the contending countries had claimed following the wholesale slaughter of World War I as they set about establishing the League of Nations through which, they believed, differences between countries could be solved without the need to resort to war. Although the intention was honourable, in practice the enterprise had been mere wishful thinking from the outset. The League was riddled with flaws, but somehow it limped along until the concept collapsed in the wake of the Italian invasion of Ethiopia.

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Italy was the "odd one out" in the grab for African territory in the latter half of the 19th century. Whereas its European neighbours steamrollered their way over unprepared opposition more or less wherever they wanted to go, the Italians suffered a memorable defeat at Adowa (in Ethiopia) in 1896 which is said to have been the most important defeat recorded by an African country against European invaders.

In spite of changing sides in World War I--in which their country was nominally part of the Triple Alliance with Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire (but fought on the other side)--and being awarded a "place at the victors' table" at the Peace Conference in Versailles, the Italians did not obtain the territorial rewards they had expected. Such an outcome rankled with a people who were the descendants of the Roman Empire which had once ruled much of both Europe and North Africa.

Benito Mussolini, the Fascist Duce ("Leader") of Italy in the 1930s, gave expression to those vainglorious views. In political terms, he "punched above his weight" and was generally admired for his perceived "no nonsense" approach by the other leaders of Western Europe.

Yet by mid-decade, the rapidly-rising Nazi regime of Adolf Hitler was beginning to take the play away from him among the nations who wanted to re-draw the post-war map. Mussolini was spurred by the desire to re-assert his international prestige and to avenge the "humiliation" of Adowa. He was further encouraged by the location of Ethiopia between neighbouring territory held already by Italy in Somalia and Eritrea.

The Italians increased the number of their troops stationed in Eritrea on the Ethiopian border, and the Duce hyped up the rhetoric. The situation became so tense--as the Italians encroached on Ethiopia--that it needed only an "incident" to inflame into actual war: that "incident" was forthcoming at the Welwel wells used mainly by desert nomads.

Italy invaded without a formal declaration of war. It quickly over-ran Adowa and the holy city of Axum. The Ethiopians fought as well as they were able with often primitive arms against the modernised, professional army of the invaders, who used their air force (and poison gas) to telling effect, but the end was not really in doubt.

The Italians fire-bombed the city of Harar and virtually settled the war at the battle of Maychew. On 2 May 1936, three days before the Italians entered Addis Ababa, Emperor Haile Selassie fled his country ... that is where the story really begins. The Emperor's dignified mien in exile made a favourable impression. In particular, his address to the League of Nations in Geneva won much sympathy for his country. People who had never heard of Abyssinia previously were now aware of the aggression. There were demands that "action" should be taken.

The League of Nations, which had immediately declared the Italian invasion to be illegal, had imposed some economic sanctions ... but that was the problem. What else could they do? Fighting was out--the League did not have its own army. Further sanctions? Should they be mild or severe?

The leaders of Western European--that means France and Great Britain--did not want to drive Mussolini into an allegiance with Hitler. In the terms of the time, they wanted to win the Italians "for democracy". And it was not an idle dream for which they should be easily criticised because if they had been successful in isolating Germany, the Second World War (with its millions and millions of deaths) most likely would not have taken place. Furthermore, even if Britain and France had banned the sale to Italy of vital materials (such as oil), Mussolini would have got them--and did--just the same from one of the several countries (such as the US) which were not a member of the League.

So they took the worst possible course--by trying to placate everybody, they ended up by annoying everybody.

The mild economic sanctions taken against Italy (which were removed in the summer of 1936) did nothing to help the Ethiopians, but angered the many then "subject" peoples of the British and French empires who sympathised with the plight of the African state.

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At the same time, Mussolini, aggrieved that his fellow European statesmen had not shown ethnic solidarity with him, did the very thing that the appeasers feared most ... he concluded an Axis with the Nazis which made the forthcoming world war all but certain.

With its inadequacy exposed, the League of Nations was not taken seriously again. Yet something else had happened--which was not evident to too many people at the time, but has since become a major force in world affairs. Although Ethiopia was an African country, even then, however, it was not just any country (African or otherwise). Ethiopia stood at the crossroads of culture with roots and traditions going back hundreds of years. The land, too, had withstood--as we have seen--the European aggrandisement of the preceding century, so as to be by now the sole independent country in Africa.

The coronation on 2 November 1930 of Haile Selassie, who had already been the "strong man" (de facto ruler) of Ethiopia (as "regent" and proclaimed "heir apparent") during the reign of his predecessor, Empress Zauditu, was viewed as a political landmark.

For some time before then, Marcus Garvey had announced his gospel of African integrity. With the "back to Africa" sentiment gaining credence for people of African heritage everywhere, he proclaimed in 1927: "Look to Africa for the crowning of a Black King--be shall be the Redeemer".

On his coronation, the new ruler took the titles which included "Emperor Haile Selassie I (Power of the Holy Trinity), Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah , Elect of God and King of the Kings of Ethiopia".

Haile Selassie's coronation, which appeared to fulfil Garvey's prophecy, caught the mood of the hour. Some people, such as Leonard Howells, a Jamaican who was tried for "sedition" for contending that his compatriots did not owe allegiance to the British monarch, directed their allegiance to the one ruler on earth who represented them (at least ethnically).

That loyalty crystallised around the personality of Haile Selassie--or Ras (Prince) Tafari Makonnen as he had been known before his accession to the throne. It was a sentiment that influenced many more than just those who became immediate followers of the Rastafari movement.

And then this black "kingdom" was assailed by an European power--while the other countries of Europe did nothing effective to stop it.

People of African heritage did not need to worry about the tactical niceties which exercised the judgement of the French and British politicians: they knew only that in future, too, Africans could not expect protection from the Europeans and would have to look to their own defence.

Well. World War II, which did come about as had been feared, was more widespread and bloody than that which had gone before. And Haile Selassie returned to Addis Ababa in 1941 in the wake of the Allied victory over Italy.