Western Sahara: preparations for the referendum asked.

The Security Council on 2 March invited Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali make preparations for the organization of the referendum of self-determination of the people of Western Sahara and to consult with the parties--Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el-Hamra y de Rio de Oro (POLISARIO)--on commencing voter registration promptly, starting with the updated lists of the 1974 census conducted by Spanish authorities.

In unanimously adopting resolution 809 (1993), the Council invited the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, Sahabzada Yaqub-Khan, to intensify efforts to resolve outstanding issues, particularly those relating to the interpretation and application of the criteria for voter eligibility.

The two parties were urged to cooperate fully in implementing the settlement plan for self-determination of the Territory's people and in resolving the outstanding issues.

The plan, approved by the Council on 27 June 1990 in resolution 658 (1990), calls for UN organization and supervision of the referendum, in cooperation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), in which voters would choose between independence or integration with Morocco.

On 26 January, the Secretary-General reported (S/25170) that notwithstanding prior acceptance of general provisions of the plan, there were substantial disagreements between the parties regarding fundamental issues.

The differences between the parties "mirror their respective positions on what ought to be the composition of the electoral body".

The parties' opposing points of view on the electorate largely accounted for their differences as to interpretation of the criteria and evidence in support of applications for registration. POLISARIO, the Secretary-General pointed out, had emphasized the special importance of written evidence emanating from the Territory, in other words, authentic documents issued by Spanish authorities in the Territory, while Morocco had stressed the equal importance in a nomadic and traditional society of oral testimonies and official documents, regardless of their source.

Three options

According to the Secretary-General, three broad options would seem to be available:

(a) Continuation and, if possible, intensification of talks. (Chances for success under this option were very slim, he said.)

(b) immediate implementation of the UN/OAU settlement plan, based on the instructions for application review set out in a 19 December 1991 report (S/23299). (That might mean that the implementation would have to proceed without the cooperation of one of the parties, he noted.)

(c) Adoption of an alternative approach not based on the settlement plan.

The Secretary-General, therefore, asked for guidance from the Council on how best to proceed. Depending on the Council's decision, the role and strength of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) would have to be adjusted.

As of 20 January, MINURSO's military component totalled 328 personnel, including 228 military observers and 100 support personnel, as well as 103 civilian staff members. MINURSO's military mandate remained restricted to monitoring and verifying the cease-fire in effect since 6 September 1991.

In a 4 March letter (A/48195-S/25364) to the Secretary-General, Algeria, as an observer State to the process of settling the conflict in Western Sahara, recalled that Morocco and POLISARIO had agreed that the 1974 census should constitute the point of reference and the basis for identifying the Saharans eligible to participate in the referendum for self-determination. The introduction of new elements not agreed to by both parties, it maintained, would be "incompatible with the spirit and letter of the settlement plan".