Wesleyan theological methodology as a theory of integration.

The central claim of this article is that debates over the integration of psychological theories and findings, on the one hand, and Christian doctrine, on the other, largely boil down to differences in theological methodology, and that the theological methodology often associated with John Wesley offers a compelling model of such integration. Section I lays out how it is that while there are logical and normative matters involved in discussions of theoretical integration, methodological issues are at the heart of such discussions, and hence, how it is that one's theological methodology determines one's theory of integration. Given this thesis, Section II outlines the general contours of Wesleyan theological methodology. This methodology involves four mutually interacting though hierarchically arranged sources of knowledge: Scripture, tradition, reason, and experience. The final section elucidates the manner in which this understanding of theological method can be taken as a viable and vital model of the theoretical integration of psychology and theology.

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One response to our post-modern situation is to reappropriate pre-modern points of view. The pre-modern, Western world was much more at home with the interplay of theology, church tradition, philosophy, and science. But with the rise of reason during the Enlightenment and the retreat to Scripture in the Protestant Reformation, the stage was set for the demarcation, dichotomization, and disintegration of the relationship between theology and science. Wesleyanism, rooted in the English Reformation, avoided some of the dichotomizing tendencies of modernity. Thus, Wesleyan theological methodology offers us a perspective on the integration of psychology and theology that can help see through some of the modern confusion.

By the 'integration of psychology and theology,' let us have in mind theoretical or conceptual integration. This is what Bouma-Prediger (1990) has labeled "interdisciplinary integration" which has as its aim "to compare and contrast and, if possible, reconcile and unite the assumptions, conclusions, methods, and so forth, of two distinct disciplines so as to combine them in some fruitful way" (pp. 23-24). Of course, there is the further issue of which or whose theology as well as which or whose psychology is to be united. For the present, let us leave the specificities of these terms undefined, 'theology' generally referring to the discipline which studies and systematizes the nature of God, his works (particularly human persons and their condition), and his relation to his works (particularly God's redemption of human persons), and 'psychology' generally referring to the discipline which studies and systematizes the nature of human persons (particularly the human mind) and their functioning (particularly their cognitive, emotional, and behavioral functioning). Thus understood, in theoretical integration the concern is with interfacing theological theories and concepts with psychological theories and concepts.

I. THREE CRUCIAL QUESTIONS REGARDING INTEGRATION

When it comes to this type of integration, it is essential that three questions are clearly distinguished:

(1) The logical question: can we integrate psychological theories and theological doctrines?

(2) The normative question: should we integrate psychological theories and theological doctrines?

(3) The methodological question: how should we integrate psychological theories and theological doctrines?

These questions will be addressed in turn, ultimately showing that it is with the final, methodological question that the salient differences over integration arise. This is a significant point in that if indeed methodological issues are at the heart of integration disputes; then it is fitting to turn to theological methodology as the means to settle these disputes. So while some of the following may be a review of familiar territory, it seems beneficial to engage in such a recapitulation in order to demonstrate the relevance of theological methodology (whether Wesleyan or not) to debates regarding integration.

The Logical Question

The logical question is whether we can integrate psychology and theology. The issue here is whether there exists a logical relationship between the disciplines of psychology and theology such that theoretical integration is possible. There are two conditions that must be fulfilled in order for such a logical relationship to exist. First, each of the disciplines must make truth-claims regarding reality; and second, each of the disciplines must make truth-claims regarding overlapping portions of reality. As long as psychology presents truth-claims about domains of reality that overlap to some degree with domains of reality about which theology also makes truth-claims, then integration is clearly a real possibility--i.e. it can be done.

It seems clear that the integration of psychology and theology can be performed in that both psychology and theology contain truth-claims about reality and at least some of those truth-claims refer to overlapping portions of reality. Of course, there are anti-realists or constructionists who would deny that psychological and/or theological concepts apply to mind-independent realities (Moore, 2003; Gergen, 1985, 1994). And there may be others who, while affirming that psychological and theological concepts apply to mind-independent realities, would deny that the two disciplines ever refer to a common reality. But leaving these seemingly untenable positions to the side, the straightforward answer to the logical question is that integration can be done.

The Normative Question

But just because something can be done, does not mean that it ought to be done. For example, just because a biblical understanding of spiritual maturity can be integrated with a particular psychological understanding of human maturity, it does not follow that it ought to be. This is the normative question of integration: should we integrate psychological theories and theological doctrines?

When it comes to this question, one must endeavor to surface the normative reasons both for and against the appropriateness of integration. The normative reasons in question are not derived from moral norms--there is nothing morally right or wrong about theoretical integration as a practice. Rather, the potential norms are--in the end--epistemic in nature. That is, given that we value the having of knowledge, there are certain epistemic norms or standards that lead us aright in the pursuit of knowledge. On the basis of these norms we can consider whether it is epistemically appropriate to integrate psychology and theology. (1)

One central epistemic norm is that our beliefs and systems of beliefs ought to be epistemically justified or warranted (Plantinga, 1993; Swinburne, 2001). This is the notion that our beliefs and theories ought to be on a good footing vis-a-vis the truth (David, 2001). Understandably, we generally want to believe only those propositions that are likely to be true and not those that are likely to be false. If a proposition is justified or warranted in our cognitive situation, then from our cognitive situation such a proposition is in some sense likely to be true.

So we should only take psychology and theology seriously as integrative partners if we believe that these two disciplines largely contain and/or regularly produce propositions that are likely to be true. For if we are interested in knowledge about the world, then we are in need of legitimate sources of knowledge and legitimate sources of knowledge are those sources which largely contain and/or regularly produce propositions which are likely to be true. So a complex issue lurking in the background here is the epistemic warrant or justification that is available for psychology and theology understood as putative sources of knowledge. If we have good reason to think that the findings and theories of psychology in general (or in some more specified instances) are justified or warranted, and if we have good reason to think that the interpretations and doctrines of Scripture in general (or in some more specified instances) are justified or warranted, then there is something to be said for integrating these findings, theories, interpretations, and doctrines.

So the normative question of whether we should integrate psychology and theology initially comes down to the question of the epistemic status (i.e. epistemic legitimacy or authority) of both psychology and theology as sources of knowledge. Surely, there are those who think that either psychology and/or theology are illegitimate sources of knowledge. For instance, the radical Biblicist deems the only legitimate source of knowledge to be the statements of Scripture and the radical empiricist considers the only legitimate source of knowledge to be the findings of empirical observation. If either radical Biblicism or empiricism is correct, then integration should not be done for there is no epistemic gain in doing it.

And yet, both radical Biblicism and empiricism are incorrect for they are self-refuting positions. The radical Biblicist's idea that the only legitimate source of knowledge are the statements of Scripture is not itself a statement of Scripture and thus is an illegitimate claim according to its own standards, and the radical empiricist's idea that the only legitimate source of knowledge are the findings of empirical observation is not itself a finding of empirical observation and thus is an illegitimate claim according to its own standards. Of course, the self-defeating nature of radical Biblicism and empiricism does not guarantee that both psychology and theology are epistemically grounded as sources of knowledge. The epistemic status of a theoretical discipline is a complex matter. But for those who are confident that both psychology and theology possess at least some well-justified theories and doctrines, integration is at least permissible.

Indeed, when it comes to those matters upon which both psychology and theology have something to say (e.g. the essential nature of the person, the nature of sin/psychopathology, the process of human maturation), we are rightfully concerned with coming to have as much true insight as we possibly can (Johnson, 1997; Ellens, 1997). But then, it appears to follow that the integration of psychology and theology is not merely permissible but, in some sense, obligatory. For our intuitive practice is to pay attention to all evidence that we deem acceptable and relevant to our object of inquiry. For instance, if our object of inquiry were an unsolved murder, it would be absurd to only pay attention to fingerprints left at the crime scene when there are respectable witnesses to the murder also available. So in the face of two or more putative sources of knowledge, we would require reasons not to integrate in order to overturn the common sense presumption in favor of integration. This means that unless there are overriding epistemic norms that count against the integration of psychology and theology, there is a strong normative presumption in favor of the integration of these two disciplines.

But some have thought that there are other epistemic norms that override the above presumption in favor of integration. First, there is the idea that theology somehow adulterates the objectivity of psychology (e.g. Myers & Jeeves, 1987, pp. 11-17). Since psychology was developed under modern, Enlightenment ideals it is often assumed that the psychological theorist or researcher should be as neutral and objective an observer as possible and that religious beliefs can only serve to bias such neutrality and objectivity. Hence, integration should not be done.

Several things can be said in response to this normative objection to the value of integration. For one, granting that psychological research and theorizing does require a religiously neutral and objective perspective, this would not by itself undermine the value of integration. For integrating theological conclusions with psychological conclusions does not necessarily entail that theological beliefs come into play when one is doing his psychological research and theorizing. Integration need not be so thoroughgoing that one's objectivity and neutrality is compromised. (2)

But this response exposes a deeper problem with this particular objection to integration. For the assumption contained in this objection is that the having of theological background beliefs somehow necessarily distorts our observations and interpretations of reality. But why think this? Here I am not contending that our observations of reality escape being theoryladen (e.g. Kuhn, 1996). It seems right to suppose that all observation and interpretation involves and is influenced by conceptual apparatus and at times full-blown theories. But the theory or concept-ladeness of observation and interpretation is unproblematic when the theoretical concepts that we bring to our experience are appropriate to the reality in question. If theology possesses truth about reality, then true theological doctrines should help us conceptualize reality aright in our psychological research and theorizing rather than undermine the possibility of this kind of objective grasp. So rather than adulterating the objectivity of psychological research and theorizing, once theology is taken seriously as a source of knowledge, theological concepts should be seen as helpful in coming to have an accurate understanding of the reality in question (cf. Willard, 1999).

A second objection to the normative value of integration is the claim that psychology in some manner adulterates the biblical purity of theology (e.g. Bobgan & Bobgan, 1979). This is the idea that modern psychology is inherently humanistic, naturalistic, deterministic, positivistic, etc. such that any conclusions drawn from it will be antithetical, in one way or another, to biblical theology. In this way, psychology is dangerous for the Christian theologian, and, while it may be worthy of critique, it is certainly to be avoided when it comes to playing any sort of positive role in the development of one's theological views.

It almost goes without saying that many of the fundamental commitments of modern psychology go against essential tenets of Christian doctrine (e.g. the basic goodness of human nature, reductionistic materialism, anti-supernaturalism, etc.). But while this point cautions us to the uncritical adoption of psychological theories wholesale, it is not enough to overturn the anticipated value of critical integration. Our doctrines of common grace and general revelation as well as widespread experience assure us that even unregenerate minds operating within erroneous worldviews can develop accurate understandings and penetrating insights of at least some portions of reality, including the human self (Calvin, 1559/1989; Grudem, 1994; Hoekema, 1986). As long as these findings and theoretical conclusions are not blindly accepted, it is unclear how views formed within the rubric of modern psychology necessarily adulterate the biblical purity of theology and thereby overturn the presumption in favor of integration.

The third and last normative objection to the value of integration that we will consider is the complaint that the integration of psychology with theology threatens the doctrine of the sufficiency of Scripture (e.g. MacArthur, 1991; Crabb, 1981; Welch & Powlison, 1997). This is a problematic objection in that it hinges on one's definition of the doctrine of biblical sufficiency. But it appears that the only definition of this doctrine that makes the objection stick is a definition that goes against the very teachings of Scripture. The definition would be one in which the sufficiency of Scripture is taken to disallow without qualification all extra-biblical sources of knowledge when it comes to our understanding of matters of faith and practice.

It is obvious that such a position on sufficiency would give us normative reasons to abandon theoretical integration, but it is equally obvious that such a position on sufficiency is unbiblical. For Scripture itself both utilizes and endorses the use of extra-biblical sources of knowledge. For example, Paul encourages the Philippian believers to "join in following my example, and observe those who walk according to the pattern you have in us.... The things you have learned and received and heard and seen in me, practice these things, and the God of peace will be with you" (Phil. 3:17, 4:9; cf. Heb. 13:7). The idea here is that the Philippians are to take careful note of actual human lives as a source of information on the manner of life that is to be lived as followers of Christ (Fee, 1995). The text itself points outside of itself, endorsing the use of the observation of others as a viable source of instruction on Christian practice (cf. Prov. 24:30-34). Or take Deuteronomy 18:22 in which the important matter of testing a prophet assumes the reliability of human cognition and sense perception in determining whether the prediction came to pass. Here again, the text encourages the utilization of an extra-biblical source of knowledge as a viable means of coming to a conclusion about whether a prophet spoke from the Lord (cf. Coe, 1991). In these places and in many others, the epistemology of Scripture itself goes against (and thereby undermines) this narrow understanding of the doctrine of biblical sufficiency. Therefore, the doctrine of the sufficiency of Scripture must be defined less stringently than above, and any less stringent definition will not unqualifiedly disallow integration.

So when it comes to the three normative objections to the value of integration considered above, it seems evident that the presumption in favor of the value of theoretical integration holds strong. This means that not only is it the case that theoretical integration can be done due to the fact that with psychology and theology we have two sets of truth-claims pertaining to overlapping fields of inquiry, but that theoretical integration ought to be done given the absence of normative prohibitions against integration coupled with the value of consulting all legitimate sources of knowledge that are relevant to an object on inquiry. Hence, the question is not whether we can or should do theoretical integration, but rather how such integration ought to be done.

The Methodological Question

What should be clear from the foregoing is that disagreements over the integration of psychology and theology ultimately amount to disagreements over the answer to the methodological question of how integration ought to be done. At least within evangelicalism, the possibility and value of integration is evident, but there is widespread divergence over the manner in which theoretical integration should proceed (e.g. Johnson & Jones, 2000).

Understanding differences over the theoretical integration of psychology and theology as differences in response to the methodological question helps us tune in to what is ultimately at the bottom of these differences. For what is typically at issue is not the possibility or value of integration, but rather the appropriate manner of doing theoretical integration (cf. Powlison, 1992, 2001). How, precisely, do we bring psychological theories/concepts and theological doctrines/concepts together in an appropriate manner?

As has been noted by others, the answer to this methodological question is epistemic in nature (e.g. Carter & Narramore, 1979). In particular, the answer to the methodological question depends on what sources of knowledge we take to be authoritative and the degree of authority we assign to each authoritative source of knowledge. It is only after reaching some clarity on these matters that we can develop a methodology of integration.

It is here that theological methodology comes into play. For the authority of Scripture as well as the degree to which extra-biblical sources of knowledge are allowable partners in the development of doctrine is investigated in the arena of systematic theology known as theological methodology (also known as 'first theology' and 'theological prolegomena'). For Scripture itself can be seen as holding the keys to what sources of knowledge beyond the biblical text are appropriate in forming conclusions about, amongst other matters, the nature of human persons, human dysfunction, and the maturation process. Given that integration is possible and valuable, we can look to Scripture to provide us with an understanding of theological methodology that will then dictate how it is that we ought to do theoretical integration. Once we are clear on the sources of knowledge besides Scripture that are legitimate and the relative authority of Scripture to these other sources, we will have the basis on which to understand how to go about doing theoretical integration. So in moving from discussions of theories of integration to discussions of theological methodology, we move to the heart of the matter when it comes to debates over integration, and we also open ourselves to a standard by which to determine how integration ought to be done. (3)

III. WESLEYAN THEOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY

If this is all granted, then what is now needed is a full-blown treatment of theological methodology! Such a treatment would undoubtedly exceed the bounds of this paper, so here I only intend to propose what might be called a Wesleyan theological methodology as, at the least, a compelling way of understanding the relation of Scripture to other sources of knowledge (see Malony, 1999).

To begin our exploration of Wesleyan theological methodology it is perhaps most illuminating to set the Wesleyan view in the foreground of alternative understandings of theological sources. Special revelation, ultimately canonized in the Old and New Testaments, has traditionally been regarded as the foundational source of Christian theology. Without God's written Word to us there would be nowhere to start, nowhere to end, and nothing to say in the development of theology. And yet, this traditional place of Scripture has been threatened in various ways throughout church history. The pre-Reformation church tended to elevate the statements of the church fathers, creeds, councils, and popes to an equal if not higher level of authority than the Scriptures (Pelikan, 1984). Soon after, the 18th century Protestant deists took reason to ride roughshod over Scripture (McGrath, 1986), and in the aftermath of this rationalistic bent, the liberal Protestant theologians of the 19th and early 20th centuries turned to religious experience as the ultimate ground of theologizing (Murphy, 1996). In the late 20th century, post-liberal theology offered a return to the biblical text, but with a philosophy of language that disemboweled the authority of Scripture (e.g. Lindbeck, 1984). Along the way, evangelical theology consistently held to the supreme authority of the Scriptures, but oftentimes without any constructive engagement with extra-biblical knowledge (Marsden, 1980).

In the face of these extremes, the theological methodology associated with John Wesley is refreshing. Wesleyan theological methodology upholds the supreme authority of Scripture, but maintains that the lesser lights of tradition, reason, and experience can aid in our understanding of Scripture. While Wesley did not utilize this term, these four complementary, though hierarchically arranged, sources of knowledge--Scripture, tradition, reason, and experience--have become known as the "Wesleyan quadrilateral" (Oden, 1994, 1998; Outler, 1985; Thorsen, 1990).

Wesley and subsequent Wesleyans were certainly not the only ones who thought of theological methodology along these lines. Thomas Oden (1994) finds the essential elements of the Wesleyan quadrilateral in the writings of Clement of Alexandria, Athanasius, Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, Catherine of Siena, and Calvin. J. I. Packer (1990) refers to something akin to Wesley's quadrilateral as the "authentic evangelical method" (p. 10). A full-fledged treatment of this topic would provide a thorough biblical and theological defense of the quadrilateral, but here we must content ourselves with a brief summary of each source and the proposed relation between them in the theological endeavor. My purpose in this is not so much to exposit Wesley's or the Wesleyan view on the matter (this has been done elsewhere--Oden, 1994; Outler, 1985; Thorsen, 1990), but rather to utilize Wesley's and Wesleyan insights as a springboard for the development of a robust understanding of these four sources of knowledge.

A. Scripture

Wesley made clear that the Holy Spirit's illumination of Scripture to the believer was the highest and most relevant source of knowledge when it came to the development of theological doctrine. Wesley (1756/1979c) wrote, "The Scripture, therefore, is a rule sufficient to itself, and was by men divinely inspired at once delivered to the world; and so neither needs, nor is capable of, any further addition" (p. 90). Wesley (1744/1979) repeatedly stressed "the written word of God to be the only and sufficient rule both of Christian faith and practice" (p. 340).

Given that Scripture is the fully inspired Word of God, it is the primary and regulatory source of authority for understanding God, his works, and his relation to his works. Scripture is primary in the sense that in doing theology Scripture determines the doctrinal categories, the essential content of those categories, and the resultant boundaries of those categories. And Scripture is regulatory in the sense that the authority of Scripture overrides and regulates/governs the lesser authorities of tradition, reason, and experience.

But while Wesley conceived of Scripture as the primary and regulatory rule for matters of faith and practice, he did not think that such a position excluded appeal to extra-biblical sources of knowledge for the purpose of clarifying, explicating, and confirming what was taught in Scripture. Scripture is truly sufficient in that it is not a matter of needing or requiring some additional source of information for the essential matters of faith or practice nor is it that some other authoritative source rivals that of Scripture. It is simply that Scripture itself speaks of additional sources at the believer's disposal that would serve theology in its attempt to be relevant, sound, and comprehensive. So while Scripture is the primary and regulatory source in theology, the Wesleyan quadrilateral proposes that Scripture can be helpfully understood in the light of tradition, reason, and experience.

B. Tradition

Wesley (1771/1979) wished to present views that were "agreeable ... to Scripture, reason, and Christian antiquity" (p. iv), where "Christian antiquity" referred to "the religion of the primitive church, of the whole church in the purest ages" (Wesley, 1777/1979, p. 424). In this way, Wesley (1756/1979a) saw the church fathers as the "most authentic commentators on Scripture" (p. 484) since they were nearest the original writings and obviously empowered by the Holy Spirit. The appeal to church tradition particularly benefits the "explication of a doctrine that is not sufficiently explained, or for the confirmation of a doctrine generally received" (Wesley, 1756/1979a, pp. 86-87). And yet while appreciating the force of traditional teachings, Wesley (1753/1979) remained clear that these teachings were not inspired, and therefore, were not infallible as were the Scriptures (p. 133).

Tradition may be understood as a record of the consensual interpretations of Scripture and the consensual doctrinal formulations of Christian believers across the span of church history. So in its proper place, tradition plays both an explicatory role in exposing a provisional understanding(s) of a doctrine in cases where it is initially unclear and a confirmatory role in cases where contemporary doctrinal conclusions jive with the historically orthodox tradition. Consulting church tradition in this manner can also help us escape our historical situatedness (cf. Holmes, 2002). Since our cultural context oftentimes influences our perspective on a text or doctrine, it is good to have at hand the biblical interpretations and theological conceptualizations of others from various times and places. This cloud of witnesses can lead us to uncover our contextual blind spots and historical idiosyncrasies. In this way tradition plays a clarificatory role by awakening us to a less historically biased understanding of the text as well as doctrine. So whether in explication, confirmation, or clarification, tradition takes us back to our interpretations of the text and our doctrinal formulations with deeper insight and conviction.

This emphasis on tradition seems appropriate given the notion that the Holy Spirit has been involved in the illumination of the Word to human interpreters since apostolic days (1 Cor. 2:12-16). Thus, we should be suspicious when after two thousand years of reflection on the biblical text we arrive at an interpretation of Scripture or a doctrinal formulation that is novel. Rather, we should expect to find our theological views reflected to a large extent in the orthodox stream of Christian thought, and we should be bothered and have good reason for departing when they are not. (4)

So we have seen that the appeal to tradition in theology can help clarify, explicate, and confirm our theological understanding. Of course, the role of tradition is always constrained by the primacy and regulatory authority of Scripture. But in its proper place, tradition appears to offer a vital component of a robust and comprehensive systematic theology (Frame, 1987; Holmes, 2002; Hall, 2002; McGrath, 1990).

C. Reason

We now turn to discuss the role of reason in the Wesleyan quadrilateral. Having taught logic at Oxford, Wesley was no stranger to the powers of deductive and inductive thought and he unhesitatingly endorsed the utilization of reason in theology. "It is a fundamental principle with us [Methodists] that to renounce reason is to renounce religion, that religion and reason go hand in hand, and that all irrational religion is false religion" (Thorsen, 1990, p. 169). While Wesley recognized the limitations of reason (particularly what he termed "false rationalism"), he maintained that right reason and correct interpretation would never result in inconsistency (Thorsen, 1990, p. 171-173). For Wesley (1777/1979), there was "no method of bringing any to the knowledge of the truth, except the methods of reason and persuasion" (p. 427). In this Wesley clearly saw that reason was the natural or organic means that the Holy Spirit utilized to move the human mind to intellectual understanding. Oden (1998) captures this full-bodied use of reason: "The [next] wall of the quadrilateral fortress, reason, requires critical analysis of all that has been asserted in order to avoid self-contradiction, to take appropriate account of scientific and historical knowledge, to credit appropriately new information and empirical data, and to try to see the truth as a whole and not as disparate parts or incongruently separable insights" (p. 339).

So reason legitimately plays at least three 'ministerial' roles (rather than 'magisterial') in the process of theological reflection (cf. Clark, 2003; Erickson, 1998; Frame, 1987). First, reason helps to clarify terms and organize thought in a sensible manner. Second, reason provides the logical norms involved in valid forms of reasoning. And third, reason can be utilized in the rational defense and confirmation of one's conclusions. It is by means of these uses that philosophy has been known as the 'handmaid of theology.'

It seems relatively clear that reason should be applied in these manners to the Scriptures in order to understand and organize biblical teachings, to derive doctrines that are implied by the text, and to offer rational justification of those doctrines. For the Holy Spirit's illumination of the text to the believer and the deriving of sound doctrine from such illumined interpretation does not appear to bypass the thoughtful reflection of the believer (e.g. 2 Tim. 2:7). In the same way reason comes into play through careful reflection on general revelation (e.g. Prov. 24:30-34). Such an understanding of reason squares with the traditional understanding of God's revelation coming to human persons both through the written Word and also through the 'book of nature' (Ellens, 1997).

So while tradition brings to theology the historical teachings and lives of the church, reason brings to theology the intellectual tools to come to justified beliefs about theological topics utilizing both special and general revelation as objects of inquiry.

D. Experience

The fourth aspect of the Wesleyan quadrilateral is experience. Wesley primarily thought of experience in the sense of a conscious, inner awareness of the Spirit's work in the regenerate life (Oden, 1994, p. 84-86). Wesley (1767/1979) writes "And here properly comes in, to confirm this scriptural doctrine, the experience of the children of God--the experience not of two or three, nor of a few, but of a great multitude which no man can number.... It is confirmed in your experience and mine. The Spirit itself bore witness to my spirit that I was a child of God, gave me evidence hereof, and I immediately cried, 'Abba, Father!'" (p. 127). The experience of the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit confirms the truth of God's Word within our lives. This kind of experience was mediated by what Wesley referred to as "spiritual senses" as opposed to the "natural senses" (Oden, 1994, p. 85).

But for Wesley both the spiritual senses as well as the natural senses were capable of garnishing a clear apprehension of reality, whether that reality be nonempirical or empirical. Wesley (1781/1979) was largely appreciative of John Locke's empiricism, accepting human experience of the empirical world as a significant source of knowledge (Haas, 1995). For instance, Wesley (1748/1979) held that our experience of the natural world pointed to the existence and nature of God (p. 335; cf. Hendricks, 1983) and Wesley (1756/1979b) also appealed to the widespread experience of moral failure as empirical evidence for the doctrine of original sin. In his An Address to the Clergy, Wesley (1756/1979a) writes:

Should not a Minister be acquainted too with at least the general
grounds of natural philosophy [i.e. science]? Is not this a great help
to the accurate understanding of several passages of Scripture? Assisted
by this, he may himself comprehend, and on proper occasions explain to
others, how the invisible things of God are seen from the creation of
the world; how "the heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament
showeth his handiwork;" till they cry out, "O Lord, how manifold are thy
works! In wisdom hast thou made them all" (pp. 483-484).

So we first discover in Wesley an appreciation of the experience of the inner testimony of the Holy Spirit in the regenerate life. This kind of conscious, experiential awareness does not seem to be a source of substantive knowledge, but rather it appears to be a form of religious experience that serves as an experiential confirmation of the truth of biblical doctrine (cf. Franks Davis, 1989). This appears to be slightly different than the Reformed notion of the inner testimony of the Holy Spirit which, according to Plantinga (2000), warrants our Christian beliefs even though we may be unaware of the Holy Spirit's testifying work. In addition, Wesley is open to experience of the empirical world as a substantive source of knowledge. Of course, this empirical experience can be of a formalized, quantitative kind as we find in the experimental methods of the physical and social sciences, or it can be of a more informal, qualitative kind as we find in our own personal experience and our partial understanding of others' experiences of whom we are aware. But whatever the extent of such reflection on our or others' observations, empirical experience provides a means of coming to justified or warranted beliefs about the created order by means of God's general revelation to us (cf. McGrath, 2001).

So it appears that experience as a source of knowledge can provide an experiential confirmation of the truth of what Scripture teaches, an inner assurance of our Christian beliefs, as well as a means of coming to empirical knowledge relevant to the doctrinal categories, content, and boundaries set by the Scriptures. It is this latter sense of experience that is most pertinent to integration, for in reflection on empirical experience we have the epistemological basis for the discipline of psychology.

IV. WESLEYAN THEOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY AS A THEORY OF INTEGRATION

As outlined, the Wesleyan quadrilateral answers the methodological question of how one ought to do integration and thus serves as a compelling model of theoretical integration. From this theological perspective, the findings and theories of psychology would function as an interplay of reason and experience. Psychological data and theories would be derived from careful observation of and reflection on the nature and dynamics of the human self, human functioning, psychopathology, change, etc., which would then be integrated with the relevant theological content derived from Scripture within the confines established by that content as well as within the biblically defined doctrinal categories and boundaries. Psychology, like philosophy, would function as an ancilla theologiae--a handmaid to theology--and theology would remain the "queen of the sciences" (McGrath, 2001). The role of the natural sciences would be "subsidiary" and "ancillary" to that of theology (Aquinas, 1273/1964, p. 19). In this role psychology as a human or social science might clarify or explicate or confirm our understandings of various doctrines. The best interpretations of Scripture would always regulate the best interpretations of the natural world, unless we came to see in light of general revelation that what we took to be the best interpretation of Scripture was in actual fact insufficiently grounded in the text (cf. Farnsworth, 1996). (5)

Hence, when theology and psychology come to us as distinct and somewhat isolated disciplines, the theory of integration implied by the Wesleyan quadrilateral shows the manner in which the conclusions of each can be brought together in a principled way. But more than this, this methodology of integration provides a model for thinking integratively about reality from the beginning (e.g. Strauss, 1997). If we come to understand and adopt the Wesleyan quadrilateral as a robust understanding of our sources of knowledge, then we can do our psychologizing with theology in mind and we can do our theologizing with psychology in mind--not to mention Church tradition, personal experience, other relevant sciences, as well as philosophy. In this way we develop a "comprehensive engagement with reality" (McGrath, 2001, p. 7). Since none of us are well versed in the content and methodologies of each of these disciplines, we find that the enterprise of seeking knowledge is another place (thankfully) in which we must exercise dependence on one another as we seek to be led by the Holy Spirit into greater wisdom and understanding.

(1) Some may object to my using deontological terms (e.g. 'norm', 'ought', 'appropriate', etc.) in an epistemic context due to the apparent fact that human persons do not have voluntary control over their beliefs in the same way that they do over their actions. So the objection is that it is unsound to talk about what ought to be believed given that persons do not have voluntary control over what they believe (Alston, 1989). I agree that persons do not have direct voluntary control over what they come to believe (though they do have indirect control via their methods of investigation). Nevertheless, I do not see how it follows from this that it is unsound to apply deontological language in the epistemic context. The heroin dependent person no longer has control over refraining from injecting heroin when it is presented to him, but it still seems right to say that he shouldn't shoot heroin even though he can't refrain from doing it. This expresses a moral condemnation of his act as an act and thereby provides him a moral gauge to do what he can do to eventually be able to refrain from using heroin. In a similar way epistemic norms provide an epistemic gauge that can lead us to do what we can do to eventually come to believe true propositions and refrain from believing false propositions.

(2) I have in mind cases in which, for instance, my theological beliefs and values incline me towards wanting a certain result from my research. Here it seems possible to bracket my deep desire for a certain result and allow the data to speak for itself (Myers, 1990). As is often emphasized, such 'objectivity' becomes increasingly difficult the more interpretation comes into play (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979), but this does not negate the fact that it is nevertheless possible to embrace a clear outcome of one's research that goes against one's most cherished beliefs and values.

(3) Some might baulk at the idea of "doing" integration, for integration is something we ultimately 'become' rather than 'do.' This is the notion of "embodied" or "personal" or "existential" integration. I am certainly in favor of this notion of 'becoming integrated' over and against the notion of 'doing integration.' But inasmuch as 'becoming integrated' involves or includes understanding what this means theoretically, then the logical, normative, and methodological issues related to 'doing integration' are fundamental to 'becoming integrated' (cf. Tan, 2001).

(4) Besides this, tradition may also serve as a tool for theology via accounts of the actual lives (rather than the teachings) of the faithful. Scripture repeatedly points outside itself to the lives of the faithful as a source of insight into the nature of the Christian life (e.g. Hebrews 13:7-8; Phil. 3:17, 4:9; 1 Cor. 4:16, 1 Thess, 4:6). Of course, here again there is the need for the text to determine who is to be emulated and to what degree, but with this cautionary note in mind it appears that the accounts of the lives of the faithful can be a helpful resource in informing our understanding of the Christian way (De Boer, 1962).

(5) It may be suggested that the interpretations of Scripture are on par with the interpretations of nature, both being the product of fallible minds (e.g. Clark, 2003). But while the interpretations of Scripture are fallible renderings of the infallible Word of God, these fallible interpretations still take precedence over the fallible interpretations of nature. This is because the Scriptures are ultimately the product of an infinite mind, with unlimited knowledge, and a comprehensive perspective while scientific research and theories are the products of finite minds, with limited knowledge, and a partial perspective. So the epistemic authority of what appear to be the clear teachings of God in his written Word is greater than the epistemic authority of what appear to be the clear teachings of collective human experience, for the simple fact that the former is the word of God and the latter is the word of humans.

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STEVEN L. PORTER

Biola University 

AUTHOR

PORTER, STEVEN L. Address: Rosemead School of Psychology, Biola University, 13800 Biola Avenue, La Mirada, CA 90639. Title: Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Theology. Degrees: BA, Biola University; MA, Talbot School of Theology; MPhil, University of Oxford; PhD, University of Southern California. Specializations: Philosophical theology; spiritual formation; epistemology.

Correspondence concerning this article may be sent to Steven L. Porter, PhD, Biola University, 13800 Biola Avenue, La Mirada, CA 90639. Email: [e-mail]