Wartime strategic direction of Soviet Armed Forces: historical lessons.

Headquarters, Supreme High Command (Hq SHC) was the warfare direction center during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. The General Staff relayed its decisions to commanders of the Armed Forces services, high commands of strategic sectors, Hq SHC representatives to the Fronts, and ultimately forces in the field. The nature of its work was influenced considerably by I.V. Stalin, his person, his disposition, and his absolute hold on the country.

It was believed in the prewar years that the Main Military Council would be in charge of wartime direction of the Red Army, this being the reason why the national leadership failed to create, in due time, the SHC Headquarters and sector high commands, the top bodies for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces.

The extremely unfavorable operational-strategic situation was a factor that compounded the difficulties associated with the direction of forces and assets at the war's outset. Despite the intelligence about German war preparations, the army and the navy were not brought to combat readiness, something that put the country in a difficult position. On the first day of the war, the People Commissar of Defense's directive No. 3, one based on the prewar plans and ignoring the obtaining situation, ordered forces of the Fronts to surround--by concentric, concentrated attacks--and destroy the enemy's Suwalki and Lvov force groupings, capturing, by the end of June 24, Suwalki and Lublin areas.

The task was unrealistic. Five mechanized corps, which were supposed to launch the counterattack, had to push forward hundreds of kilometers, to rout strong enemy groupings, and to seize, two days later, areas that were within 100-150 kilometers of their present positions.

On June 22, 1941, the entire General Staff leadership--Army General G.K. Zhukov and his deputies lieutenant generals N.F. Vatutin, V.D. Sokolovsky and G.K. Malandin--were sent to aid the Fronts, which complicated the General Staff's operation.

The High Command Headquarters was created on June 23, 1941, which included People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko (chairman), Politburo members K.E. Voroshilov, V.M. Molotov, and I.V. Stalin, Chief of General Staff G.K. Zhukov, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense S.M. Budyonny, and People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov. On July 10,1941, it was transformed to Supreme Command Headquarters, with Chief of General Staff B.M. Shaposhnikov becoming yet another member and I.V. Stalin its chairman. On August 8, 1941, Stalin became the Supreme Commander and the Headquarters was renamed Supreme High Command Headquarters.

It was an extremely difficult task to control forces on a huge front stretching from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea. So, in order to bring the strategic direction closer to the fronts, the Headquarters created, on July 10, 1941, high commands of North-Western, Western, and South-Western Sectors. Put in charge of these were Marshals K.E. Voroshilov, S.K. Timoshenko and S.M. Budyonny. But they failed to improve promptness of direction after all. The high commanders had no reserves for bringing an active impact to bear on combat operations. Nor did they have the experience needed to handle major force groupings, or good working staffs, or the necessary communications. On top of that, they lacked the relevant powers.

Stalin's constant interference in the work of the General Staff, sector high commanders and front commanders, his overestimation of his own strength and knowledge of wartime direction of forces, as well as his disdain for human fates and life often led to grave consequences. For example, he did not let pull back forces to the eastern bank of the Dnepr and leave Kiev in early September 1941, when the South-Western Front faced a threat of encirclement (although the General Staff believed it was the right thing to do and so did the sector high commander and the front commander, who implored Stalin to give his permission). As a result, the Red Army lost the South-Western Front, its strongest, and the irrevocable losses totaled 627,000 officers and men, including Front Commander Col. Gen. M.P. Kirponos, chief of staff Maj. Gen. V.I. Tupikov, Military Council member M.A. Burmistenko, and others.

In a number of cases the Headquarters controlled the fronts in circumvention of the interim strategic direction echelon, the high commands of the sectors, which it had itself created, handing down missions directly to front commanders. The command of other fronts, for its part, had to coordinate all of its decisions with the Headquarters, something that in many respects complicated the command and control effort.

Subsequently (in 1942), following considerable changes in warfare conditions, the high commands of the sectors got abolished and never played the role they had been assigned.

In 1945, the Headquarters created a High Command for the Far East in order to wage a war against Japan, a step taken in consideration of the remoteness of the Far Eastern Theater, its huge territory, and the need to use the Pacific Fleet to aid the fronts. Its head, Marshal A.M. Vassilevsky, controlled the Trans-Baikal, the 1st and the 2nd Far Eastern Fronts, and the Pacific Fleet. The C&C element enabled prompt direction of the fronts and the fleet: it could react rapidly to shifts in the situation and help the fronts whenever necessary.

In the course of the war the Headquarters used to create and abolish fronts, often without grounds. For example, in July 1941 it created the Central Front, which was abolished in August, with its armies handed over to the Bryansk Front, which in turn was disbanded in November and formed anew on December 24. The Stalingrad Front was divided, on August 5, 1942, into Stalingrad and South-Eastern fronts; but a week later, on August 13, the Headquarters took the decision to subordinate the Stalingrad Front to the South-Eastern Front commander. In June 1942, it disbanded the Voronezh Front and restored it, though belatedly (the enemy being on the doorstep of Voronezh), on July 8.

The frequent replacement of front commanders, too, was a complicating factor in the direction of forces. There were 43 generals commanding the fronts during the Great Patriotic War, many of them, particularly in the beginning, for very brief periods (from five to fifty days), including K.E. Voroshilov (five days), D.G. Pavlov, S.I. Bogdanov, V.N. Gordov, M.G. Yefremov, F.I. Kuznetsov, I.I. Fedyuninsky, N.E. Chibisov, D.I. Ryabyshev and P.P. Sobennikov (from 10 to 50 days). Of course, that placed a negative impact on direction.

Early in the war the Headquarters and the General Staff made serious operational-strategic miscalculations. After the unsuccessful border battle the Headquarters failed to implement an earlier plan that consisted in taking possession of the Ostashkov-Dorogobuzh-Dnepr line and containing the German push toward Moscow. But in December 1941, the Red Army managed to stop the enemy near Moscow. The defensive operation that ensued bled his battle groups white, whereupon the Red Army launched a counteroffensive, inflicting on him a serious defeat and thus disrupting Hitler's blitzkrieg plan. By virtue of holding Leningrad, Moscow and Donbass, the Red Army retained chances of a victory. A turning point in the war was achieved in consequence of the grown resistance and selflessness of Soviet officers and men.

The state and political system created in the country made it possible to mobilize all of its manpower and economic resources. The huge losses sustained at the early stage were replaced and subsequently there was a steady buildup of forces. It must be said that the concentration of the entire amount of state and political power in Stalin's hands, his strong will, indomitable energy and resolve helped mobilize the whole of national resources in order to defeat the enemy.

But the Headquarters and the General Staff were not always right in their estimates of the operational-strategic situation; occasionally they overstated German losses. For example, the General Staff estimated that the enemy's 1941 irrevocable losses came up to over one million officers and men, whereas the Germans put their losses for five months of 1941 at about 230,000 killed and 14,000 missing. (1) In 1942, the Supreme High Command put before the Red Army an unrealistic objective--"to make 1942 the year of the final defeat of the German fascist forces and of the liberation of the Soviet land" (2)--the reason being its overestimation of the capabilities of the friendly forces and underestimation of the enemy's.

Many fronts in that period were urged to pursue offensive operations, although they did not have enough forces and assets for the purpose. In addition, the Headquarters mistakenly believed that in 1942 the German army would as before seek to launch its main attack against Moscow rather than in the south. These strategic miscalculations were instrumental in the enemy advancing in the direction of the Volga and the Caucasus.

At the same time, despite the serious defeat in the initial period, the Headquarters and the General Staff managed to prepare and mass major reserves, organizing the outstanding Stalingrad operation in fall 1942. In its course the Red Army surrounded and destroyed a big German force and overtook the strategic initiative.

The Headquarters' decision intentionally to pass to the defensive near Kursk in 1943 provided for the rout of the advancing enemy battle groups and for a successful friendly counteroffensive.

The crucial results of the strategic direction by the Headquarters and the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War consisted in the rout of the German forces and attainment of the Great Victory.

There were various strategic direction methods. Starting 1942, whenever it contemplated large-scale operations involving forces of several fronts, the Headquarters sent up its representatives, mostly G.K. Zhukov, A.V. Vassilevsky, S.K. Timoshenko and N.N. Voronov, whose task it was to help the fronts and coordinate their actions.

The Headquarters' representatives did much to prepare and pursue operations. They were active in developing operational concepts and plans. They also helped front and army commanders to prepare the forces, to organize combat operations and teamwork between the fronts' advancing force groupings and combined units of Armed Forces services and combat arms, and to provide timely support for operations. Through its representatives, the Headquarters influenced preparation and conduct of all major and important operations. It also controlled execution of plans and assignments determined by the Supreme High Command.

By nature of their activities, the representatives were the interim echelon of strategic direction, standing between the Headquarters and the fronts. Much in their work depended on their personal knowledge and capacity to organize pursuance of objectives.

Representative to the Crimea Front, Army Commissar 1st Rank L.Z. Mekhlis, failed to cope with his duties in spring 1942. Quite often he would interfere with the work of the front command. He also held fruitless Military Council meetings and scribbled denunciations against the front commander, Gen. D.T. Kozlov. The irresponsible bureaucratic paperwork, which both Mekhlis and Kozlov engaged in, was one of the reasons why the front suffered a defeat in May 1942. During 12 days of the German offensive, the Crimea Front, though possessing a considerable superiority in forces and assets, lost 176,566 troops, 347 tanks, 3,476 guns and mortars, and 400 planes. The German command declared that its forces had taken 170,000 troops prisoner, while losing only 7,588 of their own. (3) The Headquarters dismissed and demoted both Mekhlis and Kozlov.

In operations requiring participation of several fronts, long-range aviation, national air defense forces, and naval forces, the representatives performed the coordinating functions, seeking to help the fronts attain their objectives. For example, on July 27, 1944, the Headquarters issued a directive ordering G.K. Zhukov to coordinate operations of the 1st and the 2nd Byelorussian fronts, and A.M. Vassilevsky, the 1st Baltic and the 3rd Byelorussian fronts.

During the last year of the war, when the length of the Soviet-German front became reduced, the number of fronts diminished, while their strategic importance, particularly in the main sectors, increased, the Headquarters assumed the direction of the majority of the fronts, appointing its best generals--G.K. Zhukov, A.M. Vassilevsky, K.K. Rokossovsky and I.S. Konev--as front commanders in the decisive sectors.

Was there a need for the Headquarters' representatives to the fronts?

No army in the world had an institution of this kind. The phenomenon had its roots in the style of the Soviet state and party leadership. In Civil War years, when the situation at the fronts grew difficult, V.I. Lenin used to send specially authorized representatives of the Party and the Soviet Government: the latter just did not trust the old military cadre. During the whole of the Great Patriotic War, Stalin went to the front just once, in August 1943, when he had meetings with the commanders of the Western and the Bryansk fronts, V.D. Sokolovsky and A.I. Yeremenko. The visit took two days. At the same time, he wanted to know about all events taking place at the fronts and to influence these. The representatives had a duty to provide objective information about the operational situation. The Supreme Commander required reports on the dot of time and that was regarded as one of the main functions of the representatives. In August 1943, when he had to wait several extra hours for a report from the front, he even threatened to dismiss Chief of General Staff A.M. Vassilevsky. This was one of the specific features of the Stalinist Armed Forces direction methods.

Front commanders expressed different views on the representatives' role. Former commander of the 1st Baltic Front, I.C. Bagramyan, believed that "the representatives of the SHC Headquarters played an on the whole important part in organizing military operations on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War, in enhancing stability, promptness and efficiency of the Armed Forces direction, and in ensuring a rational use of forces and assets in the operations. With their help the SHC was able, with minimal managerial costs, to successfully deal with the main tasks involved in preparing and running strategic operations, to coordinate actions of major force groupings, and to maintain close and continuous teamwork between them, Armed Forces services and combat arms. In essence, the SHC Headquarters' representatives, with their small staffs, were temporary operational-strategic direction elements created in the period of preparation and pursuance of crucial operations in corresponding strategic sectors. In character, they were intermediate echelons between the Headquarters and the fronts." (4)

Central Front commander K.K. Rokossovsky expressed, in April 1943, a different view on matters of direction and the role of the SHC Headquarters' representatives. Specifically, he wrote to the Headquarters: "There is also an incomprehensible situation existing in the area of command and control of forces, when Chief of General Staff, instead of being in the Center, where the entire command and control of the Armed Forces is concentrated, leaves for long for a sector of the front and thus is excluded from the command and control endeavor. Deputy Supreme Commander, too, leaves for some sector, and so it often happens that during some most tense periods at the front the Supreme Commander alone was in Moscow ... I think," he went on, addressing himself to Malenkov and Antonov, "that command and control of the fronts should be carried out by the Headquarters and the General Staff from the Center. They also shall coordinate the fronts' actions, which is precisely what the General Staff exists for. After all, the first months of the war showed the entire impracticability of the hastily created sectors, which united command and control of several fronts. But the Headquarters again began applying the same thing, if under a different name, to wit, representative of the Headquarters for coordination of actions of two fronts. Attached to a front commander, this representative replaces him, but bears no responsibility for the outcome of combat operations." (5)

Rokossovsky also pointed to a reduced degree of responsibility on the part of commanders, when a HQ representative was in their entourage and bound them hand and foot. (6)

K.K. Rokossovsky had every reason to express that view about HQ representatives, what with Red Army artillery chief N.N. Voronov serving two months as the representative to the Don Front, of which Rokossovsky was the commander, during the Stalingrad operation, when he helped with arty and arty ammunition.

After the war front commanders I.S. Konev and A.I. Yeremenko declared that HQ representatives had been unnecessary, being an excessive intermediate echelon, particularly during front-scale operations. Their constant presence at command and control posts, in combined units and units frequently fettered front commanders and staffs, complicating their work and distracting them from their duties.

As seen by the present writer, it was Stalin who brought into being the HQ representatives institution, which tallied with his leadership methods and his regime. Had Marshal G.K. Zhukov, for one, been the Supreme Commander, there would have been no need for them. But then the country would have been different, as would the conditions inside it.

Stalin determined the entire activities of the HQ and the General Staff, which depended on his disposition and leadership methods. While working on a decision or considering important warfare issues, he would summon officials, who had a direct relation to maters in hand, and, often with participation of some Politburo and State Defense Committee members, would adopt the necessary decisions, which were immediately turned into HQ directives, orders or instructions.

The Headquarters never assembled in full. Its membership was purely symbolic. A.M. Vassilevsky, Chief of General Staff for nearly three years, was not a SHCHQ member. *

After the Stalingrad battle Stalin tended to give more attention to the General Staff's opinions. During operation planning, HQ representatives were asked for their views and front commanders were summoned to Moscow to report their plans. At the same time, the Supreme Commander frequently disagreed with operation timeframes, occasionally insisting that operations be completed by a certain date, such as February 23, May 1, or November 7.

Writes Army General M.A. Gareyev: "The matter with Stalin, like with other politicians (as, for example, K.E. Voroshilov, D.F. Ustinov), who at different times conceitedly meddled in military issues, was that they, knowing not what fighting forces were all about, lacked any command and control experience, were totally unable to fancy how events could really develop in the wake of political decision-making, and, hence, military incompetence of decisions and assignment of unrealistic missions to forces." (7)

A case in point is a telephone conversation between 2nd Ukrainian Front Commander Marshal R.Y. Malinovsky and Stalin in late October 1944. Malinovsky was asking permission to postpone his attack on Budapest by five days in order to have time enough to prepare the operation and wait until the arrival of the 4th Mechanized Corps that was due to reinforce the 46th Army. He assured Stalin: "If you give me five days now, in the subsequent days, five days at the most, Budapest will be taken." But the other man replied this: "I categorically order you to attack Budapest the very next day." (8) The ill-prepared operation proved unsuccessful, the fighting for Budapest dragging on till February 1945.

In the last year of the war, despite the strategic advantage on the fronts, the HQ, obeying Stalin's orders, urged the soonest possible rout of the German forces cut off in the Crimea, the Baltic area, and East Prussia--on the motive that it was necessary for enabling the adjacent fronts to push an advance and for achieving definite military-political goals.

Six fronts counting a total of 3.5 million officers and men had to push the enemy out, to break through deliberate defenses and lines of strongly fortified positions, to storm fortresses, to engage in fierce fighting and suffer immense losses. In the East Prussian operation alone the losses added up to 584,000, over 126,000 of these irrevocable.

Major enemy forces could be reliably blocked and destroyed mostly by artillery fire and air strikes; redeployment by sea could be interdicted by massed Air Force and Navy attacks.

The General Staff was the Headquarters' main working body, doing the entire amount of work connected with the strategic direction of the Armed Forces; simultaneously it was the main operational-strategic C&C body. In effect, the General Staff performed many functions of the SHC Headquarters. It organized and pursued collection and analysis of situational information, prepared reports and proposals for the Supreme Commander, directed fronts, planned crucial operations, determined objectives for the Air Force and the Navy, coordinated their actions, organized delivery of manpower and material resources to the fighting forces, planned military transport movements, and prepared daily situational reports for the Supreme Commander.

As suggested above, the General Staff for long periods operated in the absence of its chief, A.M. Vassilevsky, who was permanently out to the front as a HQ representative. (He came to Moscow when the Supreme Commander called him and stayed just a few days a month.) Of course, he was constantly in touch with the General Staff, but he was unable to run the shop on the daily basis. In practice, this was done by his first deputy, A.I. Antonov. While organizing command and control of forces, the General Staff often found itself in a quandary: its proposals had to be coordinated with the Chief of General Staff and confirmed or approved by Stalin, a circumstance that complicated its work and reduced its efficiency.

Other military leaders, commanders of the services and of the combat arms, too, were involved in the wartime direction of the Armed Forces. The People's Commissariat of the Navy exercised overall direction of naval operations, gave aid to front and fleet commanders in using forces and organizing teamwork of naval and land forces, particularly in amphibious assault operations, and provided for combat activities of the Navy.

The Air Force commander directed the Air Force, organized air operations and joint actions of air armies during operations that involved several fronts, reinforced air combat forces by redeploying air armies and bringing in new air units, as well as supervised basing and material and technical support.

Commanders (chiefs) of Artillery, Air Defense, Armor, and Engineer Troops sent proposals to the Headquarters and the General Staff on how to use their respective combat arms or to reinforce fronts, supervised training of new combined units and units, and dealt with many other issues.

In peacetime, the People's Commissariat of Defense was in charge of military-political, operational and administrative matters; in wartime it mostly provided the Armed Forces with manpower resources and material.

With Stalin simultaneously holding the positions of Supreme Commander and People's Commissar of Defense, there was no need for any preliminary clearance of proposals, something that enhanced promptness of direction. Decisions on operational-strategic employment of the Armed Forces were given the form of HQ directives and instructions, and administrative matters, that of orders of the People's Commissar of Defense. The Supreme Commander directly controlled the General Staff.

At the present time the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation is a federal executive authority, which pursues State policy and engages in State administration in matters of defense. One of its main tasks is providing monetary funds and other resources to the Armed Forces. The Defense Minister is assigned numerous administrative-political functions. As the present writer sees it, a more clear-cut delimitation of duties between the Defense Minister and Chief of General Staff will assist prompt direction of the Armed Forces in peace-time and wartime.

Today, Russia has peacetime Supreme Commander. I believe, the General Staff should operate under his direction and chiefly engage in preparing the Armed Forces and planning their employment while repelling an aggression. Being the Headquarters' operational-strategic body, it is due to realize its goals within an administrative structure resembling its own wartime counterpart. This will enable Chief of General Staff to acquire the necessary skills for cooperation with the Supreme Commander. He will directly report his proposals, thus securing prompter decision-making and an efficient direction of the Armed Forces. Neither will he have to daily clear the matters of AF employment with the Defense Minister.

The wartime direction of all troops and forces involved in an operation was a centralized one, with commanders-in-chief (commanders) and their staff in charge of C&C during military (combat) operations. Various command groups were created on extremely rare occasions. This circumstance is of importance even today and the tendency to forget it, as is evident from latter-day combat experience, leads to setbacks and excessive casualties.

For example, the command and control system lacked clarity at the time of the Soviet interference in Afghanistan and combat operations by the 40th Army. The army remained subordinated to the Commander of the Turkestan Military District, but actually it was controlled by a command group of the USSR Defense Ministry and for some time even by the chief military adviser of the Supreme Council of Afghanistan and later by the C-in-C of the Southern Sector. The District command mostly was in charge of all-out support, manning and materiel.

Defense Minister D.F Ustinov never visited Afghanistan. It was only thanks to the fact that there were experienced generals, such as S.L. Sokolov and V.I. Varennikov, heading the USSR Defense Ministry command group that it proved possible to promptly deal with many problems and avoid excessive losses.

During the Russian army's combat operations in Chechnya, particularly between 1994 and 1996, the command and control system had many faults: it lacked clarity and was extremely arcane. The direction of forces was entrusted to the command of the North Caucasian Military District, the Interior Ministry (Internal Troops), the Defense Ministry, the FSB, as well as ad hoc commands of force groupings. The absence of centralized control led to unprepared and uncoordinated actions and unjustified losses.

Today, in organizing the strategic direction of the Armed Forces, we should proceed primarily from an evaluation of the international situation and an extent of threats to Russia's security.

As is evident from the record of the Great Patriotic War, the system of strategic direction and its bodies--Supreme Command Headquarters and commands of strategic sectors--should be created in good time and prepared to perform their duties in peacetime. Then at the start of military operations they will be able to control the troops (forces).

The conversion to the three-service structure of the Armed Forces does not mean that the Air Force and the Air Defense Troops will operate on their own in their sphere and that they will be controlled in a centralized fashion from Moscow. Today it is an unthinkable proposition.

Currently all military districts are on the border with other States. This country's military-administrative division chiefly coincides with the military-strategic sectors. Staffs of military districts should be the bodies of operational-strategic direction in these sectors, bodies that in wartime will control all forces, including the Air Defense Troops, the Air Force, as well as units and combined units of other power structures deployed in the district. It also makes sense to create a unified rear support system to cater to all these structures in strategic sectors and corresponding command and control elements.

To wage large-scale military operations, it is necessary to have different reserves. Their preparation might be entrusted to the commander-in-chief of the Land Forces and commanders of wartime military districts. It is the latter that do most mobilization, material support and training work.

As I see it, the commander-in-chief of the Land Forces (who does not participate in combat command and control) and military district commanders (operational commands) might be made responsible for national (district) air defense and for territorial defense. The Air Force should hand the Air Defense Troops over to the chief command of the Land Forces. In my view, surface-to-air missile forces will be the main antiaircraft weapon, while tactical air defense elements have a lot of surface-to-air missile systems. Military district (front) commanders shall organize air defenses of forces and facilities. Faced with an aggression, they should direct efforts to rebuff the enemy's attack and air strikes and control all troops in a particular sector.

Operational-strategic exercises in sectors should be systematic rather than held once every six years. These should test combat readiness, operational employment of forces and teamwork with military units of other ministries and agencies.

The staffs of military districts and operational formations (armies) should be the backbone of the entire command and control system.

Stand-by units should immediately react to threats in emergencies. Exercises ought to train their operations.

One cannot agree with the existing view that military successes are unconnected with commanders' one-man decisions and that only company commanders take decisions on their own whereas all higher-level ones are collective. Of course, the process involves deputy commanders (C-in-C), as well as chiefs of different services, combat arms, and the special forces; it also uses automated control systems. But in this case, too, the commander (C-in-C) takes the decision personally and bears personal responsibility for its results.

It should be noted in conclusion that not all the strategic direction methods tested in the last war will be fit for 21st-century operations. Already today an effective command and control endeavor requires a modern command and control system based on automated command posts, real-time space reconnaissance assets, ramified communications networks and a reliable radio navigation system. These command and control assets will in turn require that combined-arms commanders and staffs possess a higher level of professionalism.

* It was only on February 17, 1945, that a State Defense Committee order had A.M. Vassilevsky, A.I. Antonov and N.A. Bulganin put on the SHCHQ.

NOTES:

(1.) B. Muller-Gillebrand, Sukhoputnaya armiya Germaniyi. 1933-1945, Book 3, Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p. 17.

(2.) I. Stalin, O Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine Sovetskogo Soyuza, 5th edition, Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, Moscow, 1952, p. 39.

(3.) Velikaya Otechestvennaya voina 1941-1945, Book 1, Surovyye ispytaniya, Izdatel'stvo "Biblioteka", "Mosgorarkhiv", Moscow, 1995, p. 259.

(4.) I. Bagramyan, I. Vyrodov, "Rol' predstavitelei stavki VGK v gody voiny. Organizatsiya i metody ikh raboty," Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal, No. 8, 1980, pp. 25-33.

(5.) Quoted from: A.K. Sulyanov, Marshal Zhukov, Harvest Publishers, Minsk, 2002, pp. 398-399.

(6.) Ibidem.

(7.) M.A. Gareyev, Neodnoznachnyye stranitsy voiny, Moscow, 1995, p. 280.

(8.) M. Gorbunov, "Marshal Malinovsky," Sovetskaya Rossiya, 12 April 1985; M.A. Gareyev, "Marshal Malinovsky," Krasnaya Zvezda, 18 April 2000.

Lt. Gen. Ye.I. MALASHENKO (Ret.)

Yevgeny Ivanovich MALASHENKO was born in 1924. Joined the USSR Armed Forces in 1941. During the Great Patriotic War was with the fighting forces, commanding a platoon, a reconnaissance company, and reconnaissance units of a naval rifle brigade, a rifle division, and an airborne division. After the war graduated from M.V. Frunze Military Academy and General Staff Academy. Held positions as deputy chief of staff of a corps, an army, and a military district. Headed the command group at the staff of the Special Corps in Budapest in 1956 and the staff of the Chief Military Adviser in Egypt after the Six-Day Arab-Israeli War in 1967. Subsequently held positions as chief of staff of the Carpathian Military District, and deputy chief of staff of the Joint Armed Forces of the member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Was on the central staff of the Defense Ministry and a consultant at the Center of Operational-Strategic Studies of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.