Wars of the 21st century.

Leading military experts (and not only they) have constantly been trying to predict the character and content of future wars. Politicians, diplomats, historians, scientists, and even people in the arts have been making their forecasts. The events in the Persian Gulf and Yugoslavia, the U.S.-led antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan, and other armed conflicts have once again drawn attention to this problem, prompting an upsurge in publications.

So, according to Western analysts, the new generation of wars is characterized by the absence of the classic armed confrontation between two or several states. In it, a country or a group of countries are involved in a military standoff with terrorist formations that do not directly belong to any particular state. This is the fourth generation of wars (in Western classification) that have come to replace armed conflicts with the use of high-tech weapons (Iraq, Yugoslavia) that in turn followed colonial and world wars; this also refers to so-called liberation armies, drug cartels, crime syndicates, religious extremists, and other suchlike organizations. Experts believe that with large-scale terrorist activity classic weapons and methods warfare, characteristic of an entirely different generation of conflicts, cannot be used effectively. On the other hand, the state should be ready to ensure a firm defense of its territory, to which end it is necessary to have specially trained armed forces.

The author of the recently published book, Beskontaktnyye voyny (Stand-off Wars), (1) proposes classifying more than 15,000 wars and armed conflicts in the history of civilization by generations (five in all), defining and analyzing sixth-generation wars--stand-off wars. While the author's classification can on the whole be accepted, the definition of stand-off wars--as well as the term itself--does not quite reflect the possible character of warfare in the 21st century.

Stand-off wars are defined as combat operations without direct participation by ground forces. Stand-off weapons mainly include precision offensive and defensive conventional weapons, weapons based on new physical principles, information weapons, and EW assets. The strategic objective of such wars is to destroy the economic capacity of an adversary state in a stand-off mode.

This definition arouses a number of questions. First of all, one of the parties to armed confrontation will most likely still be in contact, if not with ground forces of a stronger state or a coalition of states, then definitely with air assets. Second, the use of stand-off weapons against a weaker enemy is also applicable to fifth-generation wars (nuclear wars). There is no need for direct engagement of ground forces to deliver nuclear strikes as a means of destroying the economic capacity of a non-nuclear state.

We have already gotten over an obsession with the ultimate weapon. The Soviet military-political leadership of the early 1960s, in placing a bet on development of nuclear missiles, made some really fantastic force development plans, in particular proposing to maintain only reinforced border troops and strategic rocket forces. The subsequent course of events showed the erroneousness of such approaches to ensuring the country's military security while the Soviet Union's direct or indirect involvement in local wars and armed conflicts required an appropriate development of general-purpose forces.

The war in the Persian Gulf marked a watershed in the evolution of weapons and the military art, prompting an in-depth analysis of the character and content of future high-tech wars. While not on the whole denying the decisive role of modern weapons (with other conditions being equal for the opponents) in achieving a victory, it is essential to point out that in the course of combat operations by the multinational force, missiles and guided air bombs accounted for a mere 7.62 percent of the total airborne weapons used. (2)

The use by Iraq of Scud operational/tactical missiles and the insufficient effectiveness of Patriot antiaircraft missile launchers in repulsing Iraqi missile strikes against Israel, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia as well as the development by Iraq of super-powerful artillery systems (the Babylon program), capable of reaching Israeli territory, show that countries with a relatively low scientific/production base can, with assistance from foreign specialists, create models of weapons and military equipment that pose a serious threat not only to contiguous states but also to others, located at a considerable distance.

All of the aforementioned suggests that stand-off wars of the 21st century could become "contact wars" for any states. The use of particular weapon systems will to a very large extent be predicated on the cost-effectiveness factor. Analysis of the character and content of local wars and armed conflicts in the past 15 years with possible long-term scenarios (including the role and place of ground troops in conflicts that may arise in the future) shows that the main factor in the scale of ground force employment (including special forces) will be the military-political and military-strategic objectives of states involved in an armed conflict.

Considering the million-strong armies in the world today and the outstanding territorial, ethnic, and religious contradictions, there is good reason to say that ground troops in the 21st century will take an active part in armed confrontation on continental theaters of operation. Furthermore, all wars sooner or later end in a political settlement--the signing of appropriate peace agreements. To enforce law and order and to ensure a stable postwar settlement, there is a need for a contingent of ground troops capable of ensuring the conduct of humanitarian operations, fair democratic elections under international supervision, payment of reparations, the work of an international tribunal, etc.

Analysis of the development, production volumes, and existing stockpiles of weapons and military equipment suggests that in the period until 2015-2020, high-tech military operations are likely to be conducted only by industrially developed countries as part of relatively short-term local and regional wars.

In the event of outbreak of large-scale wars, the technological level will decline considerably since their conduct will require full-scale mobilization activities, including the provision of troops with arms and military equipment in storage. The latter, in all states without exception, contain a substantial part of obsolete models. The initial period of a large-scale war with participation of industrially developed countries will be characterized by high-tech military operations. Then, as strategic reserves are deployed, the level of technology will decline, and it is only subject to the warring states' economies being put on a war footing, including the production of modern arms and military equipment, that one of the subsequent periods of the war can see a basically new quality of warfare.

In the 2020-2040 period, high-tech military operations by industrially developed states in large-scale wars will be possible while Third World countries will be able to wage them for a relatively short time. In the second half of the 21st century, we should expect a technological breakthrough in weapon systems.

Taking a realistic view of the ongoing political processes in the world and the evolution of arms, military equipment, and forms and methods of warfare, it would be reasonable to propose a new name to sixth-generation wars--"selective engagement wars." True, it is only applicable to local and regional wars waged by industrially developed countries. In large-scale wars characterized by decisive objectives, "selectivity" can at any critical moment give way to nuclear strikes and total destruction. So "selectivity" in large-scale wars has a rather high degree of uncertainty. It may not be present in local and regional wars waged by Third World countries.

The selectivity of engagement applies to: the physical destruction of enemy personnel, arms and military equipment, and industrial enterprises; the timing of the destruction, and the use of particular weapon systems.

Selectivity in the physical destruction of enemy personnel assumes that, based on continuous monitoring, the civilian population and military personnel of an opposing state (a coalition of states) are divided into three groups: implacable enemies, the vacillating element, and those refusing to fight. Military action will be preceded by an active informational and psychological impact on the population and armed forces of an opposing side with the aim to maximally increase the number of the last named and to reduce the number of the implacable, who are subject to neutralization (elimination) with the use of military force. The operation will receive broad coverage in the media, as a limited and brilliantly executed combat action. In other words, B.L. Hart's indirect action strategy, positing that today's adversary will become your customer tomorrow, and your ally the day after tomorrow, will, to a certain degree, be translated into reality.

Selectivity in destroying enemy arms and military equipment consists above all in an automated identification of the most dangerous targets and their effective engagement priorities.

Selectivity in destroying industrial enterprises consists in the identification of key targets and consecutive effective engagement of enemy industrial capacities for the production of weapons and essential equipment, thus creating conditions for a political settlement based on categorical demands.

Selectivity in the timing of destruction presupposes that existing reconnaissance, target designation, navigation and command and control systems, combined with highly effective weapon systems, can ensure a victory over any adversary within a set time frame.

Selectivity in employment of particular weapon systems is characterized by the possibility of a broad selection of weapons based on the cost-effectiveness principle, prioritization of the use of effective engagement, EW, and camouflage, concealment, and deception assets, and weapons maneuver.

Higher selectivity of effective engagement is predicated on increase in the proportion of artificial intelligence in prospective models of reconnaissance, command and control and precision weapons as well as military purpose robots. Successes already achieved in the development of sea and air launched precision cruise missiles and experience in the successful combat use of strike unmanned aerial vehicles show that over time the role of unmanned military assets in effective engagement will be growing exponentially. This will be especially typical in the performance of special missions involving the use of fully autonomous intellectual strike systems that can independently identify, select, and engage targets ensuring the necessary level of concealment, element of surprise, and secrecy. Such actions enable the top military-political command not to assume responsibility for them or comment on ongoing events. Unmanned aerial vehicles take on special significance in connection with their further miniaturization an d expansion in the sphere of their combat employment. Thus the United States has achieved considerable success in developing super-small Microstar unmanned aerial vehicles. (3)

There is no doubt that various types of cruise missiles and strike and special-purpose unmanned aerial vehicles have a number of substantial advantages over manned aerial vehicles: a long flying time regardless of the combat situation on the ground or accelerative forces; all-weather capability; a set level of "combat proficiency;" and the absence of the survival instinct. Nonetheless, it would be wrong to go as far as to diminish the role of manned aviation in wars of the 21st century. Combat employment of strike aviation will substantially supplement the capability for selective engagement with unmanned assets. Manned aerial vehicles will continue to perform the whole range of airlifting tasks, also retaining a considerable part of reconnaissance, early radar warning and command and control, EW, and anti-aircraft functions.

So, possible regional and local wars in the 21st century will be characterized by a measure of "selectivity" in the conduct of combat operations, the brunt of them (especially at the initial period of war) borne by air and air-defense forces while the extent of participation by other branches of service will be predicated on military-political objectives and the scale of combat operations. An effective employment of modern and prospective air-defense weapon systems, camouflage, concealment, and deception and EW assets can substantially reduce the effectiveness of various types of aviation, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles used by the enemy. The U.S. withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty, the ongoing proliferation of missile technology, and the development of new combat aerial vehicles capable of flying in the atmosphere and circumterrestrial space at hypersonic speeds objectively necessitate the creation of a unified air-space defense system, built around weapons based on new physical principles.

The development and employment of weapons based on new physical principles will without a doubt bring about a revolution in the military art, which, however, should not be exaggerated. Thus, instability of the earth's atmosphere (the presence of clouds, heavy precipitation, fog and haze conditions, dust storms, etc.), the use of aerosols and artificial vapor screens impose substantial limitations on the use of laser weapons. Electronic and EW elements of combat systems can be disabled by powerful electromagnetic impulse generators (super-computers). Nonetheless, their action can be neutralized by a powerful counter radiation or preemptive use of microwave weapon systems. Such limitations also apply to other types of weapons based on new physical principles. So, even in the 21st century, the importance of modem weapon systems should not be exaggerated.

Most military experts believe that future warfare will be characterized by highly maneuverable action without a clear-cut front line, with open flanks. Point-of-action operations with an extensive use of various types of assault forces and airmobile troops combined with a rapid advance by the main attack force along particular lines of advance will be typical. At the same time it is important to note that in the next few decades the use of microwave weapons and super generators can substantially disable many types of transport and fighting vehicles, turning modern communication, command and control, and navigation systems literally into a pile of junk. There will still be no clear-cut front line. Point-of-action operations will be characterized by fierce fighting

for well organized positions and fortified areas, protected against EW systems. Any troop movement and redeployment will require a substantial amount of support assets.

All wars will still be characterized by: a trend to wage wars by a coalition of states; effective engagement of rear-service installations, industrial enterprises, and communication lines across the enemy's territory; active information warfare; the use of indirect methods and forms of impact on the armed forces and the country as a whole; combat operations and air campaigns; and the use of stand-off EW and weapon systems.

In light of the latest developments connected with the U.S. efforts to eliminate terrorist organizations throughout the world, there is good reason to believe that we are becoming witness to the outbreak of, and indirect participants in, World War III--a low-intensity world war. It will likely have a protracted character, including, along with antiterrotist operations that will be slowly growing into antiterrorist campaigns, operations to eliminate capacities to produce weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery; to overthrow political regimes sponsoring terrorism (including simply uncooperative political regimes); to stop arms trafficking; to ensure unhindered access to energy sources; to ensure a "just" territorial division; to promote "democratic transformations;" to protect ethnic minorities and groups, and to combat drug trafficking and piracy; various forms of psychological warfare, and so forth.

It seems that the titanic efforts by the United States to ensure domination over all countries in the 21st century are doomed. The U.S. resolve to wipe out terrorist organizations and forces posing a threat to national security will be a major factor in the high conflict potential in the world, to some extent or other defining the character (content) of wars in the 21st century. Clearly, the fight against international terrorism is not so much about massed air strikes or operations by special forces (especially on a worldwide scale) as a reasonable policy oriented not toward hegemony but toward mutually beneficial cooperation and the priority of universal human values and objectives.

NOTES:

(1.) V.I. Slipchenko, Beskontaktnyye voyny, Grand-Press Publishers, Moscow, 2001, p. 384.

(2.) V.V. Panov, V.I. Gaykalov, A.F. Goloborodov et al. Sovremennyoe vooruzheniye v voyne, Moscow, 1994, P. 284.

(3.) Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye, No. 3, 1999, p. 65.