WHY APPROVE A BOND IF THERE AREN'T RESULTS?

Byline: Jon Coupal

IT seems that every day we hear another disappointing report about some California school district falling short on the promises it made to voters to convince them to approve new school bonds and higher property taxes.

From Sacramento to Los Angeles, San Rafael to Murrieta Valley, the story is the same. Unexpected construction cost increases are blamed for an inability to fulfill the compact with voters for school construction and improvement.

The most extreme example comes from the Los Angeles Community College District.

In 2001 the LACCD rushed to take advantage of the newly passed Proposition 39, which reduced the vote required to increase property taxes for school bonds from two-thirds to 55 percent. At the cost to the average homeowner of a ``latte or two a month,'' the district chancellor said community colleges would be refurbished, seismic improvements would be made to existing campuses and new classrooms built.

Within a year after the voters generously agreed to increase property taxes to help Los Angeles-area community colleges, district officials made a stunning announcement. There would not be enough money to complete the promised building program. They would, in fact, come up $1 billion short - a cost miscalculation of nearly 85 percent.

So voters were told that if they would just approve one more bond, then all projects would be completed, including state-of-the-art culinary arts facilities and sports stadiums. And in 2003, with much less enthusiasm and by a much smaller margin, voters again agreed to increase taxes on property owners.

Now, barely more than two years after the second bond was approved, district officials are admitting that they will not be able to meet the expectations they, themselves, raised.

Yet this time, whether from fear of a public backlash, or a genuine desire to show the public they can make good use of funds already provided, LACCD officials are not yet asking for another bond. Perhaps they recognize that with their current shaky record of performance, a new bond at this time would have a snowball's chance in the hot place, even with the help of Proposition 39's easier passing standard.

Regardless of their motivation, the decision not to proceed with a third bond is prudent. Now district administrators will be forced to carefully prioritize capital needs and complete as much as they can with the money they have.

It is a lesson that should be carefully considered by school officials around the state.

No one disputes the rising building costs that school districts routinely cite as an explanation for the poor results. Rapidly increasing real-estate values make purchasing land for new classrooms more expensive every day. And a worldwide boom in construction is driving up the cost of materials. But there is a point at which these increased costs stop being a legitimate excuse and start being a post hoc rationalization for bad management and hyped-up marketing.

Moreover, the timing is suspect. Many of the school districts that are now forced to scale back their efforts passed bonds within the last several years, much too recently to claim ignorance of cost escalation realities.

While there are almost always cost increases associated with any project, the fact is that this can be anticipated in the budget. However, some school officials apparently fear that presenting realistic cost accounting will detract from the rosy scenario they would prefer to present to the public.

So the approach seems to be: Promise the moon and the stars to get a bond passed and worry about fulfillment later.

But costs have gone up for taxpayers, too, and increasingly, the public's willingness to approve new bonds will be tied to a school district's performance in handling the proceeds of previous measures.

School districts need to understand that a little more honesty and a little less hype will go a long way in maintaining credibility with the voting public.