Using underground facilities in urban warfare.

Troops used underground service lines and structures for centuries, doing that as far back as the Roman and Byzantine empires. Already at that time there were undermining tunnels made under fortifications. The Russian army led by Ivan IV (The Terrible) made a skilful use of this tactics while storming Kazan (1552).

The topicality of this theme today is connected with considerable proliferation of cities and urban population numbers. Major populated localities tend to "sprawl" and expand their territory. Modern-day urbanization is characterized in particular by a transition from a compact ("pinpoint") town to urban agglomerations, urban- and rural-type territorial entities. By the last decade of the 20th century, Russia, for one, had nearly 50 agglomerations, which comprised one-third of all cities and were inhabited by approximately 65 million people.

The infrastructure complex is of much importance in city planning, with some of its elements (rail, motor, pipeline, electronic, cable suspension, etc.) having much influence on methods of urban warfare. Frequently, the sewerage, water supply, as well as heat supply system is a concealed but quite ramified network existing several meters below the earth surface. There are entire underground streets and districts, which have the same function as blood vessels do in a human body. Using these structures enables troops to rapidly transfer forces and assets from one area to another without being observed, and to penetrate the depth of dispositions of the opposing side.

The Soviet military art attached much importance to organization and conduct of warfare with reliance on underground service lines. For example, the late 1930s saw publication of Manual on Siegecraft Mine Operations for the Engineer Troops.

The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 brought about a reappraisal of goals and conditions of underground warfare. Published in early 1942, Siegecraft Mine Operations and Mine Warfare, a manual for the engineer troops, defined the main elements of field underground and mine structures, sequence of operations, and methods of organizing for mine attacks and mine defense. While storming Berlin in 1945, the Soviet troops successfully used underground service lines for sending assault teams and raiding and reconnaissance parties to the enemy rear.

As is to be regretted, the experience of fighting inside underground service lines and structures the Soviet army gained during the Stalingrad battle, the Vistula-Oder, Koe nigsberg, Budapest and Berlin operations undeservedly sunk into oblivion after introduction of nuclear weapons.

NATO military experts, on the contrary, regarded and continue to regard exploration of uses that troops can make of underground service lines and structures in the course of street fighting as a priority in advancing the military art. They timely revise the tactical standards for motorized and tank units and amend classifications of urban buildings, structures and their underground service lines subject to the nature and specific features of an architectural ensemble, layout, and building materials and constructions used. For example, research conducted at U.S. and West German training centers of the land forces resulted in the drafting and introduction, in 1979, of two field manuals: FM 90-10. Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (Division--Brigade), and FM 90-10-1. An Infantryman's Guide to Urban Combat (Brigade--Battalion).

In the opinion of U.S. and West German military specialists, a combination of hard perimeter and mobile defense of cities, as well as control of their interconnecting services systems will provide defenders with an opportunity, given adequate fire support, to pin down considerable forces of an advancing enemy. This will make it possible to attain operational, and during defense of major cities strategic, goals of a defensive operation. Combat (field) manuals of the U.S. Land Forces and of the West German Bundeswehr advise commanders of motorized infantry units to use underground service lines in order to outflank (envelop) enemy motorized rifle and tank units "from under ground" (practicing so-called elastic compression of combat formations by underground service lines and subsequent "spring" impact). After that the units are blocked from the flanks, cut off from the main forces, and engaged by fires. A particular focus is on controlling exits from underground service systems. These must be mined and demolish ed in the face of enemy penetration (both in and out). Buildings, to which the systems lead, should be demolished (set on fire) as well.

Since 1993, NATO land forces experts concentrated on exploring the ways of enhancing effectiveness of grouptactics in urban conditions. Reinforced motorized infantry (infantry) battalion (company) is the U.S. and FRG land forces' main tactical units for mobile defense ("retrograde operations") in populated localities, suburbs, city fringes, industrial areas, and in other sparsely built areas. Reinforced infantry company split into garrisons of defended (captured) buildings (facilities) and mobile groups (1) are designated to pursue offensive and defensive actions on urbanized terrain, which includes movement-arresting low-rise residential areas or "the private sector," as well as densely built high-rise areas.

The Russian Armed Forces have gained much experience of fighting inside underground service lines in the course of two Chechen campaigns. Street fighting in Grozny, Argun, Shah, Bamut, Komsomolskoye, Tando, Karamakhi and Chabanmakhi shows that the side, which can make a skilful use of underground structures and service lines, is much superior to its adversary in degree of protection, mobility, and the capability for timely concentration of forces and assets in the right place and at the decisive moment.

As the present writers see it, the illegal armed formations (IAF) in the first Chechen campaign outdid the federal troops in using tactics of perimeter defense of buildings (structures) and assault and raiding parties. For example, after beating back one or two attacks by a tank-reinforced motorized rifle unit, they would withdraw to neighboring buildings (structures) via underground service lines. When a motorized rifle unit started massing in a captured structure, they would briefly open preparation fire by shooting several rounds from RPG-7 grenade launchers at the windows and then would counterattack from several directions along underground service lines, having posted snipers to block routes of retreat to neighboring buildings. In organizing ambushes, killing zones and tank traps, they made an extensive use of underground service lines to move to firing positions and withdraw from areas exposed to artillery and tank fire.

During the second Chechen campaign, the IAF improved their tactics of underground warfare. Reconnaissance, sniper, and raiding and assault parties increasingly often took active operations to urbanized terrain that had already been "mopped up" by the Interior Ministry's Internal Troops and OMON units, deftly moving by routes they had prepared in advance among ruins of houses. They often converted exits to the surface into shelters, dugouts, or permanent emplacements, thoroughly camouflaged them and protected with remotely controlled landmines. As estimated by the staff of the Joint Force, around two-thirds of losses were inflicted by snipers operating within such parties, who would fire from embrasures in basement walls, top-story windows and roofs.

Grozny's layout, both rectangular and circular-radial, was behind the manner, in which the IAF used city structures. Sparse housing of suburbs and dense, regular, combined housing of city outskirts was normally used in the course of defensive engagements as security areas and centers of resistance to cover with fire the routes leading to the city center and important infrastructure facilities.

Modern underground water, gas, and heat supply systems, sewerage, waste- and rain-water disposal system, ventilation systems of residential houses ("the private sector") are so made as to be accessible only at inspection and servicing points. In the rest of zones they are impassable in view of the small diameter of pipes (20 to 700 mm). The IAF converted stretches and tubes of these service lines into permanent emplacements and personnel shelters. Sections of pipelines passing under roads and dug-in reservoirs were filled with oil and used for starting fires. Access paths leading to them were mined and protected by sniper fire.

Organization of strong points in 2- to 4-story brick or prefab houses involved making manholes in basement walls at pipe inlets and connecting them with emplacements (trenches) dug in the yards in front of house facades. The majority of fire emplacements in buildings were supplied with reserve escape routes via basement manholes and holes in the floor (ceiling) of rooms. Stairwells were mined or demolished and exits were protected by sniper fire.

Turning and inspection pits of the inner-yard water supply system were converted into shelters for three or four riflemen, with their connecting trenches normally taken beyond the line of housing to neighborhood tubes of combined gas, heat, water supply, and sewerage systems that could be accessed by people.

Located in yards, air intakes of ventilation systems of high-rise apartment houses were converted to manholes opening into the air duct that led to the air ventilation chamber in the basement (or more infrequently in the attic). But the thin steel sheeting of ventilation skips inside buildings was a factor that not always allowed of personnel movement. Bigger in cross-section and volume, industrial ventilation systems provided for movements of IAF raiding and assault parties between centers of resistance.

The combat practice of the two Chechen campaigns shows that the rain sewerage system with its dense network of turning, washout, inspection and drop pits and storm-water inlets is best suited for movement of both raiding-reconnaissance and sniper parties and personnel of motorized rifle units. Exits from these can in good time be protected (blocked) by tank, IFV (APC) fire from ambushes. Zonal rain sewerage systems that comprise similar systems of blocks of houses, city districts and micro-districts may dump water both to reservoirs and sewage works located 1.5 to 2 kilometers from where an engagement is fought. In Grozny, this distance permitted movement by IAF detachments and groups between inside and outside lines of defensive positions. It must also be said that in places of outmost concentration of underground structures (street crossings, lanes branching off main roads and leading to blocks of houses and micro-districts), heat-, gas-, and water-supply lines are normally laid within a single tube.

For their part, federal troops used underground structures in populated localities predominantly for shelter. Basements of demolished houses possessing convenient exits were converted into firing positions and tank ambushes. Commanders of motorized rifle elements sought not to expose their men to unjustified risks, because often there was no updated intelligence, nor plans of underground communication lines. They also lacked requisite reconnaissance equipment and technology for underground navigation and command and control.

In the present conditions marked by the growing spatial scope of combat operations, it is necessary to look for fundamentally new forms and methods of fighting, including inside underground service lines. It makes sense in this connection to draw up regulations on conducting urban combat operations (combat) and reserve a chapter on tactics of warfare inside underground service lines. Specialized units ought to be trained in advance for this purpose too. As the present writers see it, the problem can be tackled by way of creating in the RF Armed Forces a center for training specialists on combat in underground service lines. In a combat situation, units and elements trained at the center may be assigned to combined arms units or operate on their own. Elements of this kind must have specialized radio transmitters for communication with "the surface" and with groups operating inside the service lines. They also are bound to have an instrument for finding their coordinates under ground. Besides, it is necessary to develop for them weapons and equipment, specifically instruments enabling detection and identification of service lines.

Of no small importance for organization of combat operations, command and control of forces and assets, and their orientation is providing the troops in good time with large-scale maps and street maps of cities and populated localities, which indicate underground service lines and describe them. A street map must be in color and detailed (at the 1:10 000 or 1:5 000 scale), and have names of streets, squares and important facilities printed on it. It is necessary to have a sufficient number of electronic maps, which in combination with satellite navigation systems make for reliable orientation in urban conditions and in certain cases inside underground service lines. They also assure real-time acquisition of highly precise data on the location of friendly troops.

Prospectively it makes sense to create a computerized center for control of underground structures as an element of a force pursuing combat operations (combat) to capture a city. Much importance will soon attach to robotized means of warfare in underground service lines.

We believe it is necessary to dwell separately on troop tactics involving the use of urban underground structures. In the first place, modern urban combat affords much broader opportunities for conducting reconnaissance in the enemy rear. Underground structures of medium-sized and big populated localities enable the sending of both single scouts and whole groups, including reconnaissance and raiding parties, to the enemy rear. They may conduct reconnaissance by visual observation, by probing, by making ambushes, and by raiding tactical command posts, dumps, and other targets.

It is of considerable importance to plan in advance, prepare and coordinate actions of units and combined units involved in a defensive engagement on the surface and those of elements attacking from underground service lines, something that makes it possible to cut off enemy battalion (regimental) second echelons (reserves), halt them in a definite area (a street, an avenue), and thus prevent their timely emergence on counterattack (counterpunch) lines. In an attack (counterattack), a thoroughly organized use of underground service lines will enable a single (double) turning movement (envelopment) vis-a-vis the adversary and disruption of routes whereby he brings in or evacuates his reserves.

Thus, the combat practice brings us face to face with the necessity of rethinking the role and importance of underground service lines in warfare.

To implement the above proposals, it is necessary to start teaching urban combat organization methods to military university students, attracting units and elements trained for operations using service structures.

NOTE:

(1.) FM 90-10-1. An Infantryman's Guide to Urban Combat, 1993, pp. 3-14, 3-19.