Upgrading military art during the second period of the Great Patriotic War.

Russia is getting ready to mark 60 years of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Preparations for the anniversary have been discussed at a meeting of the State Council chaired by the RF President. The head of state said in a statement: "It is not our historical memory alone that is connected with the Great Victory. Its legacy even today largely determines Russia's foreign policy positions. And, what is extremely important, young generations of our people are being brought up based on these heroic traditions." (1) Considering the fact that historians in Western countries have been inclined to play down the role of our army in defeating Nazi Germany, the President thus formulated one of the tasks of information work--it is necessary "to oppose the attempts to distort and revise the history of World War II and minimize our country's contribution to the smashing of Nazism." (2)

There are events replete with grandeur and drama in the history of the Great Patriotic War. Their true meaning and actual consequences have not been brought to light completely; this will take the efforts of more than one generation of military researchers. Some of these events include operations conducted by our forces in the second period of the war that took place in the course of two offensive campaigns in the winter of 1942-1943 and in the summer and fall of 1943.

Soviet Counteroffensive at Stalingrad

By the fall of 1942, the situation at the Eastern front was characterized by the end of the enemy's temporary superiority and the gaining by the Red Army of new experience in the conduct of combat operations and further strengthening of moral and political unity of the Soviet people. Despite the heavy damage done by the Nazis to the country's economy, putting it on a war footing was proceeding at an accelerated pace.

While the situation remained tense on the whole, favorable conditions were created by mid-November 1942 for defeating the enemy on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front. The Nazi forces, attempting to seize the sources of oil in the Caucasus and the areas in the lower reaches of the Volga, sustained heavy losses, lost their offensive momentum, became overextended on a long front and had to go over to the defensive everywhere. The Nazi command thought that, owing to its losses sustained in the summer and fall, the Red Army would not be able to launch major offensive operations in the south any time soon.

German troops of Army Group "B" faced, in November 1942, three Soviet fronts: the Southwestern, Don, and Stalingrad fronts. They brought together more than one million men, 13,500 artillery pieces and mortars, 979 tanks and self-propelled guns and 1,350 combat planes, i.e., these fronts had by the beginning of the counteroffensive roughly the same number of personnel as the Germans and exceeded the enemy by a factor of 1.4 in the number of tanks, by a factor of 1.3 in artillery pieces and mortars and by a factor of 1.1 in planes. Given such a balance of forces, it was only the great skill of the Soviet troops command that could ensure success in the conduct of the most important operation consisting in encircling a large force grouping of the enemy.

Preparations for the counteroffensive began with developing the concept of operation. The concept was a result of the many-sided creative efforts of the Supreme High Command Headquarters (Hq SHC), commands and headquarters of the armed services, components and fleets. Generals G.K. Zhukov, A.M. Vasilevskiy, N.N. Voronov, A.A. Novikov, and G.A. Vorozheykin took an active part in developing the plan of the operation. The counteroffensive was planned as a single strategic operation by a group of fronts to encircle and destroy all enemy forces that had broken through to the Volga. Essentially, the concept was to launch powerful attacks from the bases in Serafimovich, Kletskaya and the area of lakes south of Stalingrad in order to smash the flanks of the enemy force grouping and, continuing the advance along converging axes, to encircle and destroy the main enemy forces operating in the area of Stalingrad.

This was the first plan of a counteroffensive that called for establishing simultaneously an inner and an outer perimeter of envelopment. Operating on the inner perimeter were tank, mechanized and cavalry corps that were to push forward along the axes of main thrusts and complete the encirclement of the main enemy force grouping. Rifle and cavalry corps were assigned for operations on the outer perimeter of envelopment. The plan also called for one-echelon operational disposition of the fronts whereas the combined-arms armies were to employ a two-echelon disposition of forces.

As a result of the decisive massing of forces and fires along the axes of main thrusts of the fronts and armies they achieved a double and triple superiority in personnel and equipment which made it possible to launch a strong initial attack and successfully continue advance during the course of the operation. It was for the first time that we employed considerable armored forces. Also for the first time, a large-scale artillery offensive was prepared and carried into effect in support of the infantry and tanks. The planned duration of the artillery preparation was between 60 and 80 minutes and it was planned to support the attack using a method of successive fire concentration. The "air offensive" plan provided for involving the air armies including preliminary air strikes and support of troops in the operational depth.

Engineering preparations were planned for the fronts and armies and included engineering reconnaissance, preparation of the attack positions, the clearing of lanes through minefields, the construction of bridges and floating bridge crossings, the building of cross-country tracks and consolidation of seized positions. For the first time during the Great Patriotic War, it was decided to use mobile obstacle construction detachments to support the advance of tank corps. Much attention was paid during preparations for the counteroffensive to organizing cooperation, especially cooperation between the combat arms, command and control in all echelons, as well as to logistic support of the operation primarily with ammunition, fuel, food and warm clothing.

Compared to the Battle of Moscow, the organization of front and army offensive operations in the counteroffensive at Stalingrad had many new aspects signaling further development of military art. For example, the fronts and armies fully switched over to operations using strike forces, artillery and air offensives; the operational density increased appreciably and superiority in strength and assets was achieved. The fronts and armies received a powerful means for exploiting operational success in the shape of tank and mechanized corps while breakthrough artillery divisions were used for the first time. The depth of advance of combined-arms units was increased and transition was completed to the one-echelon tactical order of battle; artillery groups were reinforced for more powerful artillery preparations and artillery support of assaults.

The counteroffensive at Stalingrad--unprecedented in military history of the world--was a big achievement for Soviet military art. This was the Red Army's first successful strategic operation to encircle and destroy the enemy's main force by three fronts that were not greatly superior numerically to the enemy.

The Battle of Kursk 

The battle at the Kursk salient (bulge) in 1943 is usually believed to have had two phases: the defensive operation (5-23 July) and the counteroffensive (12 July-23 August). This distinction is conventional in a sense because the forces of the Voronezh Front and, beginning 12 July, part of the forces of the Steppe Front conducted defensive operations until 23 July. As for the forces of the Bryansk Front and the left wing of the Western Front, they were not directly involved in defensive operations at the Kursk Bulge. At the same time, their counteroffensive, begun on 12 July, had a great effect on the general course of the Battle of Kursk.

The second year of the most difficult war for our country with Nazi Germany was drawing to a close. By the mid- 1943, the Soviet troops successfully solved a number of strategic tasks and advanced 600-700 km westward improving their position along all fronts. The industry stepped up manufacture of military equipment and it was reaching the troops in growing amounts. The organizational structure of military units was also improving. The combined-arms armies were completing their transition to organizations based on corps, which meant better command and control. The armies now included organic artillery. Big artillery and mortar task forces of the High Command Reserve were being created. Armies of tanks of similar types were put together to replace the tank armies with mixed types. Now each army comprised two tank corps and one mechanized corps. Organizational changes continued in the air armies; qualitative improvements were being made in the special troops of the operational and combat rear services.

In the spring of 1943, Nazi Germany began hectic preparations for a summer offensive. It started production of new medium (Panther) and heavy (Tiger) tanks and the self-propelled Ferdinand gun, stepped up, in comparison to 1943, the production of artillery pieces, mortars and combat planes; it launched total mobilization to make up almost for all its casualties and lost weapons and military equipment.

Taking advantage of the absence of a second front in Europe, the Nazi command made plans to form on the Eastern Front a great concentration of fighting power for a major offensive in the summer of 1943 to regain the strategic initiative and turn the course of war in its favor. The Nazi strategists attached special importance to an offensive at Kursk where a bulge, formed during the 1943 winter campaign, extended over 550 km and protruded westward deep into the German defense lines. The Germans planned powerful attacks from the areas near Orel and Belgorod toward Kursk to surround and destroy the Soviet forces within the bulge. They also planned to smash our troops in the Donets Basin. They concentrated for the operation 50 divisions, including 16 motorized and armored divisions of about 900,000 troops, up to 10,000 artillery guns and mortars, 2,700 tanks and more than 2,000 planes, or roughly 70 percent of all their tank divisions and more than 65 percent of the combat planes operating at the entire Eastern Front.

The Hq SHC surmised the German attack and decided to use deliberate defense operations to exhaust and bleed dry the enemy attack forces before launching a decisive counteroffensive and totally defeat them. Defending the Kursk Bulge was tasked to the Central and Voronezh fronts that had more than 1.3 million men, 20,000 artillery guns and mortars, more than 3,300 tanks and self-propelled artillery guns and 2,650 planes. Concentrated behind in the interior areas were major strategic reserves that constituted the Steppe Front. The Soviets had a preponderance of both troops and weapons making it possible to build solid defenses and organize an offensive.

Unlike the defense of Stalingrad, the fronts had a two-echelon operational disposition of forces where tank armies for the first time formed the second echelon. In addition to second echelons, there were combined-arms, antitank artillery, engineer and other reserves. The armies mainly had a one-echelon operational disposition of forces. The firmness of the defense was enhanced by restoring to them the rifle corps which, as a rule, had a two-echelon disposition of forces. In addition, emerging as most important elements of the operational disposition of the armies' forces were reserves of different tasking designations, artillery groups and mobile obstacle construction detachments.

Appreciable changes took place in the structure of defense and engineering preparations of the terrain. It is significant that the organizers of defense at Kursk had the troops take up in advance the first three defense lines in the sectors of anticipated enemy operations (and front-echelon lines in the most important sectors).

Antitank defense was taken a step further when it was organized to the entire tactical depth and to the operational depth in the main sectors. The system of antitank defense included company defense strongholds that formed antitank areas, antitank obstacles, antitank artillery reserves, and mobile obstacle construction detachments. All types of artillery were called upon to combat tanks, including antiaircraft guns, mortars, tanks, infantry weapons and aircraft that dropped antitank bombs. Fire delivered by artillery and tanks formed the backbone of the antitank defense.

Spoiling attacks against enemy penetrations were to be mounted by the tank armies and corps in three to five sectors planned in advance. Separate tank and self-propelled artillery gun units were attached to combined-arms armies. They were as a rule employed in a centralized manner as mobile tank reserves of the commanders of the tank armies and even the commanders of rifle corps and divisions.

A new departure in the employment of artillery was its deep echelonment in important sectors, the planning of its counterpreparation fire well in advance, the creation of strong artillery antitank reserves, strong artillery groups in support of the infantry and long range artillery groups in armies and divisions defending in main sectors. A distinctive feature in the employment of the air forces consisted in that the staffs of the fronts preplanned counterpreparation by airstrike along with artillery counterpreparation fire.

The efforts of the engineer troops were primarily directed at creating a dense network of defensive installations and mined obstacles along the main axes of probable enemy main attacks and taking camouflage and concealment measures. The armies and fronts were supposed to have several mobile obstacle construction detachments. These detachments were also set up in the corps, divisions and even in regiments that were defending in the main sectors.

A distinguishing feature in the organization of command and control of troops was the siting of command and control centers much closer to the battle formations of subunits, units and combined units. The command posts of the combat arms and aviation were established close to the command posts of combined-arms chiefs with a wider use of radio stations.

The success of the (5-23 July) defensive operations was largely due to the Hq SHC strategic reserves set up behind the lines. This made it possible not only to extend the depth of defense but also build up forces in a prompt and timely manner in sectors where enemy troops were active, as well as to deliver powerful counterstrikes. A big role in it was played by broad and expeditious maneuvers of army and front troops and weapons.

An important role in combating enemy tanks was played by the antitank strongpoints, the far-flung network of antitank obstacles covered by artillery and infantry fire, antitank artillery reserves and mobile obstacle construction detachments.

The defensive operations at Kursk were characterized by massive employment of armored and mechanized troops. Not only did tank corps and armies mount spoiling attacks at breaking in enemy forces but, when necessary, they took up defensive positions in the depth which considerably increased the firmness of our defense. The artillery was as a rule used on a massive scale for a broad range of missions: to destroy enemy personnel, combat enemy artillery, tanks and aircraft and support counterattacks and spoiling attacks by the friendly forces. The scope of air operations widened significantly. The air armies concentrated their efforts on the main sectors of enemy operations, cooperated more closely with the combined-arms and tank armies. Long-range aviation was used on a broad scale. All this made possible to gain total air supremacy in operations.

The Orel offensive operation was held from 12 July to 18 August. Preparations for it were based on the fact that the fronts were for the first time to break through the prepared and disposed in depth enemy defense and exploit tactical success to achieve operational success at a rapid pace. That was preceded by a resolute massing of forces and fires in the sectors of main attacks, the creation of operational and tactical density of men and equipment and combat positions of troops disposed in depth; the armies formed breakthrough exploitation forces composed of one or two tank corps. Plans called for pressing with the offensive day and night. Unlike the Stalingrad counteroffensive, the corps, divisions, regiments and battalions in the main sectors were attacking in two and, sometimes, in three echelons. This made it possible to build up the power of strikes from the depth and timely exploitation of success. There were some changes made in the employment of tanks. Included in the tank groups of close infantry support were regiments of self-propelled artillery that were to follow the attacking tanks and support them with the fire from their cannons. In some armies, tanks were attached to rifle divisions of not only the first but also the second echelon of the corps. Tank corps constituted mobile groups of the armies and tank armies were for the first time considered for being used as mobile groups of the fronts.

The aviation was assigned the following tasks: to cover the troops of attack force groupings of the fronts during preparation and conduct of operations; to suppress pockets of resistance along the forward edge of the battle area and in the immediate operational depth and to disrupt the enemy command and control system; to support the initiation to combat of combined tank units and their actions in the operational depth; to combat arriving enemy reserves.

The counteroffensive was preceded by extensive preparations.

All the fronts had made good preparations of their attack positions, redeployed their forces, their units and combined units organized painstaking combat training in breaking through the enemy in-depth and strongly fortified defense and created big stockpiles of resources.

The offensive mounted by the Western and Bryansk Fronts compelled the enemy to divert part of its Orel force grouping from the Kursk sector. That created a favorable situation for a counterattack by the right wing of the Central Front. By the end of July, the forces of the three fronts outflanked the Orel force grouping of the enemy in the north, east and south. In its attempt to stave off the threat of encirclement, the German command began, on 30 July, to withdraw its troops from the Orel toehold. The Soviet troops began to pursue the enemy. In the morning of 4 August, the troops of the left wing of the Bryansk Front broke into Orel and freed it by the morning of 5 August. The same day, the Steppe Front troops liberated Belgorod. Taking Orel and Belgorod, our troops continued the offensive.

The Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation was carried out between 3 August and 23 August. An instructive point about the preparations for this operation was that the enemy became deluded as to the true direction of the main attack of our troops. From 28 July to 6 August, the 38th Army, operating on the right wing of the Voronezh Front, expertly simulated a concentration of a large group of forces in the Sumy sector. Not only did the Nazi command begin bombing the areas of presumed concentration of forces, it tied up in that sector its significant reserves. Remarkably, the operation was being prepared within a limited timeframe. Nevertheless, the troops of both fronts prepared well for the offensive and provided themselves with the necessary supplies.

As a result of the operation, the Soviet troops completed the destruction of the Belgorod-Kharkov enemy force grouping and took up an advantageous position for a general offensive to liberate the Right Bank of Ukraine and the Donets Basin. The enemy sustained irreparable losses and all its attempts to hold the strategic toeholds around Orel and Kharkov were thwarted.

The success of the operation was first of all attributed to the expert selection of the moment for our troops to launch the counteroffensive. It began when the main German offensive force groupings sustained huge losses and their offensive was in crisis. The success of the operation was also helped by skillful organization of strategic cooperation between groups of the fronts that were advancing in the western, southwestern and other sectors. This denied the Nazi command the possibility to redeploy the troops. Of enormous importance in achieving victory were also the major Hq SHC strategic reserves created in the Kursk sector that were used to continue the fronts' advance.

The Soviet troops for the first time solved the task of breaking through prepared and disposed in depth enemy defenses and of proceeding to exploitation the offensive success. This was possible through organizing powerful attack forces in the fronts and armies, the massing of men and equipment in breakthrough sectors and the presence in the fronts of tank strategic formations and the presence in the armies of major tank (mechanized) combined units. As the counteroffensive went on, the fronts and armies were gaining experience in repelling counterattacks of big enemy tank force groupings. This was done in close cooperation of all components of the Ground Troops and aviation. In order to stop and smash the enemy, the fronts and armies had part of their forces go over to the tough defensive and they simultaneously mounted a powerful attack on the flank and rear of the enemy counterattack force. As a result of the increased supplies of combat equipment and reinforcement means, tactical densities of our troops during the counteroffensive at Kursk doubled and tripled in comparison to the counteroffensive at Stalingrad. The command and control of troops improved due to siting the command and control facilities closer to the battle lines, the wide use of radio communications and the introduction of a corps-level command and control.

The counteroffensive at Kursk served to improve methods of employing various components of the Ground Troops and aviation. Tank and mechanized troops were used on a larger scale. In comparison with the counteroffensive at Stalingrad, the density of tanks in immediate support of infantry grew significantly higher with 15 to 20 tanks and self-propelled artillery guns per one kilometer of the front. They used for the first time at Kursk self-propelled artillery regiments that proved to be an effective means of support to tank and infantry attacks.

The employment of artillery had its distinguishing features: the density of artillery guns and mortars in the sectors of main attacks increased considerably; they eliminated the gap between the end of artillery preparation and the beginning of artillery support of the assault; artillery groups of the armies came to be divided into subgroups in accordance with the number of first-echelon corps; the rifle regiments now had, alongside the infantry support groups, direct fire artillery groups; destruction and demolition artillery groups were established not only in the armies but also in the corps operating in the main sectors.

The main tasks of the engineer troops were: the removal of obstacles, repairing and building of roads and bridges, clearing of landmines, protecting flanks, consolidation of captured positions and water obstacle crossing support.

Military art moved a notch up with respect to the employment of aviation. The Battle of Kursk saw a more resolute massing of front aviation and longrange aviation in the principal offensive sectors and their improved cooperation with the Ground Troops. "Air offensive," or offensive air support--a new form of employing aviation in offensive--was used to the full. The Soviet Air Force finally won and held the air supremacy and inflicted irreparable damage on the enemy air forces.

In the Battle of Kursk, our command demonstrated a creative and innovative approach to solving important tasks of strategy, operational art and tactics asserting their superiority over the military school of Nazi Germany. Greater progress was made in organizing strategic cooperation between groups of fronts and the employment of major reserves changed the situation in our favor. They gained experience in massing men and equipment in decisive sectors. The reorganized tank armies were employed for the first time as exploitation echelons. The creation and expert employment of strategic reserves was of major importance in achieving the objectives in defensive and offensive operations. They were not excessively dispersed, as it happened in the early period of the war. Instead, they were sent to the principal sectors at decisive moments, which made strategic success possible.

Successful solutions were found to such an important strategic task as selecting the direction of the main attack. The attack was directed at the strongest force grouping of the enemy, the smashing of which disrupted the firmness of the entire strategic front of the enemy, worsened the political situation and created advantageous conditions for the conduct of the entire campaign by our troops. The strategic level of C & C was characterized by greater centralization of control, very skillful timing of operations and choosing the most appropriate methods of combat. The Soviet command consistently built up the power of attacks and skillfully organized cooperation between fronts operating in one or several sectors.

The crushing defeat of the Nazi troops at the Kursk Bulge marked the major turning point in the course of the war. The Soviet troops broke the backbone of the Nazi army, foiled its attempts at revenge for its Stalingrad defeat and compelled it once and for all to strategic defense. The Red Army now had a firm grip on the strategic initiative.

It is more than 60 years since the end of the Battle of Kursk. Enormous geostrategic changes have taken place in the world over this period. The contents of warfare, including its forms and methods, have changed. The correlation between strategy, operational art and tactic is changing. Already now, the exploitation of the results of attacks with strategic weapons and completion of the defeat of enemy force groupings depends on the success of combat actions on the operational and tactical scale. In the future, there will be a strong linkage between the actions of a great number of armed services, component arms and special troops performing a great number of very complex and interconnected strategic, operational and tactical missions simultaneously in all the spheres of armed hostilities.

In this context, the lessons of the last war still remain an invaluable source of military knowledge. It is of enduring importance for further development of military art in modern conditions to study and sum up the experience of important operations in history.

NOTES:

1. "Poklonimsya velikim tem godam," Krasnaya zvezda, 6 July 2000.

2. Ibidem.

Col. P.I. LISITSKIY

Sector Deputy Chief at the TsVSI GSh VS RF (Center for Military-Strategic Studies of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces)

Lt. Gen. S.A. BOGDANOV (Ret.)

TsVSI GSh VS RF Chief Researcher

Doctor of Military Sciences