Understanding Our Future Battlespace: Why We Need to Integrate I0 into the IPB Process.

Exponential increases in the availability of information will lead to an era of cheap information available to anyone anywhere. This will vastly change the nature of the battlespaces and the nature of war itself. As we attempt to understand our future battlespaces and prepare them for the full spectrum of operations, we need to apply sound, proven methods that will allow us to shape them to our advantage. This shaping must include information operations (IO).

This article addresses the question, "Why do we need to integrate IO into the intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB)(1) process?". The short answer is that we need a proven, systematic process that enables planners to integrate all facets of IO into our operations. The IPB process, a thoroughly developed and proven method of understanding the battlespace, provides commanders and staffs an analytical approach toward examining an adversary and themselves in order to set the context the staff uses in the military decision-making process (MDMP) to determine a proper course of action (C0A) to take.(2)

Successful IO require a thorough and detailed [intelligence preparation of the battlefield) IPB. IPB includes information about enemy capabilities, decision-making style, and in formation systems. It also considers the effect of the media and the attitudes, culture, economy, demographics, politics, and personalities of people in the farea of operations) AO.

FM 3-0, Operations

Defining IO

When defining the IO environment, the IPB process provides a systematic approach allowing commanders to better understand the nature of the enemy, terrain, environment, and themselves. Performing the IPB process enables the development of extensive databases for potential AOs. The staff will systematically update these databases as the environment changes.(3)

FM 3-0 defines information operations as follows:

IO are actions taken to affect [an] adversary, and influence others' decision-making processes, in formation and in formation systems while protecting one's own information and information systems. IO are primarily shaping operations that create and preserve opportunities for decisive operations. IO are both offensive and defensive.... The value of 10 is not in their effect on how well an enemy transmits data. Their real value is measured only by their effect on the enemy's ability to execute military actions....(4)

IO contain critical elements of activities that require analysis when preparing the battlespace for full-spectrum operations. These elements include "perception management actions" such as psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception, electronic warfare (EW), operations security (OPSEC), counter propaganda, counter intelligence (CI), computer network attack, computer network defense, physical destruction, and information assurance. The related 10 activities are public affairs and civil-military operations. Each component orchestrated within the overall plan produces a synergistic effect against the elements of an adversary's decision-making process, information, and information systems.(5)

Today's environment goes beyond what previously was a land-centric focus and deals with more abstract concepts. Concepts such as "network-centric warfare" fall within 10 and require a greater awareness of a variety of elements. According to John Gartska, "The idea of networking the force provides the warfighter access to new frontiers in the in formation domain."(6) These include: knowledge of the on-going information revolution, the importance of automation and its impact on enemy and friendly weapons systems, proliferation of global communication, and the expansive nature of computer technology.(7) It also goes beyond this notion into areas that allow planners and commanders to gain relative advantages in combat power. These advantages can include greater shared awareness, a higher degree of collaboration, and expanded information reach. This leads to greater survivability, increased efficiency and lethality from our superior weapons platforms, and a higher degree of control over our operational tempo.

IO contain both offensive and defensive components. Offensive IO include activities such as those mentioned above, whereas defensive IO contain objectives established to protect and defend our information systems. (8) IO can be either direct or indirect. Direct IO "bypasses the adversary's perceptive or observing functions" such as a direct attack against a computer network. (9) Indirect IO involves creating information that an "adversary must observe if the intended effect is to be achieved." (10)

Information preparation of the battlefield is the best process that military planners currently have for understanding the battlespace and the options it presents to friendly and enemy forces. Applying the IPB process and integrating IO enables a commander to maximize his combat power at critical points in time and space to best affect his battlespace.

IO must become a complementary part of the IPB and targeting processes; IPB, targeting, and IO are interrelated by the nature of the environment. We must examine our enemy's IO strengths and weaknesses, much as we have done using conventional systems in the past, and match them against our own. To do this, we need to understand how IO fits into the IPB process and keep in mind that our future opponents are doing the same.

Knowing what types of operations future belligerent states are planning and conducting is important. For example, some of our potential adversaries have already begun preparing the operational environment for a future conflict. In order to determine what our counteractions might be, we first need to understand what they are thinking.

Step One: Defining the Battlespace

Defining the battlespace environment identifies, for further analysis, specific features of the information environment, activities within it, and the physical space where activities occur that may influence available COAs or affect the commander's decisions. (11) The critical first step is to determine the commander's battlespace. This means identifying geographic and information environmental factors where friendly forces will operate. It establishes "boundaries" but neither limits nor contains a commander within a set "box," especially as it pertains to information operations.

Regardless of the level of execution, AOs are usually geographical boundaries specified on an operations overlay that we receive from our higher headquarters. In terms of time, it is always for the duration of the operations specified in some operations order. However, the nature of the area of interest (AOI) (12) and the types of information activities with which a command is concerned vary significantly according to the echelon that is doing the IPB. Figure 1 enumerates considerations when integrating IO into the IPB process in order to construct the AO and AOI for each level of war.

Establishing an AOI that exceeds the limits of the AO and the commander's battlespace allows the commander to anticipate future developments and determine appropriate countermeasures to take. Other AOI examples at the tactical level of war include local radio facilities, communication stations tied into an existing telephone system, designated microwave antenna sites, and enemy command and control ([C.sup.2]) nodes the staff has targeted for destruction. The same thinking applies to the operational and strategic levels of war. Although the commander is assigned the AO, the AOI must include consideration of its effects on information operations as well. For instance, AOI considerations might be a regional or national telecommunications facility, fixed structure [C.sup.2] nodes, urban population centers that access cable, satellite, and other commercial systems. Figure 2 depicts an example of a commander's battlespace as it relates to the information environment.

This figure portrays for a commander the information network that he controls within his assigned AO. An essential characteristic of this step focuses a commander and staff on those aspects that will have the greatest effect on friendly and enemy information operations. It ensures that he understands the IO situation as he moves into the next phase, which enables him to grasp what effects the battlespace will have on his operations.

Step Two: Describing the Battlespace Effects

The next step is to describe how IO affect the battlespace. Describing these effects includes determining how the information environment affects both an adversary and our own friendly operations. In this step, analysts must avoid the common mistake of presenting commanders with large amounts of data about the battlespace without describing how it will shape his fight. If done properly, this step paints a clear picture of the opportunities and limitations the information environment presents. One way to examine the effects is to look at our own and an enemy's "information potential" when it comes to both peacetime and wartime operations. Information potential considers friendly and enemy capabilities that can affect the outcome in peace or war.

Figure 3 shows how the considerations of the relationship of IO and their potential effects on the battlespace environment differ for each level of war.

These considerations are clear examples of the importance of integrating IO into the IPB process. When determining our desired battlespace effects, IO may play a more important role than conventional weapons have in the past.

Step Three: Evaluating the Threat

Evaluating the threat requires analysis of threat force capabilities and any known doctrinal principles or patterns of behavior they prefer to employ. This step requires an evaluation of the adversary's information operations network without regard for the effects of weather or geography. At this point, an analyst must limit the description of an adversary's capabilities to those that will affect the commander's operations (directly and indirectly). For example, while presenting information about the entire country's [C.sup.2], communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (15) architecture may sound like a good idea, the intelligence officer should limit the presentation to those critical nodes and networks within the theater that the commander can affect (see Figure 4).

The critical friendly nodes enables a commander to visualize how his and his adversary's information networks fit into the operational environment. (16) The example in Figure 4 depicts, from top to bottom, a commander's information network transposed over successive friendly information grids. This enables a commander to visualize how his information system fits in relation to those of other friendly forces. A similar approach to take is to depict the enemy's information grids. This provides the decision-maker expanded battlespace visualization, greater knowledge, and increased awareness of his information environment. It also allows him to visualize how it may affect his operations and how he may affect the enemy's. Using this technique enables the commander to view his battlespace to prioritize his network, and to link combat power to weapons systems more efficiently. This also broadens his understanding of where the networks are in relation to his ability to apply their capabilities. Lastly, it will provid e the time-space advantage by knowing when to make decisions relative to available sensors and shooters. Analysis of these information networks facilitates a commander's gain of tactical, operational, and strategic advantage over his opponent.

Step Four: Determining Available Threat COAs

The final step is to identify and develop likely threat courses of action (COAs) that will influence accomplishment of the friendly mission. How does the enemy present himself within our battlespace with regard to his IO capability? This important question requires detailed consideration in order to develop a suitable and feasible friendly COA. At the operational and strategic levels, analysts must present several enemy COAs. At the tactical level, at a minimum, the intelligence officer must present the enemy's most likely and most dangerous COAs. This allows the commander to visualize in time and space how an adversary may use his IO systems to attack or defend against our own actions. For instance, an adversary will use direct and indirect methods to get at our information centers of gravity (COGs). The information COGs are where a confluence of automation, communications, collection of information, thinking, planning, and decision-making activities occur. (17)

Conclusion

IPB is a valid, existing process that provides a framework for analysis of the information operations environment. Without some set-piece structure to begin analyzing a given battlespace, IO will remain a concept reserved for esoteric, intellectual discussions. Once we integrate the IO concept into a valid, well-known process, commanders will come to understand better the true nature of their operational environments. Our desire must be to achieve information superiority over future opponents. Having information superiority increases the speed of the command's preempting adversary options, creates new options, and improves the effectiveness of selected options. (18) Integrating information operations into the IPB process is not simply another task in an already complicated approach; it will play a critical role in a future war and may determine its outcome.

Lieutenant Colonel Mike Flynn recently graduated from the Naval War College (NWC) and is currently the G2, XVIIIth Airborne Corps, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. His recent assignments include G2, 82d Airborne Division; Commander, 313th MI Battalion, 82d Airborne Division; and Senior Observer/Controller for Intelligence at the Joint Readiness Training Center. LTC Flynn holds three Masters degrees, a Master of Business Administration from Golden Gate University, a Master of Military Arts and Sciences from the School of Advanced Military Studies, and a Masters degree in National Security Studies from the NWC.

Endnotes

(1.) IPB expanded to intelligence preparation of the battlefield [italics added]. However, with the advent of space operations and the multidimensional operational environment that we deal with today, IPB has evolved into intelligence preparation of the battlespace. This term will appear in the next version of FM 34-130 and is already used in newer versions of other doctrinal manuals.

(2.) IPB is a process developed over the past two decades. Numerous doctrinal manuals address the concept and application of IPB. The principal manual is FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield; another is FM 101-5, The Military Decision-Making Process. It is also discussed in numerous joint publications, including Joint Pub 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.

(3.) Joint Pub 3-13, page GL-8.

(4.) Department of the Army, FM 3-0, Operations, defines IO on page 11-16.

(5.) Joint Pub 3-13, page 11-3.

(6.) This quote is attributed to Mr. John J. Gartska, co-author of Network Centric Warfare: Information Age Organizations, during a presentation he gave to the elective Information Operations Course on Network Centric Warfare at the Naval War College, 6 December 2000.

(7.) Department of the Army, Information Operations Challenge, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence (Washington, D.C., 1999), page 1-6.

(8.) Joint Pub 3-13, page viii.

(9.) Jane's Information Group, Chapter III, "Operational Concepts, Information Warfare Like Air and Space Power," U.S. Information Warfare, 1996, page 60.

(10.) Jane's Information Group, page 60.

(11.) Department of the Army, FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (Washington D.C., 1994), page 2-2.

(12.) The acronym "AI" which meant "area of interest" changed to "AOI" with FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, dated 1997.

(13.) FM 34-130, pages 5-1 and 5-2.

(14.) Ibid, pages 5-2 to 5-4.

(15.) [C.sup.2], communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance are all components that play a vital role in the understanding of 10 and how it affects our operational environment.

(16.) During his December presentation, John J. Gatrska discussed the Global Information Grid. He described "networking the force" as a combination of sensors (regardless of the platforms), the decision-makers (regardless of their locations), and the shooters (regardless of the Service). He describes these in relation to our priorities for networking information, the linkage of IO to our combat power, and the determination of the value added to the warfighter.

(17.) Information Operations Challenge, page 1-6.

(18.) John J. Gartska, et al., Network Centric Warfare: Implications for Military Operations, Figure 7, "Full-Spectrum Dominance Enabled by Information Superiority," at <http://www.dodccrp.org/NCW/imply_mil_ ops.htm> [7 January 2001].

[Figure 4 Omitted]

[Figure 2 omitted]

RELATED ARTICLE: Tactical

* Ability of the local infrastructure to support information operations.

* Availability of press coverage or known threat propaganda systems.

* Identified deception capabilities or previous patterns of deception techniques employed.

Operational

* Known or templated command, control, communications, computers and intelligence ([C.sup.4]I) sites within the threater, region, or assigned AO.

* Previously identified critical node analysis operations, other significant computer-based capabilities, or knowledge and development of virus protection or attack software capabilities.

* Known public affairs capabilities or media outlets of the adversarial state or belligerent.

Strategic

* Ability to affect public support in the United States.

* Identify of regional/national telecommunications infrastructure.

Figure 1. Considerations When Integrating IO into the IPB Process.

* Known capability or development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). (13)

Tactical

* The U.S-Korean Treaty does not allow us to conduct information operations in specific areas.

* The enemy cannot establish an information grid for a period of six weeks because the logistics system will not support faster movement of critical equipment to the forward AO.

Operational

* Terrain throughout the AOI hinders capabilities of friendly and enemy tactical [C.sup.4]I systems, creating a greater need for space-based and cellular system use.

* Ability of enemy information networks to support movement of forces in the theater is susceptible to electronic deception operations and CNA.

Strategic

Figure 3. Differing Effects of IO on the Battlespace.

* Enemy popular support only in the regions surrounding the built-up areas and those within the cities themselves.

* Enemy has networked strategic air defense systems into two belligerent nations adjacent to the assigned theater of operations. Both nations have bilateral treaties with the United States. (14)

Offensive information operations are the integrated use of assigned and supporting capabilities and activities, mutually supported by intelligence, to affect enemy decision-makers or to influence others to achieve or promote specific objectives.

Defensive information operations are the integration and coordination of policies and procedures, operations, personnel, and technology to protect and defend friendly information and information systems. Defensive information operations ensure timely, accurate, and relevant information access while denying adversaries the opportunity to exploit friendly information and information systems for their own purposes.

(FM 3-0, Operations, page 11-17)