UNOSOM II mandate extended: mission's future pondered.

Despite its deep concern over a deteriorating security environment, including "attacks and harassment" against UN peacekeepers, the Security Council on 30 September extended the mandate of the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) for one month, until 31 October. In the meantime, the Council would undertake a thorough examination of UNOSOM's mandate, with a view to deciding on its future.

The Council, in adopting resolution 946 (1994) by 14 votes to none, with the United States abstaining, also encouraged the Secretary-General to intensify preparations of contingency arrangements for the possible withdrawal of UNOSOM II within a specified time-frame.

The Council also declared its readiness to consider sending a mission to Somalia at the appropriate time, in order to convey directly to the Somali political parties its views on the situation in the country and on the future of the UN presence there.

UNOSOM II force levels were to be reduced from 18,761 as of August to 15,000 by the end of october, with withdrawals concentrated in areas of relative stability. UNOSOM forces would continue to protect major seaports and airports and escort humanitarian convoys, but would no longer be in a position to protect UN agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in vacated areas. The forces would be concentrated mainly in Mogadishu, Baidoa and Kismayo.

UNOSOM II continued to provide basic training to Somali police, but had discontinued the further issue of police equipment, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali reported. Despite political commitments to remove military vehicles and checkpoints, "technicals"--vehicles mounted with machine-guns and recoilless weapons and manned by armed militia--were observed daily in Mogadishu, particularly around the seaport and airport. Small-arms fire was heard continuously in the capital city, and threats of armed militias and "technicals" outside Mogadishu were described as "permanent".

No progress

In explaining the United States position, Madeleine K. Albright said the time had come to bring UNOSOM II to a conclusion. Over the past four months, she said, there was a "total lack of progress on political reconciliation". General deterioration had been punctuated by violent attacks on UN peace-keepers. More than 140 peace-keepers had died in Somalia, she noted.

The mission was draining scarce resources that could be better used elsewhere. In the face of Somali "intransigence" and unwillingness to reach political agreement, UNOSOM could not continue to spend $2.5 million per day to maintain 15,000 troops in Somalia, she stated.

In a 17 September report (S/1994/1068), the Secretary-General said efforts of the Somali parties, with UNOSOM II's assistance, could lead to the convening of a Hawiye peace conference and a preparatory meeting for the national reconciliation conference, set to convene by the end of September. A one-month mandate extension, he said, would give him time to submit by mid-October a report on his assessment of prospects of national reconciliation and recommendations for the future of UNOSOM II.

Reconciliation efforts

The Secretary-General also in his report detailed the ongoing efforts at political reconciliation, as well as the UN humanitarian relief programme and reports of unrest.

His Special Representative, James Victor Gbeho of Ghana, would continue to support the Somali efforts, but the daunting difficulties that had frustrated past efforts to implement the political agreements reached at Addis Ababa and Nairobi should not be overlooked, the Secretary-General said.

Stressing the importance of interclan reconciliation, Mr. Boutros-Ghali noted the intensive consultations with Ali Mahdi Mohamed, General Mohamed Farah Aidid and the Imam of Hirab, Imam Mahamoud Imam Omar, concerning arrangements for convening the Hawiye peace conference and the national reconciliation conference. Gen. Aidid and Mr. Mahdi had expressed support for the Imam's initiative to resolve the differences among the Hawiye sub-clans as a prelude to the reconciliation conference, he reported.

Since the conclusion on 18 June of the Lower Juba Reconciliation Conference, there had been no major violations of its peace agreement, the report stated. Following his election on 22 August as Chairman of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf had affirmed his commitment to bring together the southern factions in Mogadishu to facilitate national reconciliation.

At a meeting held in Djibouti from 13 to 17 August between the Chairmen of the Somali National Movement (SNM) and the other three northwest-based political factions--the Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA), the United Somali Party (USP) and the United Somali Front (USF)--it had been declared in a joint statement that secession of the north was neither feasible nor desirable, and that the national reconciliation conference should be convened no later than September 1994.

Humanitarian relief

The UN and NGOs continued to provide humanitarian relief, wherever conditions allowed, to the most vulnerable segments of Somali society, the Secretary-General reported on 17 September. Major health and nutritional indicators of the majority of the population had held relatively stable, and a good harvest was expected following the rainy season.

Under normal security and administrative conditions, international assistance should be in a post-emergency recovery and development phase, the Secretary-General stated. However, this was not the situation in most regions, owing to continued banditry, fighting and petty disputes. Several organizations had thus withdrawn their international staff from certain locations.

The ability of UNOSOM II to provide coordination, information, logistic support and security had been reduced by troop reductions, Somali political and military actions, and budget restrictions. UNOSOM II was supporting humanitarian operations in just half the territory that it had covered in mid-1994.

Other reports

In his 17 August report (S/1994/977), the Secretary-General had recommended that the UN continue "for a little longer" to give the Somali leaders the opportunity to demonstrate their readiness to cooperate with the UN and with each other to bring their country "back from the abyss". While it was too early to conclude that UNOSOM II could not achieve its objectives, the omens did not appear promising.

The two antagonistic groups--the Somali National Alliance (SNA) and the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA)--were continuing to encourage the creation of new partisan factions not parties to the Addis Ababa and Nairobi agreements. That would complicate further the prospects for the national reconciliation conference, it was stated.

It was thought at one time that the elders could play a central role in the formation of a Somali Government, the report went on. But the armed factions would be extremely difficult to marginalize and they often operated with the blessing of the elders. Despite those difficulties, it would seem that the prudent approach would be the reconciliation of factions within the framework of traditional structures.

On 18 July, the Secretary-General had reported (S/1994/839) that daily life in many regions was returning to normal, and agricultural production was recovering. on the other hand, there had been a "significant deterioration" in the security situation, especially in Mogadishu, due to a resumption in inter-clan fighting and an increase in banditry.

In those circumstances, the international community's growing concern about how long it would be expected to support efforts towards national reconciliation in Somalia was fully understandable, the Secretary-General added. The impression had been created that despite the prolonged suffering of the Somali people, certain Somali leaders were still not prepared "to subordinate their personal ambitions for power to the cause of peace and stability".