U.S. defense-export controls: stuck in Cold War.

The U.S. defense export-control establishment continues to be buffeted from all sides. Depending on the critic du jour, U.S defense trade controls are either too weak and threaten U.S. national security, or too heavy-handed and threaten U.S. economic interests. A multitude of supporting arguments buttress these two core critiques:

* U.S. allies and friends will trade U.S.-developed advanced capabilities to countries that the United States does not want to have access to the technology.

* Restricting U.S. defense trade will only encourage the development of indigenous capabilities, not tied to U.S. maintenance or logistics.

* Restricting U.S. defense trade will only cede the field to competing European and Asian suppliers. This soon may be highlighted, should the European Union elect to lift its 1989 ban on selling arms to China. This is a double-edged argument, feeding distrust of U.S. allies and friends.

What remains curious is that these arguments have remained fairly constant from the beginning of the Cold War to the post 9-11 era despite a radically changing geo-political environment.

The Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) led the charge in controlling defense trade with Communist Bloc countries during the Cold War. in the post-Cold War era, Russia and most of the former Warsaw Pact countries are full participants in the toothless successor organization, the Wassenaar Arrangement.

The rationale for export controls in the international community evolved from restricting trade with the Commmunist Bloc, via the CoCom, to contributing "to regional and international security and stability, by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms, and dual-use goods and technologies" according to the official Wassenaar website, www.wassenaar.org.

While this agreement brought many of the members of the former Communist Bloc into a multilateral relationship with the West (to the applause of free-traders), it unfortunately has no teeth. The "decision to transfer or deny transfer of any item is the sole responsibility of each participating state," the website said. This encourages many in the U.S. government to distrust the ability of the international community--particularly in Europe--to adequately control defense exports to parties unfriendly to the United States.

Further contributing to this distrust is Europe's attitude to the last major bastion of the former Communist Bloc--China.

Without a direct threat from China, Europe has its eyes firmly fixed on the booming Chinese marker. It now appears ready to cast aside its concerns over human rights, overlook the strategic concerns the United States maintains vis-a-vis China and Taiwan, and lift its sanctions on defense trade with the "Middle Kingdom."

Also widening the gap between the United States and the rest of the world has been U.S. execution of the global war on terror. Rightly or wrongly, the U.S. reaction to the attacks of 9-11 has alienated much of the world.

Despite these massive changes, export controls for the most sensitive U.S. technologies remain mired in an environment that no longer exists. The U.S. Foreign Assistance Act, Export Administration Act, Arms Export Control Act and their implementing regulations are all grounded in the military, diplomatic and political realities of the Cold War. They fail to address the many new military, economic and political challenges that currently confront the United Stares.

The result is a continuing hodge-podge of case-by-case determinations, contradictory guidance and frightening compliance enforcement that frustrates industry and alienates the few nations that have stood with the United States in the most difficult of circumstances.

Recent attempts to adjust the U.S. export-licensing process within the context of existing legislation indicate that many believe it possible to convince U.S. friends and allies to adopt essentially the same level of export controls as the U.S. currently imposes.

This was the favored approach of the Clinton administration. Its review of export controls, commonly referred to as the Defense Trade Security Initiatives, stated: "For treaty allies that adopt and demonstrate export control and technology security systems that are comparable in effectiveness to those of the U.S., we are prepared to establish new ITAR exemptions ... In order to qualify for an ITAR exemption, each ally will be required to have in place, with the United States, a bilateral agreement on export controls."

This is done on the assumption that those states would perceive the benefit of additional U.S. technological exports in return for accepting restrictions to their export markets. This, in turn, would limit the proliferation of advanced defense technologies to those parties with which the United States has declined to trade.

The flaw in this logic now is glaringly obvious. Even at the height of the Cold War, it was not possible to obtain consensus among our friends and allies on export controls. Even when such consensus is obtained, distrust within influential elements of the U.S. Congress of any relaxation of controls post 9-11 makes it unlikely. Even with nations--such as the United Kingdom--making tremendous efforts to update their export controls laws and support unpopular U.S. initiatives in the war on terror, the House International Relations Committee has remained unrelenting in its refusal to relax controls.

This impasse is no longer tolerable. The transformation underway within the U.S. military to enable it to more effectively defend U.S. national security interests will require a correlating change within the U.S. defense industry that is structured to equip it. That transformation will not be possible within the context of a Cold War export-control policy.

What is needed is a comprehensive review of the purpose of U.S. export controls in the post 9-11 era and an assessment of the most effective means to achieve that purpose. New policy, addressing the major challenges of the post 9-11 world, must be supported by new legislation that acknowledges the realities of the current paradigm.

Hugo Posey is vice president for strategic planning at the Center for Security Strategies and Operations of Anteon Corporation. Prior to retirement from the Air Force, he served as chief of export control (SAF/IADM). Ben Stone is NDIA's director for international trade and programs.

NDIA GOVERNMENT POLICY

Peter M. Steffes

Vice President, Government Policy

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Ruth W. Franklin

Director, Procurement

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Ben Stone

Director, International Trade Policy and Programs

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Chandra Burnside

Analyst, Government Policy

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