U.S. Customs goes high-tech for cargo security.

BALTIMORE -- The gritty docks along the Dundalk Marine Terminal, in Maryland's Port of Baltimore, are among the last lines of defense in the multi-layered, global effort by the Department of Homeland Security's Customs and Border Protection (CBP) arm to intercept illegal cargo.

CBP officers at Dundalk and similar terminals at other ports across the nation employ the latest state-of-the-art technology to inspect maritime cargo containers and trucks as they are unloading from newly arrived ships, but they face significant challenges.

A recent report by a Congressional watchdog agency, the Government Accountability Office, for example, criticizes the quality of CBP's detection equipment and asserts that staffing imbalances have prevented the agency from inspecting many U.S.-bound shipments.

Almost 9 million containers enter U.S. ports each year from all over the world, CBP officials told National Defense. The Port of Baltimore--the largest terminal for roll-on, roll-off ships in the nation--receives 150,000 or so during that period, said Neil P. Shannon, the agency's acting director for the facility. Each incoming ship carries hundreds of containers that must be processed.

To deal with such a vast workload, CBP has adopted what it calls a multidimensional, layered approach, which starts in the overseas ports where the ships originate, Shannon said.

The United States has signed agreements with 38 ports in Europe, Asia, Africa, the Middle East and North America, where 70 percent of all maritime containers originate. The agreements--part of a Container Security Initiative, or CSI--enable CBP officers to partner with foreign officials to identify and inspect cargo they consider high-risk before it is loaded onto U.S.-bound vessels.

"CSI is a dynamic, evolving program moving rapidly forward to extend the zone of security and prescreen the greatest volume of maritime cargo destined to the United States," CBP Commissioner Robert C. Bonner said in a recent statement. "Our goal is to have 50 operational ports by the end of 2006. Once CSI is implemented in 50 ports, approximately 90 percent of all trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific cargo imported into the United States will be subjected to pre-screening."

Under CSI, ship operators are required to provide U.S. Customs with the cargo manifests of vessels bound from foreign ports to the United States, including information about all containerized shipments at least 24 hours before those containers are loaded, Shannon said.

This information is fed electronically to CBP's National Targeting Center in Northern Virginia. The center scrutinizes the manifests using an automated targeting system to determine which shipments require further inspection.

This system--developed under a $9 million, four-year contract awarded in 2003 to SETA Corporation, of McLean, Va.--uses risk-based analysis to decide which containers should not be loaded aboard the vessel at the foreign port, which need to be inspected at either the foreign or the U.S port, and which are low-risk and can shipped without further review.

As a result of this system, CBP officers in Baltimore scan only about 14 to 15 percent of the containers passing through their port, Shannon said. "We wouldn't want to scan all of the containers on a ship," he said. "That would be a waste of time."

Nevertheless, Shannon insisted, CBP officers do examine every container that they consider high risk.

In September, for example, CBP agricultural specialists in the Port of Savannah, Ga., while inspecting a personal-effects shipment from Saudi Arabia, discovered an extremely destructive beetle that could have devastated U.S. grain, cereal and seed products.

In June, CBP officers in the Port of Miami, Fla., seized 10 stolen motorcycles that were being imported from Denmark.

In 2004, CBP officers and a Coast Guard team apprehended a stowaway on board an Antiguan vessel just before it entered the Port of West Palm Beach, Fla.

Before 2001, CBP focused primarily on drug smuggling Those operations still keep officers busy. In 2004, for example, CBP officers in Miami seized 2,195 pounds of marijuana with a wholesale value of $2.2 million. The marijuana was discovered behind a false wall built into the nose of a 20-foot container from Trinidad and Tobago.

Sometimes drug smuggling is linked to terrorist activity, said Lorne Campbell, a CBP supervisor in Baltimore. "A year ago, we seized 3,500 pounds of a drug called khat. Three individuals were arrested."

Khat is a naturally occurring stimulant derived from a shrub, primarily cultivated in East Africa and the Arabian peninsula. It has two active ingredients, both controlled substances in the United States.

What particularly concerned CBP, Campbell said, was that the proceeds from khat sales were believed to be used frequently to fund terrorist activities.

CBP officers board some ships as they dock, explained the agency's Jack Ramsey. "We check the IDs of the people on board--the crew and any passengers. We interview them, search the cabins and do sweeps looking for radiation."

The Dundalk unit often employs a canine team, which includes a trained handler and a dog trained to sniff out contraband. (See related story)

For additional help in uncovering illegal shipments, CBP officers are turning increasingly to advanced technology.

At the terminal in June, Bonner and Maryland Gov. Robert Ehrlich Jr. unveiled a mobile sea container X-ray system called the Eagle. This huge, $6 million device is designed to inspect cargo containers and trucks as they are unloaded. A similar system is being used in Savannah, Ga., Shannon said

The Eagle is a self-propelled imaging system that is tall and wide enough to pass over and around containers and trucks, X-raying them as it moves.

The Eagle "allows us to see inside the containers," Shannon said. The system is able to scan a container in approximately one minute. An image of the scan is available immediately for officers to evaluate for potential threats.

Black-and-white images can be converted into a four-color palette to help distinguish shapes inside containers or trucks. The images, however, can be difficult for untrained eyes to decipher. Operators receive two weeks of introductory training in using the scanner, said Officer Tyesha Bordeaux. After that, she said, it takes a few months to become proficient in operating the device.

The CBP unit at Dundalk also has two mobile vehicle and cargo inspection systems. The mobile VACIS, as the device is known, is smaller and lighter than the Eagle, making it easier to deploy. It is mounted on the back of a pickup truck. Once it is deployed, it remains stationary, unlike the Eagle, and scans trucks and containers as they pass. The mobile VACIS uses gamma rays, rather than X-rays, to conduct the inspections.

"We can scan them as fast as they can bring them to us," said Officer Brian Martus. "It takes five seconds to scan a container."

In Los Angeles and Long Beach, Calif., CBP is installing 90 radiation portal monitors to screen all incoming international containers and vehicles for nuclear and radiological materials.

RPMs are detection devices that provide CBP officers with a passive, non-intrusive means to conduct such screening. They do not emit radiation, but can detect various types of radiation emanating from nuclear devices, dirty bombs, natural sources and isotopes commonly used in medicine and industry.

The RPMs in Los Angeles and Long Beach are scheduled to be operational by December. They were installed at the seaport in Oakland, Calif., earlier this year. In 2006, CBP plans to place one at the Dundalk terminal's gate so that vehicles can be scanned as they exit, said Officer Walter Simmons.

CBP officers also use handheld devices to detect radiation. One such piece of equipment is the radioactive isotope identification device, which employs the "grab, point and click" method of operation. The RIID looks like a small shoebox with a handle. It is controlled using one button and a thumb-operated, multifunctional joystick switch. It allows the operator to survey an area for contamination, measure the hazard level and analyze the material. It is being used at more than 60 Customs and Border Patrol field offices.

In addition, since 2003, more than 10,400 CBP officers with frontline inspection responsibilities have been issued personal radiation detectors. These small, highly sensitive devices--worn on the belt--resemble pagers or cell phones. They sound an alarm if radiation is detected.

Immediately following the 2001 terrorist attacks, CBP recognized that it would need the cooperation of importers. In November 2001, it launched the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism. Under C-TPAT, CBP offers importing companies expedited processing and fewer inspections if they agree to devise policies and programs to prevent their part of the supply chain from being infiltrated by terrorists.

One of the steps that CBP is urging participants to take is to use "Smart Box" containers. A Smart Box is a container with a sensor inside that CBP officers can read--either at an overseas port or on arrival in the United States--and learn whether or not it has been opened prematurely.

At last count, approximately 10,000 businesses had joined C-TPAT, making it the largest voluntary partnership between government and the private sector in U.S. history, Bonner said.

An April 2005 report by the GAO labeled these efforts as "promising," but raised concerns about CBP'S "ability to achieve its ultimate goal of improved cargo security."

Richard Stana, director of GAO'S Homeland Security and Justice Team, told the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations that CBP had been unable to target all U.S.-bound shipments from CSI ports because of staffing imbalances. "As a result, 35 percent of these shipments were not targeted [for] overseas inspection," he said.

In addition, Stana said, CBP has not established minimum technical requirements for the detection capability of inspection equipment used as part of CSI. Participating ports use various types of equipment to inspect containers, and the capabilities of such equipment can vary, he noted.

"Given these conditions, CBP has limited assurance that inspections conducted under CSI are effective at detecting and identifying terrorist weapons of mass destruction," Stana said.

In response, CBP said it agreed with the GAO'S findings and proposed to reconsider:

* Which inspection functions should to be performed at CSI ports and which should be done within the United States.

* The optimum staff levels needed at CSI ports.

* The cost of locating CBP officers who decide which containers to target for inspection at CSI ports instead of in the United States.

CBP also agreed to establish minimum technical requirements for the capabilities of non-intrusive inspection equipment at CSI ports, including imaging and radiation-detection devices, to help ensure that all equipment used can detect WMD. In addition, CBP promised to develop performance measures to track the progress in meeting CSI's objectives.

CBP receives some help from the administration's 2006 budget request, which provides additional funds for cargo security. In the request, CBP receives a total of $6.7 billion, a 4.8 percent increase, including $125 million for additional radiation portal monitors. CSI gets $138.8 million, a $5.4 million boost, and C-TPAT receives $54.3 million, including $8.2 million to enhance supply-chain security validations. The automated targeting system gets $28.3 million, with $5.4 million to strengthen targeting and risk-analysis capabilities.