Two ways to zero.

Two Ways to Zero

EVEN IF WE TOOK all our intermediate- and short-rangemissiles out of Europe, we'd have plenty of nuclear firepower left there, wouldn't we?

This argument might be called track two of theAdministration's push for an autumn arms-control Summit. Track one is the old familiar rhetoric of disarmament and arms control--making a safer world, historic opportunities, giving peace a chance, et cetera, et cetera: Self-generating stuff, for the most part, which the Administration need do little, beyond an occasional balloon from Howard Baker or the President, to float. Track two is for hard-heads: cold-eyed folk who never put much stock in universal peace or human nature, but who can be kept in line so long as the force balance sheets look reasonably in order. Its exponents tend to be current or former Administration figures like Richard Perle.

In the latest issue of Foreign Affairs, ChristophBertram, the diplomatic correspondent of the West German weekly Die Zeit, gives a handy rundown of the track-two balance sheet. Even if all intermediate- and short-range missiles were withdrawn, Western Europe would be left with the following nuclear arsenal: "Four hundred warheads on U.S. strategic submarine-launched missiles assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe; . . . the nuclear-armed cruise missiles on U.S. warships operating in European waters; the 72 Pershing I missiles operated by West Germany whose nuclear warheads are under the sole control of the United States . . .; up to 4,600 "tactical' nuclear warheads for use by fighter-bomber planes, [battlefield] missiles, and artillery; and finally the British and French [nuclear] forces.'

That looks like a big nuclear wallop. But makinga strategic tally is never just a matter of counting weapons; it requires an analysis of uses and functions. Bertram runs down the checklist a second time and finds each item wanting.

--Strategic submarine-launched missiles: "a politicalgesture of very limited military relevance,' since "it is almost inconceivable . . . that an American President would threaten the immediate use of these strategic weapons to cope with any conventional Soviet aggression limited to Europe.'

--Sea-launched cruise missiles: "not at present tiedto the European theater.'

--Pershing I's: "aging, vulnerable, . . . unlikely tobe modernized.'

--Tactical warheads on fighter-bombers: increasing"the number of nuclear aircraft raise[s] the old dilemma that they might be needed more urgently in a conventional role.'

--Tactical nukes generally: "they presuppose theleast likely of all military uses--. . . in the early phases of a conventional conflict and on the territory of the defending country' (broiled Hamburgers, anyone?).

--The French and the Brits: "because of minimalsize [their forces] cannot be expected to provide extended deterrence to the Alliance's non-nuclear members.'

Thus track two leads in the same direction as trackone: nowhere. The intermediate- and short-range missiles, it seems, were first put into Western Europe for a reason: because the array of other nuclear weapons did not credibly offset the conventional might of the Warsaw Pact.

During the freeze campaign of unblessed memory,the Left's continuous refrain was: We already have enough missiles to destroy the world two (or ten, or umpteen) times over. How sad that the Reagan Administration is putting out, for the consumption of the hard-headed, a variant of the same stale line.