Tuzla to Cortina From Peacekeeping to Warfighting.

"Training is the cornerstone of readiness and the basis for credible deterrence and capable defense. Training is the means by which the Army's quality soldiers and leaders develop their warfighting proficiency and exercise the collective capabilities they will require in combat. Training prepares soldiers, leaders, and units to fight and win in war--the Army's basic mission."

In April, the 2d Battalion, 15th Field Artillery Regiment (2-15 FAR), 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, New York, participated in a brigade-level, fires-focused rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana. The battalion had the unique opportunity to receive dedicated training support from the FA School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and detailed feedback on its ability to plan, coordinate, and execute FA fires in support of a light infantry brigade combat team (BCT).

Based on this rotation, the battalion was asked to review its home-station training and share with others its "road-to-war" as 2-15 FAR transitioned from peacekeeping duties in the Balkans. During this transition, the battalion embraced new concepts and new equipment for providing fires and prepared for combat.

The Training Plan. In the fall of 1999, the majority of 2-15 FAR was braving the wintry conditions of Bosnia-Herzegovina and continued manning the perimeter on Eagle Base, Tuzla, as part of the non-standard Stabilization Force (SFOR) 6 combat arms battalion mission. Meanwhile, the leadership of the battalion began planning the battalion's next road-to-war. It did not take long to identify the next major fight and realize it lay in the not-so-distant future at Fort Polk in JRTC Rotation 01-06.

The staff used the early months of 2000 to finalize redeployment plans and map out the battalion's road-to-war training (see Figure 1). Early planning set the stage for the battalion's rapidly regaining its skills and contributed to a successful rotation at the JRTC.

After assessing the effects of peacekeeping on individual and collective skills, the battalion leadership determined training on the following areas would be key to regaining warfighting skills: rebuilding teams from the section-level up, developing company-grade officers to fight and win in small-scale conflicts, executing fires (voice and digital) from sensor-to-shooter, and establishing viable planning standing operating procedures (SOP).

Rebuilding Teams. After returning to Fort Drum, the battalion began transitioning from peacekeeping duties to providing direct support (DS) FA fires, starting with its Foundation: teams from the section-level up. To accomplish this, the battalion developed a certification program that targeted howitzer sections, key leaders and fire support personnel.

Throughout the battalion's train-up, certification played an important role in assessing leader confidence and section performance. Ultimately, this process validated perishable individual and collective skills, which eventually provided the firing batteries the chance to conduct their first live-fire training since July 1999.

Developing Leaders. The objective of this program was to ensure all leaders were technically and tactically proficient as well as confident in their abilities. The program was both for officers and NCOs, but it was unique in its approach to officer development, focusing on company grade officers.

The battalion command group philosophy was that the best place for lieutenants to learn and grow is not in another classroom environment but with their NCOs and sections conducting hands-on, performance-oriented training. On the other hand, captains needed a forum where they could interact and address topics concerning the training and employment of artillery assets in a DS role. Consequently, the battalion commander led the captain's training, teaching the fundamentals and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) of the battalion's mission-essential and collective tasks.

The format for these classes was "semiformal" and focused on preparing leaders for upcoming training events, combat training center (CTC) rotations and combat. Although the primary audience for these classes was captains, all officers and NCOs were encouraged to attend. Many of the topics discussed during the captain's training are listed in Figure 2.

Delivering Fires. The battalion's success in providing fires to the BCT rested on its ability to inculcate in every soldier the importance of planning and executing accurate and timely fires. Therefore, the battalion implemented a training plan that validated individual and collective skills; demonstrated proficiency on new equipment, such as the advanced FA tactical data system (AFATDS); tested the unit's ability to execute fires at the battery and battalion-levels; and sustained digital proficiency throughout the battalion.

The battalion designed a certification program that objectively assessed the abilities of the leaders, howitzer sections, fire direction centers (FDCs) and fire support personnel to deliver fires. This program was conducted before live-fire events, testing individual knowledge and demonstrated proficiency. Additionally, the assessment provided a baseline for the battery leadership to determine how to most effectively train their personnel. Finally external gunnery evaluations and combined-arms live-fires tested the battalion's ability to deliver accurate and timely fires. The success of these events instilled leader confidence and validated their abilities to execute their critical wartime collective tasks to standard.

One of the major milestones for the battalion along its road-to-war was fielding and conducting new equipment training on AFATDS. In September 2000, the battalion fielded AFATDS. Key leaders and operators throughout the battalion participated in a two-week train-up, allowing the battalion to conduct FA planning and operations in a digital environment. Completing all new equipment training (NET) sessions on time, the battalion executed a command post exercise (CPX) to validate its proficiency on digital equipment and employed its capabilities during back-to-back brigade- and division-level exercises.

During these exercises, the battalion executed fires at the battery and battalion levels. In the brigade exercise, the firing batteries delivered lethal fires in external gunnery evaluations. In the division exercise, the battalion massed fires and executed combined arms training focused on synchronizing the fight with the supported maneuver brigade. Throughout both events, the battalion used AFATDS to train on its mission-essential tasks which greatly enhanced mission analysis and preparation for and execution of fires at the brigade-level and below.

Sustaining and improving the battalion's digital proficiency was a weekly task. The division artillery established a sequential "gate" strategy for improving and sustaining the skills of individuals and sections on digital devices. Gate 1 focused on the proficiency of the operator and supervisor of each digital device. Gate 2 focused on the employment of digital devices within sections and teams. Gate 3 covered all collective digital fire support sustainment training tasks from sensor to shooter. This training consisted of at least 12 hours weekly.

Establishing a Planning SOP. Several articles have been written addressing the FA decision-making process. Two articles played a vital role in helping the battalion develop its planning SOP: "Artillerization of the Military Decision-Making Process [MDMP]" in the "Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Newsletter," No. 99-11, August 1999, and "Wargaming--The DS Battalion Way" in the "CTC Quarterly Bulletin," No. 00-3, March 2000. Using these articles as guides, the battalion developed a planning SOP that addressed the doctrinal steps of the MDMP, incorporated the supported maneuver brigade's guidance and battle rhythm, standardized briefing formats and streamlined course-of-action (COA) development and analysis. In its SOP, the battalion standardized the planning process, ultimately, giving battery commanders more time to prepare.

To accomplish this, we addressed two issues. First, a DS FA battalion must focus on wargaming and executing a single COA. Second, the briefing formats needed to be tailored to accomplish more than one function.

Focused COA. FM 101-5 Organization and Operations states, "The focus of any planning process should be to quickly develop a flexible, tactically sound and fully integrated and synchronized plan that increases the likelihood of mission success with the fewest casualties possible." To facilitate this, it cites "time" as the most significant and unrenewable factor when shortening the planning process.

Based on the general considerations listed in FM 101-5, the battalion developed an SOP that did four things. First, it increased the commander' s involvement, allowing him more time to make decisions during the process without waiting for detailed briefings after each step. Next, the SOP forced the commander to become directive in his guidance, limiting options. Third, the SOP also forced the commander to limit the number of COAs developed and wargamed. Finally, the SOP maximized parallel planning with the supported maneuver brigade. What emerged was a process that streamlined COA development and shortened staff planning and orders production by six hours.

The key to this planning process was the battalion and battery commanders' involvement. Because the emphasis was on the commanders, the staff was instructed to pay attention, take detailed notes and let the commanders talk and formulate a concept of operation.

The SOP outlines six steps in the process of developing a COA and wargaming it.

Step 1. Immediately following the mission analysis briefing, the S3 reviews the FA battalion task organization and outlines the brigade's area of operations, highlighting maneuver objectives and the current locations of the FA battalion, its subordinate units and any reinforcing units.

Step 2. The commanders review the brigade's mission statement and brigade commander's intent for fires to identify all FA tasks necessary to support the brigade's scheme of maneuver.

Step 3. From the list of FA tasks, the commanders assign each task to a specific unit. Some tasks may be assigned to the battalion tactical operations center (TOC) or administration and logistics operations center (ALOC), depending on the phase of the operation (e.g., the TOC's controlling the execution of any preparatory fires or the ALOC's assuming control of the battle).

Step 4. The battalion fire direction officer (FDO) provides his battlefield calculus. This updates the commanders on the ammunition on-hand--killer volleys and minutes of smoke available, family of scatterable mines (FASCAM) and precision-guided munitions--proposed fire order standards, and estimated ammunition expenditures in support of the battle. The commanders then review the positioning of all FA units and adjust the positions, as necessary, to accomplish the assigned tasks.

Step 5. This critical step in the process identifies and links the essential fire support tasks (EFSTs) to essential FA tasks (EFATs). At this point, the battery commanders are released, departing with a firm understanding of the operation and their tasks. As they depart, the battalion commander and the S3 hand-carry a copy of the COA sketch to the brigade TOC and meet with the brigade fire support officer (FSO) to further assign fire support teams (FISTs) to each FA tasks.

This step ensures a detailed synchronization of fire support and FA assets. Figure 3 shows an example of EFATs linked to EFSTs.

Step 6. The FA battalion staff wargames the remaining details of the COA and prepares the wargame briefing and FA support plan (FASP).

Tailoring the Briefings. The second issue is to build a useful planning SOP centered on tailoring the briefings to accomplish more than one function and save time (primarily for the staff). After some brainstorming, it became clear that the best way to make the briefings multifunctional was to link the FA COA briefing to the battalion commander's concept back brief to the brigade commander. With minor adjustments, the staff could build one briefing to accomplish both tasks, thus reducing time and overhead.

The High Road. These are the things that worked well in our train-up for the JRTC.

Leader Development. One of the advantages of peacekeeping in Bosnia was our junior leaders learned to make decisions. Peacekeeping duties forced junior soldiers (officers and enlisted) to make hundreds of decisions daily. These real-world operations turn leaders into self-led professionals. Additionally, our leaders facilitated the battalion's retraining for combat and enhanced operations at the JRTC. Leaders at all levels had learned the art of making smart decisions when the boss was not around.

Planning SOP. Standardizing the battalion's planning process was a critical issue. As such, the goal was to establish a SOP that was simple, effective and could be followed. In the end, the SOP proved to be an invaluable tool in planning and synchronizing battlefield operations in the BCT.

Staff Training. Because the battalion was about to go on a fire support focused rotation at the JRTC, the battalion could tap additional resources to enhance unit training. One resource came in the form of a CTC Trends Reversal Team from the FA school. This team, consisting of former CTC observer/controllers, provided the battalion staff a systematic corrective approach to identify and fix repetitive negative trends noted by the CTCs.

The team's first visit concentrated on the academics of staff planning and integration; new equipment training, such as on the Viper or for precision lightweight global position system receiver (PLGR) upgrades for the FISTs; target refinement; and assistance with digital systems sustaining training (DSST). The team's second visit, which occurred just before the battalion deployed to the JRTC, focused on a command post exercise (CPX) for the staff to hone its skills on the MDMP and artillerization of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) using a JRTC-based scenario. Additionally, the team conducted a fire support seminar and reviewed "keys to success" for each staff member.

At the end of both visits, the team provided the battalion detailed feedback on areas for future training that would sustain and improve combat performance. The response to this support was positive and heightened staff readiness for operations at the JRTC.

Combined Arms Live-Fire Training. During the train-up for the JRTC, the battalion conducted several live-fire exercises with its supported maneuver battalions. The two FISTs deploying to the JRTC conducted leader walk and shoot exercises, emphasizing the observers' ability to quickly integrate fires upon enemy contact and instilling leader confidence at the platoon and company levels.

Additionally, the battalion conducted a task force night air assault live fire. This combined arms live-fire exercise (CALFEX) gave the battalion a chance to execute multi-echelon training at its best. The support platoon tested its ability to conduct pick-up zone (PZ) control, hook-up teams validated training on UH-60 and CH-47D helicopters, one firing battery validated sling-load operations and force protection measures, the battalion fire support element (FSE) validated its planning and synchronization of fires, and the battery FDC trained on aerial observer missions with OH-58D helicopters. This was a tremendous event that set the stage for deployment to the JRTC Republic of Cortina.

The Low Road. We had some challenges during the train up for the JRTC.

Time. At first glance, the road-to-war time line indicates the battalion had plenty of time to prepare for the JRTC. What is not clear is the gate strategy the 10th Mountain Division uses to prepare units for deployment to the JRTC. This progressive strategy is based on focusing initial training efforts at the squad, platoon and company levels and then using this training as the foundation for battle-focused collective training at the battalion and higher levels. The training is tailored for artillery units, applying the artillery tables; but the concept remains the same.

Applying this strategy to the battalion's road-to-war time line, we conducted two brigade-level field training exercises (FTXs), called Commando Peak, and one division-level FTX, called Mountain Peak. In the first brigade FTX, battery commanders trained individuals and sections. The second brigade FTX focused on collective training at the battery and battalion levels. Finally, the division exercise served as a capstone for unit training and tested the BCT's ability to plan, prepare and execute advanced tactical operations in low- and mid-intensity scenarios.

Normally after the division training program, units are at their peak and ready for deployment to the JRTC. Unfortunately, that was not the case for 2-15 FAR. After completing the division validation exercise, the battalion had to wait five months before deploying to the JRTC. As a result, the battalion had to create opportunities to train on collective skills and struggled to maintain its ability to execute at the battalion level.

Weather. The challenge of maintaining individual and collective training was exacerbated by the extreme winter weather at Fort Drum. Record snow falls and sub-zero temperatures frustrated the battalion on many occasions, and several training events at the battery-level had to be cancelled. Some sustainment training was pushed indoors.

Personnel Turbulence. Despite efforts to stabilize personnel throughout the battalion's train-up and deployment to the JRTC, the battalion experienced a 28 percent turnover rate between its capstone exercise in November 2000 and deployment to the JRTC in April 2001. After returning from Bosnia, the S3 section transitioned through four operations NDOs, two assistant S3s, two battalion FDOs and two battalion fire direction NCOs.

This high turnover rate was the residual effects from our previous stabilization for the SFOR 6 mission. The battalion constantly had to retrain and validate the basic military occupational skills (MOS). The constant retraining caused by the turnover reaffirmed the need to develop and implement a standardized Planning SOP that was simple to understand and easy to use.

Conclusion. Although much has been written and discussed concerning the degrading effects of peacekeeping operations, the success 2-15 FAR achieved at the JRTC clearly shows that through assessment, focused training and vigilant leadership a unit can quickly regain its warfighting capability. By looking deep and planning the battalion's next road-to-war training, 2-15 FAR developed a home-station training plan that allowed the battalion to deploy successfully and have a great JRTC rotation.

Lieutenant Colonel Samuel H. Johnson, until recently, commanded the 2d Battalion, 15th Field Artillery Regiment (2-15 FAR), part of the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) at Fort Drum, New York. Currently, he is a student at the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island. In his previous assignments, he was the Executive Officer (XO) of the 10th Mountain Division Artillery and Deputy Fire Support Coordinator for the division. He also served as Secretary of the 'General Staff of US Army Alaska and XO of the 4th Battalion, 11th Field Artillery at Fort Wainwright, Alaska. In the 2d Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment at Fort Lewis, Washington, he was a Battalion Fire Support Officer (FSO) and participated in Operation Just Cause in Panama.

Major Donald H. Myers, until recently, was the Executive Officer of 2-15 FAR at Fort Drum. He is now the XO for the G3 of the XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Among other assignments, he was the Brigade Plans Officer, Battalion XO and Firing Battery Observer/Controller (0/C) in the 4th Cavalry Brigade (Training Support) at Fort Knox, Kentucky. He also served as the Battlefield Effects Officer-inCharge and Firing Battery 0/C at the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC), Hohenfels, Germany. Also in Germany, he was a Battalion FSO and Commander of A Battery, 2d Battalion, 29th Field Artillery, both in the 1st Armored Division. He is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Figure 3: Example of a Course-of-Action (COA) Sketch with EFSTs
and EFATs Linked
Task Organization: 2-15 FAR (105-mm, Towed) DS and E/7 FA
(155-mm, Towed) GS
Observer/Trigger  Key Tasks
Scouts, 4-31 IN   1. Disrupt fires for
                  counterreconnaissance.
TF FSO, 4-31 IN   2. Fire SEAD.
Q-36 FA TOC       3. Destroy enemy indirect fire
                  systems. **
4-31 IN           4. Neutralize combat observation
                  post (COPs)/counterrecon. *
2-14 IN           4a. Neutralize COPs in support of
                  the main effort. *
TF FSO, 4-31 IN   5. Provide deception fires for
                  false LZ. *
TF FSO, 4-31 IN   6. Provide deception fires for
                  false breech. *
COLT 1            7. Obscure the breech. **
TF FSO, 4-31 IN   8. Echelon fires.
TF FSO, 2-14 IN   9. Provide SOSR fires.
Observer/Trigger  Task Link
Scouts, 4-31 IN   C Battery
TF FSO, 4-31 IN   C Battery
Q-36 FA TOC       Q-36 Radar Section/2-15 FAR TOC, A Battery
4-31 IN           C Battery
2-14 IN           A Battery
TF FSO, 4-31 IN   B Battery
TF FSO, 4-31 IN   E/7 Battery, B Battery (Backup)
COLT 1            C Battery
TF FSO, 4-31 IN   B Battery
TF FSO, 2-14 IN   B Battery, E/7 Battery
(*)EFSTs
(**)EFATs

* Battery Defense

* Emergency Occupations

* Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems (AFATDS)

* Firebase Construction and Operations

* Tactical Fire Direction

* Targeting

* Tactical Use of Smoke

* Air Assault Operations

*Fire Support in Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT)

Figure 2: Subjects Taught at 2-15 FAR Captain's Training

Legend:

A Asit = Air Assault

AFATDS = Advanced FA Tactical Data System

Bde = Brigade

CALFEX = Combined Arms Live-Fire Exercise

CPX = Command Post Exercise

Div Arty = Division Artillery

DSST = Digital Systems Sustainment Training

FCX = Fire Control Exercise

FDC = Fire Direction Center

FIST = Fire Support Team

FTX = Field Training Exercise

IN = Infantry

JCF-AWE = Joint Contingency Force-Advanced Warfighter Experiment

JRTC = Joint Readiness Training Center

LFX = Live-Fire Exercise

LTP = Leader Training Program

NET = New Equipment Training

O/C = Observer/Controller

Pit = Platoon

STAFFEX = Staff Exercise

TOC = Tactical Operations Center

TOCEX = Tactical Operations Center Exercise

TF = Task Force

USMA = US Military Academy at West Point

Legend:

AA = Assembly Area

COLT = Combat Observation Lasing Team

DS = Direct Support

GS = General Support

EFATs = Essential FA Tasks

EFSTs = Essential Fire Support Tasks

LD/LC = Line of Departure/Line of Contact

LZ = Landing Zone

PL = Phase Line

SEAD = Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

SOSR = Suppression, Observation, Security and Reduction

TF FSO = Task Force Fire Support Officer

TOC = Tactical Operations Center