Turkey: Arms and Human Rights.

Considered a strategic NATO ally, Turkey has benefited from a U.S. policy that is long on military assistance and short on constructive criticism. Washington values close ties with Turkey both as a secular state with a predominately Muslim population and as a buffer between Europe and the Middle East and Caucasus regions. Once valued as a deterrent to the Soviet threat, Turkey is now considered a key ally in stopping terrorism, drug trafficking, and Islamic fundamentalism from seeping across the Bosporus Straits. Turkey also offers opportunities as an emerging market and a potential site for the Caspian Sea oil pipeline. Finally, Turkey won U.S. favor by supporting the Gulf War, participating in Bosnian peacekeeping, and providing a base for U.S. fighter planes monitoring the "no-fly-zone" in northern Iraq.

The 1980 Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement reaffirmed the tight relationship between the U.S. and Turkey, which had been threatened after Turkey's 1974 invasion of Cyprus and the subsequent U.S. arms embargo. This accord allowed U.S. military bases on Turkish soil in exchange for help modernizing Turkey's military, opening the door to a flood of U.S. arms transfers. Since 1980 the U.S. has shipped $9 billion worth of arms to Turkey and provided $6.5 billion in grant and loan military aid to purchase U.S. equipment. By fiscal year 1999, Congress phased out this type of military aid to both Greece and Turkey out of a recognition that these relatively well-off states could finance their own arms purchases. Before FY 1999, Turkey had been the third largest recipient of U.S. military aid.

The U.S. government believes large quantities of arms sales buy political influence in addition to providing economic benefits. In reality, Washington has held little sway over Ankara's behavior in such key foreign policy areas as promoting human rights and democracy, preserving regional stability, keeping Turkey tied to Western Europe, and promoting economic growth. Additionally, Turkey has only reluctantly accepted the embargo against Iraq and is pursuing a natural gas pipeline deal with Iran in defiance of the U.S. embargo.

U.S. arms sales actually undermine many U.S. foreign policy goals by providing physical and political support to the Turkish military at the expense of democratically elected leaders and civil society. The Turkish military's 15-year war against the rebel Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in southeast Turkey has involved severe violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, including indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force. The war has served as an excuse to repress political leaders, journalists, and human rights activists seeking greater rights for Kurds and a peaceful end to the war. Additionally, in the name of protecting a strictly secular society, the Turkish military uses its inordinate power to suppress religious expression and mild political Islamic activism.

U.S. arms sales and continued conflict in Turkey also damage Turkey's economy and prospects for economic cooperation with the West. The 1998 CIA Factbook states that Turkey spends about $7 billion a year on the war with the PKK, which contributed to a 99% inflation rate for 1998 and a national debt equal to half the government's revenue. War-related political and financial instability has discouraged foreign investment. A U.S.-backed plan would route a Caspian Sea oil pipeline through territory where the PKK operates, leaving it susceptible to rebel attacks. An end to the war and improvements in human rights are also necessary preconditions for Turkey's entry into the European Union (EU), which the U.S. believes would draw Turkey closer to the West. Turkey's ceaseless provocation of Greece, again using U.S. arms, is another barrier to EU entry.

The Turkish military is planning a massive modernization project, with over $30 billion budgeted over the next eight years. The first major acquisition will be 145 attack helicopters worth $3.5 billion, to be coproduced with the Turkish company TAI. As helicopters have figured prominently in the destruction of civilian targets, U.S. human rights and arms control groups protested vehemently when Boeing and Bell Textron requested marketing licenses for this sale. In response, the State Department approved marketing licenses, but stated that if a U.S. helicopter were selected, it would not issue an export license unless Turkey made significant progress on human rights and allowed the U.S. to monitor use of the equipment in Turkey. The specific criteria laid out included: decriminalization of free speech; release of journalists and parliamentarians; steps to end torture and police impunity; reopening of NGOs closed by authorities; democratization and the expansion of political participation; lifting of the state of emergency in southeast Turkey; and the resettlement of internally displaced persons (estimated at 500,000 to 2.5 million people).

Prime Minister Yilmaz pledged to make these improvements in a December 1997 meeting with President Clinton. While Turkey has yet to choose among five finalists (including the two U.S. competitors), it also remains far from meeting the agreed-upon conditions and has in fact regressed in key areas.

Key Points

* Turkey has long topped the list of U.S. arms importers and recipients of U.S. military aid.

* U.S. arms transfers support the Turkish army to the detriment of Turkey's fledgling democracy.

* Turkey has launched a major military modernization project and will be seeking even greater quantities of U.S. arms.

By Tamar Gabelnick, Federation of American Scientists 

Tamar Gabelnick ([e-mail]) is Acting Director of the Arms Sales Monitoring Project of the Federation of American Scientists.