Trouble at the Commonwealth.

The Commonwealth prides itself on helping to bring development, good governance and human rights to member countries, especially those in Africa and the Caribbean. But a report published at the end of May by an "Investigation Panel" set up by the Commonwealth secretary general, Don McKinnon, into allegations of bad governance, discrimination and maladministration at the headquarters of the Commonwealth based in London, has confirmed "a climate of fear" stalking the corridors of the organisation. Osei Boateng reports.

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The Commonwealth has 53 member states, 18 of them African, excluding Zimbabwe which withdrew in 2003. Statistics show that about 43% of all Commonwealth development activities are focused on Africa. As such Africa and Africans should be seriously concerned if things are not going well at the Commonwealth headquarters or Secretariat at Marlborough House (the main HQ in Pall Mall in central London) and Quadrant House (the spillover HQ across the street).

African interest in the Commonwealth becomes even more crucial as its decisions, as we have seen in the Zimbabwean case, could have serious economic and political repercussions on member countries. According to Joel Kibazo, the Commonwealth's director of communications, (in a recent rejoinder to The Guardian of Lagos, Nigeria): "The Commonwealth is what its members want it to be." Therefore it is the responsibility of member states, especially the African members, to demand a proper judicial inquiry into what has been happening at Marlborough House.

In fact, the groundwork has already been done. On 31 May, an "Investigation Panel" appointed by the Commonwealth secretary general, Don McKinnon, and headed by Mrs Glenda Morean Philip, high commissioner of Trinidad and Tobago in the UK, into alleged poor quality of governance, discrimination, bullying and harassment at the Commonwealth Secretariat reported damningly that, "there is a climate of fear in the Commonwealth Secretariat," and that "people will not speak out [because] there is fear of retribution". The Panel was set up in April following a long memo sent to the secretary general on 13 January by the Commonwealth's "governance guru", Professor Victor O. Ayeni, 48, the highest ranking Nigerian official at the Secretariat and director of the Commonwealth's Governance and Institutional Development Division (GIDD), complaining about the deteriorating quality of governance at the Secretariat (see extracts of Ayeni's memo on p17).

The Panel sat at Marlborough House between April and May this year. After looking into the matter, the Panel, though exonerating the secretary general and two other top officials named by Ayeni in his memo of a number of the allegations, based on the "evidence before it", concluded that there is a "climate of fear" at Marlborough House which was unhealthy for the Commonwealth as a whole.

In the Panel's own words: "Dr Ayeni claims that Secretariat staff are scared to tell the secretary general the truth. It is the viewpoint of a man experienced with ombudsman procedures and who will naturally be sensitive to the freedoms of the human person and principles for their protection, and no doubt at the root of his allegation that Secretariat colleagues are resigned to suffer in silence for fear of further persecution and humiliation. In his mind, the prime examples are his own case and that of Ms Annie Carlton.

"But it is not Dr Ayeni alone that speaks of this. The chairman of the CSSA [Commonwealth Senior Staff Association, Victor Pungong] told the Panel that there is a climate of fear in the Commonwealth Secretariat and that people will not speak out or allow the CSSA to take up complaints on their behalf. 'There is fear of retribution,' he said. Another CSSA member said much the same thing, that although staff seemed to have much to say, they were apprehensive about coming before the Panel because they were 'scared for their jobs'."

This is a serious indictment against an organisation which in 2002 suspended one of its member states, Zimbabwe, claiming that President Robert Mugabe's government in Harare was dictatorial and was also abusing the human rights of its citizens, including their right to free speech. And yet, here is the same Commonwealth doing exactly the same thing at its headquarters in the centre of London.

The Panel continued: "The chairman of the CSSA informed the Panel that ... Secretariat staff were 'overwhelmingly sympathetic' towards Prof Ayeni and were particularly unhappy about his not being allowed to attend [a 30 March meeting in] Nigeria: that there was a feeling amongst staff that Prof Ayeni had not been fairly treated. [The CSSA chairman] said he personally found the supportive attitude of staff rather surprising, especially as [Ayeni] had a reputation for being tough with his own divisional staff."

In the end, the Panel concluded that: "Based on Dr Ayeni's evidence, and what the Panel received from some Secretariat staff as well as from the chairman of the CSSA, we conclude that there is some basis for the allegation that staff are afraid to speak out because of fear of being sanctioned, but we cannot make a general pronouncement on this allegation. Of course, this may hold true for any other institution. But we believe that the perception is real enough to warrant the attention of management." A closer look at the huge volume of documentation on this case reveals that the problem faced by the Commonwealth stems from its own anachronistic superstructure. It is operating in the 21st century on some weird 20th century norms and regulations. As a result, it gives too much power, in fact almost absolute power, to its secretary general without any superior bodies overseeing his activities between the two-yearly meetings of the Commonwealth heads of government (CHOGM). It is CHOGM that appoints the secretary general, but surprisingly leaves him to his own wiles (incidentally all four past Commonwealth secretary generals have been men, never women).

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As Dr Ayeni puts it: "Ensuring the accountability of those in authority is at the heart of Commonwealth good governance principles ... It is worth adding that besides the issue of conduct, the situation in the Secretariat also has to do with the construction of the office of the secretary general. The wide unfettered discretion apparently ascribed to the secretary general is difficult to reconcile with 21st century realities. There is no direct accountability to a board to oversee his conduct and ensure that he abides by modern corporate governance principles and codes of conduct. But interestingly, we insist that our member countries live up to these standards."

Ayeni continues: "To understand the office of the Commonwealth secretary general as it is today, one has to go back to the formation of the League of Nations at the end of the First World War. With considerable influence from the British Civil Service tradition, but for reasons that largely had to do with its size and the realities of the time, the secretary general of the League of Nations as administrative head had no limitations placed upon him in that role.

"The United Nations inherited the essential concept of an international civil service constructed on the format of the League of Nations, but nevertheless evolved a number of supporting and superintending organs, including the General Assembly and the Security Council to moderate the powers of the secretary general as administrative head. The huge size of the United Nations would, in any event, have made it impossible to do otherwise.

"Several decades later, [in fact in 1965] the Commonwealth Secretariat was formed. Perhaps because its fundamental logic was not evident at the time, the Secretariat recreated in the main the original concept of the League of Nations but left out, arguably for reasons of size and cost, the elaborate complementary structures now in place in the United Nations.

"Furthermore, the instruments establishing the office of the Commonwealth secretary general implicitly assume that the incumbent will be someone whose conduct is above reproach while leaving open the required qualifications. It is clear that these instruments did not anticipate the experiences of the last several years. This is where in my view the fundamental problem lies."

Ayeni says he is not "proposing a UN-style internal governance structure for the Commonwealth. Yet, it cannot be denied that an essentially 20th century idea now needs serious revisiting, moreso with the evidence that has emerged of its unanticipated impact on staff and the Commonwealth itself. The Commonwealth is a great time-honoured institution, but that reputation is at risk as a result of the crisis at hand."

Until May this year, Prof Ayeni had been a Commonwealth employee for more than 10 years, the last three as director of its Governance and Institutional Development Division (GIDD)--more or less the "governance czar" of the Commonwealth. But he was prevented from resuming office in May after he was suspended in March following the longish memo he sent to Don McKinnon, a former New Zealand farmer and foreign secretary.

The memo seemed to have been triggered by a "management" decision last October refusing Ayeni a contract renewal after his current one expired on 30 September 2006. Feeling discriminated against, based on his bitter experiences at the Secretariat going back 27 months, an aggrieved Ayeni poured his heart out, pointing out how the "declining quality of governance at the Secretariat" was injuring the reputation of the Commonwealth.

But unbeknown to Ayeni, McKinnon, using his sweeping powers as secretary general, had decided way back in August 2003 that the Nigerian's three-year contract as director of GIDD would not be renewed, come rain or shine. He would serve "one term only".

When Ayeni applied for the job, a promotion as he already worked in that division, the interview panel had reported very favourable about him to the secretary general. "[Ayeni] has worked in academic roles and in GIDD and has significant intellectual credibility in this area," the panel wrote. "He provided sound answers to interview questions with insights for future strategic operation of the division. During the group exercise, he showed leadership and his responses to the people management exercise indicate he has reasonably developed skills in this area ..."

In the end, the panel selected "two competent candidates to recommend for appointment. Either has all the required competencies with differing strengths. They were rated equal in both interview and assessment exercises. Dr Ayeni brings greater intellectual credibility to the role, while Mrs Marianna Ellingson [from Papua New Guinea] is assessed as a stronger performer in people management".

McKinnon read the recommendation and decided thus, writing at the foot of the page: "Single three-year contract to Dr Ayeni to be offered only [the word "only" was underlined three times]. His management skills [are] not up to full expectation and therefore close scrutiny will be expected."

Yet Ayeni's "letter of appointment", signed by the deputy secretary general, Mrs Florence Mugasha, dated 26 August 2003, did not expressly say that he was being offered a "single three-year contract only". It merely said: "Your appointment is on contract terms for a period of three years from the date of your appointment."

The letter went on: "You will know that the Commonwealth Secretariat is in the process of reviewing its pay and grading systems and other terms and conditions of service (TACOS). The results of this review will not adversely affect your rights during the currency of the contract you are now being offered, but if the reviews conclude that significant changes need to be made to the Secretariat's TACOS, there is a possibility that any future contracts that may be offered to you in accordance with any employment policy may not bear a relationship to this contract."

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In Queen's English, this meant "there was a possibility" that "future contracts" may be offered to Ayeni. That was his understanding, even though to accept the offer, he was made to sign an undertaking on 29 August 2003, saying: "I accept the appointment on the terms and conditions stated above and I understand that I have no legal or other right to a further contract."

The "terms and conditions" attached on a separate sheet, said in Paragraph One, under the heading "contract term": "Appointments are on limited term contracts usually of three years. Contracts may be renewed by mutual agreement and subject to fully satisfactory performance. Staff at this level may normally serve for not more than two three-year contracts. The secretary general will retain the flexibility to approve or decline extensions as circumstances warrant."

This was as confusing as it gets. Ayeni's colleagues who had been offered single term contracts "only", had been told in Paragraph Two of their "letters of appointment", in clear Queen's English: "Your appointment is on contract terms for a period of three years from the date of your appointment and will not be extended thereafter." Ayeni's letter of appointment did not say any such thing.

This was supported by the report of the Investigation Panel: "Notwithstanding the terms of his appointment," the Panel said, "we believe that Prof Ayeni harboured a reasonable expectation, subject to his obtaining satisfactory performance appraisals, of a renewal of his contract on the expiration of his current term. This expectation was created by a combination of factors: the letter from Mrs Mugasha offering the GIDD directorship was less than equivocal; he exceeded the required standards in performance, including in management, during his probation; the Handbook provisions [containing staff rules] are supportive of a renewal; and, as of that time, no other director had been refused a contract renewal.

"Viewed objectively in these circumstances, we conclude that Dr Ayeni's expectation was not unreasonable; certainly there was an understandable basis for him to expect a renewal, [moreso when] the evidence before us is that the professor's performance in his department was highly rated ..."

But all that counted for nothing because the secretary general had decided, way back in August 2003, that whatever performance Ayeni put up, he could be as good at his job and as righteous as Jesus Christ, he still would not get a contract renewal. Of course, Ayeni did not know this.

So, when he was told in October last year that his contract would not be renewed at the end of September 2006, he was greatly shocked! Coming on top of 27 months of, as he wrote in the 13 January memo to McKinnon, being deliberately set up to fail by people above him, "including the secretary general himself", he threw the book at his superiors.

The language of the memo was seen by McKinnon as objectionable, and claiming that Ayeni had refused an "informal" approach to resolve the issues raised in the memo as demanded by the staff rules, McKinnon instituted a disciplinary process against Ayeni which kicked in at the same time as the sittings of the "Investigation Panel".

In effect, besides being suspended, Ayeni was made to undergo two "trials" happening at the same time over the same allegations. At one point, the Disciplinary Board (DB) set up by the secretary general could not help but point out the farce, saying in its report that it could not deal with Charges 2 and 3 against Ayeni because of the "parallel investigation" then being conducted by the Investigation Panel.

Besides the second and third charges, the DB listed 17 other management failings in dealing with Ayeni's case. It said the Nigerian had not refused an "informal" approach to resolve the issues. And yet, the DB recommended that because of the bad blood caused by Ayeni's allegations ("allegations currently under separate investigation, though not yet corroborated or disproved", said the DB), he should be paid off and "accorded a dignified and respectful departure ... in recognition of [his] major contributions to ComSec as a committed and capable senior professional over the course of a decade of service."

In the final analysis, Ayeni's problems stem from the fact that the Commonwealth gives its secretary general too much power. Even the softly-softly Investigation Panel acknowledged this in its report: "In his statement to the Panel, the chairman of the CSSA expressed the view, which was more or less supported by other staff before the Panel, that the secretary general had personally dealt much too early with Dr Ayeni's case; that the matter could have been left to HRS [Human Resources Section] with the secretary general removing himself to a point where he could, at some distance and objectively, be the final arbiter. As the CSSA chairman said, the secretary general is not only the person, he is also the image of the office of the secretary general. We fully support these sentiments. We believe they are wise."

The Panel went on: "The evidence before us lends to the view expressed by some members of staff that the 'chain of command' in Human Resources matters is not what it should be. While in theory it should be: HRS-Corporate Affairs-DSGFM then to the secretary general, there appears to be a discernible practice of the secretary general being involved early and directly in either initiating or intervening in HR matters, even with relatively minor staff matters."

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A close reading of the Panel's report, and the copious background documentation that flowed between Ayeni on the one hand, and the secretary general, Ayeni's line manager and the Human Resources Section on the other, gives the impression that the Panel was either overly diplomatic in its report or was just deliberately playing with words. It is quite interesting that, because of the Commonwealth's own arcane rules, the secretary general who had been so accused by Ayeni, also happened to be the authority that set up the Panel and to whom the Panel reported, and who had the discretion to implement or not implement the Panel's findings. In this day and age, this can only happen at the Commonwealth! And the same organisation goes around the world preaching and teaching the virtues of good governance!

In fact, the Investigation Panel cannot be blamed much. It had its work cut out. Because of "the climate of fear" at the Commonwealth Secretariat, the Panel faced a Herculean task in getting witnesses prepared to jeopardise their jobs by coming forward to testify. Ayeni himself was cautious not to name potential witnesses in his memo or other supporting documents for fear that their jobs would be put at risk. As a result, having sat in Marlborough House [another mistake, because any other venue could have lessened the fear of witnesses] with only a few staff members prepared to come forward or send written statements, the Panel correctly concluded that based on "evidence before it", a number of Ayeni's allegations were too general and could not be substantiated.

That, of course, was a legal point correctly put, which did not diminish the fact that if there was no "climate of fear" and witnesses had freely come forward, other evidence not available to the Panel could have been obtained to support Ayeni's allegations, or at least many of them.

Even then, the Panel concluded that: "The perception of the existence of low staff morale and of staff fearing to speak out legitimately on issues affecting their tenure at the Secretariat should be addressed by the introduction of a programme designed to build trust and confidence amongst staff in each other, and between staff and management."

Ayeni himself had written to the Panel on 27 April: "I remain convinced that the Commonwealth stands on precarious moral and political grounds to demand good governance of her member governments if it is known that deliberate breaches of staff's human and employment rights, and inevitably other forms of serious misconduct, are condoned in its own Secretariat.

"The issue here is fundamentally about the public accountability of the Commonwealth secretary general. Therefore it seems most unusual that the investigation into serious matters concerning his repeated conducts should also be determined, facilitated and, ultimately, reported to him. Remarkably, he has also demanded that the proceedings and deliberations of the Investigation Panel are not held in public ...

"My fear for potential witnesses cannot be over-emphasised, given past experiences of reprisal. It will be hard to get witnesses to come forward for a fair and credible investigation with the secretary general at his post and in the knowledge that the Investigation Panel will submit their report to him eventually."

But all this fell on deaf ears. And nobody can help, because the Commonwealth has no such superintending organ. Not even the Commonwealth's chairman-in-office, currently held by the Government of Malta, could do anything. When Ayeni wrote to Malta to intervene, Malta wrote back on 10 July, saying: "I do not believe it appropriate and indeed within the Government of Malta's competence to involve ourselves in the way you have asked me to do. However, although the secretary general is not obliged to accept to negotiate ... I have taken it upon myself to conduct discreet inquiries ..."

The Commonwealth exists for all member countries. And it is their duty to demand a proper judicial inquiry into what is happening at Marlborough House. The results of such an inquiry would help the Commonwealth evolve new rules and organs suitable for the 21st century.

Next year's Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) to be hosted by Uganda will elect a new secretary general as Don McKinnon's second term ends at the Uganda CHOGM. The new secretary general should not be saddled with the same arcane rules and norms that are causing the current problems at Marlborough House.

As Don McKinnon himself wrote on 18 June, after receiving the Investigation Panel report: "I sincerely appreciate the time and effort which the Investigation Panel has devoted to this sensitive and difficult exercise. I believe the Panel has produced a comprehensive and balanced report, which has provided both clarity and food for thought. I have taken careful note of the recommendations and will ensure that they are implemented."

CHOGM should equally take a "careful note" of the recommendations. The "food for thought" therein will serve the Commonwealth well in the future.