Tropic Lightning convoy Ops lane training.

Before the 25th Infantry Division (Light) (25th ID) and Pacific Command (PACOM) Soldiers deployed from Hawaii to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) II and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) V, the division devised a list of deployment certification training tasks (DCTT). These tasks were divided into three levels, as shown in Figure 1 on Page 22.

Level III of the DCTT included convoy operations. In Iraqi and Afghan, every convoy is a combat operation, regardless of how far it's traveling or what it's hauling.

With its routine repositioning and re-supply operations, an FA unit was the logical choice to train the division's convoy operations. Therefore, 3d Battalion, 7th Field Artillery (3-7 FA) received the mission to execute the DCTT convoy operations lane.

Step 1: Get the Right People and Training Content. The battalion commander tasked the battalion fire direction officer (FDO), two battery executive officers (XOs), two chiefs of firing battery, the battalion master gunner, two gunnery sergeants, four howitzer section chiefs, the battalion support platoon sergeant and 30 additional personnel to execute this training on a daily basis.

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Having this many personnel involved in convoy operations training for three months as the battalion prepared to deploy to Afghanistan was a unique challenge. The 30 personnel came from the firing batteries on a rotating basis and served as the opposing force (OPFOR), but the lane cadre, instructors and observers/controllers (O/Cs) remained constant throughout the training. This helped standardize the training for all units.

Convoy operations are dynamic, and we wanted to ensure we were training the latest tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) used by units deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan. These TTPs covered combat, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), blocked/unblocked ambushes, reaction to civil disturbances, reaction to illegal checkpoints, sniper attacks and breaks-in-contact. The enemy constantly changes how he attacks Coalition Force convoys, and we wanted to disseminate the latest information, so we researched convoy operations at the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) website, emailed units currently deployed in both theaters executing convoy operations (1st Armored Division in Iraq and 10th Mountain Division in Afghanistan) and read doctrinal manuals about the subject. Relying too heavily on doctrinal manuals is a problem because OIF started in March 2003 and manuals dated earlier may be obsolete.

We developed the instruction based on this research with the intention of providing a baseline of information for leaders. Once the instructors, O/Cs and OPFOR were trained and certified, we conducted a "murder board" with the entire cadre present to improve each block of instruction.

Step 2: Resource the Training. For the convoy operations lane, we needed a larger amount of land than the other Level III tasks--enough land for a hands-on practical exercise (PE), as directed by the commanding general (CG). The PE required a vehicle assembly area for the pre-combat checks (PCCs) and pre-combat inspections (PCIs) and a lane long enough for multiple convoy scenarios for each company to react to.

We were given the East Range Training Area at Schofield Barracks to setup and execute training--an area of approximately 20 kilometers with an eight-kilometer circular route on a dirt road. On this land, we could push two company iterations through the PE at a time, each traveling in opposite directions. This allowed us to evaluate whether or not units cross talked when passing each other in convoys.

We resourced the vehicles from the battalion, giving us the ability to train each convoy using the same criteria. A unit may not have the up-armored high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) or light medium tactical vehicles (LMTVs) used during the training, but it could have the mission to escort LMTVs and would need to know how to position them.

This approach also enabled us to teach the convoy planning factors of tactically segregating leaders and high-value targets in a convoy; using a forward security element; positioning the crew-served weapon systems; and locating communications platforms. Not every vehicle has an advanced system improvement program (ASIP) single-channel ground and airborne radio system (SINCGARS), and leaders must identify which vehicles get them.

With two companies going through each PE, our throughput was 220 personnel or 110 per convoy. We did not want convoy leaders to get used to having big convoys (a bad habit), so we planned seven vehicles for each convoy, three M998 HMMWVs and four LMTVs. The combat configuration load (CCL) for each LMTV was 26 personnel and for each HMMWV, eight personnel. The battalion provided six M998 HMMWVs and eight LMTVs for the convoy PE and, additionally, one LMTV and four HMMWVs for the O/Cs and OPFOR.

To replicate IED explosions, we used artillery simulators. Each O/C had two artillery simulators per convoy. We also resourced 5.56-mm blanks for our unblocked and blocked ambushes. At the legal checkpoint, we used concertina wire for the obstacle where each convoy had to stop and conduct face-to-face coordination with host-nation police.

Kevlar blankets were not available during training, so the battalion bought 4,400 sand bags. We filled them before the first iteration of training and hardened each vehicle in accordance with standards in the CALL Handbook Stability and Support Operations. This enabled each unit to get a firsthand look at what "right" looks like without having to spend training time filling sand bags or hardening each vehicle.

It took five hours per iteration to give the convoy leadership a movement order, observe the unit's PCCs/PCIs, execute the PE portion and conduct an after-action review (AAR). We trained two companies in the morning and two in the afternoon for a daily throughput of 440 personnel.

Step 3: Conduct the Training. Five hours only touches the surface of convoy operations. We had to determine the most critical information and best way to present it. The PE was our "moneymaker." During this phase, convoy leaders took the information, executed their abbreviated troop-leading procedures (TLPs) and reacted to four vignettes while conducting convoys. After the PE, the O/Cs would facilitate thorough AARs.

Finally, at the end of the day, we emailed each company commander and first sergeant a "take-home packet" with our "smart cards" and convoy operations formats. These helped units to continue training before their departure.

For the first hour of the training, we divided every unit into two groups: squad leader and above (potential convoy leaders) and everyone else. We broke leaders away from Soldiers because we had specific topics to discuss with leaders and time was limited.

Soldiers had two 30-minute blocks of instruction taught by a certified leader. Leaders had four 15-minute blocks of instruction, including a briefing on the threat and rules of engagement (ROE) for the PE. The instructors were two captains and two senior NCOs.

On the lane, each convoy had to react to four vignettes: a legal checkpoint, a civil disturbance, an unblocked ambush and an IED with mass casualties. Additionally, at the IED site, the scenario unfolded into a blocked ambush if a vehicle was disabled and the convoy did not attempt to recover or move the vehicle.

We provided each convoy an interpreter (a "Terp") upon request. Four O/Cs rode with each convoy: one with the convoy commander, two with the lead element and one in the middle of each convoy. The O/Cs assessed Soldiers' actions.

Although we allocated 90 minutes for each PE, we had no clock. Units could take as long as they wanted to negotiate the lane. The longest a unit took was three hours and 30 minutes: the shortest was 25 minutes.

For the convoy leaders, we chose company XOs, platoon leaders and senior NCOs. First sergeants, platoon sergeants and personnel that would push convoys to and from the administration and logistics operations center (ALOC) were designated as convoy NCOs-in-charge (NCOICs).

In some cases, company commanders were convoy commanders, so their lieutenants could see the TLP initiated. But while the convoy was still inside the wire, a "mortar attack" took out the commander (he became an observer) so a lieutenant could take over the convoy. We also provided a field grade officer each day to receive convoy back briefs from the convoy commanders.

We had three weeks to prepare for this mission, from the tasking until the first iteration. The 3-7 FA commander, then the division artillery commander and finally the CG validated the convoy operations lane training.

In retrospect, conducting this training forced many Never Broken Battalion leaders, from section chiefs to the battalion commander, to update their thinking on convoys and constantly seek additional information. The battalion not only trained 8,000 personnel, but also witnessed many unique TTPs devised by units going through the training.

As 3-7 FA deployed to Afghanistan in support of OEF V and conducted at least five mounted combat patrols per day, the training allowed the battalion to "hit the ground running" with a solid base of knowledge on convoy operations.

Lessons Learned. Over the course of almost three months, we observed more than 100 company-sized units in convoy lane training. Although they were not evaluated or given a "Go" or "No-Go" score, the O/C team noticed two elements of convoy operations that translated into success in lane execution: convoy composition and communications, and adherence to good TLPs.

Convoy Composition and Communications. Units that correctly thought through the equipment and personnel placement within the convoy order recognized the advantages composition planning gives to the mission.

The most important factor in determining the composition of the convoy is leader control. Slower units realized quickly once movement started that control depends on communications, and units that fared better established a healthy secondary communications plan ahead of time. A convoy leader who ensured he could communicate with each vehicle in the convoy rarely dealt with a breaks-in-contact and minimized Soldier vulnerability by stopping only when absolutely necessary.

It is important to note (especially for Lightfighters) that hand and arm signals are not an effective means for convoy secondary communications. Multicolored flags and other longer range visual signals are more effective when radio communications are unavailable.

Troop-Leading Procedures. Units whose leaders had practiced TLPs fared much better than those without a solid procedural structure, including combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units. The O/C team noticed the greatest difference in performance between units that used one-third of the time available for planning and issuing the convoy order with two-thirds allotted for supervision and rehearsals--the one-third, two thirds rule. See Figure 2 for the TLP for convoy operations.

Leaders at all levels must constantly stay informed of the latest means that enemy combatants are using to attack our convoys in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Our Soldiers deserve the best and latest information and home station convoy training to counter the changing threat in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Level I Tasks -- Taught and certified by the companies.
* Rifle Marksmanship
* Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC)
* First Aid Tasks

Level II Tasks -- Taught by division in blocks 30 days before the unit
deployed.
* Interacting with the Media (Public Affairs Office, or PAO)
* Threat and Country Culture (G2)
* Rules of Engagement (ROE) (Staff Judge Advocate, or SJA)
* Preventative Medicine (Tripler Army Medical Center)

Level III Tasks -- Taught by units that executed them daily: division
had a matrix to coordinate company rotations through the lanes.
* Planning Convoys. Preparation of Vehicles/Equipment and Actions-on-
  Contact Battle Drills (3d Battalion. 7th Field Artillery)
* Identification of Minefields and Improvised Explosive Device (IED)
  Awareness and Hardening Vehicles/Structures for Force Protection (65th
  Engineers Sappers Battalion)
* Checkpoint Setup/Vehicles and Personnel Searches (25th Military
  Police)

Figure 1: 25th Division Deployment Certification Training Tasks (DCTT)

Receive the mission.

Issue the warning order.
* Issue convoy leaders the five Ws--who, what, when, where, why--and
  tentative timeline.
* Prioritize PCCs (NCOIC).
* Create a sand table or visual aid.
* Prioritize rehearsals (based upon enemy MDCOA/MPCOA).

Make a Tentative Plan.
* Consider intelligence, terrain/weather, convoy composition, rehearsal
  techniques and safety.
* Determine mission-essential tasks.
* Have a plan for vehicle self-recovery--always.
* Understand which other units can be mutually supporting along the
  route.

Initiate Movement.
* Establish a vehicle marshalling area if task organization includes
  more than one unit.
* Gain positive control of all external equipment and loads.

Conduct Reconnaissance. (Air, Ground and Map)
* Consider historical ambush/IED locations and bad neighborhoods.
* Determine what other convoys have seen on the route.
* Decide where your convoy is vulnerable along the route.

Complete the Plan.
Issue the Convoy Order. (Complete in less than 1/3 of the planning
time.)
* Everyone in the convoy should attend the orders brief, if time allows;
  at a minimum, convoy leaders and drivers must attend.
* Use visual aids and strip maps to help understand route info.

Supervise. (Done in 2/3 of the planning time.)
* Prioritize PCIs.
* Prioritize rehearsals -- conduct rehearsals in order of importance
  based upon enemy MDCOA and MPCOA or what you think will most likely
  happen to your convoy (always be prepared for breakdowns and breaks in
  communications).
  - Full-Force Rehearsal -- all Soldiers participate, same conditions as
    the operation.
  - Reduced-Scale Rehearsal -- drivers and convoy leaders in convoy
    order "walk through" battle drills while others watch; the walk
    through identifies what trucks will do when an enemy or external
    action affects the convoy.
  - Rehearsal Back-Brief -- At a minimum, the rehearsal should include a
    back-brief from convoy leaders and drivers.

Legend:
IED = Improvised Explosive Device
MDCOA = Most Dangerous Course-of-Action
MPCOA = Most Probable Course-of-Action
NCOIC = NCO-in-Charge
PCCs = Pre-Combat Checks
PCIs = Pre-Combat Inspections

Figure 2. Troop-Leading Procedures for Convoy Operations

By Lieutenant Colonel Clarence Neason, Jr., and Captains John D. Williams and J. Bradley Marvin

Lieutenant Colonel Clarence Neason, Jr., gives up command of the Never Broken 3d Battalion, 7th Field Artillery (3-7 FA), 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, in June, the battalion he deployed to Afghanistan for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) V. His battalion executed Convoy Operations Lane Training for the 25th Division prior to its deployment. He will be the 25th Division Inspector General.

Captain John D. Williams, Commander of C/3-7 FA, and Captain J. Bradley Marvin, S4 of 3-7 FA, planned, resourced and executed the 25th Division's Convoy Operations Deployment Certification Training Tasks (DCTT) from November 2003 until February 2004. They trained more than 8,000 Soldiers in Hawaii and then deployed to Afghanistan for OEF V in support of the 3d Brigade Combat Team, 25th Division. While in Iraq, C/3-7 FA doubled as a mounted infantry company.