Transnationalism and foreign policy analysis: the sustained primacy of the state in a transformed post-Cold War foreign policy arena (Transnationalism contra globalisation: the myth, or illusion, of globalisation).

The impact that the phenomenon of transnationalism has had on the nature and content of international relations as a field of study and practice is undeniable. Foreign policy and foreign policy analysis are no exception as they are not exempt from the need to adapt to the changes introduced by transnationalism to the international system. Transnational relations can be said to consist of contacts, coalitions and interactions across state boundaries that are not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of government. (1) It is within such developments that claims have been advanced that transnationalism in the post-Cold War era has signalled the gradual vanishing of the centricity of the state as the primary actor in the international system and that Non-State Actors (NSAs), such as transnational corporations (TNCs) and other transnational actors (TNAs), in addition to deterritorialised centres of authority, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) and United Nations (UN), and transnational legitimacy-providers, such as global civil society, will supplant the state as the primary actor in a globalised as opposed to international system. (2)

This assertion has invariably presented a radical challenge to the field of foreign policy analysis (FPA)--which is the manifestation of Aristotle's concept of Phronesis (3,4) in the sphere of foreign policy--since traditional FPA has always departed from assumptions based on the primacy of the state and its legitimacy as the sole entity which can formulate and implement a foreign policy. As such, the purpose of this paper will be to evaluate this challenge to FPA and in doing so to determine what impression this challenge has had on FPA. This will be done in part by examining what exactly 'foreign policy' is and who and what can make it.

Accordingly, this study will also investigate the future of foreign policy in a world being constantly transformed by the phenomenon of transnationalism. More precisely, it will focus on the impact of transnationalism on decision-making as a process of foreign policy (with implementation being the other), looking specifically at how foreign policy making, in general terms, might adapt to the changes, if not challenges, posed by transnationalism. Two options, in terms of the possible responses, will be examined; most notably whether the most prominent foreign policy making agent, the foreign ministry, (5) will decide to engage the changed foreign policy arena through specialisation and greater expertise or whether it will step back and delegate to the other increasingly relevant and international-minded departments that are being brought into the fore by the new transnational actors and issues, effectively adopting a co-ordinating and co-operating role.

Reconciling the concepts of transnationalism and foreign policy therefore seems like a useful endeavour, as well as an important exercise in the analysis of international relations and foreign policy because of the apparent inherent tensions present within the concepts' traditional logics.

In the post-Cold War era the perception has emerged that NSAs such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and TNCs can possess a foreign policy. (6) This perception is somewhat misleading, particularly when the notion of 'foreign policy' is cemented into and considered inextricable from conceptions of 'statehood' and 'government' by virtue of its evolution being dependent on the evolution of centralised political communities, such as states. (7) Having a foreign policy implies that there exists some sort of universal understanding of an internal/external dichotomy through which humans define themselves as belonging to one group or another. The modern community of states has formalised this internal/external dichotomy through the institutionalisation and legalisation of the Westphalian sovereign state system. (8) Indeed, foreign policy can be defined as the goals sought, values set, decisions made and actions taken by states and national governments acting on their behalf, in the context of external relations of national societies. This constitutes an attempt to design, manage and control the foreign relations of national societies. (9) But before elaborating on the statist nature of foreign policy, Oakeshott's definition of the modern state should be considered due to its complementary value for any understanding of foreign policy's ontology.

Oakeshott writes that a modern European state--a model of geopolitical organisation that has become universal--can be recognised as being:

   an association of legally 'free' human beings, among whom a certain
   sentiment of solidarity had emerged; occupying a territory with
   defined and settled frontiers; organised by a single system of law
   exclusively its own, and a single hierarchy of courts, which
   allowed no independent jurisdictions; rules by its own exclusive,
   centralised, sovereign government, which disposes of very great
   executive power; a member of a manifold of states which has come to
   be recognised as 'Europe', and having territorial possessions
   (sometimes called 'colonies') outside Europe; normally' preparing
   for war, fighting a war, or recovering from a war, designed to
   maintain a balance of power in this system of European states. (10)

Oakeshott's definition of the governments of these states is also helpful. He defines the government of such a state as being a:

   single, centralised, ruling authority, operating by means of its
   own appointed agents, sovereign, independent of all external
   authority, proof against prescription, and exceedingly powerful.
   (11)

On the primary activities of a European state's government, Oakeshott writes that:

   its main activities appeared as lawmaking, the administration of
   the law, and the pursuit of policy both in respect of its own
   subjects and in respect of neighbouring European states. (12)

What is implied is that the essence of a state (due to its supreme procedural sovereignty) and the authority derived by governments is dependent on the perception that a modern state is a type of association that can only exist if the members of this association recognise their obligation to recognise the authority of government. (13) States, as opposed to NSAs, are thus entities which have supreme legal authority which was gradually institutionalised and thus it is not surprising that foreign policy has traditionally been seen as falling within the realm of interstate relations. Oakeshott's description of the nature of the modern state as being a fusion between both telocratic and nomocratic characteristics should be recalled. The foreign policy prerogative of states is primarily manifested due to, as Oakeshott perceived it, the telocratic nature, in part, of states. (14) Therefore, not only do states possess the legal authority to formulate a foreign policy, but it is also within their inherent being to formulate a foreign policy due to the existence of the 'Other', to put it in Levinasian terms, and this necessity to have a foreign policy is due to the inevitability of and need for inter-state interaction, which, to complete the circle, legitimises the state's authority to formulate a foreign policy. Thus, the existence of other states necessitates that states formulate a foreign policy.

Hence, NSAs such as NGOs and TNCs cannot craft foreign policy because they do not possess the required authority or recognition to do so. This is why entities such as Greenpeace, Amnesty International and Coca-Cola do not have foreign policies. In essence, the manifestation and legitimisation of foreign policy does not merely depend on inner recognition, but also the recognition of others. NSAs do not possess this recognition as supreme legal entities, such as states do. Arguing that NSAs can possess a foreign policy is an attempt to ascribe statist characteristics to NSAs, and in doing so attempt to understand NSAs in statist terms. Via this endeavour it is implicitly conceded that foreign policy is inherently a manifestation associated with states and hence intimately tied to the ontology and raison d'etre of both the notions of 'statehood' and 'government'. NSAs need to become state-like in order to possess a foreign policy, which is a contradiction in terms since NSAs such as NGOs and TNCs cannot become state-like without absolving themselves from their non-state nature or status.

Although NSAs such as TNCs have emerged as pivotal players in the world(as opposed to global) economy by virtue of their immense financial resources and their numerous employees throughout the globe, TNCs can still not be considered to possess foreign policy. (15) TNCs are certainly active participants in economic and world political affairs and, due to this status, are afforded the opportunity to advance their interests in international conferences and meetings in an effort to administer local, national, and international interests, sometimes vis-a-vis states and inter-governmental organisations (IGOs). They manage a myriad of relationships via the development of their own representative mechanisms, which allow for the management of the complex relationships which define the contemporary world economy. (16) However, TNCs remain subject to the authority of states, and are thus required to express their interests and implement them via the instruments and frameworks that states provide, otherwise these interests lack the necessary legitimacy to be implemented. (17) This is primarily because TNCs do not share the ontology and raison d'etre of states, with states being a telocratic-nomocratic fusion while TNCs are almost entirely telocratic in nature, which removes any consideration for humaneness and its manifestation in the forms of representation and constitutionalism--concepts which have led to the legitimisation of states as the supreme authority. Thus, TNCs, for the sake of conceptual clarity, have a business policy, not a foreign policy, and can only implement their business policy via the structures provided by states; similarly, NGOs have an agenda, not a foreign policy.

The phenomenon of transnationalism has, however, been accompanied by supra-nationalism via the manifestation of IGOs, which are not states in themselves, but possess a foreign policy. (18) However, the ability of IGOs to possess a foreign policy can be easily reconciled with the notion that foreign policy is solely the preserve of states. (19) IGOs are composed of states and by virtue of this composition possess the necessary authority to possess a foreign policy, since the foreign policy of IGOs is the result of concurrence by states to allow IGOs to possess a foreign policy. (20)

In order to gain an understanding of what exactly 'transnationalism' refers to, it is necessary to first define the terms 'international' and 'globalisation'. The 'international' is essentially a state-centric concept in that it refers to the relationship between states and the agents and representatives of states, such as their governments. (21) To extend the definition, the 'international' implies that all interactions between states, even if such interactions are purely financial and performed by an NSA, are subject to the state by virtue of such interaction having to occur via state structures. (22) For example, during the Cold War the matrix of cultural exchange, whether publicly- or privately-funded, between states, as conceived in realist doctrine, implied mutual recognition in addition to the ability to control the identity and value of the culture thereby 'exchanged'. (23) The Cold War era world tours of the Bolshoi Ballet are a famous example of this. (24) The UN, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organisation (WTO), international treaties and international customs and tariff regulations are all examples of phenomena associated with the notion of the 'international'.

The concept of 'globalisation' (popularised in the 1980s) is, in a sense, built upon the notion of the 'international'. (25) To elaborate, 'globalisation' refers to the growing trans-border integration of economies and political and social systems--or societies and cultures--and the concomitant rise in the mobility of people, products, capital and ideas. (26) 'Globalisation', taken to its developmental extreme, suggests that eventually total integration will occur, which will see the 'international' disappear and the emergence of a 'global village'--'a world system that covers the entire globe'. (27)

'Transnationalism' is the most recent manifestation in this evolution of the terms. (28) 'Transnationalism' essentially refers to the growing multiplicity of ties and interactions--encapsulated by the word 'integration'--which link people, institutions, and NSAs in general across the borders of states. (29) Transnational activities can be manifested, inter alia, socially, by contacting citizens of foreign states; culturally, by celebrating the ethnic, religious, or national holidays associated with another state; religiously, such as manifested in faith-based projects and organisations; economically, such as investment and remittances; and, finally, politically, via social movements and the lobbying of either foreign governments or the citizens of foreign states. (30) Transnationalism should thus be situated within the concept of 'globalisation'. (31)

Over the past twenty years, there has been a proliferation of new forms of international organisations whose operation has detracted from the competencies of states. These non-state actors have effectively challenged one of the key claims made by states in order to dominate international affairs. States claim that they are better organised, on the whole, and are able to achieve the requirements of their citizens for order, prosperity and development. Indeed, a variety of non-state actors are increasingly involved in the crucial issues of world politics. These actors form an important part of the global environment, affecting the possibilities and probabilities of state actions. (32)

NSAs in the contemporary global system include international organisations. These mainly consist of inter-governmental organisations (IGOs), which are composed of states, and NGOs, which are private international actors. As such, NGOs are organisations that cut across national boundaries; making them transnational. They are made up of private individuals or groups that exist 'below' the level of the state; that is, while they require physical facilities inside states, they do not need governments in order to conduct international relations. As they deal with a great variety of matters, NGOs most often perform rather low-level, specifically functional tasks, promoting contact across state boundaries on matters of common interests and providing non-governmental means of communication among individuals of many nations. NGOs help knit the global society together in much the same way that private groups do within a country. As such, NGOs can function as pressure groups affecting national governments or IGOs, and a great many are also often formally consulted on matters of concern in which they specialise in. (33)

Conversely, some of the most powerful transnational actors are multinational corporations (MNCs), especially as their numbers and importance have grown enormously in recent years. In 2001, there were about 65,000 firms conducting business in foreign countries--a six-fold increase since the early 1990s--with over 85,000 affiliates. The top 100 industrial (not including financial) MNCs controlled almost $6 trillion in assets, had $4.4 trillion in sales, and employed more than 14 million people worldwide. (34) Giant corporations like these cannot help but affect the policies of many governments and the welfare of many people. For instance, oil companies would still have a tremendous impact with their pricing and marketing policies even if they did not try to change the policy or personnel of national governments. MNCs possess their spheres of influence through the division of world markets. In fact, they often engage in diplomacy and espionage, which are the traditional tools of state interaction. Most importantly, MNCs have very large economic resources at their disposal, which gives them an advantage over not only many of the newer and smaller states, but also some of the established ones. For example, in 2001, the US discount store Wal-Mart had gross sales equal to the gross national product (GNP) of Sweden ($218 billion) and exceeded the GNPs of all but twenty-one nations. (35)

It seems, then, that transnationalism implies a lesser role for the governments of states as it emphasises trans-border interaction and cooperation between NSAs, and, like globalisation, shares the popular vision of a 'global village' and world governments. (36) That said, some would argue that such a view should be taken with much moderation, if not disputed outright, particularly the latter point of the formation of a world government--by far the most prevalent--since it can be argued that transnationalism is not opposed to a state system but rather functions within it. As such, transnationalism, unlike globalisation, does not necessarily suggest nor desire a world government, a point that will be argued throughout this paper. NSAs such as NGOs like Greenpeace and Amnesty International, global research networks, global environmental concerns, and global financial activities (such as international capital movements and international trade) are all phenomena associated with transnationalism. These, in turn, invariably require the existence of a state system, or any kind of political community where territorialised entities are strictly distinguished from each other. The EU, which is often used as an example of the success of transnationalism or as being the jewel of successful transnational integration, perfectly underlines the argument.

Transnationalism can also be distinguished from globalisation in another significant way. Globalisation is often associated with cultural imperialism and homogenisation, while transnationalism attempts to circumvent this accusation via the virtue of co-operation. There is an attempt to argue that globalisation and transnationalism seek different forms of integration. (37) Transnationalism should hence not be confused with globalisation and the connotations of it. Furthermore, another, albeit minor, distinction is the fact that globalisation refers to a phenomenon which affects all states, while transnationalism refers to a phenomenon which affects multiple states, but which is not necessarily global.

The EU--along with the now defunct Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON)--stands as the archetypical manifestation of transnationalism by virtue of being a supranational union during the Cold War. Although the EU was only established in November 1993 (post-Cold War) by the Treaty of Maastricht, it has its roots within the Cold War era and is very much a product of the Zeitgeist of the Cold War era. The EU is the current manifestation of the vision of the evolution of a democratic transnational European community first founded upon the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which later evolved into the European Economic Community (EEC). Hence, the EU is a child of the Cold War era (38) and can legitimately be portrayed as being an example of the role of transnationalism during the Cold War era.

Cold War transnationalism was a type of transnationalism which did not stand in opposition to the state and its authority and foreign policy. Rather, it worked in conjunction with the state and even complemented its foreign policy and authority. Essentially, the member states of entities such as the ECSC and ECC allowed controlled transnational integration to occur due to the strategic benefit of transnational integration.

In discussing pre-Cold War transnationalism, emphasis is given to pre-Westphalian Medieval Europe. It should be noted for the purposes of this argument that Medieval Europe, as opposed to the modern state system, did not possess strictly defined borders and authority was not based on territory; it was deterritorialised and jurisdiction was not based on geographical considerations. (39) For instance, the authority of the Catholic Church and the pope, or papal office, by extension, and Hugh Capet, the Count of Paris and in 987 elected 'king' of the West Franks, was not based on the ownership of territory, but rather Dei gratia, in the case of the former, and by virtue of election to a sanctified office, in the case of the latter. (40)

Moreover, populations were free to migrate without an excessive regard for borders, since borders in Medieval Europe were diffuse, shifting, and permeable, and hence could not be seen as containing strict jurisdictional limits, as is the case in a contemporary state system. (41) Relationships and allegiances were scattered--the king of France could, hypothetically-speaking, include the count of Flanders as his vassal, the count of Luxembourg as a prince of France, and the king of Sicily as a prince of the French royal house. (42) Similarly, an Italian noble might swear fealty to an English king, or a Norman duke declare himself a vassal of a German prince and a fief might swear allegiance to multiple kings. (43)

Strictly speaking, transnationalism only existed during the pre-Westphalian system in a very loosely-defined manner, since transnationalism is in essence associated with a state system where borders are rigidly defined. However, it is possible to draw certain parallels between Medieval 'transnationalism' and post-Cold War transnationalism, or at least its vision, and this is the value of a discussion of Medieval 'transnationalism'--it allows for the conceptualisation of deterritorialised authority through which transnationalism can, possibly, exist without the strict requirement of the existence of a state system where states are the supreme actors, (44) although the existence of states is still required, and through this a possible detachment from its basis on the concept of the 'international', state-centric system.

The post-Cold War era witnessed the emergence of a variety of NSAs in world politics and the world economy, leading to increasingly complex political realities. (45) Transnationalism in the modern context has increasingly come to refer to the growing number of people who have the freedom, legally and economically, to move across borders and between cultures, doing business their own way. (46)

Keohane and Nye's definition of transnationalism should also be considered. Keohane and Nye define transnationalism, in its contemporary form, as being:

   ...the movement of tangible and intangible items (including ideas)
   across state boundaries when at least one actor is not an agent of
   a government or inter-governmental organisation. (47)

Although this definition seemingly greatly correlates with the previous definitions it can, firstly, be distinguished from Medieval transnationalism in that the legality of movement was a non-existent requirement during the Medieval era, which implies that modern transnationalism is tied to a well-defined legal character, and hence to the state. Secondly, it can be distinguished from Cold War era transnationalism by the extensive freedom of movement (both physical, such as travelling, and non-physical, such as information exchange) which exists now, as opposed to the restricted freedom of movement which existed during the Cold War era.

The character of contemporary transnationalism has led to the changing of the role of the UN and the establishment of entities such as the ICC--both of which are deterritorialised entities of authority--and has placed these deterritorialised entities of authority alongside states. This does not, however, necessarily imply a relationship of opposition between deterritorialised and territorialised entities of authority. Contemporary transnationalism, taken to its extreme, has rather envisioned a world where authority is based on both deterritorialised entities and states which work in unison, as attested to by the legal character of post-Cold War era transnationalism. To elaborate on and substantiate this latter point, the ethics of contemporary transnationalism should be considered.

Before elaborating on the ethics of transnationalism, it will be reiterated that the spirit of transnationalism still stays the same; it is merely manifested in different manners during different periods. Moreover, it should also be noted that it has been the case for centuries that some states are less powerful than transnational economic and religious organisations and other TNAs. However, this does not undermine the legitimacy of states since it is incorrect to equate foreign policy legitimacy with power when, actually, foreign policy legitimacy must be equated with the legitimacy that statehood provides.

Although transnationalism is merely a phenomenon, or occurrence, and should thus not be linked to any normative or ideological stance, such as has occurred with the concept of 'globalisation', it can be argued that transnationalism is a neutral concept. For transnationalism to occur, a certain transnational character must exist to perform the phenomenon of transnationalism. Hence, transnationalism cannot be entirely de-linked from the character which is performing it and, also, the type of transnational character that the phenomenon of transnationalism is bound to proliferate. Thus, transnationalism can be indirectly linked to an ethical stance.

The emergence of powerful deterritorial TNCs and global civil society hint to what kind of ethics should be associated with contemporary transnationalism. Transnationalism is primarily founded upon the notion that states should act in an inclusive and tolerant manner towards the 'Other' and in accordance with the spirit of the minimalist state conception, which implies a very 'thin' ethics. Transnational ethics would thus condemn North Korea's Juche ideology. However, this is not to say that the ethics of contemporary transnationalism is cosmopolitan since it would not, for example, necessarily condemn the exploitation of humans by TNCs eager to employ cheap labour with minimal to no regard for labour rights. Rather, cosmopolitan ethics can be derived from transnational ethics, such as certain NGOs have done. The ethics of contemporary transnationalism hence does not intrinsically provide an ethics for the progress of humanity; rather it provides a foundation from which such an ethics can be built by virtue of its call for inclusiveness, tolerance, and a minimalist state. Notions such as capitalism (48) and liberal democracy (49) can hence be constructed upon these values. This implies that contemporary transnationalism is very much a product of capitalism due to the huge technological contribution made by this idea which allowed for greater freedom of movement and liberal democracy. However, this does not imply that transnationalism shares the values of liberal democracy and capitalism despite the potential of the ethics of transnationalism to aid the development of, among other things, capitalism, liberal democracy, and cosmopolitan ethics.

Although contemporary (or post-Cold War) transnationalism has doubtlessly had an impact on the function and perception of foreign policy, as made by states, it has not allowed for the possession of a foreign policy by NSAs such as TNCs and NGOs and other TNAs since the nature of foreign policy has remained unaltered--its nature is still state-centric. (50) That said the foreign policy of states has increasingly had to adapt to issues raised by NSAs and TNAs. (51) Transnational technical and welfare issues, such as finance, trade, environmentalism and labour standards, and the diminution of political boundaries due to the expansion of communications networks, social protest and environmental concerns, the spread of neo-liberal capitalism, the globalised media, and conventional (52) and unconventional wars, with transnational terrorism being a potent example of the latter, have presented novel challenges to the way in which foreign policy is perceived, conducted, and implemented by establishing adapted boundaries of policy consideration. (53) Put differently, states in the post-Cold War era find themselves between the reality of expansive transnational networks and the ideal of sovereign control.

The emergence and proliferation of transnationalism and transnational actors has had an effect on the foreign policy arena. The foreign policy arena can be broadly described as the terrain in which foreign policy decisions are made and actions taken. It is occupied by a range of significant actors, issues and interests, all of which give it a dynamism and life. Accordingly, one of the key tests of an effective foreign policy is the way in which the foreign policy makers can appraise the shifting array of forces in the arena, respond to those forces, and use the opportunities they create. More negatively, though, it might be argued that withstanding the challenges and insecurities of the arena, such as those presented by the phenomenon of transnationalism, is the minimum requirement of an effective foreign policy. (54)

In terms of the actors of the foreign policy arena, participation in foreign policy has traditionally been seen as a hierarchical and relatively restricted 'community' of designated political and bureaucratic elites, who have a continuous responsibility to pursue foreign policy objectives, and who are specially qualified for the task. Transnationalism, however, has brought changes that create much wider participation by a broader array of actors from the international, the governmental and the domestic contexts. Furthermore, although participation in such a (now more) diffused system still, to some extent, remains within the boundaries of government, it is complicated by the fact that 'government' has become a more elastic concept. Beyond government, we must also register the fact that influence upon foreign policy has diffused much more broadly through societies. This has much to do with the changing subject matter of foreign policy itself, as it also reflects the widening awareness of international issues. (55)

Similarly, the strongly hierarchical view of the issues on the foreign policy agenda, especially in the form of its strong link to national security, has come under attack from the phenomenon of transnationalism. Indeed, the nature of 'national security' itself has come under pressure, as there has been a broadening of the national security agenda to new areas of activity; leaving security being defined in terms that range across economic, environmental and societal concerns. (56) The agenda of foreign policy has become increasingly congested as processes of regionalisation and transnationalism have accelerated. Hence, the traditional preoccupation with security--however defined--now has to compete with a multiplicity of other, more everyday issues relating to economic management, environmental degradation, trans-border communication and cultural interaction. (57) The new issues of the foreign policy agenda came, during the 1970s, to be termed 'intermestic', since they engaged the domestic and the foreign policy processes of societies, and created new types of political and organisational challenges. (58)

With regards to the interests around which foreign policy centres, the historically close link between foreign policy and national security has traditionally meant that the idea of 'national interest' is fundamental to traditional notions of foreign policy. However, the concept of a monolithic national interest expressed by the foreign policy makers is increasingly difficult to relate to the untidiness of actual foreign policy making today. For one, it has been argued that the growing transnationalisation of interests has 'domesticated' the previously unruly setting of world politics; the implications of which are that there is a growing emphasis in foreign policy on the satisfaction of sectional interests at the same time as there is an increasing incentive to respond to international interests and governance structures. (59)

Contemporary transnationalism can be said, then, to have effected an intellectual shift from the notion of bounded rationality, where national interests are defined based on domestic preferences, to one where it is recognised that foreign policy should display more varied interests which should be less egotistic, targeted at structures, consider global public goods and be, at times, issue specific; It has, moreover, forced a shift in the manner in which decision-formulation is perceived. (60) According to realists, decision-formulation was traditionally perceived as being either the product of competition of social forces within a territorially delimited space, according to utilitarian-liberals, or the anarchical system which states find themselves within. (61) The emergence of contemporary transnationalism has, however, led to the recognition that, following constructivist reasoning, decision-formulation is now the product of pluralistic competition of a multitude of internal and external forces. (62)

The foreign ministry and those under its control, such as its diplomats, represent a formidable engine in the making of foreign policy especially because of the vital functions they have traditionally performed, such as information-gathering and policy-making. (63) Politicians rely heavily on the experts in the foreign ministry to sift through the vast quantities of incoming information, to interpret and predict the actions of other states and to formulate policy options on the multiple detailed questions which never come to public attention. Another vital function performed by foreign ministries is that of acting as a bureaucratic memory. As every system needs continuity in its external relations, career diplomats institutionalise them by serving as the system's collective memory with the help of its record-keeping system. Without the capacity to relate myriad past commitments and treaties to the present, and to each other, decision-makers would be left 'floundering in chaos', given the complexity of the contemporary international system. (64)

As such, foreign ministries have had a considerable degree of autonomy; virtually constituting a sub-elite within the machinery of government. Their control over external representations, their privileged contacts with foreigners and the continued mystique of international affairs has traditionally given them a certain carapace which protects against interference by other parts of the domestic administration. However, as a result of the phenomenon of post-Cold War transnationalism, many states are now facing what has been termed the 'horizontal decentralisation' of their foreign relations in the form of their foreign ministries' loss of control over many external issues to other parts of the state bureaucracy. (65) The past fifty years have seen the emergence of many rivals to conventional diplomats from within the bureaucracy because of their greater expertise and specialisation at dealing with these new and more specific issues. The propagation in numbers and importance of transnational actors and their issues and subsequent interests has meant that foreign ministries are more and more stretched thin in the attempt to cater for this range of knowledge.

This has, inevitably, started to challenge the traditional conception of foreign policy analysis where foreign ministries and their employees, as the main foreign policy makers and implementers in unified government action, are being supplanted by home-based experts and non-governmental para-diplomats. For one, foreign ministries are more and more being seen as technically inadequate, if not incompetent, as diplomats are perceived as over-generalist and over-stretched; incapable of discussion on equal terms with economists, scientists and businessmen. Even the 'specialism in abroad' counts for less now that travel is much easier and more common. Furthermore, most domestic departments now engage directly in international relations by sending their own experts out to meet their equivalents in another state or to participate in specialised international organisations and conferences. These trans-governmental relations, that are in effect transnational in nature, represent the growth and diffusion of 'government' that has occurred in the governmental context of foreign policy making in response to the new demands of international life created by the impacts of globalisation, transnationalism, regionalisation and the proliferation of new states and organisations. (66)

It is therefore clear that the foreign ministry will have to adapt to the changes in dynamics and challenges posed by transnationalism. In light of the expanding foreign policy arena, where other governmental departments become more and more involved with, if not influential in, foreign policy making, the foreign ministry will have to redefine its role if it is to keep its relevance and pre-eminence as the dominant foreign policy maker. As such, it is faced with two options on opposite ends of a spectrum of possible responses. The most obvious option would be to adapt to the expanding foreign policy arena by expanding itself, meaning that the foreign ministry would have to increase the training and specialisation of its staff in order to make them more technically competent to deal with the growing numbers and importance of issues and actors in the arena. This would invariably entail an expansion of the ministry, in budget and size, as specialised sub-departments within the ministry which deal with specific sectors such as economics or the environment within context of foreign affairs would emerge. The logic behind such an option resides in the fact that diplomats continue to be valued by the members of a network of national and international influential figures, politicians and journalists, who lean on their skills in daily life, and who have seen at close hand how the profession has become more stressful, demanding and often physically dangerous since 1945.

The other option consists of focusing on the new needs for coordination in foreign relations within the government created by the greater diversification of external relations brought about by trans-governmentalism and transnationalism. That said, adopting such an option would effectively mean reducing the size and capacity of the foreign ministry as it would opt to delegate the business of foreign affairs on specific issues such as financial and environmental ones to the relevant government departments that deal with them professionally, not only because of their expertise on the matter but also because of the fact that most domestic departments already have their own mini-foreign sub-departments in which they engage directly in international relations. (67) The foreign ministry's purpose would, thus, focus more on effectively synthesising and coordinating the actions and behaviour of all these other departments' foreign relations, ultimately encouraging cooperation and providing leadership in the conduct of the state's aggregate foreign relations. Accordingly, such a role would seem to fall closer in line to the broad definition of

foreign policy provided by Christopher Hill, where foreign policy is seen as the 'sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations'. (68)

To be sure, these options depend on available financial resources and capabilities and/or political/institutional culture. Either way, it would seem then as if the ultimate effect of transnationalism on foreign policy making is a general expansion of the governmental context of foreign policy making; whether it is through expanding and specialising the foreign ministry or through the comprehensive inclusion of other departments within the realm of foreign affairs, and in the conduct of foreign policy and foreign policy making. Contemporary transnationalism has altered the perception of which actors should be the target of foreign policy implementation. (69) Traditionally, the target of foreign policy was merely other states, however, contemporary transnationalism has forced a reconsideration of this stance and has called for the consideration of multiple actors at multiple levels and also of governance structures, such as those entailed by the notion of 'global governance'. (70) Contemporary transnationalism has hence altered the scope of state foreign policy by calling for the recognition of the internal-external nexus and the inclusion of a multitude of novel considerations, and has neither undermined the authority of the state nor the legitimacy of the state--and supranational entities by extension--as the only entity which can possess a foreign policy.

With regard to the capacities and instruments of foreign policy making and implementation, contemporary transnationalism has led to an emphasis on relational and structural power and communicative action in the form of arguing and deliberation and also the introduction of public diplomacy (71). Traditionally, the capacities and instruments of foreign policy were merely thought of in terms of relational power and the diplomacy of coercion and bargaining (72). Contemporary transnationalism has, also, altered the perception of the structure of the external sphere by pressing for an expansion of the Weltanschauung of those responsible for the making and formalisation of foreign policy by pressing for the recognition that the structure of the external sphere is not merely composed of international institutions and international law, but rather formal and informal institutions, networks, and rules and norms. (73)

Still, although contemporary transnationalism has had a significant influence on the way in which foreign policy is perceived and the functions associated with it, it has not challenged the centrality of the state as the primary actor of the international system. The case of the EU as a prime example helps to appreciate why this is so. Even the EU fails to present a legitimate challenge to the conception of the state as the primary actor of the international system by acting as an alternative for state centrality by virtue of being a supranational entity with the capacity to garner the authority and legitimacy associated with states, by virtue of being composed of states. Even though the EU is, arguably, the most powerful contemporary example of transnationalism, since within its supra-nationalism it contains an almost borderless internal sphere where goods, people, capital, and ideas are allowed close to complete freedom of movement between member states and where member states are expected to display a certain degree of congruence by virtue of being a member of the EU, (74) it does not threaten the primacy of states and their authority to form a foreign policy which is dissimilar to those of other member states and which is not necessarily in agreement with EU foreign policy.

States such as Germany, France, and the United Kingdom (UK), often engage in bilateral diplomacy with non-EU states and other EU states and express their national interest in an egotistical way in a manner which is not always consistent with the foreign policy of other EU members or even EU foreign policy. (75) A testimony of this is the insistence of major EU member states like Germany, France, and the UK to maintain separate embassies and consulates. (76) Essentially, engaging in transnational activities, or allowing them to occur, within the EU is of enormous benefit to member states. This indicates how transnationalism can be utilised by states to their advantage. As such, transnationalism allows states the potential of effective economic statecraft but also, moreover, allows states to formulate foreign policy in such a way as to take advantage of the zeitgeist of, for instance, global civil society. Thus, transnationalism opens up a new world of possibilities for states when making foreign policy, which is the essence of practical foreign policy making--simply consider the development opportunities entry into the EU has provided Poland with and the reform incentives that non-EU member states often passionately engage in, in order to gain entry into the EU.

Transnationalism has led to the introduction and consolidation of certain ethical concerns largely due to the globalised media. This highlights that transnationalism has forced states to adapt, but has not undermined the centrality of states. The globalised media has allowed the notion of Homo Sociologicus--social man--to be adapted globally and, via this adaptation, transnationalism has led to a greater concern for human rights, as is evident with, for instance, the growing concern for Jus in Bello, or, the law of how states should conduct themselves during war, both externally and internally. The 9/11 attacks (and the imposition of stringent security measures as a response to Jihadism) and the recent global financial crisis (77) have further served to illustrate the primacy of states even in a transnational world. (78) This highlighted that states remain the only legitimate makers of foreign policy. Even if the aforementioned events did not occur, it is unlikely that contemporary transnationalism would have altered the reality of state primacy. State primacy would merely have been concealed. The reality remains that it is only through the support and consent of states that contemporary transnationalism is allowed to flourish.

It is unlikely that transnationalism will induce the end of the state system or the end of a world which consists of various political communities since different ideas of community are likely to always exist. As indicated previously, transnationalism has always existed alongside states and political communities, which alludes to the notion that the phenomenon of transnationalism has been manifested in different ways at different times--due to a certain zeitgeist and stage of technological development--and that states have had to adapt to these manifestations, by, for instance, embracing soft power and economic power over military action and placing less emphasis on territory with reference to economic development. Currently, transnationalism has led to the notion, in the constructivist sense, that peace is within the interests of all states and hence that states should desire to cooperate--via, for instance, institution-building, summits, and the creation and consolidations of norms--for the sake of international order and global responsibility. The combating of transnational crime, global poverty, and environmental degradation are examples of this notion. This is the essence of Aristotle's concept of Phronesis, and also as later employed by Gadamer.

To conclude, while transnationalism has caused a shift in the perception and function of foreign policy, it has not challenged the position of the state as the sole entity with the legitimacy to formulate a foreign policy. Transnationalism has not been able to supplant the state as the primary actor within the international system because the logic of transnationalism--be it Medieval, Cold War era, or contemporary--does not stand in opposition to the centrality of state. Transnationalism has essentially led to new issues being considered in the formulation of foreign policy and in FPA and has altered the way in which foreign policy is implemented and through which implementation is analysed in FPA and in doing so has introduced new concerns in the field of FPA. To that effect, it has expanded the foreign policy arena leaving the (traditionally) chief foreign policy maker, the foreign ministry, with the options of either expanding to cope with the changing arena, or adopting a coordinating and synthesizing role of the state's foreign affairs with regards to the increasingly growing number of other governmental departments that now increasingly participate in foreign relations.

These options depend on certain factors, however, such as financial resources/ capabilities or political/institutional culture. Expanding the foreign ministry by hiring and training a greater number of field-specific civil servants and diplomats is not only bound to be a costly exercise but also an intricate, if not problematic, one in terms of political and bureaucratic negotiations. (79) The political/institutional culture of government also matters when deciding which option to choose. For instance, if the foreign ministry has traditionally been a weak institution within government in terms of influence on policy making, adopting the option of focusing on coordinating the increasing foreign affairs and relations of other departments might not just be ineffective, but might also lead to further loss in influence in governmental power and influence.

More specifically, though, such configurations can come down to the type of relationship between the head of government and the foreign minister in terms of power and influence in policy making. Indeed, while the nominal chief of foreign policy operations in most states is the foreign minister, heads of government often have a natural tendency to get drawn into foreign policy. Therefore, using Hill's three models of head of government-foreign minister relations, we can suggest that only certain types of relationships are viable for the successful adoption of the foreign ministry's option of focusing on the entire government's foreign affairs coordination. (80) These include one that encompasses the culture of an established foreign minister, in which there is a clear division of labour and excellent communications, and one of equality consisting of trust, ability and matching reputations. Conversely, a relationship that is made of a subordinate foreign minister would probably not be the best condition for the adoption of the option.

In any case, it must be understood and acknowledged that the possible responses to the effects of transnationalism on the foreign policy arena highlighted above only depict the extreme paths available to the foreign ministry as it adapts to the growth of transnationalism. As such, any practical courses of action taken by foreign ministries around the world are more likely to fall somewhere within the spectrum, encompassing aspects from both ends to some extent, i.e. some expertise and specialisation with regards to the new actors and issues in the arena, as well as more of a coordinating role amongst the emerging governmental departments involved in foreign affairs. Regardless of the course of action undertaken, however, the importance and significance of the foreign ministry as the key player in foreign policy making is ultimately maintained--validating the idea that a foreign policy still remains within the exclusive purview of the state as the primary actor of the international system. Foreign policy is exclusive to states by virtue of states being the only entities with the necessary legitimacy to make foreign policy with authority.

(1) J.S. Nye & R. Keohane (eds.), Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge 1971), xi.

(2) J.P. Muldoon, The Diplomacy of Business, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 16 (2005), 341.

(3) A word which is found in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Phronesis celebrates the virtue of practical thought, or practical wisdom.

(4) Alexis Tabensky's (2007) Realistic Idealism: An Aristotelian Alternative to Machiavellian International Relations, published in Theoria 54(113), is another example of how Aristotelian thought may influence our understanding of the domains of international relations and foreign policy.

(5) It is recognised that the executive has traditionally been the chief foreign policy maker and foreign ministry, or the ministry of foreign affairs (MFA), the chief foreign policy implementer and, at times, advisor. Obama's recent visit to India has shown this since he stated that the alliance between the United States and India 'will be one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century' (Sky News, 'Obama hails "world power" India', 8 November 2010, http://www.skynews.com.au/world/article. aspx?id=536674&vId=, accessed 19 November 2010.). However, in the context of this paper, due to its theoretical aim, it will be assumed that when referring to the foreign ministry as the chief foreign policy maker that it is acknowledged that the executive is the entity which actually makes foreign policy and that the foreign ministry merely serves to advise the executive and to implement foreign policy.

(6) Ibid.

(7) M. Webber & M. Smith, Introduction, in M. Webber & M. Smith (eds), Foreign Policy in a Transformed World (Harlow 2002), 3.

(8) S. Keukeleire & S. Schunz, 'Foreign policy, globalization and global governance: the European Union's structural foreign policy', paper presented to the European Consortium for Political Research Standing Group on the European Union Fourth Pan-European Conference on European Union Politics, Riga 25-27 September 2008, 3.

(9) Webber & Smith, op. cit., 9-10.

(10) M. Oakeshott, Lectures in the History of Political Thought, in T. Nardin & L. O'Sullivan (eds), (Exeter 2006), 373.

(11) Ibid., 380.

(12) Ibid., 381.

(13) Ibid., 468.

(14) Ibid., 481.

(15) Muldoon, op. cit., 341-342.

(16) Ibid.

(17) E. Leaver & J. Cavanagh, Controlling Transnational Corporations, in T. Barry & M. Honey (eds), Global Focus: U.S. Foreign Policy at the Turn of the Millennium (Basingstoke 2000), 77-78.

(18) B. White, The European Challenge to Foreign Policy Analysis, European Journal of International Relations, 5, 1(1999), 42-43. The premier example of this is the European Union (EU).

(19) Ibid., 43.

(20) Ibid., 46-47.

(21) C. DeVeraux, & M. Griffin, 'International, global, transnational? Just a matter of words?', paper presented to the Fourth International Conference of Cultural Policy Research, Vienna 12-16 July 2006, 1-2.

(22) Ibid.

(23) Ibid.

(24) Ibid.

(25) Ibid., 2.

(26) Ibid.

(27) Ibid., 3.

(28) Ibid.

(29) Ibid.

(30) L. Goldring, S.J Henders & P. Vandergeest, 'The Politics of Transnational Ties: Implications for Policy, Research, and Communities', York Centre for Asia Research-Centre for Research on Latin America and the Caribbean Workshop Report, York University, 7-8 March 2003, 4.

(31) DeVeraux & Griffin, op. cit., 3.

(32) B. Russett, H. Star & D. Kinsella, World Politics: The Menu for Choice. (8th edn, Australia 2006), 65.

(33) Ibid., 69.

(34) United Nations, World Investment Report2003. FDI Policies for Development: National and International Perspectives, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, (New York 2003), 187-188.

(35) Russet et al., op. cit., 71.

(36) DeVeraux & Griffin, op.cit., 3-4.

(37) Ibid.

(38) It could similarly be argued that the UN is also a child of the Cold War era and that in some ways its ontology and the manner in which it functions and structured should be understood within this context, which is probably a contributing reason to calls for reform given certain perceived anachronisms associated with the UN, such as, say, the composition of the UN Security Council (UNSC).

(39) S.J. Kobrin, "Back to the Future: Neomedievalism and the Postmodern Digital World Economy". Journal of International Affairs, 51, 2(1998), 368.

(40) Oakeshott, op. cit., 261-262.

(41) Kobrin, op. cit., 363-364.

(42) Ibid., 364.

(43) Ibid., 366.

(44) Ibid., 368.

(45) A. Chong, Review: The Post-International Challenge to Foreign Policy: Signposting 'Plus Non-State' Politics, Review of International Studies, 28, 4 (2002), 783. The emergence of, among other things, a global civil society and TNCs is an example of the contemporary form of transnationalism.

(46) S. Westwood & A. Phizacklea, Introduction, in S. Westwood & A. Phizacklea (eds), Trans-nationalism and the Politics of Belonging (London 2000), 2.

(47) Cited in J.F. Stack, The Ethnic Challenge to International Relations Theory, in D. Carment & P. James, War in the Midst of Peace: The International Politics of Ethnic Conflict (Pittsburgh 1997), 21.

(48) A notion which came into being due to calls for a minimalist state and a notion whereupon the world economy is based and within which the spirit of TNCs functions.

(49) Liberal democracy allows for the proper functioning of markets through the maintenance of the rule of law based on the values of inclusiveness and tolerance.

(50) S.D. Krasner, Sovereignty. Foreign Policy, 122 (January/February 2001), 21-24.

(51) Ibid., 24-25.

(52) Something which is becoming increasingly anachronistic.

(53) V.M. Hudson, & C.S. Vore, Foreign Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today, And Tomorrow, Mershon International Studies Review, 39, 2 (1995), 226-227.

(54) Webber & Smith, op. cit., 29-30.

(55) Ibid., 41.

(56) B. Buzan, O. Waever, & J. de Wilde, Security. A New Framework for Analysis, (London 1998), 1.

(57) B. White, R. Little & M. Smith (eds), Issues in World Politics (3rd edn, Basingstoke 2005), 274-293

(58) B. Manning, The Congress, the Executive, and Intermestic Affairs, Foreign Affairs, 55, 2 (1997), 306-324.

(59) Webber & Smith, op. cit., 44.

(60) Keukeleire & Schunz, op. cit. 14.

(61) Ibid.

(62) Ibid.

(63) C. Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, (London 2003), 77.

(64) Ibid.

(65) Ibid., 82.

(66) D.H. Davis, How the Bureaucracy Makes Foreign Policy: An Exchange Analysis. (Washington D.C. 1972), 59-66.

(67) Ibid.

(68) Hill, op. cit., 3.

(69) Keukeleire & Schunz, op. cit., 9.

(70) Ibid., 9-10.

(71) Ibid., 14.

(72) Ibid.

(73) Ibid.

(74) A notion which is not dissimilar to the notion of deterritorialised authority.

(75) D. Dinan, External Relations, in D. Dinan (ed). Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration (Boulder, CO, 2005), 520-523; W. Horsley, 'Why Germany is now happy to punch its weight', BBC News, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-1l436595, accessed 19 November 2010.

(76) Dinan, op. cit., 520-523.

(77) And the London Consensus which followed it, which encouraged a departure from the laissez-faire economic orthodoxy and signalled the temporary demise of the Washington Consensus.

(78) M. Lind, 'The future of US foreign policy: a reply', Open Democracy, 12 April 2007, http://www. opendemocracy.net/democracy-americanpower/future_reply_4426.jsp, accessed 15 September 2009, 2.

(79) P. Riddel, Blair as Prime Minister, in A. Seldon (ed.), The Blair Effect: The Blair Government 1997-2001, (London, 2001), 37.

(80) Hill, op. cit., 61.

Casper Hendrik Claassen, Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa.

Edgar Cizero Ntasano, Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa.