Transforming the Force--From Korea to Today.

Q As both a participant and historian, what did you learn front the post-Cold War transformation of the Army and how does that apply to the transformation today?

A First, I believe the premise of your question is incorrect--the process of the Army's transformation actually began with the Korean War and continues today. According to my research and as the thesis of my new book, the Army has been transforming for 50 years from a "big-war" Army into one shaped to fight limited, firepower-intensive wars. [The book is Three Paradoxes: An Essay on the Future of Land Warfare, being published by Rowman and Littlefield, Inc., and is clue out this fall.]

The Korean War was the first major American conflict in this century that was fought for limited ends. Unlike World Wars I and II, we no longer had a ''blank check'' to spend resources to achieve national objectives. The process has continued as each successive conflict has shaped and clarified, almost in a Darwinian fashion, how the American Army will have to fight in the future.

The problem was that during the Cold War from 1950 to 1989, our doctrinal focus always returned to the north German plain to the more sinister but more familiar prospect of fighting an unlimited war for national survival against the Russians. To its great credit, the Army quickly learned to modify its fighting methods to accommodate the new realities of limited liability wars.

For most western armies, fighting a limited liability conflict means they have limited resources to pursue their national objectives. And increasingly, beginning in Korea and going through Kosovo, part of limiting the cost of a conflict became limiting the loss of human life. For example, even the Russians in Chechnya had to accommodate this realization. They learned quickly that they could not afford to suffer huge tactical losses as the Russian people watched the conflict on television

This leads to the question: What does all this mean in terms of firepower? In the classical example, a commander balances his application of maneuver and firepower early in a campaign that is based on the norms of conventional war doctrine. Once the campaign evolves, he adds more and more firepower to limit the exposure of his maneuver forces to destruction, Americans in particular. The problem is that if the war lasts too long, the enemy adapts the way he fights to lessen the killing effects of firepower. Then the demands for killing power become so great that the firepower "tail" starts wagging the operational "dog," and the military force becomes ossified, resulting in stalemate. Stalemate is a condition no American force can tolerate.

Korea is a good example. In the early days of Korea, we applied doctrinally correct apportionments of maneuver and firepower-roughly two artillery battalions per maneuver brigade with some restricted use of close air support. We tended to approach operations from the Pusan Perimeter up to our withdrawal from the Yalu River in terms of corpsand division-level operations.

Now, "fast forward" to April 1951. The maneuver focus shifted downward as the firepower component escalated. Operations were at the battalion and regimental levels or lower and the apportionment increased radically-as many as 14 to 15 artillery battalions supported a single maneuver battalion. The point is we went through the doctrinal readjustment out of necessity when commanders realized they had to substitute firepower for manpower. Gradually, the infantry transitioned from a traditional big-war maneuver force, in the sense of closing with and destroying the enemy, into a force that found and shaped the enemy for the artillery and air power to kill.

Fast forward to Vietnam. In the early days, operations were multi-brigade and, in some cases, division-level and were supported by the doctrinal apportionment of artillery and close air support. But, again, the employment of maneuver changed and so did the apportionment of artillery.

The first Army leader to really understand this phenomenon was General William Depuy with his "find, fix, flush and finish" maneuver doctrine. When he took command of the 1st Infantry Division in Vietnam, the tactic was to put battalions of soldiers in the field to find platoons. Often the enemy had the upper hand, particularly if he found our infantry first. At best, these were "fair" fights at the tactical level. But Depuy understood that the American Army could not afford fair fights. The losses were simply too great.

My research shows that in the past 50 years, more than 70 percent of all combat deaths in close engagements were suffered by maneuver forces who were seeking to find the enemy. In Vietnam, General Depuy began to "find" the enemy with the smallest possible maneuver force--squads or platoons--and then "fix" the enemy's location without getting inside the lethal area of his organic small arms. Next, maneuver or firepower "flushed" the enemy out to be "finished" with killing firepower.

In a limited liability war where casualties have become our strategic center of gravity, we simply cannot afford bloody close engagements any more. We must achieve our objective quickly because the longer a war lasts and the more casualties we sustain, the fewer the options we have to maintain the initiative.

My research revealed that in wars of limited liability, 81 percent of soldiers killed were infantrymen; if you add combat pilots, both fighter pilots and Army aviators, the figure is 94 percent. So, if the Army wants to maintain strategic flexibility by moderating the loss of human life and if the greatest source of combat deaths has been maneuvers forces, specifically infantrymen, then we must achieve our tactical and operational objectives while minimizing the loss of our infantry forces. Being aggressive in the close fight may win tactical skirmishes, but we will lose the battle, campaign or war because, ultimately, casualties will erode our strategic dominance and drive us to compromise.

Another fact: historically in limited liability wars, most Americans killed in combat were killed by rudimentary weapons; the greatest killer of Americans on the battlefield is the mortar. A distant second is automatic weapons. Mines are a very distant third. I think the historical pattern will continue: Most Americans killed in combat will die from the effects of simple weapons while facing an enemy fighting on equal terms in the close fight. That was true for the Russians in Afghanistan, and it is true for the Israelis today. One of the ironies today is that a B-2 bomber can fly 8,000 miles to destroy a building with one bomb from a safe distance, yet a platoon under mortar fire is relatively helpless.

Q What about the enemy who adapts the way he fights to lessen the killing effects of firepower?

A Until recently, that was a real tactical problem. An adaptive enemy could make it difficult to deliver enough killing power to win, resulting in a stalemate--stalemate means attrition, attrition means excessive casualties and excessive casualties mean we pull out. So the goal of an enemy facing Americans in future combat is not to beat the Americans in a maneuver fight, but to avoid losing by positioning himself in such away that obviates the effects of our killing firepower. The Serbs, with their dispersed formations, false targets, concealment and movement of only small bodies of troops, showed us that even an unsophisticated enemy is beginning to catch on.

But precision fires are revolutionizing warfare and will make the changes to our doctrine work. The artillery of the future must be able to fulfill its obligation as the principal killer in the close fight by accelerating the lethality it delivers to the battlefield without increasing weight or bulk. Precision munitions will allow us to do that.

It's important to note that aerial-delivered precision cannot do the job against a dispersed enemy with a will to fight and sacrifice. He simply will present too many targets to find and kill with very expensive aerial weapons.

So the artillery must assume the mantle of precision in future conflicts. But right now, our firepower system is too bulky. About 62 percent of the weight of an armored division (94,000 tons) in Operation Desert Storm was artillery, including the stuff to haul it, protect it, maintain it--but most of the weight was in munitions.

The only way to keep our firepower system from becoming so heavy and ungainly that we restrict the ability of our infantry to maneuver is to increase the killing power per ton of weight we can deliver to the battlefield by at least an order of magnitude.

If the future FA rocket or gun has the ability to fire precision projectiles in great profusion, the doctrine that governs their use will change fundamentally. Our firing units probably will be arrayed across the battlefield in pairs rather than in battalions. The doctrine would emphasize area coverage rather than linearity and mass. The possibilities are enormous and beneficial to the way our Army fights.

But real precision requires more than just precision munitions. We also must be able to sense and track the enemy with great precision. In past wars, the errors that caused the greatest waste of ammunition--whether delivered by air, ground or from naval gunfire--was in identifying and tracking targets with precision. The average target location error for a forward observer [FO] in Vietnam was 250 meters. The average target location error for air-delivered ordnance was well over 1,000 meters.

Our experience in past wars tells us that, regretfully, initial fires delivered to support close engagements were relatively ineffective, which will be unacceptable in future wars. The need for adjustment gives the enemy time to avoid at least some of the effects of the killing firepower. As we all know from the JMENs [joint munitions effectiveness] tables, the amount of artillery required to kill the enemy goes up geometrically when the enemy goes to ground or disperses.

After we find the enemy precisely, we have to deliver firepower quickly to engage him before he can move, disperse or go to ground. Unfortunately, during the last 50 years, the time needed to engage targets with both air- and ground-delivered ordnance has increased rather than decreased.

For example, in the European Theater of Operations in 1944, the average time it took to engage a close support target in an adjust fire mission was four and a half minutes. In Korea, it took the same time (after the firepower system was built up in the spring of 1951). In Vietnam, it took 11 minutes, and the delivery of massed missions in Desert Storm took an average of 55 minutes. These times are generally consistent with the FA's experiences at the NTC [National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California].

The reasons for this increase in mission time are varied and complex. Generally, fear of fratricide and the increased layering and automation of air and ground fire support systems are responsible. Also as a rule, the more expensive the munition, the longer it takes to deliver it using today's technology and doctrine.

By the way, this is not just an Army problem. In the European Theater of Operations in 1944 and 1945, a preplanned air mission cycle was about 18 hours. In Korea and Vietnam, the cycle took 24 hours. At the operational level in Desert Storm, the ATO [air tasking order] cycle was extended to 72 hours.

After we find the enemy precisely and have the system in place to engage him rapidly, we must kill him with precision. Never in the history of warfare has the advantage on the battlefield increased so tremendously as with precision munitions.

With precision munitions, the PK [probability of kill], whether the munitions are air- or ground-delivered, has increased by a factor of 200--an unprecedented advantage. Yet, today, only aerial platforms have the capability to deliver precision munitions in great numbers. The ballistic error for munitions dropped by the Air Force in Korea and Vietnam was well over 2,000 meters. Now it is less than 10 meters.

The artillery, for the most part, is still an area fire weapon and will remain so into the foreseeable future unless the Army increases its funding for the development and fielding of precision munitions. For the Army's success in future wars, the artillery is obligated to proliferate precision.

An adaptive enemy gone to ground and dispersed into small increments only can be engaged effectively with cheap tactical precision weapons. Only the artillery can deliver cheap, timely and discrete precision killing power.

Further, we need to push the authority for the terminal phase of engaging the enemy with precision fires down to the lowest possible level--virtually to every maneuver unit on the battlefield. Everyone in close proximity to the enemy must become an FO.

Q Why not let the Air Force, Navy or even our ATACMS [Army tactical missile system] stand off and deliver precision fires?

A No amount of technology can overcome the Laws of Newtonian Physics. Limiting the time of flight probably will be our greatest challenge in killing future targets with precision fires, particularly moving targets. Air Force precision works well against fixed, strategic targets. But distant fires are simply incapable of supporting a tactical mission, particularly against targets that move.

For precision fires to be effective, we must significantly shorten the time required to sense, track and engage the target. Experience in past wars tells us that if it takes more than about a minute and one-half, even a precision weapons will not be able to destroy moving targets reliably. The longer the distance a round must travel to get to its target on a fluid battlefield, the more likely an adaptive enemy will be able to determine ways to maneuver under American firepower and survive.

Q What is your advice to today's transforming Army?

A First the fire support system must be so devoid of friction and so joint that any maneuver commander calling for precision fires will immediately receive the effects he needs from the optimum system, whether its ground-, air- or sea-delivered or from the Army, Navy, Air Force or Marines.

We need to develop precision munitions and stop planning to haul 62,000 tons of artillery stuff per division into a theater. Instead of thinking about a battalion of artillery firing tens of thousands of rounds, we must think in terms of pairs of artillery guns linked to very sophisticated aerial and ground sensors that will guarantee one round, one kill.

If our objective maneuver force is going to be as light and flexible as we postulate, then we must allow most of the massive killing power to be delivered from outside the tactical range of an enemy's weapons. Otherwise, we are back to the pre-Depuy days when fire fights were even matches.

The role of the fire support system will change in the future. In, say, 20 years, artillerymen will be less deliverers of firepower and the eyes of the system and more the coordinators and integrators of fires. In all probability, the most difficult task will be to assimilate all the battlefield information flooding into the fire support system and translate that into decisions about when, and how to deliver what effects on which targets with great timeliness and precision.

Going back to World War II, every time a layer of decision making is imposed on the fire support system, it adds eight minutes to the effects delivery time. If a corps artillery decides to fire ATACMS or a corps TOT [time-on-target], you add an average of eight minutes for every layer of decision making down to the battery level. So the minimum time it takes to deliver a corp TOT is 40 to 50 minutes. The solution is to flatten the system--streamline the decision-making process. The secret is to "touch" the mission only once.

Q What message would you like to send Field Artillerymen stationed around the world?

A You have tremendous responsibility. In this new American style of war I have described, the principal engine of physical destruction is going to be the firepower system.

As we learned in Korea, Vietnam, Desert Storm and Kosovo, an adaptive enemy who disperses cannot be destroyed from the air alone. You, Field Artillerymen, are guardians of the fire support system and are responsible for preserving the lives of close combat soldiers engaged in the tactical fight.

Major General (Retired) Robert H. Scales, Jr., is a Historian and was Commandant of the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, before he retired from the Army in 2000. Currently, he is the CEO of Walden University, Bonita Springs, Florida. While in the Army, he was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine in the Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia. He also served as Assistant Division Commander of the 2d Infantry Division in Korea and Director of the Operation Desert Storm Study Group for the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army and primary author of Certain Victory. He commanded the FA Training Center, Fort Sill; and four batteries, two in Vietnam. Among his articles and four books, he wrote Firepower in Limited War and Three Paradoxes: An Essay on the Future of Land Warfare, due out this fall (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.). General Scales holds a Ph.D. in History from Duke University.