Transforming Fires for the Objective Force.

The Field Artillery is decisively engaged in transforming fires on every axis of Army transformation: Legacy Force, Interim Force and Objective Force. (See Figure 1.) However, there are many questions about where the Field Artillery fits in the future Army and the Objective Force of 2030. "What will be Crusader's role in the Objective Force? Are we going to have an artillery version of the future combat system (FCS)? Will the high-mobility artillery rocket system (HIMARS) replace the M270A1 multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) launchers? Do you envision a replacement for the Ml19A1 105-mm howitzers in our light units if all the divisions become Objective Force design?" While we don't have the answers to all these questions, it's clear we will continue to be a major player in the combined arms team throughout the Army's transformation.

By 2030, the Field Artillery likely will have undergone some fundamental operational and organizational changes. One thing is clear, the Army is aggressively moving forward with transformation, and we must move in concert to remain relevant.

We may or may not have artillery battalions in direct support (DS) of maneuver brigades in the future. We may have something potentially more dynamic, such as batteries tailored to support FCS-equipped combat battalions. Or, we may have something that works much like DS on two levels--one for FCS-equipped combat battalions with batteries in command or support relationships and one for the brigade from a more multi-functional "fires battalion," or the brigade may receive its support from fires units organized above brigade. In fact, we are examining many different operational and organizational concepts to determine how the branch will make the greatest possible contribution to combined arms warfare--today and in the future.

No matter what the endstate, our mission will remain the same--respond to the needs of the combined arms team. We have a long legacy of evolving in this manner, and it has served us well.

Because the Objective Force is still in the conceptual stage, there are misconceptions about aspects of that force. For example, some believe the FCS will replace every type of vehicle in today's heavy divisions. That isn't the concept. Simply stated, FCS is envisioned as a networked system-of-systems that will serve as the core building block in future combat battalions for maneuver, support and sustainment.

For those who may be bothered by the many uncertainties of the transformation process, have faith. We are an integral member of the Training and Doctrine Command's (TRADOC's) transformation team developing the operational and organizational concepts for the Objective Force.

FA Progress--The First Two Axes. The transformation effort is a work-in-progress to achieve the Army Vision, and the FA is being affected by actions on all axes.

Legacy Axis. We have partnered with the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) Artillery at Fort Hood, Texas. A major milestone on the Legacy axis is the Division Capstone Exercise (DCX) Phase II that recently concluded. This exercise showcased the capabilities of the Army's first digital division. At the conclusion of this exercise, the 4th Infantry Division no longer was an Experimental Force (EXFOR) for the Army. Its tremendous warfighting capability now supports warfighting commanders-in-chief(CTNCs).

Many of the lessons learned from the 4th Division's experiences apply to other heavy divisions. Recent reviews of digitization issues suggest these issues also apply to the Interim Force.

The III Armored Corps will comprise the Legacy Force and be the Army's "strategic hedge" during the transformation process. The III Corps divisions, armored cavalry regiment and associated corps slices will receive priority for material modernization.

For the FA, this means fielding Crusader and the M270A1 in these units--creating a "fires hedge" as the Army transforms. This also means Army National Guard units that are part of the supporting Legacy Force's FA brigades will be modernized ahead of some active units. Other heavy Legacy Forces probably will remain Paladin- and M270-based until their parent divisions transform into the Objective Force design. At this time, we don't know when we will phase out the M270A1 launcher; HIMARS most likely will be part of the Objective Force.

We are carefully watching for decisions on the 82d Airborne Division and 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). If the Army chooses to maintain the unique warfighting capabilities of these two light divisions by the end of the transformation period, it will cause the Field Artillery to seek a long-term solution for a replacement to the M119A1 (towed 105-mm) howitzer.

Interim Axis. The Army is aggressively "moving out" in forming and fielding brigade combat teams (BCTs). The first Initial Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), the 3d IBCT, 2d Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington, just completed its first Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) Warfighter Exercise; we are gaining many insights about the unique operational demands of this organization.

For example, the fires and effects coordination cell (FECC) is a visionary organization that is becoming a reality in the IBCT. The FECC is responsible for integrating and synchronizing all lethal and nonlethal effects. Although the total integration of lethal and nonlethal targeting presented challenges in the Warfighter exercise, this concept appears to be valid. I feel confident the FECC will solidify its value in the future.

Another challenge of the IBCT Warfighter was mortar integration. The large number of mortars in the IBCT intensifies the age-old challenge of integrating mortars into fire support.

The Objective Force Axis. Before I discuss Objective Force concepts and their implications for the FA, I must briefly describe the changing operational environment. There is broad consensus that our Legacy, Interim and Objective Forces will face a very different operational environment than many of us faced in the past. In fact, recognition of the challenges associated with this new operational environment is a major catalyst for transformation.

New Operational Environment. The US military is the most studied force on the planet. Almost every nation has carefully watched and analyzed our actions during the last 10 years. Those who have studied our actions over time believe we are fairly predictable. Potential adversaries are adopting selected advanced capabilities and innovative strategies to overcome US military dominance, particularly with respect to ground forces.

These adaptive strategies for confronting US forces focus on several primary integrated goals: denying or delaying US intervention; creating US casualties to degrade our political will; extending the duration of operations; dissolving allied coalitions; and preserving key regime-ensuring military forces. Likely operational methodologies to achieve these goals include those listed in Figure 2.

This new operational environment poses some unique challenges for the Field Artillery. We must exploit technology to help us respond. Some of the more significant challenges are listed in Figure 3.

Given this kind of creative adversary, we must be able to respond to modernized conventional and unconventional forces that employ adaptive strategies and asymmetric tactics. Our transformed Army and its Field Artillery must retain a quality of "adaptive dominance"-- the ability to change faster than the enemy can react. This adaptive dominance will require inherent versatility and adaptive leaders.

Developing future leaders and soldiers who can operate with confidence and competence in an environment of constantly changing conditions and the resultant uncertainty is paramount. These leaders and soldiers must be prepared to shift rapidly and smoothly across the range of operations and conflict spectrum. Advanced technologies will empower our soldiers to new levels of performance. These soldiers and leaders will remain the centerpiece of tomorrow's Field Artillery.

Transforming our soldiers and leaders will present Fort Sill many institutional challenges as we move into the future. At some point, we literally will be training soldiers and leaders from all three axes. This will require greater agility in the schoolhouse than we have today. We must be flexible in developing the right skills and attributes at the right time for the appropriate grade levels.

We also must find a way to accelerate Field Artillerymen's experiences at all grade levels. We simply cannot wait for the experiences they need to transpire as a result of the normal varied assignments over time.

While technical competence will remain important, we are rapidly shifting to an era of tactical dominance much like the maneuver arms. For example, put yourself in a Crusader cockpit. While time spent performing tasks--such as computing the technical gunnery solution, determining self-location and matching fuze, projectile and charge--will shrink drastically, time and effort spent tactically maneuvering or "fighting" Crusader to provide the best, most responsive support will increase significantly. With this example, you can begin to envision the breadth of the transformation of our branch.

Objective Force Operational Concepts. As mentioned, there is still considerable misunderstanding about the Objective Force at this point. At the risk of causing additional confusion, I will describe a few of the more important ideas that are emerging and assess how these ideas will impact the Field Artillery.

The FCS-equipped combat battalion will be the fundamental building block of the Objective Force. The combat battalion is envisioned to perform the missions currently done by light infantry battalions; armored task forces; armored cavalry squadrons; Interim Force reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA) squadrons; and motorized infantry battalions. Some key characteristics of that force are outlined in Figure 4.

Future Combat System (FCS). Probably the most frequently asked Objective Force question I hear is: "Just exactly what is FCS?" This system-of-systems, the core of future maneuver battalions, will be comprised of a family of advanced, networked, ground-based maneuver, support and sustainment systems that may include both manned and unmanned platforms. The largest FCS platforms will be lighter than current mechanized systems with each element possessing common or similar characteristics with respect to mobility, survivability and sustainability.

Some FCS platforms will be multifunctional and modular, combining two or more battlefield functions, such as direct fire, indirect fire, point air defense and battle command for maneuver battalion operations. Some FCS variants may have single functions.

The survivability of FCS is predicated on a holistic approach rather than on just the passive armor protection of today.

FCS also will provide the means for maneuver forces to generate organic complementary and reinforcing effects. The indirect fire range requirement for the FCS has not been finalized. The technical challenges of platform weight and the required munitions effects will refine the requirements for the indirect fire capability for FCS as we continue to analyze warfighting needs.

Fires Implications. So what are the implications for us? We're not totally sure, but we have some insights. Fires at the brigade level could be more focused on shaping operations while FCS-equipped combat battalions could handle many more close support fires tasks within their own maneuver battalions and companies. If you think in terms of the relationship of mortars for organic fire support in the maneuver battalion and company (but with greatly expanded capabilities), then you can begin to grasp the operational concept for fires at these echelons. The key idea is that the FCS-equipped combat battalion will have an enhanced organic indirect fire capability.

This shift is not inherently bad. Today we are challenged to meet the needs of the maneuver brigade and its subordinate battalions with mortars and our Paladin howitzers. We often hear the complaint that most of FA fires are applied to satisfy the brigade's needs at the expense of subordinate units. Often this is true.

So, if FCS can meet the technical challenges normally associated with range for indirect fires, we may see a greater balance between FCS-generated organic fires and external supporting fires. This enhanced balance will require the projected increases in situational understanding and enhanced automation.

Fires Tasks in the Objective Force. Objective Force concepts correctly recognize that close supporting fires, shaping fires and preemptively attacking the enemy's strike capabilities will be enduring tasks for tactical echelon combined arms operations. What may be different is what units at what levels execute these tasks.

Today, an FA battalion in direct support must do all three. With an enhanced organic capability for indirect fires in the FCS-equipped combat battalion, we may see this unit handling more of the close supporting fires. However, Objective Force concepts clearly recognize the need for external support from assets outside the combat battalion.

In the future, a robust FECC will orchestrate this external support for the combined arms brigade (maneuver). The combined arms brigade will retain primary responsibility for setting the conditions for subordinate units through shaping operations. These concepts describe long-range, precision fires and effects from external support as being a critical enabler for shaping operations. These shaping operations are described in Figure 5.

Our Fires Concept. We envision a fires battalion as the primary source of this external support. While the final design of our FA forces supporting tactical echelon Objective Forces isn't totally clear, we have begun to examine how we should evolve. At some point, we will formalize our concept in concert with overarching Objective Force ideas.

As part of that process, we have begun a series of experiments in our Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Lab to explore operational and organizational issues for fires and effects at brigade and below in an environment representative of the future. The insights from these experiments and from the ongoing series of warfighting seminars at Headquarters TRADOC will allow us to shape and refine our concepts.

The Fires Battalion. We probably will retain something like a battalion organization in a "force pool" above brigade level. However, this battalion may be very different from today's battalion organization. We are calling this conceptual unit a fires battalion.

The fires battalions routinely could be mission tailored from standing force pools of battalions. These standing battalions would be modular--probably around platoons and batteries, as we know them today. Those platoon and battery modules also would be able to operate as subordinate forces to at least the battery level, providing responsive, decentralized support to FCS combat battalions, as needed. This design may include NetFires (missile in a box) to take advantage of its unique munitions capabilities.

Mission tailoring would begin upon deployment notification and be driven by the specific contingency and its mission. This normally will entail the packaging of cannon, rocket and missile capabilities that can be rapidly retailored with changing mission requirements--before deployment and after arrival in theater.

We hope to increase the span of command and control of the fires battalion and its subordinate batteries. We would like to have between four and six subordinate batteries, given the expected improvements in automation capabilities. Clearly there are limits on span of control, and we need to understand those boundaries better if we are to raise the "tooth" without unduly raising the "tail." Mission needs would drive both the arrangement and combinations of systems in our fighting organization and the types of command or support relationships to maneuver units at the different echelons.

Networked Fires. We must move from what is perceived as a stove-piped functional capability to an execution-centric, integrated combined arms capability. What that means is we probably won't pursue a next-generation automation system but rather continue to develop the right fires functionalities for migration to the next-generation Army battle command system (ABCS) as an integrated combined arms network. With FCS-based maneuver units generating some level of indirect fires, the need for an integrated approach to fires that works seamlessly with the combined arms team becomes very important.

The network must be able to help prioritize and direct requests for fires to the most appropriate systems in real time. This includes joint and other Army systems, such as Army Aviation. Sometimes this will result in a solution that employs multiple types of systems for optimal effects--something that doesn't happen today. The network must allow access to all relevant sensors in real time. When we have this type of capability, we will begin to break down many of the barriers that keep fires from being dynamically integrated with maneuver.

The Army is aggressively moving forward with transformation. To remain relevant to the combined arms team, we must continue to move in concert with this process. Failure to do so is not in the best interest of the Army or the branch.

Change is not inherently bad; we must embrace those changes that will improve combined arms operations and the integration and synchronization of maneuver and fires.

I've described some of our emerging ideas to begin this process. While Interim Forces are just beginning to field equipment and execute their operational concepts and Objective Force concepts and FCS development are in their infancy, you can rest assured we are fully engaged on all axes for our lane.

My tenure as Assistant Commandant of the Field Artillery School spans the time of the release of the Army Vision to the present. As I depart, I am convinced our branch is and will remain an essential part of all future combined arms operations for our Army.

Brigadier General William F. Engel was the Assistant Commandant of the Field Artillery School and Deputy Commanding General for Training of Fort Sill, Oklahoma, from October 1999 until October 2001. Currently, he is the Commanding General of White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. In his assignment before coming to FortSill as the Assistant Commandant, he was the Deputy Director of Operations at the National Military Command Center, J3, on the Joint Staff at the Pentagon. He also served as the Chief of the Command Planning Group at Headquarters Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia, and Chief of the Systems Integration and Programs Division of the Directorate of Combat Developments in the Field Artillery School, Fort Sill. He commanded the 17th Field Artillery Brigade, III Corps Artillery, FortSill, and the 4th Battalion, 41st Field Artillery, part of the 197th Field Artillery Brigade (Mechanized) at Fort Benning, Georgia, deploying the battalion to the Persian Gulf during Operations Desert Shie ld and Storm. He holds a Master of Arts in Political Science from Central State University in Oklahoma.

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* Ceasing large-scale maneuver and dispersing formations into smaller elements.

* Conducting efforts to preserve military capabilities and forces.

* Seeking protection in urban and complex terrain to use collateral damage as a shield.

* Retaining and judiciously using existing capabilities for precision strike and maneuver against key US capabilities and locations.

* Conducting decentralized operations coordinated through a preserved command and control structure.

* Integrating special operation forces (SOF), paramilitary, terror, and unconventional capabilities to deny sanctuary to US forces.

* Reverting to low-tech systems for redundancy and low-tech counters to US advantages.

* Using weapons of mass effects (WME) to interdict our access to a theater or deny our operations within a theater.

Figure 2: Enemy Methodologies in the New Operational Environment

* Minimize collateral damage.

* Counter the enemy's use of the urban environment as a sanctuary.

* Routinely implement strict rules of engagement (ROE) and interaction.

* Identify combatants and potential non-combatant casualties.

* Target small, dispersed formations that move less often.

* Engage an enemy who aggressively limits his exposure and our engagement time.

* Preemptively attack the enemy's precision strike capabilities that have considerable standoff range.

* Maximize our ability to preemptively strike the enemy.

Figure 3: FA Challenges in the New Operational Environment

Figure 4: Key Characteristics of the Objective Force Combat Battalion

* Have more comprehensive organic combined arms vice today's reliance on task force organization and extensive supporting relationships.

* Have an expanded operating radius and area of influence.

* Have an expanded mission set and broader general-purpose quality.

* Redefine close combat, encompassing a significant shift in decisive action toward tactical standoff engagement versus today's higher reliance on direct fire engagements in close combat assault.

* Conduct continuous operations, as enabled by an organic capability to conduct high-intensity combat operations for up to three days.

* Have a higher operational tempo, enabled primarily by superior situational understanding that significantly reduces the uncertainty that often retards tempo and by more lethal and precise weapon systems that hasten the pace of destruction.

* Have radically shifting force ratios for offensive and defensive operations.

* Have greater freedom of action, even while significant elements in the battalion are fully engaged.

* Employ substantially different approaches to force survivability and sustainability.

* Have sharply improved exploitation of the vertical dimension.

* More routinely integrate higher Army and joint capabilities at lower tactical levels.

* Isolate ongoing close fights of FCS-equipped combat battalions.

* Sharply expand the level of continuous fires supporting FCS combat battalions, when required.

* Augment the volume of fires to achieve rapid decision.

* Ensure freedom of action for subordinate units.

* Provide specialized capabilities, such as obscuration.

Figure 5: Purpose of Shaping Operations for the Objective Force