Training of echelons of command and troops for combat operations: the lessons of history.

The success of modern combat activities (combat actions) largely depends on the task-oriented solution of the troop command and control mission. The training of the command echelons and the troops for combat operations is one of these missions. But, at the present time, the mission under review was not fully developed in the theoretical context. In this connection, it is advisable to turn to the experience gained in the training of the echelons of command and the troops during the Great Patriotic War, in the local wars and the armed conflicts.

This experience convincingly proves the dramatic importance for the training classes (exercises, training duties) of the subordinate command echelons, troop formations (units, subdivisions) of the service arms, and the special troops to be conducted in the maximum approximated combat environment. Naturally, the preparation of the echelons of command and troops for the up-coming hostilities is not limited to the classes, exercises and training duties. They are intrinsically linked with the measures for the all-round support of the troops, as well as with their dislocation, the occupation and strengthening of the attack positions, etc.

As the case in point, the experience of the command activity of the Marshal of the Soviet Union L.A. Govorov in the training of the echelons of command and the troops is meaningful in this respect.

In the first days of the Great Patriotic War, Leonid Alexandrovich Govorov, the then Commander of the F.E. Dzerzhinsky Artillery Academy, was appointed the Artillery Commander of the Western Strategic Lines, and later the Commander of the Reserve Front. From the spring of 1942, the Supreme Military Command entrusted L.A. Govorov with the new responsible mission: in April, he was appointed the Military Force Commander of the Leningrad Front, and in August, he took command of the troops of the entire Leningrad Front. Since then, the name of L.A. Govorov was permanently inscribed in the glorious history of the Defense of Leningrad. He executed the direct command of the troops for over 670 days from 900 days of the dramatic Defense of Leningrad.

There is a good reason to consider the activities of the Leningrad Front Commander L.A. Govorov concerning the training of the troops and the headquarters for specific military operations not only prior to the operations, but also well before their execution, because the troops were on the defensive and at the same time they were readying themselves for the offensive operations.

Inventively using the experience of defense organization, L.A. Govorov carried out rigid progress control and soon managed to improve the defense objectives, which had been engineered before, and to build-up the new switch positions and communication trenches. The dense network of the trenches was intelligently interspersed with solid ferroconcrete bunkers, standard pillboxes with fire emplacements, multifarious dugouts and shelters, some of the trenches being laid aboard the forward lines of the enemy troops. All this drastically reduced the casualties from the enemy artillery and mortar fire.

To gain fire superiority, L.A. Govorov paid special attention to counter-battery fire. The Leningrad Front Commander viewed the ongoing improvement of its methods as the real opportunity to prevent the city destruction by enemy artillery fire. Executing the counterfire command, L.A. Govorov did not patronize the subordinates, but afforded ample creative opportunities, expertly directing their initiative in the search for new ways to the effective neutralization and destruction of the enemy siege artillery. Soon, the offensive posture of the Leningrad Front Artillery yielded tangible results. As early as in the second half of 1942, the enemy fired only 7,679 rounds against the city. Whereas, in the first three months of hostilities--more than 20 thousand rounds. The damage inflicted on the city of Leningrad diminished not only because of the lower intensity of shelling, but also because the enemy had to consume most of the artillery shells for counter-battery fire. (1)

In the course of the actual preparation for Operation Iskra (spark) (the breaking of the Leningrad blockage), during the entire fall of 1942 the Leningrad Front and Army Command headed by L.A. Govorov addressed the key questions of the breaking of the enemy blockade and further actions. The exercises and combat training of the units, assigned for the offensive, were planned.

The Front Commander intelligently and tirelessly prepared his armed forces for the offensive. He urged the Commanders of the troop formations to study carefully the terrain in the forward edge of the battle area and in the immediate enemy defense depth. After that, the defenses similar to those, which had to be assaulted and broken, were built-up on the exercise grounds. Intensive training was conducted twenty-four hours there. The participating units worked-out impetuous assaults, the conducting of trench combat elements, mine clearing, the blocking of bunkers and pillboxes, consolidation on the objectives, forest warfare. At the same time, variable conditions were created in different forward area sectors: some of the units had to assault heights, others had to force crossings, the rest had to break the enemy permanent defense fortifications and to counter the enemy artillery both in the forest and in open terrain, etc. Significant importance was attached to the skills and abilities for the Infantry and Armor to move forward at the distance of 150-200 meters from artillery shell explosions.

For the training of the Commanders of troop formations and of headquarters, use was also made of the terrain boards manufactured by precisely depicting the ground form, the enemy defensive facilities and the friendly forces starting assault line. Using the terrain board, the Front Commander played out with Division Commanders the up-coming combat actions. He paid special attention to the breaking of the enemy prepared defenses and to the tactical-to-operation success follow-up. The month prior to the beginning of the operation, L.A. Govorov organized the command-and-staff war game, based on the real environment of the up-coming battle.

The efforts, which were exerted for the preparation of the offensive, each time over and above justified themselves in the course of the operation. As is known, the planning of the operation, coinciding with its progress, is fairly infrequent in the war. In the operations, which were controlled by L.A. Govorov, these coincidences were no exception. The first and most dramatic of them was Operation Iskra (spark). Theoretically, it seemed unfeasible to cross the water obstacle 600-700 meters wide by ice, and then to climb the ice-covered river cliffs, where the enemy had deliberately built-up the system of permanent strong fire-points. The thought-out and well-planned neutralization of the enemy by fire was required to solve this challenging task. L.A. Govorov was perfectly aware of this, and he did his level best to organize the effective destruction of the enemy.

By the outset of the offensive, in the break-through sector 13 km wide of the 67th Army, in spite of the most difficult blockade conditions, at the expense of the intra-frontline redeployment only, the Front Troop Commander managed to concentrate 22 Artillery and Mortar Regiments, including the 28th High-Yield Artillery Division, three Artillery Battalions of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet Coastal Defense, twelve M-30 Rocket Artillery Heavy Ordnance Battalions and three M-13 Rocket Artillery Regiments. Also forming part of the Rocket Artillery of the 67th Army were two Artillery Battalions firing 280-mm high-explosive turbojet projectiles developed at the Leningrad plants.

All in all, there were 1,909 guns and mortars, including the Baltic Fleet Artillery (88 pieces of ordnance), concentrated in the breakthrough sector. This allowed creating the medium volume of artillery fire (along the 13-km front sector) amounting to 133 guns and mortars (without 45-mm guns) per one kilometer of the front sector, thereby attaining the five-fold superiority in the Artillery firepower over the enemy, aside from the Rocket Artillery. (2)

Note that Leonid Alexandrovich Govorov was the skillful expert in neutralization of the enemy by Artillery fire, the outstanding specialist in organizing the combat deployment of massed Artillery concentrations for solving the most multifarious operational-and-tactical missions. Therefore, during the war years, the Leningrad Front was permanently famed for the so-called Artillery-Oriented Front.

The Front Commander paid much attention to the training of the Artillery units, to enhanced effectiveness of its combat deployment in combat operations. Under his guidance, the Artillery Commanders and Generals were in constant search for the most effective uses of their weaponry, avoiding the errors committed by the Artillery of the other Fronts. L.A. Govorov was among the first to set the example of the inventive realization of the assignments of the Supreme High Command of the General Headquarters concerning the observance of the massed flexible Artillery deployment in the decisive directions. He insistently fought for its introduction in any echelon of command, decisively suppressing the attempts at distribution of the Artillery firepower evenly between Divisions. Soon, the Artillery concentration under single command in the decisive directions became one of the characteristic features of its combat deployment. Precisely in this Front was the Artillery first deployed both as the tactical, and the operational Service Arm at the disposal of the Commanders.

In the course of the Leningrad-Novgorod Operation (January-February 1944) aimed at the complete lifting of the blockade of Leningrad, the particularly important mission of the Leningrad Front armed forces was the breaking of strong defense lines arranged in depth, which had been built-up by the enemy during more than two and a half years. In this connection, the Artillery role in the solution of the upcoming tasks increased. Therefore, for the preparation of the Operation, L.A. Govorov, first of all, issued the preliminary directions concerning the distribution of the reinforcement Artillery between the Armies, the accumulation of munitions, the equipment of the Artillery firing positions, the conduct of combat training, etc.

Notwithstanding the fact that the Front Commander focused his efforts on the solution of the main problems, he did not relax the rigid day-to-day control measures, applying the unusual "end-to-end" method. Arriving in the Army Headquarters, he selected one of the questions of the Army alert posture for the offensive actions and checked the headquarters beginning from the top command echelon to the Regiment Commander level, and sometimes down to the Squadron Commander (Artillery Battalion Commander), Company Commander (Gun Battery Commander) level. In those days, his favorite phrase was: "The step-by-step war-gaming of the actions of every Commander and of his Staff at each stage of the operation and of the battle." (3)

The preparation of the armed forces for the offensive operation lasted nearly two and a half months. Troop training was conducted in any weather and round the clock. Training exercises were conducted in the terrain similar to that occupied by the enemy, and in the training grounds equipped according to the specifics of German defenses, the soldiers learning to assault permanent reinforced bunkers and pillboxes with fire emplacements, surmounting barbed-wire obstacles and mine fields, and acquiring the skills and experience of the breaking of the deeply arranged defenses.

The 13th Air Force Army was also preparing itself for the offensive operation. The Headquarters of Air Force Formations war-gamed various methods of interaction with Rifle Formations and Armor Formations. Training exercises were augmented by the sorties of the 277th Ground Attack Air Division, air wing leaders succeeding in getting stable radio touch with tank crews. In one of the suburbs of Leningrad, the special training ground was built-up featuring the strongholds, dugouts and trenches. The aircraft crews war-gamed bombing attacks against the small targets: pieces of ordnance, bridges, trench shelters, as well as the approach and air strike procedure for destroying the trenches. (4)

In late November 1943, after authorized permission was given for the briefing about the upcoming activities of the Commanders of Artillery Divisions and Artillery Regiments, the HQ staff of the Front Artillery and Army Artillery, the corresponding examination began at the level of the Commanders of Artillery (Mortar) Regiments, Brigades and Divisions. "The examination revealed cases, when the Commanders, among other things, did not understand "the sliding fire method." The HQ staffers, in such cases, gave the clarifying explanations, and several days later, the same Commanders were examined again to make sure that they had learned the method well ... By the beginning of December, in our sophisticated "Artillery orchestra," all the Commanders and performers knew their "scores"--the Artillery methods and techniques of the offensive operation." (5)

In conformity with the Front Commander's directions about the training classes to be conducted by the Front Artillery Commanders with Combined-Arms Troop Commanders, in December 1943 the Special Conference was held with the participation of Army Commanders, Infantry Corps and Infantry Division Commanders, Senior HQ Officers of Front Artillery, Army Artillery and Infantry Corps, Artillery Division and Artillery Brigade Commanders, and Counter-Battery Corps Commander. The Conference discussed the following reports: the planning of the Artillery offensive, the use of the long-range Artillery, the organization and use of counter-mortar groups, the use of destruction Artillery.

The four-day training classes with the Corps Commanders, Division Commanders and their HQs, with the Artillery Commanders and the HQs of the Infantry Formations and with the reinforcement Artillery were conducted in the following topics: Artillery decision-making, the use of the Artillery in the breaking of enemy defenses and in the follow-up activities. (6)

For the Generals and the Senior Combined-Arms and Artillery Officers, in December the demonstration range practice was organized in the firing ground. The audience was able to see for itself the fire effectiveness of the Artillery units, which by direct laying and from the defilade positions breached barbed wire and minefield lanes, destroyed the trenches under conditions of reduced visibility.

Note that the conferences, training classes and demonstration range practice armed the officers not only with the knowledge of the new methods for assault Artillery support, but also with the firm awareness of what they could demand from the Artillery in upcoming battles.

As the operation was planned and prepared, so did it go. "In military art, there was not a single case that the besieged armed forces, having accumulated requisite capabilities and having launched the offensive, would not differ in the vigor of their offensive activities from the actions of the troops that advanced along the external perimeter of the besieged city the way, in which it occurred on the outskirts of Leningrad." (7) Thus, the definite system of training of the command Echelons and the troops for the upcoming combat actions evolved during the Great Patriotic War.

Unfortunately, in the closing years of the 20th century, the trend outlined itself for the underrating of the thorough organization of combat activities, service arm interaction, the detailed war-gaming of many challenging questions involved in the war-gaming and the implementation of tactical activities. Unreasonably detailed exercise plans were worked out, with the possible versions of the trainees' actions defined beforehand, and that is why the war-gaming of certain tactical episodes was occasionally conducted without sufficient reckoning with the actions of Commanders and troops.

The underrating of the practical preparation of tactical activities negatively affected the training of command echelons and the troops. Sometimes, it boiled down largely to decision-making, the planning of the battle (the operation) and the assignment of missions to subordinate units and subdivisions. Little focus was made on the practical activities in organizing of interaction, command and control and to all-round combat support, especially to the questions of reconnaissance and the neutralization of the enemy by fire. This paved the way for troop formations (units and subdivisions) being obliged sometimes to commit themselves for hastily planned warfare, which is of course inadmissible.

This kind of attitude of Commanders to the legacy of the Great Patriotic War, as well as to the combat experience in Afghanistan led to the numerous and unwarranted casualties of the Federal troops, in particular, during the assault of Grozny and of other populated localities, as well as in conducting warfare activities in mountainous areas and wooded terrain.

The U.S., for one, prepared itself for the war in Iraq during ten years (2003). (8) The improvement of Command and Control activities was achieved both with the use of the computerized formats of operational-and-tactical warfare training in the computer classrooms of the National Training Center in the Mohave Desert, and in the course of almost incessant tactical war-gaming and peacekeeping operations. For example, the 3rd Infantry Division was trained in the desert conditions honing its skills in firing live ammunition. As a result, the U.S. troops were capable of solving more effectively the assigned missions compared to the large MNF Force in the Persian Gulf zone in 1991. (9)

Apparently, it would be very difficult to do without armed confrontation in the contemporary world. Therefore, the echelons of command and the troops should be trained for the upcoming hostilities well in advance and, by all means, with the glance to the legacy of the Great Patriotic War, to the experience of the local wars and armed conflicts, if the military and political situation at hand objectively requires it.

NOTES:

1. G.F. Odintsov, Povelitely ognya, Lenizdat Publishers, Leningrad, 1980, pp. 116, 118.

2. Sovetskaya artilleriya v Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voine 1941-1945, Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1960, pp. 192-193.

3. B.V. Bychevsky, Marshal Govorov, Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1970.

4. Istoriya Ordena Lenina Leningradskogo voennogo okruga, Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1988, p. 267.

5. G.F. Odintsov, op. cit., pp. 195, 196.

6. Ibid., p. 198.

7. N.N. Zhdanov, Ognevoy shchit Leningrada, Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1965, p. 183.

8. W.K. Clark, Kak pobedit v sovremennoy voine, Alpina Business Books Publishers, Moscow, 2004, p. 37.

9. Ibid., p. 39.

Col. A.B. ZUBACHEV

Candidate of Technical Sciences, assistant professor

Col. Yu.B. RIPENKO (Ret.)

Candidate of Military Sciences, assistant professor