Training a ready and relevant Army at war.

Q Based on the impact of lessons learned in OEF [Operation Enduring Freedom] and OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom] on the COE [contemporary operational environment], how has the threat and battlefield changed at the NTC [National Training Center]?

A The NTC embarked on an entirely new threat and operational environment in the spring of 2002. The TRADOC [Training and Doctrine Com-mand] DCSINT [Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence] published a revolutionary COE, and the NTC moved from a Soviet-based threat to a capabilities-based threat. This threat--the opposing force [OPFOR]--provides a menu, if you will, of the worst, most vicious capabilities of any potential adversary that exists worldwide. The division or corps commanders of the rotational units then choose from this menu, based on the rotational units' missions, and tailor the OPFOR to be the perfect sparring partners for their units. These "senior trainers" determine the units' training objectives.

So the OPFOR is a very lethal, versatile, agile, contemporary threat who doesn't fight like any known army and exhibits the collected capabilities of the worst folks we might meet. The 11th ACR [Armored Cavalry Regiment], the OPFOR, is highly trained and disciplined to be unpredictable, wily and quick at decision making; fight nonlinear, 360 degrees; and be able to exploit any weaknesses or "seams" in the rotational unit.

So the threat has changed hugely.

What also has changed is the training scenario. Units have a less predictable battle rhythm. The rotations have gone from 14 to 21 days and now include realistic RSOI [reception, staging, onward movement and integration] operations.

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]

The training scenarios are more agile. If the scenario is at the higher end of the conflict spectrum, the OPFOR can field up to five battalion-sized maneuver groups. For mission rehearsal exercises for SOSO [stability or support operations] in Iraq or Afghanistan, the OPFOR can put up to 1,800 civilians on the battlefield, male and female, who are well organized and plugged into the play so they can be Pro-US presence or anti-US presence, as required. Units now go around the clock with multiple challenges: planning and executing the mission while facing refugees, requirements for convoy escorts and heightened security, angry crowds, riots and more.

The scenarios flex for cause and effects--what a Soldier or leader does is deliberately worked in to produce an effect. So, for example, if the unit's civil affairs and PSYOPs [psychological operations] campaigns are on target, then the unit will win the civilians over and get their cooperation or glean intelligence. If the unit does a poor job of civil-military operations, it will pay a price for it in the scenario.

Units must be able to integrate lethal and nonlethal effects in the scenarios. For example in SOSO, when events start turning sour, it can become absolutely critical that units can shift to fighting with lethal fires. The NTC also has increased its emphasis on joint fires.

The NTC scenario can have a mixture of high-intensity conflict to SOSO with numerous civilians on the battlefield as a population the rotational units have to accommodate. Units must train to the human dimension on the battlefield, even at the high end of the spectrum of conflict, because that's what they'll face.

The NTC trains units on a harsh desert terrain with not only flat desert floors, but, increasingly, mountainous defiles and passes. We are now replicating the challenges of working through difficult urban terrain. We are building rudimentary, third-world villages, towns and cities at the NTC--we already have six of them, the largest of which has about 400 inhabitants who live there fulltime during a rotation.

The people in these urban towns replicate whatever cultural, ethnic and political mix the division commander wants. These include insurgents, paramilitary and terrorists, who can take on the ideology and culture of specific groups. Eventually, we will have cities with 200 to 300 buildings, terrorist training camps, fortresses, a petroleum refinery and other complex urban terrain features on the NTC battlefield. We plan to remain as versatile as possible to train urban operations for any area of the world.

One significant change at the NTC is that observer/controllers, O/Cs, who are still the experts, have moved into more of a coaching mode and less as just observers.

All the CTCs [Combat Training Centers] have gone through a cultural change--all the things we've talked about--to ensure Army training is relevant and units are ready to accomplish their missions.

Q You mentioned increasing joint fires at the NTC--what about JCAS [joint close air support]?

A The Army and Air Force are solidly committed to "getting JCAS right." The Air Force has increased the number of sorties coming in for NTC rotations, and the sorties come in continually instead of in spurts. The Air Force is providing ETACs [enlisted tactical air controllers] and ALOs [air liaison officers] with combat experience who relish the opportunity to bring aircraft in and clobber the OPFOR or create whatever effects the unit commander wants.

We strongly encourage division commanders to include the task of "Employing CAS" as one of their primary training objectives for their rotational units. The Army always will fight joint, so our joint force must train to integrate their fires--land-based. Army aviation and Air Force. Navy and Marine fixed wing.

We also coach units to keep firing artillery while they bring in CAS. But they rarely do that because it calls for complex skills and units rarely get to train on them at home station due to air restrictions and the availability of CAS aircraft. When units have the sophistication of skills to simultaneously bring in fixed-wing air. Army aviation and FA fires and synchronize those fires, they make the most of incredible joint effects and win. And when they win at the NTC, they tend to win in war.

Q With the emphasis on SOSO at recent NTC rotations, how does the NTC ensure units train on their core warfighting competencies?

A Our guidance from the Forces Command commander is to prepare units for their most likely next missions. Recently, the rotations have had a very strong undercurrent of SOSO mission training. After major combat operations in Iraq ended, the American Army took on an entirely new gamut of SOSO missions--our Soldiers and leaders have done an amazing job of "thinking on their feet," a tribute to their quality and previous Army training.

So, we at the NTC, pretty much have been preparing units to deploy to the CENTCOM [Central Command] theater with the specific training objectives determined by their division or corps commanders.

In January, we will have the first rotation that mixes high-end conflict training core warfighting competencies and SOSO. The NTC will provide a very tough OPFOR who "cuts no slack." In the near future, I think most rotations will include both.

Q What mechanisms do you have in place to ensure that the lessons from the real world, such as in OIF and OEF, are being incorporated into training at the National Training Center?

A It is absolutely essential that we not only capture the lessons learned from our operations in the CENTCOM theater (and any other theater, as required), but also anticipate trends as they're emerging. We have three mechanisms to ensure NTC training is relevant to the missions the units must accomplish.

First, we are linked to TRADOC and have continuous discussions with the Center for Army Lessons Learned, CALL. We have a CALL rep here at Fort Irwin.

Next, we have folks from the NTC in theater observing current operations. Many of the NTC leaders or O/Cs have, in fact, just returned from tours in theater. If not, we get them over there to spend time with their counterparts, so they're current.

And then third, we have strong links with the other services and other nations. We just had Jordanian officers at Fort Irwin observing and advising us on our training. I am working with the VII Carrier Battle Group out of San Diego to ensure we have joint lessons learned integrated into our training. The group is going to launch aircraft off the Stennis [USS John C. Stennis] to participate in our January NTC rotation that will be nested in the first Joint National Training Capability [JNTC] rotation. Likewise, we're working closely with the Air Force and Marines.

Q What is your vision for the National Training Center?

A As if looking through a prism, there are three aspects to my vision. The first dimension to the prism is that the National Training Center remains the premier facility world wide for training the heavy joint force; it will conduct contemporary and futuristic training, anticipating trends and events, and be well-equipped, well-instrumented, well-led and plenty big enough to train the heavy force realistically. The latter requires we expand the NTC facility.

As a first step, we are physically expanding one corridor to 90 kilometers long, which is a more realistic distance on the expanded COE battlespace. Also, as constructive and virtual capabilities become more mature, we will expand the NTC battlespace (currently 1,000 square miles) by four or five times.

The second aspect of my vision is the NTC as the cornerstone of the JNTC. Here in-the west, we are fortunate to have a number of highly capable and, potentially, incredibly synergistic ranges, bases and facilities. Our next-door neighbors are China Lake Naval Weather Station and Naval Air Weather Station. Nellis Air Force Base that provides our air support is a little more than 120 miles away. Edwards Air Force Base is nearby. Fallon Naval Air station is just right across the border in Nevada. Twentynine Palms, the Marine's force-on-force training center, borders on the NTC. Then, of course, San Diego with Navy ranges and Carrier Groups VII and I are not far away. VII is the "go-to-war" group and I is the training group.

Because of the NTC's size, joint capabilities in the area with the potential for incredible synergism and the facts that we have mature instrumentation and have been running rotations for more than 20 years, the NTC is the best choice as the cornerstone of the JNTC training for all services and agencies.

I say, "agencies," because we need a robust presence of the different agencies we will have to interface within theaters of operations, such as Special Operations Forces [SOF], DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency], CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], State Department and others. We must train to link the interfaces and synchronize our efforts.

And then, finally, we need to train multi-nationally as well. The NTC offers a huge potential for allied training, not necessarily through physical presence, but through liaison and simulations.

For example, right now from half a nation away, we can fly Apache Longbow simulators at Fort Rucker [Alabama] and "kill" OPFOR tanks moving on the desert floor of the NTC. So when the good guys cross the NTC battlefield, the pilot can see them through his windshield and must avoid fratricide. When he sees the enemy, he can pull the trigger in the simulator, have a missile launch from the Longbow and see the missile strike the OPFOR tank with simulated flames shooting up. That's new and exciting training.

We easily can conduct the same training with the Canadian. British or Korean Army. These and other nations have expressed a desire to start to explore multi-national training at the NTC via simulations.

The final part of my vision is Fort Irwin as the best place in the Army to raise a family. We are working hard to tap into the advantages of the region and improve the facilities of Fort Irwin to make it a place that families aspire to come and where Soldiers fight to get an assignment. Duty at the NTC is tough, soldierly duty, but it is very rewarding.

Q What training at the NTC has the biggest payoff for unit effectiveness in the COE, and why?

A Leader development training. We are seeing the results of this training in the CENTCOM theater right now. The US Army is, without question, a well led, well disciplined Army with leaders who are "all over" their unique missions.

The NTC has a leader development program, but its rotations also stress leaders from the brigade commander on down to the corporal. That's caused by the complexity of the scenarios and the fact that everybody is busy during the entire rotation.

The O/Cs continuously hold up the mirror of reality to the unit, not only through AARs [after-action reviews] conducted down to the platoon levels, but also during operations. The O/Cs ask leaders at all levels, "How are you doing?" "Are you meeting the standard?" It's the O/C's job to show the standard and coach leaders, so the next day, a problem is corrected and leaders have learned something.

Q The CTCs have tended to focus on direct firefight to the detriment of the indirect firefight. We had many instances in OIF where the indirect fire saved the day. What is the NTC doing to ensure we train as we fight?

A Okay ... we do appear to focus on the direct firefight, but I disagree with your assertion that we're not emphasizing the indirect firefight.

The NTC stresses the joint and combined arms fight. Many units have not mastered synchronizing fires and movement, which equals maneuver. However, in the 15 months I've been at the NTC, I have seen significant improvements in the integration of fires and movement--more scenarios in which indirect fires are decisive, using mortars. Paladin and air fires.

By the way, you can't win at the NTC unless you get fires working for you. We tell brigade commanders, "Indirect fires are yours--you own the fight and are responsible for the FA battalion just as much as for the tank battalion, infantry battalion, etc." The brigade commander who owns it all and masters its integration will be highly successful at the NTC.

But without integrating his indirect fires, the brigade commander fights with one arm tied behind his back and a leg tied up behind him.

Q In OIF, a representative of Fort Leavenworth went to Iraq and documented that many commanders were amazed at the effects of FA fires: HE [high explosive] in urban fires, the cannon-delivered precision sensor fused munition we used, called SADARM [sense and destroy armor]--even MLRS [multiple-launch rocket systems] fired in danger-close support. What is the NTC doing (or have planned for the future) to more closely replicate the effects of indirect fires when they are accurate and timely?

A I'm not surprised that OIF commanders were impressed with FA firepower; it has awesome impact and shock effects. Live fire--real artillery, real guns, shooting real rounds, real missiles--is essential to NTC training. We need to live fire it all.

HIMARS [high-mobility artillery rocket system] live fired at the NTC during the Millennium Challenge rotation last summer. After HIMARS is fielded, we certainly can train HIMARS operating with SOF deep as it did so effectively in OIF.

We continually encourage units to bring the equipment they have, so we can incorporate it into training. The brigade commander needs to be able to bring to bear all the elements of his combat power.

We also are working to replicate the effects of indirect fires more realistically. We are developing the future MILES [multiple-integrated laser engagement system] to replace SAWE [simulated area weapons effects] system in FY07, and it will include all the dimensions of indirect fires.

Right now, the guy in the foxhole watching a battalion-six does not experience the effects, which are impressive ... also devastating if you happen to be standing underneath them. But we never are going to be able to safely replicate all the dust kicking up, sparks flying, vehicles burning with their road wheels melting, etc., etc., etc.

Of course, the NTC must have joint live fires, and our future MILES must incorporate their effects as well.

Q What message would you send Army and Marine Field Artillerymen stationed around the world?

A You are an integral part of the most professional and lethal armed force the world has ever known. Your contribution is absolutely essential, and your integration gives the land force the combat power to do the nation's bidding.

Brigadier General Joseph F. Fil, Jr.

Commanding General, National Training Center and Fort Irwin, California

By Patrecia Slayden Hollis, Editor

Brigadier General Joseph F. Fil, Jr., has commanded the National Training Center (NTC) and Fort Irwin, California, since August 2002. Also at the NTC, he had served as the Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff of the Operations Group. Senior Brigade Combat Trainer (Bronco Team) and Senior Armor Task Force Trainer (Cobra Team). In his previous assignment, he was the Deputy Commanding General for US Army NATO and Chief of the Requirements and Program Branch at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Belgium. He commanded the Operations Group at the Combat Maneuver Training Center at Hohenfels, Germany; 1st Brigade (Ironhorse), 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas; and 1st Battalion, 1st Cavalry Regiment, also in the 1st Cav Division. He holds a Master of Military Art and Science from the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; a Master of National Security Strategy from the National War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania; and an MS in Administration from Central Michigan University.