Toward risk governance: in France, a strategic-management consulting firm chooses an approach to crisis avoidance through risk anticipation.

Not a week goes by anywhere in the world without a glaring example in the news of an organizational crisis that has degenerated into a disaster. Those who have to deal with the crisis often adopt a variety of predictable responses: obstinate or embarrassed silence, outright denial of the facts, retaliation, or scapegoating. Any response is exacerbated by the urgency of the situation and by the organization's fragmented or incomplete view (voluntary or otherwise) of the facts.

In nearly every case of corporate crisis, public confidence rapidly disintegrates. Victims, special interest groups, competitors, avowed adversaries--each of these groups has its own spin on the axiom that says the incident was preventable as soon as it becomes a reality. Each demands that the "guilty" parties be found and financial and/or legal reparations made.

It doesn't matter what the incident is or where it occurs--an unfolding crisis practically always follows this pattern. The consequences of the event can be difficult to assess in the here and now, but they inevitably weigh heavily on the future, sometimes containing the seeds of a new crisis. More important, the identity and credibility of the company, institution or agency suffer the long-term effects.

So how is it that organizations still get into these predicaments, even though crisis communication is viewed as essential, and with all the specialists out there who can set up ultra-responsive information systems in the blink of an eye? In reality, most agencies go no further than offering to mobilize crisis systems after an incident occurs or when the crisis is imminent--too late to address it effectively. This type of communication, no matter how massive and powerful, is often nothing more than a bandage for a gaping wound, and ultimately leads to scars that do not fade.

With 18 years of experience in emergency communications for such PR-sensitive industries as pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, chemicals, cosmetology, food and agriculture, Annie Clerc de Marco, a consultant and the founder of the French firm Antaria, which specializes in anticipating high-risk situations and crisis management, doesn't mince words: "Risk management is widely confused with emergency management. When a crisis erupts, the communications function doesn't manage anything; it just provides support as best it can. But by then, it's usually too late. The best way to manage a crisis is to avoid it."

That's the philosophy behind Antaria's approach: Crises can be easily foreseen. All you have to do is identify and analyze the components that combine to form a system headed straight for a crisis, just waiting for something to trigger it.

For example, when the oil tanker Prestige, chartered by the leading oil company in France, sank off the coast of Spain in November 2002, the attitude of the company, backed up by a major communications firm, fluctuated for a long time between embarrassed silence, trying to pin the guilt on a third party (in this case, the Bahamian ship owner) and acceptance of the facts. Yet three years earlier, the same company had experienced a similar catastrophe along the coast of Brittany. One cannot help but note that no real lesson was learned between these two accidents. A big communication campaign, including television commercials and advertisements in major newspapers and magazines, wasn't enough to erase from the public mind the picture of a company whose name is henceforth linked to pollution and profit maximization, to the point that it charters ships in pitiful condition with the potential to lay waste to the environment. That the oil company had taken concrete steps to strengthen tanker safety and controls after the first event was not publicized enough to make a positive impression.

Not seeing the big picture = crisis

"Crises are not accidents," Clerc de Marco says. "They are ingrained, extremely slowly developing pathologies that can be diagnosed. They are therefore completely foreseeable and avoidable. Having a global view that anticipates, by perceiving existing or latent factors and linking them together, can prevent what happens so frequently today: a compartmentalized, top-down view that reacts to each event but lacks the big picture and thus responds with inappropriate solutions."

Consider the heat wave that enveloped Europe for two weeks in the summer of 2003. In France, nearly 15,000 mostly elderly people died directly or indirectly from the heat, whereas neighboring countries had practically no victims. Yet there were clear warning signs well before the temperatures peaked. The heat wave was not France's first, and previous public health reports stressed the serious and often lethal risks of heatstroke for senior citizens and children when temperatures remained well above 20 degrees Celsius (68 degrees Fahrenheit) day and night for several days on end. In the days before the drama, meteorological forecasts also pointed to the very high probability of a massive and extended heat wave. As a result, emergency physicians had joined forces to demand more hospital resources from the government, especially to cope with an influx of people in the event of a heat wave. The government, meanwhile, launched a public information campaign targeting at-risk patients on the dangers of sun exposure, pollution of the ozone layer and poor hydration. Yet no changes were made to the existing hospital emergency plan.

With temperatures soaring and a growing number of people finding their way to overwhelmed hospitals or remaining isolated at home, the government ordered paramedic crews and physicians to keep quiet so as not to spread even greater panic. The minister of health himself intervened publicly late in the game and downplayed the facts. The emergency plan wasn't activated until several days into the crisis. What happened next? The inevitable leaks to the media showed the situation for what it was: seriously dysfunctional emergency services, the isolation or even abandonment of many of the elderly in large cities, and the absence of air conditioning in retirement homes.

What lessons can we learn from this example? First, there has been a crisis of confidence in the French hospital system, whose exemplary performance had long been vaunted by the government. Public distrust has mushroomed, fanned by the media, physicians' unions and patient associations, despite the fact that most hospitals employ skilled professionals and are truly committed to reform. Added to this mix is the number of health scandals covered by the media in France in recent years, including those related to contaminated blood, mad cow disease and hospital-acquired infections. The negative perception has settled in, and it will undoubtedly take a long and assiduous effort to rectify the situation.

The dangerous illusion of zero risk

It is precisely this type of example that pushes Antaria to recommend that its customers set up a true risk governance system. "In our modern societies, it's unrealistic to believe and let others believe in zero risk or in strategic silence," observes Clerc de Marco. "Today, risk is a complex concept with multiple factors that cannot be relegated to science and industry alone, for it touches the social realm, as well. Civil society has every intention of participating in, if not leading, the debate that swirls around it. A wide variety of stakeholders have emerged in the aftermath of the crises, including the media, activists, pressure groups of every stripe, and associations of ordinary citizens who want their rights to be recognized and their voices to be heard alongside those of government agencies, companies and institutions. Faced with a potentially permanent loss of confidence, risk management and its social acceptability are vital dimensions for potentially sensitive activities."

Which brings us to the core of the cindynics approach (from the Greek word for "danger") developed by Antaria. It starts with an exhaustive audit of the company's internal and external environment to identify stakeholders and analyze real and perceived risks. Once this has been mapped, an approach fueled by dialogue and constant interaction can be set up. However, as Clerc de Marco cautions, "This assumes that the company has an open mind and a commitment to transparency, and that it agrees to allow itself to be questioned and to change with regard to its stakeholders. The risks and benefits are obvious to us, but we try to avoid the NIMBY [not in my backyard] syndrome."

Antaria's strategy was used in a town in southwestern France, where it led to the signing of a civic commitment charter in May 2004 between Casco Industrie, a company that makes formaldehyde-based glue, and the Sabareges Association, a local collective that had long been opposed to locating the plant there for fear of the environmental hazards. Following Antaria's advice, Casco gradually built up dialogue with Sabareges, going so far as to offer regular tours to show progress on construction and answer questions. It also installed requested facilities and offered training so that residents could learn about its business, which in turn dispelled sometimes-unfounded fears.

It is by making this concerted effort to communicate and to assume social responsibilities that a climate of mutual trust can be established between the parties involved. By calmly planning ahead, crises in which confrontation and confusion gain the upper hand can be avoided, and the need for massive marketing campaigns aimed at restoring a muddied or suspect image can be prevented.

survey methodology

The IABC Research Foundation Crisis Communication Survey was distributed on 7 December 2005 to 4,563 IABC members who identified their area of responsibility as corporate communication or employee communication. It was distributed via an e-mail containing a link to the online survey. The survey was active for one week and closed on 14 December 2005.

Survey questions were developed jointly by IABC, Holland Communication Solutions and Gill Research.

Six hundred ten IABC members completed the survey, for an overall response rate of 13 percent (a typical response rate for an IABC Research Foundation survey).

This sample size allows statistically valid results with a margin of error of 3.69 percentage points at a 95 percent confidence level. This is a typical response rate for IABC Research Foundation surveys and is believed to be representative of the views of the IABC member population.

managing reputation

After highly sensitive information regarding Liechtenstein's financial sector was leaked to the media, the principality suffered from a string of negative press stories and a crisis of self-perception. A team of five students from the University of Lugano (Switzerland) Executive MScom Program set out to develop a framework that would enable Liechtenstein to actively manage its reputation. Their efforts resulted in a significant improvement in Liechtenstein's image--as well as a Gold Quill Award.

For more information about this and other Gold Quill Award-winning work plans, check out Best Practices in Communication Planning and Implementation 2005 at www.iabc.com /publications/library.

about the author

Olivier Cordonnier is director of corporate internal communication and eBusiness at Nestle Waters MT in Issyles-Moulineaux, France.