Toward a new foreign policy.

The U.S. and Russia are on schedule to implement the terms of the START I treaty by the implementation deadline of December 31,2001. The terms of START I, however, leave both countries with 6,000 accountable deployed weapons and a multitude of uncounted but activated weapons. Moreover, Russia and the U.S. have negotiated and signed the START II Treaty. This agreement, though signed in January 1993, has not yet entered into force for either country due to the uncertainty regarding Washington's interest in developing national missile defenses. The terms of the agreement limit each country to no more than 3,500 deployed strategic warheads. These cuts, if implemented, would be deeper than they appear, since the treaty eliminates the somewhat misleading counting rules contained in START I and would result in actual deployed arsenals on both sides to no more than 3,500 weapons.

But with the joint decisions announced at the November 2001 summit between presidents Bush and Putin, START II was bypassed. Instead of seeking verifiable reductions through a treaty arrangement--which would also limit the types and numbers of deployed weapons--the two leaders have decided for now to announce unilateral cuts. President Bush announced that the U.S. would reduce its arsenal to between 1,700 and 2,200 weapons by the end of the decade, and President Putin announced his intention to make similar, but unspecifed, reductions.

The loss of the START II treaty and Helsinki summit provisions is unfortunate for several reasons, not the least of which is that START II banned the deployment of land-based missiles with multiple warheads. These missiles are considered very destabilizing, since they pose attractive targets to a would-be attacker. Banning such weapons would also help limit the potential future growth of arsenals, should political circumstances change radically. Moreover, the Helsinki statement pledged both sides to work toward agreement on monitoring warhead elimination and to discuss controlling tactical nuclear weapons. It is not yet known if the announcements of November 2001 will be codified in a treaty (preferred by Russia, resisted by the U.S.) and implemented under any meaningful system of verification:

Although President Putin did not make a specific announcement of what reductions would be made in the Russian nuclear arsenal, below is a summary of the types of reductions that can be expected based on the rapidly aging nature of the Russian strategic arsenal. It is important to keep in mind, however, that if international circumstances worsen, Russia could deploy an arsenal of almost 4,000 weapons, some four times larger than envisioned under the cuts described below. ICBMs--Russia currently deploys 738 ICBMs of 5 different types. Due to aging, all but one of these systems the SS-27 Topoi-M--will be retired from service by the end of the decade. This means that Russia needs to eliminate over 700 currently deployed ICBMs by 2010. The number of new missiles Russia will deploy, and the number of warheads mounted on those missiles, will depend on the overall relationship between the U.S. and Russia. Russia currently lacks the resources to carry out this elimination mission on its own, and the CTR program has plans to assist with the elimination of missiles, missile fuel, and silos--provided the program is funded and the cuts are required by the terms of arms reduction agreements. CTR also intends to assist Russia in retiring additional nondeployed missiles. Overall CTR plans would result in the elimination of 1,473 ICBMs by the year 2007 (including systems already retired).

SLBMs--Russia now has 284 submarine-launched ballistic missiles deployed on 17 submarines. Given the poor condition of the Russian Navy, few of these missiles are on station and ready to launch at any given time. Moreover, the pace of retiring submarine-launched missiles is accelerating, and Russia is likely to only possess 116 missiles on 7 submarines by the end of the decade. Elimination of submarines is another important activity of the CTR program; one that is now entering a contract elimination phase where U.S. monies are being expended to hire Russian companies to destroy submarines and missile launch tubes. CTR efforts could result in the elimination of 41 submarines and 661 missiles, if the program is funded and implemented as planned.

Bombers--This component of the Russian nuclear triad is the most likely to remain stable over the course of the next 10 years. By extending the service lives of current aircraft, Russia is likely to deploy some 80 strategic bombers throughout the coming decade. If the U.S-Russian strategic relationship stabilizes and an agreement can be reached on the future of missile defenses, Russia's nuclear arsenal could dip to as low as 1,000 weapons by the end of 2010. This would allow the U.S. to pursue deep cuts of its own. It is unlikely, however, that Washington's current position on missile defenses, the ABM Treaty, or negotiated arms control will create the environment needed for these reductions to materialize. Instead, Russia could end up deploying three times as many strategic warheads, with all of the associated risks for strategic stability that accompany such an expansion. This is especially worrisome given the state of the Russian early warning radar system and the country's overall security situation.

Key Recommendations

* The U.S. and Russia should immediately follow up their unilateral decision to reduce deployed arsenals with formal negotiations on a new agreement to regulate both deep offensive nuclear reductions and the future of missile defense deployment.

* U.S. assistance to Russia--for weapons elimination, nuclear material disposition, and reducing the Russia nuclear complex--should be greatly expanded.

Jon Brook Wolfsthal <[e-mail]> is an associate with the Non-Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he works on issues related to Russian nuclear security and proliferation threats in North Korea. He is the coeditor of Nuclear Status Report: Nuclear Weapons, Fissile Materials, and Export Controls in the Former Soviet Union. Before joining the Carnegie Endowment, Jon served in the office of non-proliferation and national security in the U.S. Department of Energy during the Clinton administration.