Toward a New Foreign Policy.

There are clear lessons for Washington to learn in the Ethiopian-Eritrean war. These lessons reinforce failures of U.S. policy and understanding in Central Africa, the Great Lakes, Somalia, and elsewhere.

There is a need for more accurate information. It is necessary to understand the reality of the crises on the ground, rather than interpret them through the lens of U.S. interests and perspectives. Political correctness is no substitute for thought. Nor, to quote Mark Twain, should motion be confused with accomplishment. U.S. policymakers need continuity and African expertise. Interagency rivalries, internal State Department feuding, and a lack of sustained, high-level interest in Africa have prevented the provision for long-term analysis. There has been little effort to commit resources, whether for analysis or action, for longer than a few weeks.

Simplistic and faulty labels should be avoided. A mutually distorted perspective has caused both Ethiopia and Eritrea to see the other as a favored son of U.S. policy. It allowed Ethiopian commentators to ask why the U.S. supported a "dictator" like Isaias Afwerki. It led Eritreans to wonder--despite their own expulsion of 150,000 Ethiopians in 1991/92--why the U.S. backed "proto-Nazis" in Addis Ababa espousing a policy of "genocidal deportation."

At the time of President Clinton's Africa trip in March 1998, Washington was simplistically classifying the leaders of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda, and the Congo as part of an "African renaissance" and as (according to Foreign Affairs) "more responsive, accountable, and egalitarian than any of their predecessors." This was a particularly faulty judgement, given the poor human rights records of both President Isaias in Eritrea and Premier Meles in Ethiopia and given their attitudes toward democracy.

International arms embargoes should be maintained and tightened. The U.S. quietly initiated a unilateral arms embargo after hostilities broke out in May 1998. It also backed the UN call for restraint on arms supplies in January 1999, and it supported the UN's arms embargo (May 17, 2000). However, none of these initiatives, carried the necessary weight to control the flow of arms. Rather, the U.S. embargo annoyed Ethiopia, which claimed Washington was penalizing the victim (Ethiopia) equally with the aggressor (Eritrea), and the subsequent UN measures infuriated Eritrea, which saw itself as the victim of the initial Ethiopian aggression.

Particularly damaging has been the U.S. reluctance to speak out publicly against Russian arms sales. Russia sold high-performance fighters to both sides, MiG 29s to Eritrea and Sukhoi 27s to Ethiopia, in December 1998. Since mid-1998, the combatants have each spent an average of $300 million a year on armaments. It would appear that Washington has been unwilling to jeopardize relations with Moscow (or to sully the image of an African "renaissance") over a "minor" matter of war in the Horn of Africa.

The U.S. should employ economic aid sanctions against both countries. Although sanctions were considered, neither the World Bank nor the IMF seriously restricted funding. In late 1999, the World Bank did impose a moratorium on new programs, and the European Union also suspended loans for new development projects. The U.S. has not used its influence to push for a total cutoff of Bank or IMF funds, and Washington has continued bilateral aid to both countries. Further, Washington has not attempted to discourage either side from raising funds from their respective communities in the United States. Eritrea has been receiving at least $300 million a year for its war effort from its diaspora. Ethiopia, while attempting to do likewise, has never managed more than a fraction of this.

Humanitarian famine relief should continue. Arms purchases--from Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Italy, China, France, and the open market--have been occurring amidst major food shortages in both Eritrea and Ethiopia. These have largely been caused by drought, but both governments have clearly been distracted by the war, and there has been an inevitable diversion of agricultural resources, including commandeering farmers--hampering both cultivation and harvesting. Both countries are now seriously affected; Ethiopia is seeking aid for nearly a seventh of its 60 million people and Eritrea for almost a third of its 4 million. Donors, despite their concern over the fighting, have continued to provide unconditional humanitarian help to both countries. No one wants to contribute, or be seen to contribute, to famine deaths by refusing to provide food aid. Nor should they.

The U.S. and other donors should promote a multi-tiered peace package to build democracy and create long-term stability. The UN's belatedly imposed arms embargo (May 2000) should be maintained. However, the U.S., in coordination with other donors, should now consider the possibility of encouraging a peace package, which should include long-term development aid and debt relief. It must also involve: pressure for progress in good governance, including real democracy (not the paternalistic and patronizing acceptance of the single-party state, however disguised); the establishment of a free press; and a genuine improvement in human rights, irrespective of political affiliations. These are considerations that should be at the center of U.S. policy on the broadest level.

Key Recommendations

* U.S. policy in the Horn of Africa must be based on accurate information and expertise and must provide for a long-term perspective, decoupling relations with Ethiopia and Eritrea from wider considerations regarding Sudan or U.S. partners in the Middle East.

* A high-profile international arms embargo should be the first step in any future efforts at resolution of this conflict.

* Consideration should be given to a "peace package" approach incorporating development aid, debt relief, good governance, and conflict mediation.

Patrick Gilkes <[e-mail]> is a London-based independent journalist and consultant. Martin Plaut <[e-mail]> is an associate fellow with the Royal Institute of International Affairs and an editor with the BBC World Service.