Toward a New Foreign Policy.

The U.S. should recognize that its war on drugs against Colombia and other "source countries" has been a failure and that it must refocus on demand-reduction at home through education and treatment. Although overseas efforts will not solve our domestic drug problems, the U.S. does have a range of policy options that could support Colombian efforts to confront drug trafficking and the violence and corruption caused by that country's drug trade.

Any significant advance against drug trafficking is unlikely as long as Colombia's civil war continues. The opening of peace talks between FARC and the administration of President Andres Pastrana (who took office in August 1998), the first attempt at negotiations in seven years, offers a precious opportunity for peace. The people of Colombia desperately want peace. On October 24, 1999, upwards of 10 million Colombians marched for peace in Bogota and other cities, the largest public demonstration ever in the country's history.

President Clinton pledged support for the peace process and expressed his intent to broaden U.S.-Colombian relations to address a range of issues, including human rights, judicial reform, and trade. This verbal commitment has not, however, been translated into decisive and comprehensive support for peace and alternative development programs. In fact, U.S. counternarcotics policy is escalating Colombia's conflict and continues to present obstacles to the fragile negotiation process.

The U.S. should stop its counternarcotics programs in Colombia and switch to encouraging economic development for illicit crop producers. In 1998, Congress, for the first time, allocated money for alternative development in Colombia--$15 million over three years. But skepticism could easily give way to cynicism regarding this effort: by late 1999, only a half million dollars had been spent on alternative production, while U.S. military aid to Colombia soared to almost $300 million for 1999 alone. Further, current policy dictates that no money can be allocated for development projects in southern Colombia due to guerrilla presence. In fact, alternative development projects are operating in those areas, funded by the Catholic Church, the Colombian and European governments, and the United Nations--and some of these programs have even been destroyed by U.S. fumigation campaigns.

Both peasant farmers and President Pastrana have requested increased investment in development programs for conflictive areas involved in illicit crop production. Peasant farmers in southern Colombia, including coca growers, have repeatedly called for more government assistance. In 1996, these farmers organized a large protest march to demand better government services, only to be met with violent repression from military and paramilitary forces. Although the Colombian government signed a series of agreements for increased public spending on infrastructure, health, and education, these promises have yet to be fulfilled.

In 1999, Pastrana repeated his appeal for international support for "Plan Colombia," an ambitious program calling for substantial investment in development programs. However, Washington's FY1999 aid package and the FY2000 proposals before Congress apportion more than 90% of U.S. assistance to military hardware and training for the Colombian security forces. Washington's aid policy toward Colombia should change to address Pastrana's development objectives.

In addition, the U.S. should dedicate significant economic resources toward strengthening and reforming civilian democratic institutions, particularly local judiciaries. The Colombian Attorney General's Office, particularly the Human Rights Unit, has carried out a number of important investigations of human rights cases. Yet the Colombian military rarely cooperates with these investigations and has successfully blocked some probes. Because of death threats, many prosecutors have been forced to leave the Attorney General's Office; several have fled the country. The U.S. Congress has expressed its support for these human rights investigations but has failed to provide significant assistance.

Congress and the Clinton administration should publicly encourage the Colombian government to take immediate measures to combat paramilitary groups, including purging members of the armed forces who maintain ties to paramilitary groups or who tolerate their activities and enforcing the hundreds of outstanding arrest warrants for paramilitary leaders. The U.S. should deny visas to Colombian military officers implicated in human rights violations and support of paramilitary activities. Given the persistent pattern of human rights abuses by Colombia's security forces and their support for the vigilante violence of the paramilitary groups, the U.S. should terminate all assistance to Colombia's security forces.

Key Recommendations

* The U.S. should lend its full support to a negotiated settlement of Colombia's internal conflict.

* Washington should suspend all aid to the Colombian security forces until effective measures have been taken to reduce paramilitary violence conducted with the complicity of the Colombian military.

* U.S. drug control assistance should shift toward strengthening sound investigative capabilities of civilian judicial institutions and stimulating sustainable development activities for farmers currently involved in illicit crop production.

Sources for More Information

Organizations

Amnesty International USA
Colombia Coordinator
600 Pennsylvania Ave. SE, 5th Floor
Washington, DC 20003
Voice: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
Email: [e-mail]
Website: http://www.amnesty-usa.org

Center for International Policy
1755 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Ste. 312
Washington, DC 20036
Voice: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
Email: [e-mail]
Website: http://www.ciponline.org

Colombia Support Network
Box 1505
Madison, WI 53701
Voice: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
Email: [e-mail]
Website: http://www.igc.apc.org/csn

Latin America Working Group
110 Maryland Ave. NE, Box 15, Ste. 203
Washington, DC 20002
Voice: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
Email: [e-mail]
Web: http://www.lawg.org

Transnational Institute
Paulus Potterstraat 20
1071 DA Amsterdam
Netherlands
Voice: (3120) 662-6608
Fax: [phone]
Email: [e-mail]
Website: http://www.tni.org

U.S./Colombia Coordinating Office
1630 Connecticut Ave., NW, Ste. 200
Washington, DC 20009
Voice: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
Email: [e-mail]
Website: http://www.igc.org/colhrnet

Washington Office on Latin America
1630 Connecticut Ave. NW, 2nd Floor
Washington, DC 20009
Voice: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
Email: [e-mail]
Website: http://www.wola.org

Publications

Human Rights Watch, War Without Quarter: Colombia and International Humanitarian Law (Washington: Human Rights Watch, 1998).

Joy Olson and Adam Isaacson, Just the Facts: A Civilian's Guide to Defense and Security Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean (Washington: Latin America Working Group, 1998).

Ricardo Vargas, The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the Illicit Drug Trade (Washington: WOLA, TNI & Accion Andina, 1999).

Washington Office on Latin America, U.S. International Drug Control Policy: A Guide for Citizen Action (Washington: Washington Office on Latin America, 1999).

Websites

Drug Enforcement Administration
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea

El Tiempo
http://www.eltiempo.com

Office of National Drug Control Policy
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov

Peace Brigades International
http://www.igc.apc.org/pbi/colombia.html

Semana
http://www.semana.com

U.S. State Department Colombia Human Rights
Report
http://www.state.gov/www/global
/human_rights