Toward a New Foreign Policy.

During pro-reformist demonstrations in Iran that were savagely suppressed by rightist elements in July 1999, both the Clinton administration and its congressional critics remained largely silent, with the State Department only making a terse statement in calling for Iranian recognition of international human rights standards. One reason for this quiescence was the fear that more open U.S. support of the students might lead to a hard-line backlash. Supporting efforts at liberalizing the regime rather than overthrowing it entirely would be a more realistic, legal, and moral option, as well as one more likely to restore American credibility.

Past U.S. actions toward Iran have made it very difficult for Washington to play a constructive role in steering Iran toward greater respect for human rights and a more moderate foreign policy. The best the U.S. can reasonably do at this point is to avoid policies that might encourage more hard-line elements and retard current trends.

There are three major areas where U.S. policy toward Iran could improve. First, a broader coordination in the formulation of policy is essential. On the domestic level, policy toward Iran should no longer be directed primarily by the Pentagon and national security managers but should include the perspectives of State Department area specialists, Iranian-American intellectuals, and others knowledgeable about the country. On the international level, the U.S. must reverse its unilateralism and should coordinate policy with the Europeans and others who share U.S. concerns. Enforcing already-existing safeguards against nuclear proliferation would be one particularly important area for such efforts.

Similarly, the U.S. should work through the UN and should support other multilateral efforts to create a new security regime for the region rather than simply fueling the arms race and exacerbating the suspicions and bellicose rhetoric between Iran and the Arab gulf states. The U.S. must also seriously consider the perspectives of the democratic opposition in Iran. Although the Iranian opposition which supports the arms embargo and opposes direct support for the government until moderate forces consolidate their hold and liberalize further--is somewhat divided, most strenuously oppose the U.S.-led economic embargo against Iran.

Second, the U.S. must scrap its double standards. Rather than targeting only Iran, the Clinton administration must pressure Saudi Arabia and other allied regimes in the Middle East to end their human rights abuses. Once the need for evenhandedness is recognized, there are a number of potential agreements that could be solidified between the U.S. and Iran. For example, Washington could propose ending its support for Israeli occupation forces in southern Lebanon in return for an end to Iranian support of the Lebanese Hezbollah resisting that occupation.

Similarly, the best way to stop any potential procurement of nuclear weapons by Iran is to support the establishment of a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East. Such a move would require both the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear forces from the region and a pledge by Washington to pressure Israel to dismantle its nuclear arsenal. Iran has long supported such a nuclear-free zone agreement.

Third, U.S. policy must include a carrot as well as a stick. There has been a great reluctance to reward Iran for good behavior, in part as a reaction to the misguided policies of the Reagan administration, which sent arms to hard-line elements in the Iranian military. To maximize its policy impact, Washington should let Teheran know just which Iranian policies will result in rewards or punishments.

Similarly, the U.S. must ascertain which of its demands for policy changes in Iran are reasonable and realistic. For example, given both the widespread support among Iranians for the Palestinians and the growing realization that the current framework of the negotiations are to the Palestinians' disadvantage, insisting upon Iranian governmental support of the U.S.-brokered Middle East peace process is unrealistic.

Iran will continue to play an important and unique role in the politics of the region based on its own perceived self interests. Despite persistent efforts to isolate Iran, the U.S. cannot change that reality. It is important that Washington find a way to encourage Iran to become a more responsible member of the community of nations and to end its repression against legitimate dissent. This will require, however, that America reevaluate its policies toward both Iran and the Middle East as a whole. Detente between the U.S. and Iran is necessary if there is to be peace and security in the region. The current antagonistic relationship between the two countries serves neither's long-term interests.

Key Recommendations

* Washington should increase coordination with other governments and should broaden the base of U.S. policy formulation to include those with greater knowledge of Iran.

* The U.S. should craft more consistent policies regarding terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and human rights so as to regain credibility in challenging Iran on these issues.

* The U.S. should use both carrot and stick to support reasonable and realistic demands for change, letting the Iranians know which policies will result in rewards or punishments.

Sources for More Information

Organizations

Center for Iranian Research and Analysis (CIRA)
c/o Executive Director, CIRA
Department of Economics
Northeastern University
Boston, MA 02115
Voice: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
Email: [e-mail]
Website: http://www.dac.neu.edu/cira/

Middle East Policy Council
1730 M Street NW, Ste. 512
Washington, DC 20036-4505
Voice: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
Email: [e-mail]
Website: http://www.mepc.org

Middle East Research & Information Project
1500 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Ste. 119
Washington, DC 20005
Voice: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
Email: [e-mail]
Website: http://www.merip.org

Publications

Hooshang Amirahmadi, "US-Iran Relations:
From Confrontation to Modus Vivendi?" CIRA
Bulletin, vol. 14, no. 2, September 1998, pp. 31-4.
Jahangir Amuzegar, "Khatami's Iran, One Year
Later;" Mahmood Monshipouri, "Iran's Search for
the New Pragmatism;" Hamid Zangeneh, "The
Post-Revolutionary Iranian Economy;" Murry
Eiland III, "Mixed Messages and Carpet
Diplomacy;" Graham E. Fuller, "Repairing U.S.-Iranian
Relations;" Middle East Policy, vol. VI, no.
2, October 1998.

James Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of
American-Iranian Relations (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1988).

Shahram Chubin and Jerrold D. Green,
"Engaging Iran: A U.S. Strategy," Survival, vol.
40, no. 3, Autumn 1998, pp. 153-69.

Anoushrvan Ehteshami, After Khomeini: The
Iranian Second Republic (London: Routledge,
1995).

Electronic Middle East Insight, electronic
newsletter. To subscribe, send email to:
[e-mail] with "Subscribe EMEI"
in the body of the email.

James E Goode, Jr., The United States and Iran: In
the Shadow of Musaddiq (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1997).

Shireen Hunter, Iran and the World: Continuity in
a Revolutionary Decade (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1990).

Charles Kurzman, "Soft on Satan: Challenges for
Iranian-U.S. Relations," Middle East Policy, vol.
VI, no. 1, June 1998.

Hisham Milhem, Dual Containment: The Demise
of a Fallacy (Washington: Center for
Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown
University, 1997).

Gholam Hossein Razi, "The Nature of U.S.
Opposition to Iran: A Framework for Foreign
Policy Analysis," Iranian Journal Of International
Affairs, vol. 10, no. 3, Fall 1998, pp. 238-79.

Websites

American-Iranian Council (AIC)
http://american-iranian.org

Data Center
http://www.igc.apc.org/worldviews/wvmet.html

Iranian Trade Association (ITA)
http://www.IranianTrade.org

Iranians for International Cooperation (IIC)
http://iic.org