Toward a New Foreign Policy.

Vague U.S. law gives the Clinton administration a great deal of discretion over arms export approvals. When a sale to a close ally like Turkey is at stake, the immediate financial and political gratification of an arms sale is almost always favored over the longer-term benefits of restraint. For this reason, U.S. arms export law should be amended to include more precise eligibility criteria. Legislation introduced in the past three Congresses--the Arms Transfers Code of Conduct--would prevent arms sales to states that are undemocratic, abuse their citizens' human rights, are engaged in acts of armed aggression, or do not fully participate in the UN Register of Conventional Weapons, unless the President issues a national security waiver. Unlike present law, these disqualifying categories are fully defined so that decisions can be made according to clear, consistent criteria.

If a code of conduct were in place, Turkey would not qualify for arms sales until it ended the war with the PKK, guaranteed the rights of all Turkish citizens, and ended its aggressive posturing toward Greece. Although the Clinton administration would probably take advantage of the code's national security waiver, the process of denying eligibility and then justifying the sale on national security grounds would add a degree of scrutiny that might cause both the buyer and the seller to reconsider.

In the meantime, the U.S. State Department should honor its pledge to withhold an export license for attack helicopters until Turkey takes serious steps to meet agreed-upon human rights conditions. In a March 1999 meeting between nongovernmental groups and Assistant Secretaries of State Grossman and Koh, the U.S. officials appeared optimistic that significant improvements could be achieved before Turkey makes its arms purchasing decision, expected in the next six to eight months. Yet the strong showing for both the nationalist DSP and the extreme-right National Action Party (MHP) in recent elections does not bode well for a positive policy shift in the near future.

The U.S. State Department must not accept promises in exchange for real change; past pledges to reform human rights laws and practices have not translated into actual reforms. Moreover, until the Turkish government rescinds the state of emergency in the Southeast and allows U.S. government officials access to the region, Washington will be unable either to verify official claims of improvements or to ensure that future arms shipments are not used in human rights abuses. Rather than trusting the Turkish government to use U.S. arms appropriately, America should refrain from selling arms until independent verification is possible.

The attack helicopter sale provides a good test case for the new U.S. policy with its due emphasis on human rights, but it should not be a unique occurrence. By adopting a consistent set of firm criteria, such as the Arms Transfers Code of Conduct, the U.S. government would affirm that short-term goals--in this case logistical support for U.S. policy toward Iraq--do not outweigh longer-term goals, such as a democratic and stable Turkey. U.S. interests in the Aegean region go far beyond containing Saddam Hussein, and a free-flowing arms sales policy undercuts other strategic, political, and economic objectives.

Moreover, the U.S. policy of maintaining a no-fly-zone in northern Iraq is absurdly illogical. U.S. jets based at Incirlik, Turkey, patrol Iraqi airspace--and have recently bombed air-defense systems--in order to protect the Kurdish population from military attacks. Yet in regular sorties north of the Iraqi border, Turkey simultaneously uses U.S.-exported jets and attack helicopters--and U.S.-supplied intelligence--to target the same Kurdish population in Turkey.

Washington must issue a strong statement of concern over human rights and democratic practices and back it with an arms embargo--as several European states have done--for Turkey to take U.S. concerns seriously. State Department officials assert that they use bilateral discussions to push for democratic and human rights reforms. Given the dismal failure of these efforts, either arms sales have not provided the U.S. with enough influence, or U.S. officials have not cared to exercise their supposed clout to defend these foreign policy goals. Withholding arms to Turkey can help achieve such goals by denying the physical and political support the Turkish military needs to continue its civil conflict with the PKK, its stranglehold on Turkish politics, and its maintenance of a political system based on exclusion and repression.

By Tamar Gabelnick, Federation of American Scientists 

Tamar Gabelnick ([e-mail]) is Acting Director of the Arms Sales Monitoring Project of the Federation of American Scientists.