Toward a New Foreign Policy.

Key Recommendations

* Nuclear Weapons: The U.S. must lead by example and take
concrete steps regarding nuclear arms control if India and
Pakistan are to sign the CTBT.

* Terrorism: Washington should continue to incorporate South Asia
regional concerns about terrorism into its global policy, but in
doing so it should not give India carte blanche in Kashmir.

* Kashmir: The U.S. must encourage India's leadership in negotiations over
Kashmir while ensuring respect for human rights in that state.

The U.S. administration would do well to take far greater cognizance of how U.S. global interests mesh with South Asian regional ones. For example, pressure to sign the CTBT simply underscores South Asian perceptions of U.S. hypocrisy. Until the U.S. first ratifies the CTBT and pursues a more robust arms control agenda, India will not come on board. And, the interests of a vocal intellectual minority notwithstanding, Pakistan will not sign the CTBT until its large neighbor has done so.

Clinton should urge both India and Pakistan to develop more extensive confidence building mechanisms as well as contain the further weaponization of their extant nuclear weapons capabilities. Delicate and determined leadership is required, and the Clinton administration could provide the impetus for negotiations in this direction. No action in this regard was taken during the Clinton state visit, yet continuing talks create some room for optimism.

Terrorism is one area that the Clinton administration has clearly identified as a point of access to South Asian foreign policy. During his state visit, President Clinton linked Kashmiri terrorism with global terrorism issues and clearly supported the Indian position that many Kashmiri terrorist groups receive Pakistani support. Clinton also created a forum for greater anti-terrorist cooperation. This shift in the U.S. view toward one that incorporates South Asian regional concerns into a global policy is all to the good.

Unfortunately, Clinton did not make productive use of his visit to Pakistan. Since Clinton did choose to visit Pakistan and thereby enhance the legitimacy of the Musharraf regime, his administration would be well advised to engage the Pakistani administration with more than the strident rhetoric Clinton used during his visit. Pakistani Chief Executive Musharraf was offered neither inducements nor threats; he was simply told to change his ways. Predictably, Pakistan took no initiatives on the terrorist front in the immediate aftermath of the Clinton visit.

The U.S. should insist on more concrete steps by the Musharraf government, and it should not underestimate its influence in the region. For example, Washington should insist that Musharraf explicitly reject state sponsorship of terrorism and take measurable steps to break existing links between the Pakistani state and terrorists in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India. In exchange, the U.S. could provide financial resources for such antiterrorist initiatives. This approach is more likely to address U.S. global terrorism concerns such as Osama bin Laden because, troublingly to be sure, it would enhance the stability of Pakistan's current military government. Trade and aid both strengthen central governments, and both U.S. and multilateral assistance are critical to Pakistan's stability. The Clinton administration must ensure that any such assistance is doled out slowly and only after measurable progress on each of the principal U.S. concerns: nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and democracy.

Regarding democracy, the U.S. should not push for a rapid return to elected civilian rule in Pakistan. Instead, the U.S. should devote political and financial resources to promoting respect for basic human rights, monitoring progress on the Musharraf government's timetable for a return to democratic rule, and supporting the construction of the state institutions necessary to make elected civilian rule function more democratically, such as an effective tax system and an independent judicial apparatus.

In addition to financial inducements, the U.S. should use its increasingly well-honed Kashmir stick against Pakistan. Clinton should regularly remind Pakistan that if it does not move against supporters of terrorists in Afghanistan and Kashmir, Washington will lend support to the position that the LoC in Kashmir should be considered a de jure international border.

The risk associated with such a proactive, pro-India Kashmir policy is that Pakistan might prefer war to a peace under conditions dictated by India. The U.S. position has come to reflect India's regarding terrorism, bilateral negotiations, and the Line of Control. This change in U.S. views enables India to negotiate with Pakistan from a position of strength. The U.S. should watch carefully and respond if India uses its new support irresponsibly. The U.S. must insist that India respect the basic human rights of Kashmiris living in the area it controls and move to craft institutions that provide meaningful political representation to currently disaffected citizens in this troubled state.

Washington also should pressure India to drop its demand for Pakistani withdrawal from the areas of Kashmir it occupies as a precondition for bilateral negotiations and it should urge India to desist from its current demand that all of Kashmir be returned to Indian control.

Sumit Ganguly ([e-mail]) is a visiting fellow at the Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University. David Stuligross ([e-mail]) is the South Asia editor at Asian Survey and coordinates the South Asia Nuclear Dialogue at the Nautilus Institute.