Toward a New Foreign Policy.

The Clinton administrations renewed commitment to implementing the 1999 Lusaka Agreement, sending UN peacekeeping troops, and establishing a cease-fire in the DRC is welcome. The Lusaka Agreement and the Security Council resolution to send a UN force can represent steps on the road toward peace and reconstruction if implemented; Washington should work to make sure that happens, expeditiously and with sufficient numbers of troops and financial resources.

While embracing the Lusaka Agreement, the U.S. should make it dear that the obligations imposed on the Kabila government are not unique. The Congo has become infected by conflicts in neighboring African states and currently serves as a battleground in the struggle between Uganda and Zimbabwe for hegemony within Africa. An effective resolution of the DRC conflict has to address these other conflicts. If national dialogue and reconciliation are critical in the DRC, they are equally necessary in Rwanda (where the RPF regime represents only former exiles, a minority within the Tutsi minority) as well as in Burundi, Uganda, Zimbabwe, and Angola.

In the DRC conflict, what could each party settle for? Kabila justifiably wants Ugandan and Rwandan forces out of Congolese territory, and many Congolese who are not Kabila supporters agree with this position. The Lusaka Agreement links this desired outcome to a national dialogue. Kabila has announced his intention to convene a "constituent and legislative assembly," but unarmed opposition groups in the DRC have indicated that this would fall short of what is necessary for a genuine national dialogue. In addition, Kabila has announced an amnesty for members of the armed opposition (RDC, MLC), but these organizations have rejected the offer as "insulting," since it implies that they are guilty of some crime for which they need to be amnestied. Through continued overtures, some formula will have to be found by which the armed and unarmed opposition can participate in a comprehensive national dialogue.

Rwanda has sought to establish a sphere of interest over large areas of the eastern Congo (in North and South Kivu regions), insisting that this area was historically part of Rwandan territory. These claims involve a confusion between culture zones and political control. The U.S. needs to make clear to Rwanda that any claim that would change political boundaries is not valid and must be rejected. Rwanda and Uganda both want secure frontiers. This presumably is a greater priority than promoting the interests of their clients (the MLC and the two RDCs) or of the Rwanda-speakers of the eastern Congo.

These Rwanda-speakers want to be able to live in the eastern Congo, where they have been for generations or, in some cases, several centuries. Many Congolese argue that these people are not Congolese and that the Congo's nationality policy is an internal matter. This is an obsolete point of view in an era when genocide and other crimes against humanity have been recognized as international concerns, and when the claims of the former South African government that apartheid was an internal matter have been discredited. As with apartheid, discriminatory nationality laws and policies should be considered a threat to international peace.

The United States needs to defend the political rights of the Rwanda-speaking minorities, as it has attempted to defend the victims of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans. This will be difficult in practice, and these minorities (along with the Hema of Ituri) are among the likely losers as the situation in the eastern Congo evolves. However, since the current crisis involves attempts by these minorities to defend their rights, a concerted international effort should be made to avoid crafting a state-to-state solution at the expense of the interests of minorities.

Secure frontiers will require the disarming of the non-state military forces, particularly the Rwandan Hutus. The Rwandan government presumably will insist that they be disarmed. Since the UN mandate will not include disarming such forces, Kabila will have to use his leverage to accomplish this task. The U.S. must ensure that this happens, in return for promoting a national dialogue in Rwanda.

Tightening the ban on illegal diamond trading, a position already endorsed by the Clinton administration, would restrict the ability of the various Congolese rebel factions, as well as UNITA in Angola, to make trouble. Finally, the U.S. should stop its flow of weapons and military training to those involved in the Congo conflict. And Washington could further help create the conditions needed for peace and stability by unconditionally canceling the debt accrued by Zaire under Mobutu, pressuring the international financial institutions to do the same, and greatly increasing its level of development assistance to Africa.

Key Recommendations

* Diplomatic efforts must continue to ensure that a UN monitoring force is expeditiously deployed and has sufficient troops, financing, international backing.

* Washington needs not only to support national dialogue in the DRC but also dialogue in the neighboring states involved in the conflict.

* The U.S. must restrict the flow of weapons and military training to central African countries, provide unconditional debt forgiveness, and increase its development assistance.

Thomas Turner ([e-mail]), professor of political science at the law faculty of the University of Tunis III, is the coauthor of Rise and Decline of the Zairian State, and author of Racines de Lumumba.