Three men of Gettysburg: a study in Civil War battery command. (Civil War).

By July 1863, the artillery of the Army of the Potomac had evolved into a large and powerful force. It was well trained, well equipped and well led by Brigadier General Henry J. Hunt. Like all large military organizations, however, the Army's artillery was a complex organism made up of many subordinate units, each with different experiences and abilities. In the first days of July 1863 as the Union and Confederate armies converged on Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, it was ultimately the performance of individual batteries that determined the success of the Union Artillery.

Sixty-seven Union batteries took the field at Gettysburg, and many commanders served with distinction. (1) This is a story of three of those commanders. They are included not as the most outstanding or most typical but because together their experiences mirror the structure of the battle and illustrate its lessons for today's Field Artillerymen. Each commanded an artillery battery at a decisive point on the field on one of Gettysburg's three bloody days. One survived the trial by fire; two died at their guns. From their stories, a portrait emerges of the challenges and horrors of battery command at the fiercest moments of the American Civil War.

1 July 1863: Captain Hubert Dilger, Battery I, 1st Ohio Light Artillery. Hubert Dilger, a former officer in the Army of Baden, brought both experience and expertise to Gettysburg. Having already served as a professional soldier in his native Germany, Dilger adjusted rapidly to North American warfare and distinguished himself at Second Manassas and Chancellorsville. (2) His third major action began on the afternoon of 1 July in the fields north of Gettysburg College.

Dilger's battery of six 12-pounder Napoleons fired in support of the XI Corps' Third Division as it opposed Robert Rodes' attack. His gunners quickly silenced one Confederate battery and then continued to fire in support of the surrounding Union infantry. (3) When newly arrived Confederate rifled guns resumed counterbattery fire, Dilger called for and received an attachment of four Union 3-inch rifles (William Wheeler's 13th New York Battery). (4) Thus reinforced, Dilger's battery remained in action until Confederate infantry flanked the XI Corps line and made the Union artillery's position untenable. (5)

Dilger's performance at Gettysburg shows him to be an intelligent battlefield leader and a highly proficient artilleryman. His report of the 1 July action is remarkable for its clarity (with exception) and its attention and tactical concerns. (6)

Dilger had received orders to personally select his initial position, an unusual degree of independence for a battery commander and a mark of the confidence his superiors placed in his judgment. (7) Reinforced by Wheeler, Dilger commanded a mixed two-battery formation, combining smoothbore and rifled guns. He skillfully deployed the different pieces so as to take advantage of each one's strengths. At Dilger's direction, Wheeler suppressed the Confederate rifled guns; Dilger then aggressively moved his Napoleons forward to achieve greater effects on the Confederate infantry. (8) In both advance and withdrawal, Dilger was able to maximize the effectiveness of both batteries, bounding sections forward while positioning others in overwatch. (9)

Throughout the day, Dilger was conscious of the importance of effectively managing his ammunition. "During the whole engagement," he wrote, "three of my caissons were always employed to carry ammunition, and as slowly as I directed the fire, we were twice nearly out of ammunition." (10) With limited supply and heavy firing, this savvy use of caissons was critical to ensure that the division's infantry never found themselves without support.

Dilger's mastery of the artillery profession extended to the technical as well as the tactical. He expressed frustration with the lack of reliability of fuzes for the 12-pounder shell and spherical case and concern about the safety and effectiveness of fuzes for the 3-inch rifle. His discussion of the subject ends with emphasis on the limitations imposed by these deficiencies and a practical temporary solution of firing only percussion shells. (11)

Careful selection of firing positions, effective displacement, wise management of ammunition, knowledge of the capabilities of his weapons and a thorough understanding of the technical problems of contemporary artillery--today's artilleryman would easily recognize these as fundamentals of successful battery command. Dilger's professionalism set a standard that is still valid today.

2 July 1863: First Lieutenant Charles E. Hazlett, Battery D, 5th US Artillery. The fierce defense of Little Round Top by Lieutenant Colonel Joshua L. Chamberlain's 20th Maine Infantry is one of the best-known and most celebrated episodes in American military history. Less recognized is the heroic labor of First Lieutenant Charles E. Hazlett and Battery D, 5th US Artillery, in action less than 300 yards from the 20th Maine in the late afternoon of 2 July.

Hazlett's gunners, part of the V Corps Artillery Brigade, had the unenviable task of occupying a position on Little Round Top's rock-strewn summit. Because of the terrain, the battery's horses were able to pull only one of the guns directly into position. To move into battery, Hazlett's men had to unlimber the five remaining guns below the crest of the hill and drag them up by hand. (12) Like the guns, ammunition and water had to be hauled up from a point that the limbers and wagons could reach--on a July afternoon that was painfully hot to soldiers in wool uniforms. (13)

Despite these challenges, the battery established firing capability within minutes of arriving in position. (14) Throughout the gunners' toil, Hazlett was "with whole-souled animation encouraging our men and pointing toward the enemy amidst a storm of bullets[.]" (15)

Sadly, Hazlett did not live to see the Union triumph on Little Round Top. A few minutes after opening fire, he was fatally shot through the head, and he died several hours later. (16)

His gunners' efforts, however, were not in vain. As Battery D went into action, the Confederate brigade of Brigadier General Henry L. Benning had already attacked and overrun the Union strongpoint in Devil's Den. The hastily prepared defense of Little Round Top, however, closed the door to any Confederate exploitation of initial success.

As Benning described it, "The enemy on the mountain itself [Little Round Top] was in a position which seemed to me almost impregnable to any merely front attack even with fresh men. Indeed, to hold the ground we had appeared a difficult task. The shells of the enemy from the adjacent mountain were incessantly bursting along the summit of the peak." (17) The agony of Hazlett's men---dragging guns and ammunition up a rocky slope in searing heat--had proven worthwhile.

Military leadership is the art of convincing soldiers to do the unpleasant, uncomfortable and dangerous. Nineteenth-century artillerymen worked hard under normal conditions, but the challenges facing D Battery, 5th US were extreme. Hazlett's legacy is that he inspired his soldiers to rise to the occasion.

3 July 1863: First Lieutenant Alonzo H. Cushing, Battery A, 4th US Artillery. The morning of 3 July found First Lieutenant Alonzo Cushing's battery of six 3-inch ordnance rifles positioned behind a low stone wall on Cemetery Ridge--almost directly atop the primary objective of Confederate Major General George E. Pickett's assault. As the Confederate attack unfolded, Cushing's battery was at the center of one of the most ferocious artillery fights of the Civil War.

The battery's ordeal began before 0800 on 3 July when Confederate shells smashed into its position. A direct hit blew up one of the battery's limbers; secondary explosions touched off two others? Although Union counterbattery fire ended this first exchange, rebel artillery fell on the battery's position three more times over the next three hours. (19)

A two-hour pause ensued, during which Cushing's men readied additional ammunition and ate. Then, shortly after 1300, the Confederate artillery reopened with nearly 150 guns concentrating against Union positions on Cemetery Ridge. (20)

The effects of the Confederate bombardment on the exposed Union batteries were appalling. Colonel Norman Hall, a II Corps brigade commander who had survived ambush in the West Woods at Antietam and the attack on Marye's Heights at Fredericksburg, was nevertheless horrified as he watched the corps artillery brigade suffer under withering Confederate fire.

"The experience of the terrible grandeur of that rain of missiles and that chaos of strange and terror-spreading sounds, unexampled perhaps in history, must ever remain undescribed, but can never be forgotten by those who survived it. I cannot suffer this opportunity to pass without paying just tribute to the noble service of the officers and men of the batteries that were served within my sight. Never before during this war were so many batteries subjected to so terrible a test." (21)

Cushing's battery bled heavily under the bombardment. A shell smashed a wheel on the number 3 gun carriage, prompting the crew into near panic. Cushing, with pistol drawn to keep the gun's crew from fleeing in terror, directed the gun's repair under fire. Casualties began to mount as Confederate fire struck men as well as material. As Cushing's gunners continued to fall, the young lieutenant--himself wounded in the right shoulder and groin, vomiting from the pain--shuttled in borrowed infantrymen from the 71st Pennsylvania to keep his guns manned. (22)

As Confederate infantry moved to the assault, Cushing directed two guns forward to the stone wall that marked the forward edge of the Union battle position. Cushing, now the lone officer in the battery, stepped up to help crew one of the guns. As he fired the battery's last canister round into the charging gray line, a bullet severed his brain stem, killing him instantly. (23)

First Lieutenant Cushing's fate is a reminder that the artilleryman is first and foremost a warrior. Although artillery officers share many of the responsibilities of all walks of life and branches of military service--training, maintaining, administering and motivating--the combat arms soldier's profession is fundamentally different from any other. Technical prowess and hard work are insufficient. Today's artillerymen, like their predecessors, must be prepared to fight and die at their guns.

Conclusion. Technical and tactical proficiency, leadership and courage under fire--these qualities are as vital today as in 1863. When considering these commanders, it is important to remember that they were not perfect officers or supermen. Dilger, for example, misidentified his location on the battlefield (See endnote 4), and Hazlett expressed concern about having drawn such a difficult assignment. (24) Instead, they were talented but ordinary men, rising to meet the challenges of extraordinary times.

Their frailties do not diminish the value of their example. On the contrary, they make the experiences of Dilger, Hazlett and Cushing more real to today's artillerymen. As Redleg captains struggle to be the best battery commanders they can be, they should remember that on an old foundation--professionalism, strong leadership, and moral and physical courage--they can continue to build batteries that will meet the challenges of combat.

Endnotes:

(1.) L. Van Loan Naiswald, Grape and Canister: The Field Artillery of the Army of the Potomac, 1861-1865 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), 556.

(2.) Ibid., 152.

(3.) Harry W. Pfanz, Gettysburg: The First Day (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 168-169.

(4.) Ibid., 221.

(5.) Ibid., 249, 256.

(6.) Pfanz correctly points out that Dilger confused his location in the report, erroneously writing that he was posted between the Baltimore and Taneytown roads. Pfanz, 407 (note 31).

(7.) Naisawald, 355-356.

(8.) Ibid., 357.

(9.) Pfanz, 221,256.

(10.) The War of the Rebellion: The Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Vol. XXVII, No. 1, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1883), 754.

(11.) Ibid., 755.

(12.) Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987), 224.

(13.) It was hot enough during the fight at Little Round Top that COL William C. Oates, commanding one of the attacking Confederate regiments, was overcome and had to relinquish command. Official Records, Vol. XXVII, No. 2,393.

(14.) Official Records, Vol. XXVII, No. 1,659.

(15.) Eugene G. Taylor, Gouveneur K. Warren: The Life and Letters of an American Soldier (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1932), 129, quoted in Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day, 224.

(16.) Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day, 240.

(17.) Official Records, Vol. XXVII, No. 2,415.

(18.) Naisawald, 418.

(19.) Earl J. Hess, Pickett's Charge: The Last Attack at Gettysburg (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 116.

(20.) Ibid., 125. Official Records, Vol. XXVII, No. 2,351.

(21.) Official Records, Vol. XXVII, No. 1,437.

(22.) Hess, 142.

(23.) Naisawald, 430, 433. Hess, 143, 144.

(24.) Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day, 223.

Captain Brian C. Hayes, Army National Guard (ARNG), is the Commander of B Battery, 1st Battalion, 246th Field Artillery, located at Chatham, Virginia, as part of the 29th Infantry Division (Light). Prior to that he was a Fire Support Officer and Assistant Battalion S3 in the same battalion. Before transferring to Field Artillery, he was an active duty Armor officer in the 1st Armored Division, stationed at Fort Riley, Kansas. Captain Hayes is a graduate of Princeton University ROTC; Airborne School at Fort Benning, Georgia; and the Field Artillery Captains' Career Course at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. In his civilian profession, he is a Law Student at the College of William and Mary in Williamsburg, Virginia.