Theory of stand-off wars: debatable points.

An attempt to formulate and validate the problem associated with the elaboration of a theory of stand-off wars (1) has attracted sufficiently much attention in the military scientific circles in recent years. Its main ideas sparked off a media discussion (2) that had the aim of influencing the development of the domestic military theory and the national armed forces. As is evident from an analysis of those publications, not all provisions of the suggested theory meet the requirements of military science and are not by far indisputable in content, particularly where its methodology is concerned. Let us consider some points in this theory.

Slipchenko's discourse proceeds from the determining influence that "revolutions in military affairs" bring to bear on the character of wars. He singles out six generations of wars (see Table). But to my mind, a fuller and more accurate definition of a "revolution in military affairs" was provided by M.P. Trebin, who saw it as "the entire sum of radical changes in the means of armed warfare, methods of combat operations, strength organization, training and indoctrination." (3) In this context, it is precisely changes in the means of armed warfare that, in Trebin's opinion, have the determining influence on all other components of a "revolution in military affairs" and the character of wars as a whole. Notice that this approach is not anything new in military science: in many respects it echoes the Marxist-Leninist materialist view on the evolution of military affairs, a view that the older generation of military specialists knows well. A case in point is this conclusion by the prominent German historian and philosopher Frederick Engels: It is the invention of better weapons and a change in the live soldier material, not the "free play of wits" of the brilliant generals, that operated as a revolutionizing influence. (4)

But there is no escape from the conclusion that extending regularities in the development of warfare to regularities in the development of war as a complex sociopolitical phenomenon cannot be recognized as correct, at least not without substantial reservations. Otherwise we would be unable to come close to truth.

As one considers variants of the classification of stand-off wars that were suggested by the author of the appropriate theory, one cannot but notice a number of inaccuracies and contradictions these display. They largely determine the disputable, nature of conclusions that can be tested by examples from history.

One of the compared parameters are aims of war (main aims, as Slipchenko et al. define them). Introducing this criterion as one of the classifiers is, in my view, clearly incorrect from the point of view of military science. As of today, our military doctrine singles out military-political aims, and, possibly, it is they that should have been used. But, to my mind, it would be more reasonable and justified to divide these aims, because the political aim of a war and its military target are things of a totally different order.

If we follow the advice of the German military theorist Karl von Clausewitz, all political aims of wars that are known from the history of mankind can be put in two large groups. These are limited and unlimited aims. The limited aim of war is understood to mean a partial restriction of the enemy's sovereignty (regardless of whether the case in point is a clan, tribe or state). The unlimited aim of war is understood to mean complete political annihilation of the enemy. This division is the most justified one from the point of view of its influence on the character of warfare, its intensity and strain. In this context, it was more beneficial for the state, in all periods, to fight against those adversaries who for different reasons could not pursue the unlimited political aim of war.

The "first"-generation wars, according to Slipchenko's classification, chronologically cover the historical period of three and a half thousand years (starting from the Ancient World and till the 13th-14th centuries A.D.). During that period, the main aim of war was to destroy the enemy and seize his weapons and values (according to Slipchenko). The absurdity of this approach is obvious to anyone who has at least some knowledge of military history.

The political motives, or "a certain degree of reason in the form of peculiarly understood statehood," (5) as A.Ye. Snesarev called them, could be found already in primitive societies, at earliest stages in the history of mankind. As political aims of those wars one may name the capture of territory and women, defense of the inviolability of one's own territory, revenge for an insulted chief or violation of a religious rite, etc. The military target in this context was an organized military force capable of offering resistance to an invader. The total annihilation of the enemy was far from always the necessary condition. The acquaintance with military anthropology studies (6) will suffice to see that we are right.

The human society giving rise to states and statehood brought in its wake a clearer regulation of the military organization of states and clear formulation of political aims of wars in the first place. The example of how the four "world monarchies" (Assyrian-Babylonian, Persian, Macedonian and Roman) evolved and developed their statehood enables one to trace the wish to expand in their foreign policy activities, and a gradual strengthening and improvement of their political foundations in domestic life. In this context, their interstate wars display a wide spectrum of military goals, from the threat to use force to complete annihilation of the enemy military force and occasionally the entire male population. Testifying to the growth of precisely the political component is the fact that wars in that period lasted for many years, alternating with long spells of peace, the latter connected not only with the process of accumulation of forces during a war but also with peace treaties that secured, for a sufficiently long time, the maintenance of diplomatic and trade relations.

We can observe in that historical epoch, particularly in the Greek and Roman periods of ancient history, the "sparks of ennoblement" and mollification of some excessively crude forms of warfare. Plutarch, for one, wrote that the Spartans had deemed it unworthy of good heart or a noble and magnanimous nation (generation) to slay those who suffered a defeat, took to flight, or lost all hope of victory. Thucydides, one of the earliest philosophers, condemned the slaying of an unarmed enemy pleading for quarter. After him the same ideas were expressed by Diodorus Siculus, Cicero, Titus Livius, Tacitus and others. (7) Similar views characterized the ancient Indian military tradition as well. (8)

Notice that the destruction of an enemy economy was seen as an important military goal already in that early period. Some cases in point are numerous naval blockade operations mounted by Athens, Sparta, Carthage and particularly Rome. The efficiency of those measures was an important contribution to victory over the enemy, but the main thing was that it was understood by the generals and statesmen in the ancient times. The "second-", "third-" and "fourth-"generation wars (when firearms became the decisive war factor) focused on this matter to a no smaller extent. Suffice it to mention as an example the Russian naval operation held in 1721 in order to crush Sweden's economic potential in the course of the Northern War (1700-1721). (9)

The range of "main goals" is also considerable in the "third-" to "sixth-" generation wars, but their list itself is far from being complete, since the "fourth-"generation wars, for example, do aim at overthrowing the enemy's political system, whereas the "sixth-"generation wars don't. But it is precisely this goal (!) that the coalition forces pursued in their latest wars against Afghanistan and Iraq.

The choice of other than the most essential characteristic of war as the main classification criterion led to mistakes in other compared parameters of wars. Let us start from the scale of war. Slipchenko believes that the "first-"generation wars were characterized by the tactical scale, the "second-" and "third-"generation wars operational-strategic, the "fourth-" and "fifth-"generation wars strategic, and the "sixth-"generation wars again the operational-strategic scale. This conclusion arises from the list of the main forms of combat operations in the Table's "the main type of confrontation (on land, at sea, in the air)" column. Notice that the name of the "compared parameter" has been chosen incorrectly at the very least, because the notion "the type of military operations" is clearly defined and includes defense and offense, while the notion "the type of confrontation" in use here is nowhere present in the military science. (10) Considering that the supporters of the theory of stand-off wars identify combats as examples of naval actions for first-generation wars, battles for second- and third-generation wars, operations for fourth- and sixth-generation wars, and strikes for fifth-generation wars, it becomes clear that they don't see the difference between types and forms of military operations in use during this or that epoch.

Here one cannot but agree with the authors' position, because naval actions were in the form of both battles and operations as early as the Ancient World epoch. To avoid criticism from the skeptics, let me cite as an example Pompey-led Roman fleet operation to crush piracy in 67 B.C.

In the 1st century B.C., the pirates established a state of their own in Cilicia, Asia Minor, turning the town of Coracesium into the base of their fleet which at that time counted as many as 1,000 light and mobile ships. Apart from Cilicia, there were pirate bases in Crete, Cyprus, Lycia, Thrace, Mauritania and the Balearic Islands. For a number of generations, the pirate state was a considerable political force. Dominating the Inner (Mediterranean) Sea, the pirates robbed merchant ships with impunity and raided coastal cities, leading away freemen whom they sold to slavery. That made normal Inner Sea trade impossible. Rome's trade links with its provinces in Asia Minor, Africa and Spain, whence there came the main reserves of food and agricultural produce, were disrupted, something that affected food deliveries to the nation, particularly the big cities, reduced state revenues, and prepared the ground for grave economic and financial crises.

Decade-long (78-68 B.C.) repeated attempts to destroy piracy produced no result. And so, the Roman Senate appointed Pompey, in 67 B.C., to deal with the pirates. The Roman general and politician Gnaeus Pompeius (106-48 B.C.) was given dictatorial powers. A law was passed "whereby there was granted to him, not only the government of the seas as admiral, but, in direct words, sole and irresponsible sovereignty over all men. For the decree gave him absolute power and authority in all the seas within the Pillars of Hercules, and in the adjacent mainland for the space of four hundred furlongs from the sea. Now there were but few regions in the Roman empire out of that compass; and the greatest of the nations and most powerful of the kings were included in the limit. Moreover, by this decree he had a power of selecting fifteen lieutenants out of the senate, and of assigning to each his province in charge; then he might take likewise out of the treasury and out of the hands of the revenue-farmers what moneys he pleased; as also two hundred sail of ships, with a power to press and levy what soldiers and seamen he thought fit. Five hundred ships were manned for him, and an army raised of one hundred and twenty thousand foot and five thousand horse." (11)

Pompey's concept was to attack the pirates simultaneously in the western Inner Sea at the first stage in the operation, and to pursue consecutive war actions in the eastern Mediterranean at the second stage (in effect, the case in point was two consecutive operations). A plan was drawn up on the basis of his concept that divided the sea into 13 areas, with a legate-led squadron due to operate in each. Pompey's own squadron counted 60 best and fastest ships, and it was supposed to engage in cruising warfare in the Tyrrhenian Sea destroying pirate ships off the coast of Sardinia and Sicily. Thus Pompey's simultaneous and universal fleet actions gave the pirates no chance to move base to some other coastal areas. That brought stage one to an end. At stage two, Pompey's fleet was due to sail to Asia Minor and destroy the corsair fleet. The plan was to disembark the army and have it capture the city of Coracesium, the main base. After that the whole coast was to be cleansed of pirates, who had to be dislodged from their fortresses and populated localities. The entire operation was supposed to be completed within three months most favorable for navigation.

The operation proceeded in full conformity with the plan. The western Inner Sea was cleansed of pirates within 40 days. The second part of the operation lasted 49 days. Coracesium surrendered after fierce resistance; Cilicia's castles and fortresses were destroyed. Nearly 10,000 pirates were killed or taken prisoner, 120 fortresses were pulled down, and 400 ships were captured. All of that resulted in the pirate state ceasing to exist and Rome extending its control to Crete and Cilicia.

Thus it may be stated that the above example has all essential features of an operation as a form of military action: a totality of simultaneous and consecutive battles and engagements coordinated in terms of aim, objectives, location and time, battles that ran to a single concept and plan to accomplish strategic, operational-strategic, operational or operational-tactical tasks within a prescribed period of time. And one can cite sufficiently numerous examples of this sort both from the epoch of oar-powered fleet and the epoch of sail-powered fleet.

The practical military activities were divided into strategy and tactics as early as the epoch of the Ancient World, as M.P. Trebin justly notes. (12) In this context, not only engagement or battle but also strategic maneuver was of importance for achieving the war goals. To those interested in the matter I would recommend the book by B.H. Liddel Hart. (13)

When speaking about military operations in the air, V.I. Slipchenko and his followers mention air attacks on troops and air battles only in the period of "fourth-"generation wars. This is not an exhaustive list either, because such a form of military action as operation was used on a sufficiently wide scale in those years too. (14) Thus, this warrants the conclusion that yet another line in the classification table is wrong.

Five out of six lines in the classification table are, mildly speaking, debatable. This enables one to infer that the author's reasoning proceeded from wrong premises, that is, that he, while drawing correct conclusions from his analysis of latter-year wars, did a poor job reproducing history. I will try to show why.

As mentioned earlier, it was always beneficial for the state to wage wars against enemies incapable of pursuing unlimited political aims. In this event, possible losses in the course of a military defeat were minimized, because even in the worst-case scenario the enemy was unable to insist on excessive terms when peace was negotiated. Aside from that, a defeat in a war of this kind did not threaten the former side's statehood and existing political system.

The English were the first to realize as much and raised it to the level of state policy. They justly believed that as long as they dominated the seas there was no threat facing England proper. The English were also the first to ground this state in theory, amending the theory of Karl von Clausewitz. It was Sir Julian Stafford Corbett who introduced the notion "limited object." He wrote that one of the two conditions was needed to fully meet the description: either it must be not only limited in size but also be effectively of limited political importance; or it must be so located as to be capable of being strategically isolated or of being led to a practical isolation by strategic operations ... To make an object really limited, we should have not only the strength to effect the isolation but also the strength to secure the defense of our own country by putting up obstacles to an unlimited counterstrike. (15)

This definition formulates a political approach which determined, over millennia of human history, the belligerents' wish to create a situation where damage could be caused to the enemy while making oneself safe against his impacts. The same wish may be easily discovered in the development of armed warfare proper, something that brought in its wake, during the entire history of mankind, the development of combat weapons. Let me emphasize it once again: it is not the development of weapons that led to the wish to make oneself safe and cause maximum damage to the enemy, but the objective human desire to save one's own life did form, during the whole of history, the main trend in the development of weapons and military equipment, to wit, to increase the range within which the enemy could be effectively engaged.

The idea of unpunished and unlimited war was further developed as soon as another sphere of warfare, the air, was mastered, and the two men who did so in their works were Giulio Douhet and William Mitchell. (16) In their view, a country possessing air supremacy was able, while waging military operations, to secure itself against defeat and major losses. To achieve a rapid and final victory in a war, it was necessary and sufficient to wipe out the enemy's economic potential with the help of airpower. In accordance with the Douhet-Mitchell theory, destroying the enemy economic might and subverting the enemy popular morale by air bombardment emerged as the main aim of warfare, for which reason warfare took on a totally new character. Coming into being in the 1920s-1930s, this theory had much influence on the development of military art, and the correctness of its main postulates was confirmed by the experience of the biggest war in the history of mankind. Moreover, the success of strategic military operations pursued by the method described depended on whether or not it was possible to realize the Corbett principle that prescribed the object's isolation. In fact, the allied strategic bombing of Germany that issued from the British territory became possible after obstacles to an unlimited counterstrike had been put up, which secured that country's defense. However, where the principle failed to be translated into practice, the outcome of war was decided by warfare in the land theater of operations (TO).

Thus, we can note that military theorists have long realized the advantages of an unlimited war against an enemy deprived of such an opportunity. More than that, military theory has produced recommendations that make it possible to attain this state of affairs ("to isolate the object"), securing oneself against possible enemy impact capable of influencing the outcome of warfare. Long before the theory of stand-off wars we are now considering appeared there was introduced the notion of "supremacy"--on the seas or in the air--meant to be understood as favorable conditions in the TO or its separate area (zone) for successful performance of combat missions by the friendly forces without considerable enemy counteraction. (17) Supremacy led to a TO situation where the enemy was stripped of a chance to offer serious counteraction on the seas and in the air, and, consequently, was unable to adequately respond to strikes.

If we consider the latest wars from this point of view, we will see that both in Yugoslavia and Iraq the U.S. attained political isolation of the enemy even before the active phase in the operation, doing that with the help of diplomatic, economic, information and other kinds of pressure. After that, enjoying total supremacy on the seas, it imposed its supremacy in the air and thus achieved complete isolation of the object. As we can see, there is nothing new in this strategy, and it is no confirmation of the correctness of the theory of stand-off wars. Even if they didn't possess precision weapons, the coalition forces, though suffering somewhat greater losses, would anyway have achieved the desired military effect.

But this kind of war is possible only against countries whose military, technological and resource potential is incommensurate with that of the aggressor. Today, as I see it, the main indicator in the technological area is success in space exploration enabling the advanced countries to regard outer space as a theater of operations. The fact that the U.S. possessed total outer space supremacy in the latest wars even before the military phase secured not only information supremacy over the enemy but also favorable conditions for gaining supremacy in other spheres of warfare--in the air, on the seas, and on land. As is obvious, the algorithm of armed warfare will be the same in future wars. It means that it will be about consistent imposition of supremacy in outer space, in the air, on the seas, and finally on the land.* Before unleashing a war, the aggressor will make efforts to "isolate the object" through diplomatic, economic, information and other action. Notice that the specifics of the latest wars were determined not so much by the use of precision weapons as by the chance to achieve the total political isolation of a target of aggression, as deriving from the destruction of the bipolar world system.

But even upon achieving success in armed warfare, an aggressor is far from always able to win the war. At this point one ought to dwell on V.I. Slipchenko's position, who says this about victory in a war: "I had to introduce such notion as 'the formula of victory in a war.' As is evident from an analysis of a very big number of conflicts, it takes achieving solely three goals to win a war: first, to rout the enemy's armed forces, as a rule, in his own territory; second, to destroy the enemy's economic potential; third, to topple or to replace the enemy's political system. If all the three components are achieved simultaneously, the victory is regarded as total. But if success fails to be achieved in one of the three areas (as was the case in the Gulf war: Hussein remained in power), the victory cannot be total." (18)

To my mind, this point is debatable, and here is why. The toppling or replacement of the political system is a political goal in an unlimited war that leads to the political annihilation of the enemy. This goal is far from always pursued at an early stage in a war--at least, one can find in history a lot of wars where this goal was not present. A realized military aim is the means for achieving a war's political goal. Destroying the economic potential--a military aim--is not always the goal of military operations either, even in a war that pursues an unlimited political goal, particularly where it is intended to use the industries and resources of a defeated party. Incidentally, the Americans were very careful not to harm oil production installations during the military operations in Iraq.

The prominent German military theorist and historian Karl von Clausewitz believed that in a war pursuing an unlimited goal, that of destroying the enemy politically, it was necessary to strip him of an opportunity to resist. To achieve this goal, "the enemy's armed forces must be routed, i.e., brought to a state where they can no longer continue the fight. His territory must be vanquished, because it is capable of becoming the source of new armed forces. But even upon achieving both (italics mine.--Ye.P.), it cannot be held that the war (hostile tensions and actions by hostile forces) has come to an end as long as the enemy's will is not broken, i.e., his government and allies have not been forced to sign peace or his people has not been brought to submission." (19) In fact, a real victory is only the one where the enemies themselves concede defeat, as the Romans used to say. Where bringing the people to submission is involved, however, it often is the most difficult and unachievable task for an aggressor even after the political regime is replaced. But it is more of a political than military matter.

In conclusion, one cannot but note that there are more debatable questions than well-argued answers in the theory of stand-off wars that is still in process of being developed. It is simply impossible to discuss them all in one short article. But one may be certain about one thing: the point of view of E.G. Shevelyov, (20) who believes V.I. Slipchenko to be equal to Karl von Clausewitz, is a certain exaggeration.

NOTES:

1. V.I. Slipchenko, Beskontaktnye voiny, Gran-press Publishers, Moscow, 2001; Voiny shestogo pokoleniya. Oruzhiye i voyennoye iskusstvo budushchego, Veche Publishers, Moscow, 2002.

2. I.M. Kapitanets, Voina na more. Aktualnye problemy razvitiya voyenno-morskoy nauki, Vagrius Publishers, Moscow, 2001; idem, Flot v voinakh shestogo pokoleniya. Vaglyady na kontseptualnye osnovy razvitiya i primeneniya flota Rosii, Veche Publishers, Moscow, 2003; "Mirovye voiny XXI veka: formirovaniye i razvitiye strategicheskikh chert," Voennaia mysl', No.12, 2004; M.P. Trebin, Voiny XXI veka, AST, Harvest, Moscow, Minsk, 2005; M.S. Shutenko, "Tankovye i mekhanizirovannye voiska v beskontaktnykh voinakh shestogo pokoleniya" [www.nationalsecurity.ru/library/00024/00024tanks2.htm], and others.

3. M.P. Trebin, op. cit., p. 54.

4. V. Sukhov, Kratkiy ocherk istorii voyennogo iskusstva, State Publishers, Moscow, Leningrad, 1929, p. 7.

5. A.Ye. Snesarev, Filosofiya voiny, Finansovyi kontrol Publishers, Moscow, 2003, p. 116.

6. V.A. Shnirelman, Voina i mir v traditsionnykh obshchestvakh (po materialam zapadnykh issledovaniy), INION Publishers, Moscow, 1992; A.I. Pershits, Yu.N. Semyonov, V.A Shnirelman, Voina i mir v rannei istorii chelovechestva, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1994.

7. A.Ye. Snesarev, op. cit., p. 116.

8. Ye.A. Razin, Istoriya voennogo iskusstva XXXI v. do n.e.--VI v.n.e., Poligon Publishers, St. Petersburg-Moscow, 1999, p. 93.

9. Voenno-morskoy entsiklopedicheskiy slovar, 2nd revised edition, Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 2003, p. 741.

10. Voennaya Entsiklopediya, Vol. 2, Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1994, pp. 130-134.

11. [http://classics.mit.edu//Plutarch/pompey.html].

12. M.P. Trebin, op. cit., p. 77.

13. B. Liddel Hart, Strategiya nepryamykh deistviy, TERRA FANTASTIKA, Moscow, 2003.

14. Istoriya voyennoy strategii Rossii, ed. By V.A. Zolotaryov, Kulichkovo pole Publishers, Poligrafresursy Publishers, Moscow, 2000, p. 347.

15. J. Corbett, Nekotorye printsipy morskoi strategiyi, Moscow, 1932, pp. 52-53.

16. G. Douhe, Gospodstvgo v vozdukhe, Moscow, 1935; William Mitchell, Winger Defence, New York, 1925.

17. Ye.F. Podsoblyaev, "O traktovkakh soderzhaniya ponyatiya 'gospodstvo na more,'" Voennaia mysl', 2005, No.7, pp. 21-30.

18. V.I. Slipchenko, Beskontaktnye voiny.

19. K. Clausewitz, O voine, Vol. 1, Gosvoenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1937, p. 59.

20. E.G. Shevelyov, "Voyennyi teoretik, ravnyi Klausewitzu" [http://www.whoiswho.ru/russian/Cumom/42001/slipchenko.htm].

Capt. 1st Rank Ye.F. PODSOBLYAEV

Candidate of Historical Sciences

* Certain authors believe that the winning of information supremacy should also be included in this category. To my mind, however, this approach is somewhat unjustified. While bringing an exceptional influence to bear on the outcome of military operations, the information sphere is not nevertheless an area of warfare proper.

Classification of Wars according to V.I. Slipchenko

               First-             Second-          Third-
Compared       Generation         Generation       Generation
Parameter      War                War              War

Main type      Edged              Smoothbore       Rifled-bore multi-
of weapons     weapons            firearms         shot weapons with
                                                   higher rate of fire,
                                                   greater precision
                                                   and range
Main type of   Hand-to-           Front-wise       Trench wars by
confrontation  hand fighting      fire con-        combined-arms
on land                           frontation       combined units
                                                   and large strategic
                                                   formations
Main type of   Boarding en-       Naval battles    Naval battles
confrontation  gagements by       by sail-powered  by steam-powered
at sea         galley fleets in   fleets in        iron-clad ships of
               coastal zones      littoral seas    different classes
Main type of
confrontation
in the air
Scale of war   Tactical           Operational-     Operational-
                                  tactical         strategic
Main goal      To destroy         To destroy       The rout of the
of war         the enemy, to      the enemy,       enemy's armed forces;
               capture his        to capture       destruction of his
               weapons and        his territory    economy, and capture
               values             and values       of his territory

Compared       Fourth-            Fifth            Sixth-
Parameter      Generation         Generation       Generation
               War                War              War

Main ty pe     Automatic and      Nuclear missile  Precision weapons,
of weapons     rocket weapons,    weapons          weapons based on new
               mechanized                          physical principles,
               aircraft; troops,                   information weapons,
               tanks, aircraft                     forces and assets of
               carriers,                           electronic warfare
               submarines
Main type      Front-scale        Nuclear strike   Joint air-naval and
of weapons     operations                          ground operations
Main type of   Naval operations   Nuclear strike   Join air-ground and
confrontation                                      naval operations,
on land                                            airspace and naval
                                                   operations
Main type of   Air strikes        Nuclear strike   Airspace operation
confrontation  against ground                      using conventional
at sea         forces, air                         weapons
               battles
Main type of                                       Airspace operation
confrontation                                      using conventional
in the air                                         weapons
Scale of war   Strategic          Strategic,       Operational-strategic
                                  global,
                                  threatened
                                  destruction of
                                  civilizations
                                  or separate
                                  continents
Main goal      The rout of the    No aims          Disruption of the
of war         enemy's armed      achieved--the    economy, governance
               forces,            side that was    system, and state
               destruction of     the first to     activities;
               his economic       use unclear      destruction of
               potential, and     weapons would    military
               overthrow of his   perish somewhat  installations
               political system   later than
               its opponent       its opponent