Theoretical issues in the relationship between psychology and religion: some comments on Reber, Nelson, Slife and Whoolery, and Richardson.

The article briefly responds to and comments on the four major articles by Reber, Nelson, Slife and Whoolery, and Richardson in this special issue of the Journal of Psychology and Theology. While a substantial case has been made for how secularized and reductionistic psychology is, and how psychology is still greatly influenced by logical positivism and scientism, there is a danger of overstating this case and thus throwing out the baby with thebathwater. A healthy respect for good science in psychology is still valid and possible without succumbing to scientism and logical positivism. Ultimately we need to depend on the Holy Spirit, and the community of the church and its historic traditions, to more fully appropriate truth, including biblical psychospiritual truth.

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This special issue of the Journal of Psychology and Theology focuses on a crucial topic: theoretical issues in the relationship between psychology and religion. While significant progress has been made in recent years in the integration of religion or spirituality and psychotherapy in the mental health field (e.g. see more recently, Richards, 2006; Richards and Bergin, 2000, 2004, 2005; Sperry & Shafranske, 2005; see also Hodge, 2004; Tan, 1996, 2001b, 2003b; Tan & Johnson, 2005), more attention needs to be given to some basic theoretical issues in the relationship between psychology and religion. Miller and Delaney (2005) have recently done this in providing specifically Judeo-Christian perspectives on psychology in the areas of human nature, motivation, and change. The four major articles in this special issue of JPT are therefore timely and significant in advancing the dialogue on these crucial theoretical issues.

I am grateful to be invited to respond to, and comment on these articles. I will do so commenting on one article at a time, in the following order: (1) Reber on the problems of a secularized psychology; (2) Nelson on missed opportunities in dialogue between psychology and religion from a historical perspective; (3) Slife and Whoolery on how psychology's theories and methods are not theologically neutral and therefore are actually biased against it's main theistic consumers; and finally (4) Richardson on some hermeneutic reflections on psychology and religion.

1. Reber: "Secular psychology: What's the problem?"

Reber describes the main problems that he sees as stemming from the failure of secular psychologists to acknowledge and appreciate the religious experiences of the people they study, as well as the ethical resources of religion in general. He specifically discusses how the efforts of secular psychologists to disentangle psychology from religion are actually inconsistent with what early secularists intended in their recognition of the significant and essential role of religion in academia and the domain of interdisciplinary ideas. This is an important and valid point: secularized psychology today has departed from original secularism! If modern secularized psychology is to be truly secular in the original meaning of secularism historically speaking, then there would be more critical self-reflection and even an appropriate level of suspicion of secularism itself!

Reber than argues that whenever secular psychologists have attempted to exclude religion in their research they have ended up with a more limited capacity to describe and understand the full spectrum of human experience. Finally, he asserts that secular psychologists' disregard of the ethical and spiritual resources of religion actually leads to a number of problems that prevent them from a better recognition and evaluation of the moral assumptions and implications of their theories, research, and therapy.

Reber therefore concludes that religion must not be relegated to second-class status or an inferior discipline if a true integration of psychology and religion is to be achieved. Both disciplines need to engage in a fair and genuine dialogue about the worldviews, values, and ethics that are mutually best for the study of the full range of human experience.

Overall, Reber makes his case well, with good historical evidence and arguments. However, more specifically, in his strong criticism of prayer as a secular psychotherapeutic technique, he states that it would have to be substantially different from religious prayer because it is tied to an anti-religious worldview or belief system. He concludes that without including God, secular psychologists who study religion end up not really studying religion as experienced by the majority of religious people. While Reber's criticism here may be true in many situations, I believe that he has overstated his case. Religious phenomena such as prayer in the psychotherapeutic context (e.g., see Tan, 1996; Tan & Johnson, 2005) or as a form of religious coping (e.g., see Pargament, 1997; also see Paloutzian & Park, 2005; Spilka, Hood, Hunsberger & Gorsuch, 2003) have been studied in ways that do not reduce them to purely psychological, psychosocial, or even biological phenomena (see Pargament, 2002). Prayer as a coping mechanism or psychotherapeutic intervention can be very much a religious experience as in a religious context!

2. Nelson: "Missed opportunities in dialogue between psychology and religion"

Nelson provides a succinct but good overview of the historical development of attitudes toward science and religion. He notes that studies of the natural world, human behavior and theology were all essential parts of an integrated body of knowledge in the Middle Ages. However, a significant divide has occurred between science and religion in modern times up to the present. He traces the historical reasons for such an unfortunate split between science and religion, focusing especially on the development of positivism in Western views of epistemology and the philosophy of science.

Positivism and the associated naturalism that followed have resulted in more dogmatic formulations of science that emphasize methodologies that are quantitative. Earlier views of science in the early modern period were more flexible according to Nelson. He asserts that the recent dogmatic view of science that rigidly adheres to reductionistic naturalism and quantitative methodologies has led to reduced dialogue with religion, and even attempts to replace religion with science.

Nelson also notes that Freud and early psychologists tried hard to establish psychology as a "real" science and therefore enthusiastically accepted positivism while rejecting other alternatives. However, it is clear today that positivism is philosophically problematic and even untenable, but modern psychology is still dominated by such a positivist approach. This domination of positivism in psychology has hindered dialogue between science and religion, and also impeded overall progress in psychology, according to Nelson. He therefore proposes a return to a more comprehensive and modest conception of science (to replace the rigid scientism that has developed) that can include a number of other possible approaches to theory and research, emphasizing hermeneutic options as particularly appropriate and potentially helpful to psychology as a discipline. Nelson believes that in order to have a more complete knowledge of the world, both explanation and understanding are needed, and it is his conviction that a hermeneutic approach to the world best produces understanding, a view that has been elaborated by Richardson in this special issue of JPT. From a historical perspective, Nelson asserts that a return to the original Baconian view of science that is open to broad inquiry and flexible methodology would lead to more significant advances than the current dogmatic and narrow scientism view.

Nelson has provided a helpful and succinct historical perspective and analysis of how psychology has ended up being such a reductionistic, positivist science leading to scientism or the worship of such a narrow and dogmatic science. I agree with Nelson that a return to an earlier Baconian view of science as being more open and flexible in methodology would benefit psychology and the integration of science and religion (also see Jones, 1994; Tan, 2001b). Hermeneutic approaches, and other narrative and more qualitative options for investigating truth or knowledge of the world need to be accepted alongside the quantitative methodologies of today's still overall positivist science that is dominating psychology. However, this does not mean that good science that uses quantitative methods has to be discarded or negated. It can be appreciated, with its philosophical and methodological limitations freely acknowledged, and a fair openness to the other approaches already mentioned that are less quantitative or even non-quantitative.

3. Slife and Whoolery: "Are psychology's main theories and methods biased against its main consumers?"

Slife and Whoolery take the critique of reductionistic, positivist psychology up a few notches! As Slife has previously done in his widely published critiques of modern scientific psychology (which are cited in this article), he and Whoolery strongly dispel the common myth that views therapeutic and experimental methods as theologically, if not philosophically, neutral to the subject matter they are dealing with. They critique the myth of neutrality in therapeutic methods (which are often founded or based on naturalistic assumptions that conflict or even contradict theism), and the myth of neutrality in research methods (even experimental, quasi-experimental and correlational methods are not as objective as they seem because there are philosophies of science that underlie their use, such as ontological naturalism). Their insightful critique of the myth of neutrality in research methods has also recently been raised by others in the controversy over empirically supported psychotherapies and the problems related to the assumptions, findings and reporting in controlled clinical trials (Westen, Novotny, & Thompson-Brenner, 2004; also see Tan, 2001a, 2002, 2003b). Furthermore an American Psychological Association 2005 Presidential Task Force on Evidence-Based Practice has recently adopted a more comprehensive definition of evidence-based practice as the integration of best research evidence with clinical expertise and client values (see APA Presidential Task Force on Evidence-Based Practice, 2006).

Slife and Whoolery specifically critique the naturalistic assumptions of objectivism, materialism, and reductionism. While they provide much food for thought and deeper reflection on the serious problems with such a naturalistic approach to science, they sometimes overstate their case. For example, in considering the implications of objectivism in particular, they assert that even researchers who are theistic (or believe in God) end up working to eliminate their own religious values in using the reductionistic methodologies of science so-called. They claim that such religious values are not allowed to guide theistic researchers in deciding what methodological design is best for them to use, how best to define and operationalize the constructs of the design, and even how to interpret or explain their data or results. These researchers supposedly are not permitted to use what they believe is the truth in conducting their research studies. Instead, they are forced to use the logic of these naturalistic and reductionistic methods, which requires the elimination of any religious assumptions and values the researchers may have. I find this a strong overstatement and hence not a fully accurate critique of modern psychological science. There is a tendency to fall into such extreme logical positivism and reductionism but not all psychological theory or research today is that extreme. In fact, Brown, Murphy, and Malony (1998) have described a Christian approach called non-reductive physicalism that tries to avoid the problems of reductionism in a physicalistic, embodied view of the soul, although not all scholars will agree with such a view.

Some psychologists of religion for example have allowed their religious ideas and values to inform them in their research (e.g., see Paloutzian & Park, 2005; Richards, 2006; Spilka, et al, 2003), although there are others who are more like the logical positivists described by Slife and Whoolery. Besides, Jones (1994) has already cogently argued that such an elimination of values, religious or otherwise, cannot be fully achieved, a point footnoted by Slife and Whoolery. Methods of research in modern psychology today, especially in the area of the psychology of religion, are not all narrowly positivist and reductionistic. There is an openness to investigating religious phenomena using more flexible methodology and greater openness of conceptualization, including ideas of religion and theism. There is a danger here of throwing out the baby (good science) with the bathwater (scientism or the worship of reductionistic, positivist science).

Slife and Whoolery therefore end up emphasizing the centrality of the activity of God, even in research, and hence proposing a seriously theistic inquiry or method of research. They describe four major characteristics of a fully theistic approach to inquiry that would make it distinct from the naturalistic philosophies underlying modern scientific methods. First, a theistic perspective does not accept the naturalistic convention that method must be rule-following. Instead, it would allow, at times, questioning and even replacing core method rules or assumptions rather than rigidly or slavishly following such rules. A fully theistic approach will therefore be more phenomena-driven rather than method-driven. Second, fully theistic researchers will maximize the possibility of rupturing or challenging their assumptions in their research studies in order to avoid simply confirming their own biases. They need to be explicitly aware of their most cherished assumptions or biases, and also of alternative assumptions that are viable. Slife and Whoolery therefore emphasize the need for true humility in theistic science. Third, a fully theistic approach means that theistic researchers need to engage in rather than detach or disengage from the phenomenon they are investigating. Such engagement or relational connection and intimacy with what we care about should be based on agape love. Finally, a fourth characteristic of a truly theistic approach is a valuing of unpredictability and hence a revision of the traditional reliance on predictability in naturalistic science. Theistic researchers need to value the unpredictability of the ruptures and violations of their hypotheses or assumptions and expectations. This is what will more often lead to paradigm shifts as Kuhn (1970) has observed, and to really significant contributions to science ultimately (Feyerabend, 1975).

Slife and Whoolery have provided a strong critique of naturalistic science based on logical positivism, and argued that since theists or people who believe in God are the main consumers of psychological information, the assumptions and biases of the major theories and methods of mainstream psychology today actually conflict with the assumptions and biases of their main consumers who are theists. Their emphasis on the need to make these underlying assumptions and biases explicit is a valid and good one. Their proposal for a theistic approach to inquiry and research is enlightening and helpful. But they tend to overstate their case at times, and throw out the baby with the bathwater.

4.Richardson: "Psychology and religion: Hermeneutic reflections"

In this final article, Richardson provides a hermeneutic alternative (ontological hermeneutics) to the naturalistic and reductionistic approach that has dominated scientific psychology until today characterized by scientism, relativism, and dogmatism. In reviewing relevant literature on hermeneutics which became a distinct procedure in the seventeenth and eighteenth century for the interpretation of the bible and classic texts, Richardson focuses on the work of Friedrich Schliermacher (1768-1834) on the "hermeneutic circle", Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) on a general theory of interpretation for the human sciences, and more recently Charles Taylor on sources of the self and other related topics.

Richardson contends that hermeneutic ontology provides an alternative view of the human realm that is more plausible than conventional naturalism, and obviously more receptive to the moral ideals and spiritual realities explicated by the great religions of the world. He advocates a more basic, practical, and moral kind of understanding constructed together by people everywhere as they try to interpret the meaning of events, texts, works of art, social reality and the behaviors of others in order to relate to them following the narratives of their own lives. Yet, Richardson concedes that there is still a place for scientific knowing that includes a more instrumental approach toward the world, hence not throwing out the baby with the bathwater! Such a hermeneutical approach is essentially dialogical, and requires courage and humility to pursue it well and authentically.

Richardson critiques integrationist thinking with its dangers of domination of one partner (e.g., religion) by the other (e.g., science). However, he also fairly points out that integrationist thinking is often a sincere effort at combining psychological methods of inquiry with religious faith or vision. Integrationist theorists use psychological methods as a critical or objective approach that can help in negating false claims, exposing erroneous biases, and identifying inauthentic motives in an appropriate way. He calls these worthy aims. Such integrationist thinkers also use religious meaning to meet genuine needs and longings in a modern context that is often shallow and lacking in substance and meaning. It seems therefore that the integrationist approach pulls together the best of both worlds! Richardson quickly cautions however, that it is not that simple! The danger is that mutual estrangement or surreptitious domination can result in attempts to integrate science and religion. He therefore suggests that dialogue and mutual influence as outlined by ontological hermeneutics are essential to avoid such danger.

He concludes that hermeneutics provides a pathway of understanding, composed of life-stories that are interconnected. This pathway is not totally under one's control, and includes many surprises and at times even humbling, unwanted insights. He is aware that a hermeneutic ontology's emphasis on human uncertainty and limitations may make some religious people uncomfortable because they may perceive this to be undermining religious faith. However, he believes that a deeper appreciation of human limitations and uncertainty with appropriate humility as created human beings will help us to depend more on Divine mercy than our own artifacts. What is crucial according to Richardson, is therefore the conviction that God is a God of truth.

While Richardson makes some good arguments for an ontological hermeneutic approach to the integration of psychology and religion, and he does not throw out the baby (good science) with the bathwater (scientism and logical positivism), he does not go far enough when he states that all we require is the conviction that God is a God of truth. From a more biblical, Christian perspective, the need to have personal faith in Jesus Christ, and to depend on the power and presence or guidance of the Holy Spirit to more fully understand and appropriate truth, including psychotheological or biblical psychospiritual truth, cannot be overemphasized (see Tan, 2001b). The deepest hermeneutic then is the appropriate interpretation of biblical truth, guided by the Holy Spirit who inspired the writing of the Scriptures in the first place. There is also the need for corporate guidance in the community of the church, including a basic knowledge of church history and tradition over many centuries.

Concluding Comments

The four major articles by Reber, Nelson, Slife and Whoolery, and Richardson in this special issue of JPT have made a substantial case for how secularized and reductionistic psychology is, being still greatly influenced by logical positivism and scientism. However, there is a danger of overstating this case and thus throwing out the baby with the bathwater. A healthy respect for good science in psychology is still valid and possible without succumbing to scientism and logical positivism. Ultimately, we need to depend on the Holy Spirit and the community of the church and its historic traditions to more fully appropriate truth, including biblical psychospiritual truth.

REFERENCES

APA Presidential Task Force on Evidence-Based Practice (2006). Evidence-based practice in psychology. American Psychologist, 61, 271-285.

Brown, W., Murphy, N., & Malony, H. N. (Eds.) (1998). Whatever happened to the Soul? Scientific and theological portraits of human nature. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress.

Feyerabend, P. (1975). Against method. London: Verso.

Hodge, D. R. (2004). Spirituality and people with mental illness: Developing spiritual competency in assessment and intervention. Families in Society: The Journal of Contempory Social Services, 85, 36-44.

Jones, S. L. (1994). A constructive relationship for religion with the science and profession of psychology: Perhaps the boldest model yet. American Psychologist, 49, 184-199.

Kuhn, T. S. (1970). The structure of scientific revolution (2nd ed.). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Paloutzian, R.F., & Park, C. L. (Ed.) (2005). Handbook of the psychology of religion and spirituality. New York: Guilford Press.

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AUTHOR

TAN, SIANG-YANG. Address: Graduate School of Psychology, Fuller Theological Seminary, 180 N. Oakland Avenue, Pasadena, CA 91101. Title: Professor of Psychology. Degrees: BA, PhD., McGill University. Specializations: Cognitive-behavior therapy; religious psychotherapy; intrapersonal integration and spirituality; lay counseling; pain; epilepsy; and cross-cultural counseling, especially with Asian Americans.

SIANG-YANG TAN

Graduate School of Psychology

Fuller Theological Seminary

Requests for reprints should be sent to: Siang-Yang Tan, Ph.D., Graduate School of Psychology, Fuller Theological Seminary, 180 N. Oakland Avenue, Pasadena, CA 91101. Email: [e-mail]