The war against IED's.

I read "Defense Stifles Innovation Despite Urgent War Needs" (July 2006) with a great deal of interest, especially as it references the IED situation. Mark Johnson points out that no major contractor has set up a separate entity to do the things the military needs in terms of new equipment. Making a humvee into a 7-ton armored vehicle may be one solution, but that is 'safety from' rather than 'prevention of' the threat. I agree that many companies are geared up to chase only big-ticket items, and their overhead may even mandate it. IED training devices, to use one example, are not high ticket. But for us, it is an important solution that we take personally and it is also good business and opportunity.

Our success is largely based on the growing recognition of and demand for training more of our military on IED defeat tactics as they apply to the 'grunt' level. While companies are developing jamming and other technologies, the 'bad guys' are just as quickly adapting and adjusting as well. Bottom line is that the people who deal with the IED problem are the 'boots on the ground'.

So, I just want you to know that there are companies out there that do concentrate on the 'small ticket solutions'.

Tom Mills

AMTI 

Virginia Beach, VA

In reference to your article "Air-Ground Coordination in the Battlefield Found Lacking" (June 2006), the real problem is not simply a lack of trained ground-tactical air controllers.

Furthermore, since the departure of U.S. forces from Vietnam, a proven, effective, survivable "covert airborne surveillance platform" was shelved by the Defense Department in the reactionary assumption that a forward air-controller aircraft could not survive in the only war that the United States would be in--the high-tech battlefield with the Soviet Union.

Since then, we have almost only been involved in low-tech counterinsurgency wars. Conflicts being fought against the very same weapons used against us in Vietnam: AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenades, mines, roadside bombs and occasional shoulder-fired anti-aircraft weapons.

The benefits of airborne tactical air controllers are numerous. Overhead low altitude covert surveillance provides additional, incredible advantages. Instead, our doctrine insists on employing almost countless unmanned air vehicles that are attempting to be deployed to satisfy the overhead surveillance role but instead operate with very real limitations.

I assure you that the optimum five-minute capability can be an eternity to troops involved in a firefight. Nothing can beat a constantly available manned forward air controller, able to support unit operations and direct a response, or more probably, enable detection of an ambush before it happened.

While not addressed in your article, these manned covert surveillance aircraft silently discovered and observed the emplacing of improvised explosive devices--a task seldom successfully accomplished in this current conflict.

Richard A.Osborne

AeroSurv LLC