The unintended consequences of crisis public diplomacy: American public diplomacy in the Arab world.

With the end of major military action in Iraq, U.S. public diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim world has entered a new, more challenging phase. In the post-September 11 phase of U.S. public diplomacy, America was the undeniable victim of a terrorist attack. That image fit with the underlying message of America's war on terrorism, namely, "join us in fighting evil aggression against innocent civilians." Even still, America's public diplomacy initiative failed. Now, with the U.S.-led military action in Iraq, America is no longer perceived as the victim but rather as the aggressor. If selling Washington's message was tough before, it just got infinitely harder. Before embarking on a new diplomacy phase, it is critical to understand what went wrong in the first.

The first phase of the current American public diplomacy was heralded in with great fanfare almost immediately after September 11. The terrorist attack on America was a wake-up call for many in Washington about the importance of public diplomacy. As Congressman Henry Hyde noted, "the perceptions of foreign publics have domestic consequences." President Bush echoed the sense of urgency when he said: "We have to do a better job of telling our story."

Within days of the 9/11 attack, Secretary of State Colin Powell suddenly answered a longstanding invitation to appear on Al-Jazeera, the Arab satellite news channel. In less than a month, on October 2, veteran advertising executive Charlotte Beers was sworn in as the new undersecretary of state for public affairs and public diplomacy. In November, the House held its first hearings on public diplomacy. According to Beers and the other experts who testified, the problem was that the world did not know or understand America. Thus, the first priority of U.S. public diplomacy was to inform the world about U.S. policies and values.

Efforts focused on the Arab and Muslim world. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice followed Secretary Powell's lead and also agreed to interviews on Al-Jazeera. The State Department compiled evidence linking Al Qaeda and the 9/11 attack into a brochure, "The Network of Terrorism." A new website and a series of ads about Muslim life were created to emphasize the "shared values" between America and Muslims. New Arabic, Farsi, Dari, and Pashto-language radio stations were launched, and plans were developed for an Arabic-language television network.

The U.S. Congress and administration similarly intensified their efforts. Congress passed the new "Freedom Promotion Act of 2002," which injected $497 million annually into the budget of public diplomacy. First the Pentagon, then the White House, established special offices to help reach public diplomacy goals.

With such a concerted effort at the highest levels aimed at winning the hearts and minds of Arabs, Washington officials expected increased support in the Arab and Muslim world. That didn't happen. Despite more than a year of intensive public diplomacy aimed specifically at the Muslim and Arab world, study after study from November 2001 to December 2002 showed U.S. support steadily declining.

On February 27, 2003, appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Undersecretary Beers described the gap between how America sees itself and how others see America as "frighteningly wide." Regarding the Muslim world, Beers was even more graphic: "... millions of ordinary people ... have gravely distorted but carefully cultivated images of us--images so negative, so weird, so hostile that I can assure you a young generation of terrorists is being created." The next week, Beers resigned her position--for health reasons. America's public diplomacy initiative had clearly backfired.

In March, when America's war on terrorism led to U.S. military action in Iraq, support for America plummeted. According to a newly released study by the Pew Charitable Trust, anti-American sentiment in the Muslim world has intensified and spread. In several Arab countries, more than 90% hold an unfavorable view of the U.S., and negative perceptions have spread from the Muslim countries in the Middle East to Indonesia in the Far East and Nigeria in Africa.

Public diplomacy may not have been the only answer to the post-9/11 crisis, but it was an important tool. The problem is, it backfired. The critical question remains: What went wrong? How did American public diplomacy result in decreased support in the Arab and Muslim world?

Key Points

* The U.S. has entered a new, more challenging phase of public diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim world.

* The first phase of U.S. public diplomacy, which was heralded in with such fanfare immediately after September 11, has backfired.

* Unless Washington officials address why initial public diplomacy efforts failed, they may produce the same result but with greater consequences.

R.S. Zaharna <[e-mail]> is a Middle East analyst for Foreign Policy In Focus (online at www.fpif.org) and an assistant professor of public communication at American University. She specializes in international and intercultural communication.