The threat Saddam posed: a dictator and his WMD.

FOR almost three years, the anti-war protesters have kept up the drumbeat: "Bush lied and people died." Because weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were not found in Iraq, an endless stream of commentators continues to declare that Saddam Hussein was not the serious threat the administration claimed him to be. The critics usually go even further, and assert that sanctions and the destruction of WMD facilities by U.N. investigators had done so much damage to WMD infrastructure that it would have taken Saddam years to rebuild it even to a minimal capacity.

But these claims ignore huge amounts of contrary evidence; and most of this evidence can be found in the final report of the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG)--the very same report that many critics hold up as proof positive that Iraq was not a WMD threat. The evidence found by the ISG (an investigative commission set up by the Bush administration after the invasion of Iraq) confirms that Saddam was preparing to rapidly reconstitute his WMD program the moment he broke out of sanctions, which--given the frayed state of the coalition against him--would inevitably have happened. Not only did Bush not "lie"; the critics themselves are guilty of selectively citing evidence and of ignoring facts inconvenient to their argument. The ISG report, as well as the other evidence that continues to come to light, demonstrates that Saddam couldn't be trusted with the apparatus of a modern state, which he would have turned quickly back to producing WMD as soon as circumstances allowed.

Consider just one datum: According to the report, Saddam had the capability to start anthrax production within one week of making the decision to do so, and thereafter to produce over ten tons of weaponized anthrax a year. If even 1 percent of that amount--200 pounds--were released into the air over Washington, D.C., Congress's Office of Technology Assessment estimates that up to 3 million people would die.

How did Saddam keep such a massive capability from being discovered by the inspectors? Simply by hiding it in plain sight. For instance, at a facility called al-Hakam, Dr. Rihab Rashid Taha al-Azawi maintained a production line that produced ten tons of biopesticides for agricultural use each year. These biopesticides were produced in powder form and milled to 1 to 10 microns in size--but bio agents milled this finely are absolutely useless for agricultural purposes. Farmers found the biopesticide Dr. Rihab was sending them almost impossible to use, as it had to be handdropped one plant at a time or it would disappear. When they followed her recommendation to mix it with water and spray it, all they got was a thick slurry that clogged spray nozzles.

Though such finely milled powder may be useless for agricultural work, it is the perfect size for an inhalation bioweapon. (To be effective, anthrax must be milled at less then 10 microns.) Experts estimate that weaponized-anthrax spores that infect the skin will kill 50 percent of untreated patients; inhaled anthrax will kill 100 percent of untreated victims and 50 percent of those receiving immediate treatment. Simulations prior to Desert Storm estimated that an anthrax attack would kill over 25 percent of Coalition forces, as many as 200,000 men. In the hands of terrorists, this would be a weapon of incalculable value.

Dr. Rihab, the supposed agricultural scientist, is better known to U.S. intelligence agencies as "Dr. Germ," the head of Saddam's biological-warfare program for most of the decade immediately preceding the invasion. A 1999 Defense Intelligence Agency report called her the most dangerous woman in the world, and others have testified that she used political prisoners to test her bioweapons when she began to doubt she was getting accurate data from infected donkeys and dogs. When questioned by U.N. inspectors about al-Hakam, she claimed it was a chicken-feed plant. (Charles Duelfer, deputy executive chairman for the U.N. inspection team, later told reporters, "There were a few things that were peculiar about this animal-feed production plant, beginning with the extensive air defenses surrounding it.") According to the 1999 DIA report, the normally mild-mannered Rihab exploded into violent rages when questioned about al-Hakam, shouting, screaming, and, on one occasion, storming out of the room, before returning and smashing a chair.

In 1995, the U.N. inspectors showed Rihab documents obtained from the Israelis that demonstrated that Iraq had purchased ten tons of growth media from a British company called Oxoid. Shown this evidence, Rihab admitted to the inspectors that she had grown 19,000 liters of botulism toxin; 8,000 liters of anthrax; 2,000 liters of aflatoxins, which can cause liver cancer; clostridium perfringens, a bacterium that can cause gas gangrene; and ricin, a castor-bean derivative that can kill by impeding circulation. She also admitted conducting research into cholera, salmonella, foot-and-mouth disease, and camel pox. Neither the U.N. nor later inspectors were able to certify that all of this lethal cornucopia was ever destroyed.

In fact, in a document declassified just recently, there are indications that these deadly organisms--and the infrastructure to create them--were not destroyed. According to this document, persons at the highest levels of the regime were convinced that Iraq had eliminated its entire biological-weapons program: In a mid-1990s conference of Saddam's Revolutionary Command Council, Iraqi deputy prime minister Tariq Aziz told Saddam Hussein that he expected to resolve all biological issues with U.N. inspectors very quickly, because the program no longer existed. But Aziz was immediately contradicted by Saddam's son-in-law, who reminded Saddam that not everything had been disclosed, not even to supposedly trusted members of the regime's inner circle:</p> <pre> Some teams work and no one knows of them. Sir, they [U.N. investigators] do not know all of the methods or all of the means nor all of the scientists nor all of the places. Frankly, yes, some activities were discovered ... Sir, what they have discovered in the biological file is the least and most insignificant concern. The 17 tons [the amount of biological growth medium imported into Iraq] are not the problem, but the thousands of tons we have not accounted for or told how they were produced or how they were used ... Sir, I would like to go back to this subject [biological weapons]: Do we have to reveal everything? If we continued with the silence and if the meeting took this line, I must say that it is in our interest not to reveal anything. </pre> <p>It is clear from the remainder of this transcript--a document captured by U.S. forces--that Tariq Aziz is both startled and angry to discover that Saddam has been keeping him in the dark about continuing WMD programs even as he tries to convince U.N. inspectors that no such programs still exist. It was not until Saddam's son-in-law defected in August 1995 that the U.N. was alerted to the fact that Iraq's biological program was far greater than they believed. But by this time Saddam was close to throwing the inspectors out--before they could uncover and dismantle the program in its entirety.

The ISG report goes out of its way to understate its WMD findings, but the underlying facts are duly alarming. For instance, the report goes on at great length about Iraq's attempts to import super-high-quality aluminum tubes in 2001-2003. At the time, this was cited by Western intelligence agencies as evidence that Saddam was trying to reconstitute his WMD program. The agencies claimed that the tubes were intended to be used to build centrifuges for nuclear enrichment. The Iraqis maintained, however, that the tubes were for 81mm rockets and had nothing to do with WMD. The ISG report accepts this explanation, even though it notes that Iraq was producing 50 lower-quality tubes a day for its 81mm rockets, and had no need for the expensive higher-quality imported tubes. The report also states that an Iraqi general, Husam Muhammad Amin, became worried about repeated attempts to purchase aluminum tubes that were subject to U.N. nuclear controls and took his concerns to Abdullah Mullah al-Huwaysh (deputy prime minister and head of the Military Industrial Commission). Nonetheless, Iraq persisted in its attempts to purchase the high-grade aluminum tubes and a contract was still being negotiated as Coalition tanks rolled into Baghdad.

MOBILE DEATH FACTORIES

The ISG report dedicates an entire annex--20 pages of exhaustive analysis--to proving that the two suspected mobile bio-labs were not what Secretary of State Colin Powell claimed they were, before the U.N., in the run-up to war. But the report gives the discovery of Iraq's actual mobile bioweapons labs only a little over one page of attention.

After the 1995 defection of Saddam's son-in-law forced Iraq to admit to an extensive bioweapons program that it had been hiding, U.N. inspectors made an effort to eliminate it. But Saddam was not ready to give up all he had gained, and large portions of the bioweapons research program were continued in small mobile labs by a band of key scientists and technicians under the auspices of the Iraqi Intelligence Service. The ISG report says its investigators were unsure if any of this continuing bioweapons research was military-related. (No one ever bothered to ask the investigators if there was any other conceivable purpose for bioweapons.) The ISG found evidence that at least five mobile bioweapons research labs were operating in Baghdad right up to the commencement of the Coalition invasion. At one site, which building residents claimed was a biological lab, investigators found chemicals, along with documents from lab employees asking for hazardous-duty pay for having to work with biological materials. Another lab, discovered in a Baghdad mosque, was filled with equipment belonging to a known bioweapons scientist. Still another clandestine lab was identified by the ISG team at the Baghdad Central Public Health Laboratory, which employees admitted was operated by the Intelligence Service for several years prior to 2003.

According to the ISG report, Samarra Drug Industries had tanks available for bio-agent production ranging from 100 to 10,000 liters that could have begun bioweapons production three to four weeks after the order was given. Just one of these 10,000-liter tanks, if filled with botulinum toxin, would be enough to wipe out the global population more than twice over.

And it could be worse: Even a thimbleful of smallpox germs would kill tens of millions. If smallpox were released by terrorists in the United States, where inoculations ceased in 1972, the result would be a disaster of almost unimaginable magnitude. With some estimates claiming that each infected person can infect between 10 and 17 others, the smallpox germ is the bioweapon of choice for terrorists. Given Saddam's close links to terror groups it would have been sheer folly to allow his regime to possess even the smallest capability to produce the germ.

The report states that the ISG found evidence that Iraq had in fact obtained smallpox cultures from the former Soviet Union in 1992. An Iraqi scientist also described for the ISG Iraq's efforts to develop smallpox for biological warfare by using eggs and viral cultures. ISG investigators visited two labs where they found equipment that appeared to be used for making animal vaccines, but "this dual-use equipment was assessed to be easily diverted to produce smallpox or other pathogenic viruses." The ISG also visited a location where animal pox vaccines were produced in tissue culture; its assessment was that this equipment could be used for the rapid production of large amounts of smallpox virus.

The ISG report states in bold font that investigators "uncovered no evidence to support smallpox R&D at ASVI [Al-Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine] Institute for possible use as an offensive BW agent." Since this was the only facility in Iraq previously known to be associated with smallpox, the ISG's declaration that no biowarfare research was being conducted there would seem to give the institute a clear bill of health. But the report also says that Dr. Rihab (a.k.a. Dr. Germ) made frequent visits to the institute to conduct unidentified biological-warfare research, and that the institute maintained a "small capability" for organic production; it needs to be stressed that when it comes to smallpox, you need only a very small amount to cause a catastrophic amount of damage.

A TYRANT'S DESIGNS

In summary, then, what the Iraqi Survey Group discovered was that Saddam was maintaining a biological-warfare research program right up to the Coalition invasion, and that he had the installed capability to produce bio-toxins. Would he have used them? An amazing conversation between Saddam and his inner circle was recorded in a captured but undated Iraqi document.</p> <pre> SADDAM: I want to make sure that--close the door please (door slams)--the germ and chemical warheads, as well as the chemical and germ bombs, are available to [those concerned], so that in case we ordered an attack, they can do it without missing

any of their targets? HUSAYN KAMIL: Sir, if you'll allow me. Some of the chemicals now are distributed, this is according to the last report from the Minister of Defense, which was submitted to you, Sir. Chemical warheads are stored and are ready at Air Bases, and they know how and when to deal with, as well as arm these heads.

Also, some other artillery machines and rockets (missiles) are

available from the army. While some of the empty "stuff" is available for us, our position is very good, and we don't have any operational problems. Moreover, in the past, many substantial items and material were imported; now, we were able to establish a local project, which was established to comply with daily production. Also, another bigger project will be finalized within a month, as well as a third project in the coming two to three months that will keep us on the safe side, in terms of supply. We, Sir, only deal in common materials like phosphorus, ethyl alcohol, and methyl (interrupted) . . .

SADDAM: What is it doing with you, I need these germs to be fixed on the missiles, and tell him to hit, because starting the 15th, everyone should be ready for the action to happen at anytime, and I consider Riyadh as a target . . . HUSAYN KAMIL: (door slams) Sir, we have three types of germ weapons, but we have to decide which one we should use, some types stay capable for many years (interrupted).

SADDAM: We want the long term, the many years kind . . . HUSAYN KAMIL: ... There has to be a decision about which method of attack we use; a missile, a fighter bomb, or a fighter plane. SADDAM: With them all, all the methods . . . I want as soon as possible, if we are not transferring the weapons, to issue a clear order to [those concerned] that the weapon should be in their hands as soon as possible. I might even give them a "non-return access." [Translator Comment: to have access to the weapons; to take them with them and not to return them.] I will give them an order stating that at "one moment," if I'm not there and you don't hear my voice, you will hear somebody else's voice, so you can receive the order from him, and then you can go attack your targets. I want the weapons to be distributed to targets; I want Riyadh and Jeddah, which are the biggest Saudi cities with all the decision makers, and the Saudi rulers live there. This is for the germ and chemical weapons ... Also, all the Israeli cities, all of them. Of course you should concentrate on Tel Aviv, since it is their center. HUSAYN KAMIL: Sir, the best way to transport this weapon and achieve the most harmful effects would come by using planes, like a crop plane; to scatter it. This is, Sir, a thousand times more harmful. This is according to the analyses of the technicians (interrupted) ...

SADDAM: May God help us do it ... We will never lower our heads as long as we are alive, even if we have to destroy everybody. </pre> <p>And while biological weapons may have been the most dangerous near-term threat that Saddam could pose to the world, other WMD programs were also being fostered. As Oil for Food money began to fill his coffers, Saddam was restarting chemical-warfare, ballistic-missile, and even nuclear programs. After Desert Storm, Saddam encouraged Iraqi officials to, in his words, "preserve the nation's scientific brain trust essential for WMD." He told his close advisers that he wanted to keep Iraq's nuclear scientists fully employed, and this theme of preserving personnel resources persisted throughout the sanctions period. According to his science adviser, Ja'far Diya' Ja'far Hashim, "Saddam's primary concern was retaining cadres of skilled scientists to facilitate reconstitution of WMD programs after sanctions were lifted." Saddam instructed the general directors of Iraqi state companies to prevent key scientists from the pre-1991 WMD program from leaving the country. Saddam, as quoted by his presidential secretary, Abid Hamid Mahmud, also told scientists that they should "preserve plans in their minds" and "keep the brains of Iraq's scientists fresh."

Husayn Kamil--Saddam's son-in-law and minister of military industrialization--announced in a speech in 1995, to a large audience of WMD scientists at the Space Research Center in Baghdad, that WMD programs would be resumed and expanded as soon as U.N. inspectors left Iraq. Clearly, Saddam viewed inspectors and sanctions as little more than a temporary obstacle. In a written statement to the ISG, Saddam's presidential secretary stated that "if sanctions were lifted and there was no U.N. monitoring, then it was possible for Saddam to continue WMD activities and in my estimation it would have been done in total secrecy because he [Saddam] had learned from 1991."

HOW IMMINENT A THREAT?

The question remains as to how long it would have taken Saddam to reconstitute WMD programs once he had escaped the sanctions regime. We have already seen the answer, in the case of bioweapons: a matter of weeks. For the rest of his programs, estimates vary. Tariq Aziz said recently that "Saddam would have restarted his WMD programs, beginning with the nuclear program, after sanctions." Aziz estimated that Iraq would have a full WMD capability two years after sanctions ended. Saddam's minister of military industrialization, Abdullah Mullah al-Huwaysh, told the ISG that Saddam would have reconstituted all of the proscribed programs within five years: This would have included having a sizeable nuclear inventory on hand for immediate use. Huwaysh also stated that in response to a Saddam inquiry regarding how long it would take to start mass production of chemical weapons, he told the dictator that mustard-gas production could start within six months, but Sarin and VX would take a bit longer. Other WMD scientists claimed they had the materials and equipment to start mustard production in days, though such a fast start could damage the production equipment. By 2002, Iraq was already purchasing the precursor chemicals for the production of Sarin.

The ISG report quotes one senior official as stating that by successfully targeting scientists from Russia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, China, and several other countries, and coupling them with resident know-how, Saddam ensured that he could rebuild his entire WMD program within two years.

After 1991, Iraq's own resident WMD scientists were moved from government labs into universities: There they could carry out their work without fear of being targeted by Coalition aircraft or much bothered by U.N. inspectors. According to the ISG report, "Saddam used the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research through its universities to maintain, develop, and acquire expertise, to advance or preserve existent research projects and developments, and to procure goods prohibited by U.N. sanctions." By 1997, the number of university instructors working on WMD-related projects increased from a handful to 3,300, while a further 700-800 were sent to WMD-related companies on a regular basis to help with technical problems.

As the billions in Oil for Food cash flowed in, Saddam "began investing his growing reserves of hard currency in his militaryindustrial complex, increasing access to dual-use items and materials, and creating numerous research and development programs." Between 1996 and 2002, the annual budget for the military-industrialization ministry--which was responsible for WMD development--increased over forty-fold; by the time the Coalition invaded, it had grown to 1 trillion Iraqi dinars. The military "technical research" projects at Iraqi universities had skyrocketed from about 40 projects in 1997 to 3,200; and the military-industrialization workforce had expanded by over 50 percent in just three years. Saddam's WMD program was ready to move into overdrive.

Financial salvation led Saddam to start thinking again about nuclear weapons. In 1999 he met with his senior nuclear scientists and offered to provide them with whatever they needed, and immediately thereafter new funds began to flow to the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC). In 2001, Saddam mandated a large budget increase for the IAEC and increased the salaries of nuclear scientists tenfold. He also directed the head of the IAEC to keep nuclear scientists together, and instituted new privileges for IAEC scientists, while also investing in numerous new projects. From 2001 onward, Saddam convened frequent meetings with the IAEC to highlight new achievements.

While money flowed back into the nuclear project, Saddam also maintained an extensive ballistic-missile program. He had previously told his ministers that he did not consider ballistic missiles to be WMD and that he would never accept missile-range restrictions. In 2002, Iraq began serial production of the Al Samoud II, a ballistic missile that violated U.N. range limits: Test firings reached 183 miles (294 km). By the time the Coalition invaded, 76 of these missiles had been produced and more were in the pipeline. Saddam also, in early 2002, directed the design and production of a missile with a range of 650 to 750 km, and told Huwaysh that he wanted it within six months. Huwaysh relates that when Saddam was informed that production would take longer, and that the twin Volga engines they could sneak through sanctions would reach only 550 km, he left the room "profoundly disappointed." The difference would keep Tel Aviv out of range. (These were not the only means Saddam pursued to strike at Israel: His al-Quds organization was building four UAVs--pilotless drones--that were to be turned over to Hamas for the express purpose of killing Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon.)

What becomes clear, as example piles upon example in the ISG Report, is that this document that has been used by one side of the debate as proof that Saddam had no WMD capability actually says quite the opposite. The fact that no weapons stockpiles were found in Iraq does not mean that Iraq was not a threat. According to the report, Saddam could start producing deadly bioweapons within a week of deciding to do it; he retained the capability to produce smallpox; he had the capability to start producing chemical weapons such as mustard gas within days or at most weeks of deciding to do so; he was actively preparing to produce the nerve agents Sarin and VX; he was pouring cash into nuclear research; he was working on his ballistic-missile program even as the Coalition crossed the border into Iraq.

In short, the unholy trinity of the WMD world--bioweapons, chemical weapons, and nuclear weapons--were either readily available or in the process of being created, along with the missiles required to deliver them anywhere in the region, when Coalition armor rolled into Baghdad. Three years later, we should still be very glad it did.

Mr. Lacey is a Washington-based writer focusing on defense and foreign-policy issues.