The status of Palestinians in Israel: 1948-Oslo.

INTRODUCTION

SINCE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATE of Israel in 1948 the Palestinian Arab inhabitants have occupied a position increasing in influence and strength. Yet their economic, social, political and legal status has been largely neglected by scholars in the field. The focus of this study is the status of the Palestinian minority within Israel today. It also examines the social, political, and legal status of Palestinian Arabs within Israel in terms of segregation of the two communities of Palestinians and Jews. Israel defines itself as the only "democratic" state in the region despite its separate policies towards each community. This study aims to shed light on whether the state of Israel is entitled to define itself as a "democratic" state by examining the status of its Palestinian national minority citizen.

The data for this study is historical and taken from a variety of sources implicitly concerned with this subject, both in Arabic and Hebrew, as well as, several sources in English.

In order to understand the subject better, it is essential to first define the population of Palestinian Arabs within Israel, and why they are different from other Israelis.

The name Palestine has been used since Roman times to describe the land between Lebanon and the Sinai, excluding land to the east of the Jordan River. Today's Palestinians are descended from the first recorded inhabitants of Canaan who intermarried with the Philistines. This is what gave the land its name by the twelfth century before the Christian Era (B.C.).

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Without going into the earlier history of the Palestinian catastrophe, I would like to start with the period when the provisional government of Israel submitted its application for memebrship in the United Nations, on 29 November 1947. (1) Under the United Nations Charter, a state is admitted to membership by an affirmative vote in both the Security Council and the General Assembly. The Security Council discussed Israel's application on 17 December 1947 at a time when Britain voiced concern that Israel had not responded to the United Nations request to explain the assassination of its mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte. (2) Furthermore, Britain addressed two issues before supporting Israel's membership, (a) the clarification of Israel's position on the internationalization of Jerusalem and (b) the repatriation of Palestinian refugees. Israel's application was held up and later rejected. (3)

Israel went through a major investigation but managed to convince the United Nations to accept its membership. In the case of the repatriation of the Palestinian Arab refugees, Israeli delegates to the United Nations maintained the same position as Ben-Gurion and declared that they were not responsible for the refugee problem. (4)

In 1948, two states recognized Israel (i.e., USSR and the USA), while other states did the same the next year. (5) The recognition of Israel and its admission to the United Nations created a controversy around Israel's legitimacy. Since there had been no lawful basis to establish Israel, its recognition questioned its legitimacy. Furthermore, despite the factual existence of Israel, it had not made clear the extent of its territory. The Jewish Agency declared statehood to be within the borders of the proposed Jewish state as defined in United Nations Resolution 181. (6) In October 1949, however, Israel told the United Nations that it asserted title to territory over which its authority was actually recognized, which presumably meant the territory within the 1949 armistice line. (7) This claim to territory on Israel's side of the armistice lines is doubtful, however, since the armistice agreement stated that these lines were not international borders. (8) According to many scholars, because Israel's borders were undetermined, (9) Israel was recognized as a state for operational purposes, which they regarded as the territory on the Israeli side of the armistice line. (10)

THE PALESTINIAN CATASTROPHE

Because the armistice line was not well patrolled, some Palestinian Arab refugees managed to return. The new government of Israel called them infiltrators while at the same time, the Kneset passed a law against infiltration. (11) The authorities re-expelled those they found, who in many cases, were sizable groups. (12)

The Palestinian Arabs who were from Galilee, counted as the largest concentration of Palestinian Arabs within the armistice lines. (13) The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) depopulated nearly all of the Arab villages with the exception of Nazareth. The following figures show the extent of the depopulation of Palestinians in cities and villages before and after the expulsion:

Table 1
Depopulation of Palestinian Villages in 1948

LOCATION               BEFORE                 AFTER

Haifa                  70,000                 2,900
Jaffa                  70,000                 3,600
Jerusalem              70,000                 3,500
Lydda-Ramleh           3,4920                 2,000
Acre                   15,000                 3,000

Note: Tiberias with 5,300 Palestinians; Besian with 5,180
Palestinians; Beersheeba with 6,500 Palestinians and Safad
with 9,530 Palestinians were urban areas where the
Palestinian Arab population was not eliminated. (14)

The expulsion of Palestine's Arabs opened up the possibility of creating a Jewish State. In fact during the expulsion process, the 1948 government of Israel formulated plans to recruit several hundred thousand Jews from Europe and the Middle East. (15) The government placed newcomers in the areas where it expelled Palestinians. (16) Jewish officials, such as Ben-Gurion, claimed that immigration would save Jews from destruction, (17) His concern however, was the creation of a Jewish populated state with military potential. (18)

This is the starting point of the Palestinian problem with the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. The Israeli provisional government used the Palestinian lands, dwellings, and possessions for its Jewish population, especially the newcomers from Europe and the Middle East. Ben-Gurion passed an order ceding the houses of expelled Palestinians to the Jews. (19) By April 1949, the government of Israel reported to the Kneset that it had managed to settle 150,000 Jews. In Jerusalem, the government gave the better Palestinian houses to government officials. (20) In Jaffa, many Jewish immigrants occupied the homes of Palestinians before the government could organize the process. (21) The government did not stop there. It took housing from the remaining Palestinians inside the armistice line. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) enforced this operation in Haifa and Carmel. (22) The same action targeted the inhabitants of Acre and what was left became a Palestinian ghetto. (23) Many Palestinians within the armistice line who became internal refugees tried to return to their homes. However, the Israeli government considered the land belonging to these remaining Palestinian external refugees absentee property. The custodian of absentee property rented it only to Jews (24) Due to the government's act of seizing the property of the Palestinian internal refugees, they had no housing to return to and many lived in tin shacks or burial caves. (25) Until late 1958, nearly 20,000 internal refugees lived in makeshift housing near Arab towns. (26) Nazareth received many internal refugees in 1948 and still had three refugee neighborhoods in substandard housing in the 1980s. (27)

The expelled inhabitants of Ikrit and Biram, two Galilean villages, resorted to the courts to ask for their rights to return to their villages. Their land had been distributed to kibbutzim (Jewish agricultural collectives). (28) In 1951, the Ikrit villagers obtained permission to return from the Supreme Court of Israel. (29) However, the Minister of Defense refused to allow them to return and the IDF demolished Ikrit. (30) In 1953, the Biram villagers took a similar action and sued the government. While their case was in process, the IDF sent airplanes and bombed Biram's buildings, leveling the entire village and the Kibutzim kept the land for themselves. (31) The Israeli government closed the Ikrit and Biram cases under the 1949 Emergency Regulation Law. (32) When asked about these cases, the Prime Minister of Israel (Ben-Gurion) explained that "these are not the only villagers living a long way from their home villages. We do not want to create a precedent for the repatriation of refugees." (33) These villagers continued unsuccessfully to petition the government. (34) Expelled residents of other villages did the same without success. (35)

The Defense (Emergency) regulations provided a full set of regulations by the rule of martial law imposed by the Israeli government from 1948 until 1966. It declared Palestinian populated sectors to be "closed areas" under Article 125 of the regulations. (36) It established three martial law zones: the northern area (Galilee), the central area (Little Triangle area), and the Beersheba (Negev Desert). (37)

The military government imposed many restrictions on the Palestinians. They required permits for traveling from one area to another no matter what the destination. The IDF set up checkpoints and inspected Palestinians regularly for their passes. (38) Whoever was found with an expired pass or was caught without one was fined or imprisoned. Furthermore, any Palestinian who resided in a locality without permission from the military government could be evicted and have their property confiscated. This situation is similar to the system imposed upon the "bantustans" in South Africa. (39)

On several occasions, the military government ordered its soldiers to force large numbers of Palestinian Arabs to bring their identity papers out of their houses for identity checks. They would gather groups of residents in an open field where they kept men, women, and children for hours without food, water, or toilet facilities. (40) Furthermore, the same authority would deny travel permits to Palestinian farmers who needed to sell their produce in traditional market towns. These restrictions enabled Jewish merchants, who could travel without a pass, to buy the produce at a lower price, giving Palestinian farmers a fraction of the value of their produce. (41)

Moreover, Palestinians were under a military government and did not have access to government ministries. (42) If Palestinians chose to challenge an order of the military government, they had to go through a military court. The civil court had no jurisdiction over their petitions. (43) Israeli Jews called this system of martial law over the Palestinians within the armistice line "a colonial regime enforced by colonial law." (44)

The Israeli government enacted the Emergency Land (Regulation) Law in 1949 which authorized the expropriation of Palestinian properties for state use. The government claimed Palestinian land for the defense of the state, public security, the maintenance of essential supplies or essential public services, the absorption of immigrants or the rehabilitation of ex-soldiers or war invalids. (45) In addition, there was a 1949 law permitting the Minister of Agriculture to take control of "waste" land. So the land of Palestinian refugees could also be seized as so-called "waste" land. (46)

Furthermore, the Absentees' Property Law that was adopted in 1950 permitted confiscation of the land of a person deemed an "absentee." The original draft of the Absentees' Property Law would have defined as absentees only those who remained outside the 1949 armistice lines. As it was enacted, it included absent external refugees, internal refugees, and returning external refugees." (47) Many Palestinians were forbidden to return to their homes even though they were living in Israel. They still were referred to as "present absentees." (48)

The Absentee Property Law was used against Palestinians whose land had been confiscated even if they had only left for a matter of a few days while the fighting was going on during the 1948 war. This law was only implemented against Palestinian Arabs. (49) This law could also have been used against some Jews who moved from one place to another, but the government did not invoke this law against them. (50) The Israeli government gave confiscated Palestinian absentee property to Jewish farmers. In fact, between 1948 and 1953 the government established 370 new Jewish settlements on land it had confiscated as "absentee" from Palestinian families. (51)

Several of these "absentees" addressed complaints to the custodian's office. Their concern was that their property was in the hands of others and could not be redeemed. Some absentees were even offered exorbitant rents to lease back their own land. Israeli policy was to refuse them, for fear of difficulty in getting them to vacate in the future. In this way, thousands of Jewish settlers occupied Palestinian lands. (52)

The Israeli government typically confiscated valley lands, leaving Arabs to the rocky hillsides. (53) It confiscated major tracts in the Little Triangle area, and where water pumps were left in Arab orange groves, giving them to Jewish farmers. Members of the Kibbutzim and Moshavim in Galilee took over flocks of cattle and sheep left by the departing Palestinians. (54) The government confiscated over 85 percent of the land of the Bedouin Palestinians of the Negev Desert (55) and concentrated the remaining Bedouins into small, largely uncultivable nearby areas. (56)

Under a 1965 government statute, the Israeli government confiscated as "absentee" lands the extensive Moslem charitable lands (waqf), much of which was used for cultivation on a long-term basis. (57) All land was confiscated from those Palestinians who were refugees beyond the 1949 armistice lines. Of the land belonging to the Palestinians who remained, 65 percent had been confiscated by the mid-1950s. (58) In 1954, the value of land taken from the Palestinians was estimated at 100 million Palestinian pounds; including stone quarries, 10,000 acres of vineyards, 25,000 acres of citrus groves, 10,000 business establishments, 95 percent of what became Israel's olive groves, and 50,000 apartments. (59) Of the 859,000 Palestinians who lived within the territory on the Israeli side of the 1949 armistice lines, 684,000 lost their homes and their property. (60)

The government of Israel emptied about 400 Palestinian towns and villages. (61) It demolished many of them and planted forests to eradicate all traces of habitation. (62) One of the highest ranking Israeli officials (Moshe Dayan, former Defense Minister), referring to Zionist land acquisition both before and after 1948, said there was not a single settlement in Israel "which was not built on the site of a previous Arab settlement." (63)

The government continued in later years to confiscate Arab agricultural land on a piecemeal basis. (64) In the Negev, the Israeli government evacuated 8,000 farmers in 1980 to construct a military air base to replace evacuated airfields in the Sinai Peninsula. (65) Confiscation in Galilee led to organized citizen protests. (66) The inhabitants of the three Palestinian designated areas, according to a Jewish Agency, posed "a major threat to the character of the area as part of the Jewish state, to Jewish control thereof, and even to Israeli sovereignty over it." Furthermore, this agency called for more Jewish settlements as "mini-lookouts." (67)

PALESTINIAN COMMERCE UNDER THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT

Military government regulations existed in areas in which some Palestinian population had lived since the establishment of the state in 1948 until the government of Levi Eshkol abolished it in 1966. (68) The government has since wielded greater control over both the economic and non-economic resources of Palestinians. (69) In addition to the loss of their land, Palestinians also lost their economic infrastructure. The 1948 exodus destroyed their commercial-industrial base. (70) Often the Israeli government took over fully equipped industrial plants. For example, in Ramleh 600 Palestinian shops were distributed to Jewish immigrants. In Lydda, 1,800 pieces of Palestinian property were seized, including a button factory, a carbonated drinks plant, a sausage factory, an ice plant, a textile plant, a macaroni factory, 700 retail shops, 500 workshops, and 1,000 warehouses. (71) The government confiscated cabinetmaking shops, locksmith works, turneries, ironworks, and tinworks. All of these were leased or sold to Jews. Some of the Palestinian property was appropriated privately by what became a class of newly prosperous merchants and speculators. (72) In the mid forties the United Nations Palestine Conciliation Commission tried unsuccessfully to work out a monetary compensation system for Palestinians whose property had been taken away by the Israeli government and individual Jewish agencies. (73)

Palestinians within Israel were left with a few small towns and villages. Only in Galilee were towns and rural areas sufficiently contiguous to allow economic interchange among major cities. (74) In Nazareth, the largest Palestinian populated city following the 1948 war, tile and match factories were no longer viable. Land confiscation eroded the modest industrial potential that remained. To establish the Jewish town of Carmiel in Galilee, the government confiscated quarries of high-quality marble that had provided a livelihood for hundreds of Palestinian families. (75) The armistice line with Trans-Jordan cut Palestinian manufacturers and merchants from their traditional connections in the territory that had become the West Bank. Palestinians in Israel became heavily dependent on the Jewish economy for their industrial and consumer products. (76) The government promoted economic development for the Jewish sector but not for the Palestinian Arab sector. It used martial law to prevent the development of Palestinian industry. It denied Palestinians permits to start businesses in areas close to Palestinian habitation. The Israel Land Authority denied a permit to an Arab to open a marble quarry in Carmiel, on grounds that the area was closed to non-Jews. (77)

The same government did not make available to Palestinian entrepreneurs the financial subsidies and loans it gave to Jews. (78) The Ministry of the Interior allocated to Palestinian towns only a fraction of the funding it allotted to Jewish towns. (79) Jewish towns received funds from Zionist agencies abroad, while the Israeli government prohibited outside funds to Palestinian towns within the armistice line. (80) Industry could not develop in Arab towns because the government would not fund sewage treatment, roads, or education. (81) One could easily distinguish primary and secondary Jewish schools from Palestinian primary and secondary schools, which showed a marked disparity in quality.

The government issued the Encouragement of Capital Investment law of 1959, where the Kneset granted incentives for investment in areas designated by the Ministers of Finance, Industry, and Commerce as "development areas." (82) However, they would not designate any Palestinian localities as "development areas," not even the most economically depressed. (83) The government used the "development area" designation to provide a livelihood for Jewish immigrants instead of Palestinians and to place Jews along Israel's borders as a security measure. (84)

LEGISLATION OF THE JEWISH STATE

The state that the Jewish Agency created in Palestine reflects what is referred to as "Zionist" philosophy. (85) Signers of the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel identified themselves as "representatives of the Jewish Community of Eretz-Israel and the Zionist Movement." The declaration called Israel a "Jewish State" and defined it as such. (86) Its mission was to be a state for world Jewry. (87)

The Jewish character of Israel is reflected in its state symbols. The 1949 Flag and Emblem Law used a Jewish symbol, the Star of David, in the state flag of Israel, (88) thereby reflecting the identification of the new state with the Jewish people. The Flag and Emblem Law uses the Jewish candelabra, the menorah, as the state emblem. (89) The menorah, which appears in the Talmud, evokes the memory of the destruction of the second temple by the Roman emperor Titus in 70 A.D. Its use as Israel's emblem suggests "a return of the Jews to political existence as an independent nation." (90) The national anthem adopted by the government was the Hatikvah (hope), formerly the anthem of the Zionist movement. (91) Its words mention return to "Zion and Jerusalem." (92) The Kneset labeled Israel's immigration law the Law of Return, suggesting that Israel is a state to which Jews are returning. (93) To the Palestinians, even those who are citizens of Israel, this legislation identifying Israel as a Jewish state indicates that they are not part of the constituency whom the state represents. (94) The concept of a Jewish state reflected in Israel's legislation made Palestinians "aliens in their own land." They are not "wholly part of a nation conceived as a Jewish state." (95)

The Kneset early on rejected proposals for an explicit legislative provision that the Jewish religion law would be applied in Israel. Yet, in the state court of Israel, judges use Jewish religious law in construing Israeli law. The Kneset requires a judge "faced with a legal question" who "funds no answer to it in statute law or case-law or by analogy" to "decide it in the light of the principles of freedom, justice, equity and peace of Israel's heritage." (96) Since Israel is defined legislatively as a Jewish state, "Israel's heritage" means Jewish heritage, though there is disagreement whether this phrase refers to Jewish law only or to concepts emanating from Jewish history. (97)

The Ministry of Justice established a Jewish law department to advise the Kneset committees on the approach of Jewish law to pending bills. (98) The drafters' commentary on the 1952 Succession Law indicated that the drafters based their proposals:

   as far as possible upon Jewish Law, and in a number of
   matters--and among them the more basic, such as maintenance
   out of estate--we regard our proposals as a kind of
   continuation of Jewish Law. (99)

In the 1952 World Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency (Statute) Law, the Kneset declared the executive body of the World Zionist Organization, the Zionist Executive, to be a "juristic body" that "takes care as before of immigration and directs absorption and settlement projects in the State." (100) The specifics of its relationship with the government are treated in a covenant between it and the government, called for by Article 7 of the Statute Law. (101)

The Statute Law makes the Agency a partner of the government in the performance of many essential government services. For the State of Israel, the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency provide a valuable legal mechanism. They disseminate the kind of information normally disseminated by the government press office, but with the appearance of objective information. They enter into relations with other organizations in host countries and thereby create goodwill for Israel. They maintain contact with Jewish communities on behalf of Israel but on a nominally unofficial basis, such as the water agency and the electrical agency. (102)

These national institutions allowed Israel to establish a worldwide fund-raising apparatus under the guise of charity. In a number of countries such as the United States, Canada and others, this has yielded important financial benefits. For example, in the U.S., where substantial sums were collected for Israel, persons making contributions were entitled to deduct these sums from their income as charitable tax deductions. If contributions were made directly to the government of Israel no deduction would be allowed. (103)

In 1971 the World Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency split into two organizations. The Jewish Agency took responsibility for activities in Israel rural settlement, immigration absorption, youth training, and later, urban rehabilitation. The World Zionist Organization became responsible for Zionist political activity and the promotion of immigration to Israel from the West. (104)

Since the 1971 reorganization, the Jewish Agency has been controlled equally by Jews in and outside Israel. The two organizations alone were responsible for immigrant absorption. The Israeli government established a ministry of immigrant absorption but the Jewish Agency works with the ministry handling the bulk of the task, administratively and financially. (105) The 1971 reorganization required an amendment of the 1952 Statute Law. The amendment states that the two bodies coordinate their activities with the government through a government-World Zionist Organization committee and a government-Jewish Agency committee:

   Two committees shall be set up for the coordination of
   activities between the Government and World Zionist
   Organization and the Jewish Agency for Israel. (106)

The Agency is given other functions in legislation adopted by the Kneset. The Agency nominates one member of the National Board for Planning and Building, which oversees construction work. (107) It nominates one member of the Committee of Protection of Agricultural Land, which prevents encroachment on agricultural land. (108) As mentioned, it has, by statute, a role on governmental agricultural marketing boards and in operating (Mekorot) the state waters authority. (109) Participation in these bodies involves the Agency in decision-making for government agencies.

In 1977, the government announced an urban neighborhood improvement program called Project Renewal. It was joined with the Agency to raise funds. Neighborhoods selected for renewal by both the government and the Agency were numbered about eighty and were all inhabited by Jews. (110) One Palestinian neighborhood sought participation but was denied on the grounds that its Palestinian majority precluded Agency funding. The majority of the funding for the project was contributed by the government rather than by the Agency, which meant that the Agency's restriction on funding directed the government's contribution to Jewish neighborhoods only. (111)

The fact that the Kneset has given these national institutions extensive governmental functions means that the Zionist doctrine is professed officially by the state. (112) The role of these national institutions results in national discrimination, "while entrusted with tasks which are par excellence tasks of a governmental nature, their mandate restricts them to dealing with the Jewish sector of the Israeli population." (113) A Fund official acknowledged that:

   the Government would have to look after all citizens if they
   owned the land; since the JNF (Jewish National Fund) owns
   the land, let's be frank, we can serve just Jewish people. (114)

Another Fund official suggested all state lands be transferred to the Fund so Palestinians would not ask to use them. (115) These national institutions can discriminate in favor of Jews without the state itself being seen as the discriminating entity.

NATIONALITY AND CITIZENSHIP

Another area of Israeli legislation where differences between Jews and Palestinians are found is nationality and citizenship. In the 1950 Law of Return, the Kneset gave "every Jew" a "right to come to this country." (116) The 1952 Nationality Law conferred Israeli citizenship automatically on a Jew who settles in Israel and who does not reject it. (117) The Nationality Law does not refer to any nationality defined by geographical borders of Israel. This unrestricted right of immigration for Jews is deemed a basic aspect of the concept of a Jewish State. Furthermore, the Nationality Law deems Israel a Jewish State for Jews wherever they are, and for every Jew who wants to be an Israeli citizen, as well as the ingathering of Jews from exile.

Yet Palestinian Arabs displaced in 1948 have no right under Israeli law to return. The Nationality Law granted citizenship to a person who maintained continuous residence in Israel from 14 May 1948 to 14 July 1952 or who legally returned during that period if, in addition, the person registered as an inhabitant by 1 March 1952, under the 1949 Registration of Inhabitants Ordinance. (118) This provision was intended for Palestinian Arabs (119) who participated in the Palestinian exodus from Palestine organized by the Arab leaders in 1948. (120)

For Jews, proof of continuous residence from 14 May 1948 to 14 July 1952, was not required by the Nationality Law, since any Jew was automatically entitled to citizenship. In this way, the law made a clear distinction between the Jews and Arabs and is widely viewed as discriminatory. (121) Of those Arabs who did not leave in 1948, many were unable to prove continuous residence from 14 May 1948 to 14 July 1952, and thus were refused citizenship. (122) A Palestinian child born of such stateless parents was also stateless. In 1968 the Nationality Law was amended to grant citizenship to stateless children if the application was made between the ages of 18 and 21 and the applicant had not been convicted of a "security offense" or sentenced to a term of five or more years imprisonment after conviction of any offense. (123) In 1980, it was amended again to remove the restrictions of the original Nationality Law for Palestinian residents of Israel and to grant them citizenship as of that time. (124)

Even with the 1968 and 1980 amendments, the law still differentiates between Jews and Palestinians. The legal route for acquiring citizenship is still governed by different legislation since a Jew acquires citizenship by virtue of being a Jew, regardless of place of residence. (125) Furthermore, the 1980 amendment grants citizenship only to those Palestinians who were citizens of Palestine in 1948 (126) and who have the necessary documents to prove that. (127)

The United States characterized the Law of Return and the Nationality Law as conferring "an advantage on Jews in matters of immigration and citizenship." (128) Others have said that the two laws establish a "legal apartheid" (129) and have compared them to racial categorization in South Africa. (130) It has been argued in response that the two laws, while favoring Jews, do not discriminate against any particular nationality (131) and that it is not necessarily discriminatory to favor particular groups in granting citizenship. (132) Certain other states, it is pointed out, prefer members of ethnic groups in citizenship. Human Rights norms permit ethnic preference in citizenship, providing that such provisions do not discriminate against any particular nationality. These justifications are challenged on the basis that, while the two laws do not contain explicit discrimination against a particular nationality, the reality of their implementation in Israel is to discriminate against the indigenous population, the Palestinian Arabs.

The Jewish people Israel aspires to represent are primarily European Jews who founded Zionism at the turn of the century. Israel does not seek to assimilate into the Arab World but to maintain its separate identity. (133) Israel's one-time United Nations representative, Abba Eban, said that Israel's "integration into the Arab world" is "to be avoided." He evoked a "danger lest the predominance of immigrants of Oriental origin"--by which he meant Jews from Arabs states--might "force Israel to equalize its cultural level with that of the neighboring world. So, far from regarding our immigrants from Oriental countries as a bridge toward our integration with the Arabic- speaking world, our object should be to infuse them with an Occidental spirit, rather than to allow them to draw us into an unnatural Orientalism." (134)

PALESTINIAN POLITICAL IMPEDIMENTS IN ISRAEL

Arab citizens of Israel have the right to vote and to be elected to the Kneset. (135) Many Palestinians support the Arab-Jewish Communist party, one of the few parties sharply critical of the government on important issues. (136) They are regularly elected to the Kneset and participate actively in its debates. Palestinian Arab Kneset members have limited ability, however, to influence policy on basic issues, like the repatriation of Palestinian refugees. They cannot exert significant influence over the executive branch of government, whose functionaries are committed to Zionism. The Israeli government, the Jewish Agency, the Histadrut, and the Army all promote a Zionist view. Consequently, the ability of Palestinian Arabs to influence policy is limited or nearly impossible. (137) Since the establishment of the state of Israel, few Palestinian Arabs have served in high bureaucratic posts, and not one has become a cabinet minister. Of the 1,839 leading government officials in 1980, only 16 were Palestinian Arabs. (138) Palestinian Arabs are less able than Jews to develop with bureaucrats the relationship necessary to secure favorable action. Many Palestinian Arabs view the Israeli government as "alien." (139) In the past each ministry had an "Arab affairs" department, (140) and Palestinian Arabs approaching a ministry had to contact that rather than the official who handled the issue in question.

As a result of the 1948 expulsion, the number of Palestinian Arabs eligible to vote (approximately 17 percent of the electorate) are not a threat to Zionist policies in Israel. (141) In addition, by keeping Palestinian Arabs economically dependent, the government prevents them from exercising political power even in proportion to their reduced numbers. They have never held more than eight seats of the 120 seats in the Kneset. (142) During the early period 1948-1966, the military government in Palestinian populated areas pressured the Palestinian Arabs to vote for Zionist parties (143) and in particular for the ruling Mapai party. (144) The system of permits and closed zones had resulted in a dependence of Palestinian Arab citizens on the military government. That dependence extended to political activity. Mapai created lists of Palestinian Arabs to run as Mapai candidates in general elections. (145) A 1959 Mapai internal memorandum titled "Recommendations for Dealing with the Arab Minority in Israel" explains the purpose of creating these lists. The purpose it was said was to ensure that Arab politicians "would not consolidate into an independent Arab bloc." (146)

The military authorities threatened to confiscate land or work permits from Palestinian Arabs who supported the Communist party. (147) The military authorities also threatened Palestinian Arab workers who expressed sympathy with anti-Zionists with refusals for work permits, unemployment and hunger. (148)

The military authorities controlled elections in local Palestinian Arab areas. They prevented the election to municipal councils of Palestinian candidates viewed as hostile, and even of candidates of Zionist parties other than Mapai. (149) In some instances, when candidates they deemed hostile were elected, the military authorities dissolved the municipal council and expelled the candidates from the country or cut allocations to their municipal budget. (150)

The government's purpose in introducing elections in Palestinian Arab municipalities was to prevent the development of unity under traditional Arab leadership. The 1959 Mapai party memorandum claimed success in achieving this effort, which it referred to as its "communal policy." The "government's policy has sought to divide the Palestinian Arab population into diverse communities and regions [....] The municipal status of the Palestinian Arab villages, and the competitive spirit of local elections, deepened the divisions inside the villages themselves. The communal policy and clan divisions in the villages prevented Arab unity." (151)

The Kneset in 1985 wrote the prohibition against Palestinian Arab nationalist candidates into the statute law by prohibiting participation in Kneset elections by candidates who reject "the existence of the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish people." Uri Avnery said the purpose of this language was to "prevent Arabs from taking part in Israeli democracy." (152) Tawfiq Toubi (Palestinian Arab Kneset member) stated that this law showed Israel to be an "apartheid state." (153)

The Palestinian population of Israel have loyalties to extended families, loyalties that divided them from each other. In addition, they were not all the same religion. While the majority were Sunni Muslim, some belonged to the Druze sect of Islam, and others were Christian. The Israeli government was cognizant of these differences and their potential from its standpoint. "The government's policy," said a 1959 Mapai party memorandum, "has sought to divide the Arab population into diverse communities and regions." This "communal policy and clan divisions in the villages prevented Arab unity." (154) The government sought "forced segmentation of the population (Druze, Christian villages, townsfolk)" through the co-optation of "positive elements." (155)

One aim of the Israeli government was to foster discord between Christian and Moslem Arabs. (156) It particularly cultivated the Druze Arabs, in order to split them from other Arabs. (157) The Druze are Arabs who formed a sect within Islam in the eleventh century. (158) They live in their own villages, making up eight percent of the Palestinian Arab population within the armistice lines.

The Israeli government gave the Druze Arabs preferences over other Palestinian Arabs. (159) In 1948, it did not expel Druze Arabs in the same proportion as other Arabs. (160) In fact, it managed to convince some Druze Arabs to fight on the Zionist side. (161) Others cooperated with Zionist forces by convincing non-Druze Arabs to surrender. (162) The government put the Druze Arab areas under martial law, as it did with other Arab areas, but it terminated martial law for them in 1962, four years earlier than for other Arab areas. (163) Even before it ended martial law, the government exempted Druze Arabs from the requirement of securing permits for travel. (164)

Though the conscription law of Israel contained no ethnic criteria, the Minister of Defense would not draft Palestinian Arabs into the IDF, due to fears concerning their loyalty. (165) The IDF did not accept any Arab volunteers, except Bedouins. In 1956 however, the Minister of Defense began drafting Druze Arabs (166) and used them to oppose other Arabs, to drive Bedouin Arabs out of the Negev Desert to Jordan and to shoot Palestinian refugees attempting to re-enter Israel clandestinely from Egypt. (167) The IDF service of Druze Arabs engendered confrontations with other Arabs during the 1956 war between Israel and Egypt, as the non-Druze Arabs viewed the role of the Druze Arabs as traitorous. Fistfights between Druze and non-Druze Arabs were reported. (168) Some Druze .Arabs refused to be drafted and were prosecuted. (169) A fringe benefit of IDF service was that it made Druze Arabs eligible for many financial benefits the government gives on the basis of veteran status. Druze Arab eligibility for these benefits created a further gulf between Druze and non-Druze Arabs.

Druze Arabs have benefited in other ways. The government gave larger budget allocations to Druze Arab villages than to other Palestinian Arab towns (though still less than to Jewish towns). (170) The Histadrut admitted Druze Arabs into membership in 1957, two years earlier than other Arabs, thereby making it easier for them to get jobs. (171)

In 1970 the government changed the administrative structure for Druze Arabs. It directed government ministries to deal with Druze Arabs by ordinary channels rather than through "Arab Affairs" departments through which other Arabs are required to approach the government. (172) On identity cards, the government requires all citizens to carry nationality. For Druze Arabs the Ministry of the Interior uses "Druze" rather than "Arab" regardless of the preference of the individual. (173) In 1977 the government removed Druze Arab schools from the jurisdiction of the Education Ministry's department that handles Arab schools. (174) In Druze Arab schools the government uses a special curriculum that teaches children the differences between Druze and other Arabs to promote division. (175)

Despite granting them certain privileges, the Israeli government still discriminates against Druze Arabs in many of the ways it discriminates against other Arabs. For example, in the early 1950s, Israel confiscated Druze properties to the same degree as it did those of other Palestinian Arabs. (176) Israel does not permit Druze Arabs to purchase housing in locations close to Palestinian Arab populated areas. (177) Like other Palestinian Arabs, the Druze are excluded from employment in security-related jobs. In 1987, the government declared its intent to eventually treat Druze Arabs equally with Jews in all respects, but the reaction of the Druze Arabs to such favoritist policy was mixed. Many welcomed the benefits, (178) while also recognizing the effort to separate them from other Arabs. (179) Although many Drnze Arabs opposed this policy, it kept Druze and Non-Druze Arabs from uniting as a political force. (180)

GOVERNMENTAL SERVICES TO THE PALESTINIAN ARABS IN ISRAEL

The Israeli government provided a variety of services to the population of Israel, among these services were the building of new residential settlements and the construction of housing in coordination with the Jewish Agency. In conformity with its charter, the Agency organizes settlements for Jews only. (181) By 1968, the government and national institutions had built twenty-eight new towns for Jews in the Negev and Galilee areas, primarily for immigrants. The aim was to put "a large Jewish population" in areas where Jews were few. (182)

The Jewish National Fund, the Jewish Agency, and the Histadrut all build housing. The Ministry of Housing built two major new towns in the Galilee in Upper Nazareth adjoining the original Nazareth and Carmiel. According to its regulations, the Ministry refused to sell housing in these towns to Arabs, (183) unless they had served in the IDF, police, or prison. (184) Consequently, few Palestinian Arabs qualified. (185) As mentioned earlier, except for Druze Palestinian Arabs, the Ministry of Defense does not draft other Palestinian Arabs and does not accept them as volunteers." (186) The government intentionally put forward these conditions, first, to prevent Palestinian Arabs from purchasing houses in Jewish populated areas, second, to prevent Palestinian Arabs from living among Jews and lastly, to prevent them from claiming their expropriated property.

The Israeli government uses Jewish housing for strategic purposes. In the 1950s it created settlements in border areas, and after 1967 it built large appartment complexes in East Jerusalem in "a ring of Jewish settlement" around Arab areas, (187) to create "a Jewish-populated buffer zone between Arab Jerusalem and the West Bank." (188) Galilee has been a focus of attention for national institutions and government since it is the area with the greatest Palestinian Arab density inside the armistice line. In the 1950s, the government and national institutions established new "lookout" settlements for Jews in Galilee to increase the Jewish population there. (189)

The Israeli government continues its practice since the 1950s of giving Palestinian Arab municipalities less budget funding than Jewish municipalities for roads, sewage, and other public services. This underfunding has exacerbated the housing situation of Palestinian Arabs in Nazareth and many other Palestinian towns and villages.

Discrepancies also appear in the government's policy toward people who build houses in violation of regulations requiring a building permit. The government frequently bulldozes houses built by Palestinian Arabs without a permit. (190) Interestingly, it has not bulldozed houses built by Jews without a permit, even though, according to a study done at the Technion architecture and town planning faculty in Haifa, 75 percent of the houses built without a permit are built by Jews. (19l)

Many individual Jews discriminate against Palestinian Arabs in the sale or rental of housing. In one reported instance, a Jew who signed a preliminary agreement to sell an apartment withdrew upon discovering the purchaser was a Palestinian Arab. (192) The government has adopted no legislation to prohibit private discrimination in housing and the courts have not found it illegal. (193) The chief rabbi of the Sephardic community, Mordechai Eliahu, whose position is established by statute, (194) ruled in 1985 that Jewish law forbids a Jew to sell or lease housing to an Arab in any area of Israel where Jews live or are preparing to live. (195) The chief rabbi of Acre, a town that includes Palestinian Arabs and Jews, ruled that Jewish law forbids Jews to live in proximity to Arabs. (196)

Beyond housing, the government of Israel provides a number of welfare benefits to the public. (197) It places conditions on some of these welfare benefits, such as a recipient's having some relationship to a person who has served in the IDF. In a human rights report on Israel, the United States Department of State wrote that Arabs

   do not qualify for many of the important economic and social
   benefits that derived from military services. (198)

Universities in Israel are private. They are forbidden by government regulation to discriminate in the admission of students on the basis "race, sex, religion, national origin, or social status." (199) Nevertheless, on security grounds, the university does not accept or admit Palestinian Arab applicants to certain faculties. (200) Scholarships are given by the Office of Absorption of the Jewish Agency. Palestinian Arab students are not eligible to compete for them. However, they are available to persons immigrating under the Law of Return. (201) Certain privately funded scholarships are open only to students with IDF service. Since the universities are private, they should be able to set their own tuition fees. Universities however, set fees decided upon by the government since they receive substantial government subsidies. This decision was criticized in the press as an "apartheid policy." (202)

ETHNIC DISTINCTION IN THE LAW OF ISRAEL

Many Palestinian Arabs thought martial law had ended in 1966, but that was not the case. The government of Israel applied Defense (Emergency) Regulations primarily against Palestinian Arabs. It used these same regulations to persecute Palestinian Arabs before military, rather than civilian courts (203) and to subject individual Palestinian Arabs to town arrest. To prevent demonstrations against land confiscations in Galilee in 1976, it issued notices that villages where demonstrations were planned were still "closed areas" under regulation 125. (204) In 1986, the government used these regulations to prohibit a Palestinian cleric from traveling abroad for public speaking. (205)

In addition to the Defense (Emergency) Regulations, the Kneset adopted other legislation to suppress Palestinian Arab nationalism. For instance, in 1980, the Kneset amended the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance to prohibit

   any act manifestation identification or sympathy with a
   terrorist organization in a public place or in such manner that
   persons in a public place can see or hear such manifistatation
   of identification or sympathy, either by flying a flag or
   displaying a symbol or slogan or by causing an anthem or
   slogan to be heard, or any other similar overt act clearly
   manifesting such identification or sympathy as aforesaid. (206)

That law empowered the government to declare an organization to be terrorist. It declared as terrorist the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and thirteen other Palestinian organizations, including the component organizations of the PLO. (207) Many Palestinians have been arrested under this law, and convicted simply for flying a flag, or producing a pamphlet to support the PLO. Furthermore, the Ministry of Justice filed charges under this law against Faisal Husseini, head of the Arab Studies Society in Jerusalem. (208) The Ministry of Justice alleged that, in a newspaper interview, Husseini said that the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. (209)

Israel does not have a constitution that might take precedence over legislation that is discriminatory in nature. The Declaration of Establishment of the State of Israel called for equal rights, but Israel's courts did not deem the declaration to be a source of law. (210) The courts have no power of judicial review of legislation and, therefore, no power to overturn discriminatory laws. (211) Thus, the laws defining Israel as a Jewish state and giving Jews a preferred status cannot be challenged in the courts of Israel.

The court rarely questions officials who take measures against Palestinian Arabs for reasons of government policy or state security. (212) With administrative detention, the Kneset instituted judicial review in 1979. Nevertheless, it said the review should be conducted in closed session and it need not follow the rules of evidence. (213) The IDF, in particular, has not always obeyed the Supreme Court. As mentioned earlier, in July 1951, when the court ruled that Palestinian Arabs, who were formerly residents in the Galilee village of Ikrit, were entitled to return, the IDF defied the ruling and prevented the residents from returning. (214)

These racial distinctions found in Israel's legislation have led some commentators to call Palestinian Arabs second-class citizens in Israel. (215) Racial discrimination, as a matter of state policy, violates the customary law of human rights binding on all states. (216) The United Nations Charter prohibits discrimination by a state on the basis of ethnic group or race.

The Israeli government practices state sanctioned discrimination against Palestinian Arabs. They prohibit the return of expelled Palestinians while giving Jews ready entry. They segregate land ownership and use. They provide social services to Jews on a preferential basis. They allow national institutions to carry out governmental functions that discriminate against Paleastinian Arabs. They provide special powers to the military under the Defense (Emergency) Regulations to suppress opposition to discriminatory treatment. Israel has created a complex set of rules that facilitates and protects this continuing discrimination.

Racial distinctions in Israel's legislation is a natural and intended result of the colonization of Palestine, inherent in the ideology of Zionism. (217) Maxime Rodinson wrote that creating a Jewish state in an Arab Palestine on the basis of the Zionist concept "could not help but lead to a colonial type situation" and to a "racist state of mind." (218) Israel and South Africa share a common imperialist origin. Each won independence after armed struggle against British rule, then "coped with the problem of keeping their native population in subordinate status, and perforce resorted to comparable, though not identical, measures." (219) Both are, as a leading African Political Scientist, Professor Ali Mazruri says,

   discriminatory ideologies whose implementation inevitably
   and logically necessitated strategies of repression and ethnic
   exclusivity. (220)

There is a common religious ideology for the Zionist claim to Palestine and the Afrikaaner claim in South Africa (221) In Afrikaaner nationalism, blacks, as offspring of Ham, were pagans destined to serve the "new Israelites" as "hewers of wood and drawers of water." Both Afrikaaners and Zionists considered the land to be theirs by divine right. (222) South Africa had laws clearly identifiable as racist. Zionist racism is informal, de facto and deceptive. While South Africa was more rigid in some aspects of segregation, particularly in housing, Israel achieved the same and more by maintaining rules and regulations. Unlike South Africa, however, Israel expelled most of the indigenous population. Israel's segregation in land ownership and use is more thoroughgoing than South Africa's, and the performance of governmental functions by Israel's national institutions has no counterpart in South Africa. Arnold Toynbee, referring to Israel, said:

   a racialist state is as bad and as dangerous in the Middle East
   as it is in South Africa." He found it "wrong" that "people feel
   differently about rights and wrongs of the existence of the
   state of Israel versus white South Africa. (223)

CONCLUSION

Despite changes in certain spheres, the condition of Palestinian Arabs within Israel remains bleak. Palestinian Arabs who were once land owners are now workers in the lowest positions of the Israeli job market. Their economic situation is determined by policies the Israeli government imposes upon them. The witholding of funds and control of economic resources by the government and its national institutions make it nearly impossible to see any economic development in the Palestinian populated areas of the country. The Palestinian sector has suffered from land expropriations, cuts in resources, discrimination, suppression of its labour force and education system, and from stringent control over its political organization and social activity. (224)

Israeli government policies and restrictions have led to complete domination by Jews over the economic system, over financial institutions and over the decision-making process of the entire Palestinian community within Israel. The standard of living of Palestinians is far below that of Jews. Although the Israeli government allows Palestinian Arabs to participate in the Kneset, they have not been able to change policy regarding their status, the right of return of refugees, or compensation for what Palestinians have lost. Kneset members must abide by government regulations and security rulings. Israel's policy of discrimination is preserved by a state apparatus that defines Israel as a Jewish-Zionist entity that ensures exclusive fights to the Jewish population.

The question remains to be asked whether there will be a solution to the situation of Palestinian Arabs within Israel. There surely must be one. However, there are issues the Israeli government has to resolve. The shortcoming of a two-state system is that it provides no solution for the Palestinian Arabs displaced from Palestine in 1948. The issue of the fight of Palestinian Arabs to return to their places of origin still remains unresolved. Peace between Jews and Palestinians could be possible if, as first steps, the 1948 refugees were offered the fight to return and compensation for their losses as Jews who suffered under Hitler's Nazi regime received. It is in the interest of the Palestinian Arabs of Israel, and the Arab states where many refugees reside, as well as the world community to find a solution. Over one million Palestinians are living under the poverty line because of their displacement by the Israeli state. A more sensible resolution for the Palestinians and Israelis in the long run would be one state where both Palestinians and Jews and all citizens would have equal rights and equal protection under the law.

ENDNOTES

(1.) John Quigley, Palestine and Israel." A Challenge to Justice (Duke University Press, 1990): 87.

(2.) See "A Bullet for the Count." Jerusalem Post International Edition. October 10, 1998:16-18. Bernaddtte was assasinated by the LEHI (Lohamei Herut Yisrael) terrorist group led by Yitzhak Shamir, early Israeli Prime Minister. One should ask why the Zionist organization assassinated him ... The question that remains to be ask is what the International Community did to impose punishment and investigation upon the assasins when their identity was known to all, as today with the case of late Labanon Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri?

(3.) John Quigley, Palestine and Israel (1990): 87.

(4.) The Times, 18 May 1961: 12; John Quigely, Palestine and Israel (1990): 88.

(5.) Philip Marshal Brown, "The Recognition of Israel," American Journal of International Law, vol. 42, (1948): 620-627.

(6.) For further details please see Rosalyn Higgins, "The June War: The United Nations and the Legal Background," in John Norton Moore, The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Readings and Documents, (1977): 535-536.

(7.) John Quigley, Palestine and Israel (1990): 90-92.

(8.) Michael Akehurst, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict in International Law," New Zealand Universities Law Review, vol. 5, (1973): 239.

(9.) Such as Quinct Wright, "Legal Aspects of the Middle East Situation," Law and Contemporary Problems, vol. 33, (1968): 5 and 17-18.

(10.) Michael Akehurst, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict in International Law," New Zealand Universities Law Review, vol. 5, (1973): 239.

(11.) Laws of the State of Israel, vol. 8, (1954): 133.

(12.) Tom Segev, 1949: The First Israelis, (1986): 61.

(13.) Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949 (1987): 239-242.

(14.) Ian Lustick, "The Quiescent Palestinians: the System of Control over Arabs in Israel," in Khalil Nakhleh and Elia Zuriek (eds.)., The Sociology of the Palestinians (1980): 66; Palestine Post, 11 May 1948, p. 1.

(15.) Tom Segev, 1949: The First Israelis, (1986): 96.

(16.) "Troubled Truce," Economist, 21 August 1948: 289-290.

(17.) Tom Segev, 1949: The First Israelis, (1986): 97.

(18.) Ibid.

(19.) Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949 (1987): 190-194.

(20.) Tom Segev, 1949: The First Israelis, (1986): 78.

(21.) Ibid, 74-76; Benny Morris, The Brith of the Palestinian Refuggee Problem, (1987): 191.

(22.) Tom Segev, 1949: The First Israelis, (1986): 52-56.

(23.) Michael Palumbo, The Palestinian Catastrophe (1987): 151-152.

(24.) Maxim Ghilan, How Israel Lost Its Soul (1974): 233.

(25.) Aziz Haidar, Social Welfare Services for Israel's Arab Population (1987): 14.

(26.) Walter Schwarz, The Arabs in Israel (1959): 76.

(27.) Aziz Haidar, Social Welfare Services for Israel's Arab Population (1987): 140-143.

(28.) Hanna Dib Nakkara, "Israeli Land Seizure Under Various Defense and Emergency Regulations," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 14, no. 2 (1985): 13, and 28-30.

(29.) Mubadda Hanna Daoud et al. v. Minister of Defense et al., High Court of Justice 64/51, Piskei Din, vol. 5 part 2, (1951): 1117-1123, in Palestine Yearbook of International Law, vol. 2, (1985): 119.

(30.) Tom Segev, 1948: The First Israelis, p. 59.

(31.) Uri Davis and Norton Mezvinsky, Documents from Israel, 1967-1973: Readings for a Critique of Zionism (1975): 32-33.

(32.) Emergency Regulations (Security Zones) (Extension of Validity) (No. 2) Law, Laws of the State of Israel, vol. 3 (1949): 56.

(33.) New York Times, 24 July 1972.

(34.) David Gilmour, Dispossessed." The Ordeal of the Palestinians (1982): 102-103; Tom Segev, 1949: The First Israelis (1986): 59; Elaine Ruth Fletcher, "People Who Never Lost Hope," Jerusalem Post, International Edition, weekend, 14 February 1987.

(35.) Uri Davis and Norton Mezvinsky, Documents from Israel, 1967-1973: Readings for a Critique of Zionism (1975): 34.

(36.) Davis Kretzmer, The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel (1987): 116

(37.) Walter Schwarz, The Arabs in Israel (1959): 64-65 and 82-83; please see the attached map.

(38.) Elia T. Zuriek, The Palestinians in Israel: A Study in Internal Colonialism (1979): 120.

(39.) Maxim Ghilan, How Israel Lost Its Soul (1974):196; for further information on South Africa, see Nancy L. Clarck and William H. Worger, South Africa: The Rise and Fall of Apartheid. London: Pearson and Longam, 2004.

(40.) John Quigley, Palestine and Israel: A Challenge to Justice (Duke University Press, 1990): 106-107.

(41.) Walter Schwarz, The Arabs in Israel (1959): 64.

(42.) Tom Segev, 1948: The First Israelis, (1986): 49 and 65.

(43.) Rony Gabbay, A Political Study of the Arab-Jewish Conflict: the Arab Refugee Problem (A case Study) (1959): 287.

(44.) Uri Avnery, "Government Suppressing Free Speech," New Outlook (September 1964): 50.

(45.) Emergency Land Requisition (Regulation) Law, art. 3, Law of the State of Israel vol. 4 (1949): 3.

(46.) Sabri Jiryis, "The Legal Structure for the Expropriation and Absorption of Arab Lands in Israel," Journal of Palestine Studies vol. 2, no. 4 (1973): 98.

(47.) Tom Segev, 1949: The First Israelis, (1986): 80.

(48.) Ibid.

(49.) Davis Kretzmer, The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel (1987): 102.

(50.) Ibid, 115.

(51.) Ian Lustick, Arabs in the Jewish State (1980): 57.

(52.) Tom Segev, 1949: The First Israelis, (1986): 82.

(53.) Hasan Amun, Uri Davis, and Nasr San'allah, "Deir Al-Sad: The Destiny of an Arab Village in Galilee: A Case Study Towards a Social and Political Analysis of the Palestinian-Arab Society in Israel," in Hasan Amun, (ed.), Palestinian Arabs in Israel: Two Case Studies (1977): 13.

(54.) Tom Segev, 1949: The First Israelis, pp-73-74.

(55.) Yitzhak Oded "Bedouin Lands Threatened by Takeover," New Outlook (November-December 1964): 45-52; Walter Schwarz, The Arabs in Israel (1959): 160.

(56.) Walter Schwarz, The Arabs in Israel (1959): 159-160.

(57.) Ibid.

(58.) Ian Lustick, Arabs in the Jewish State (1980): 179.

(59.) Don Peretz, "Problems of Arab Refugee Compensation," Middle East Journal, vol. 8, (1954): 403 at 404-404.

(60.) Arnold Toynbee, A Study of History, vol. 8 (1954): 289.

(61.) Charles S. Kamen, "The Arab Population in Palestine and Israel, 1946-1951," New Outlook (October-November 1984): 36 at p. 37; Israel Shahak, "Arab Villages Destroyed in Israel," in Davis and Mezvinsky, Documents from Israel, 1967-1973: Readings for a critique of Zionism (1975): 43, at 47.

(62.) Walter Schwarz, The Arabs in Israel (1959): 69.

(63.) Moshe Dayan, "My Standing in the Labor Party," lecture, Haifa Technical Institute, Ha'aretz, April 4, (1969): 15.

(64.) Davis and Mezvinsky, Documents from Israel, 1967-1973: Readings for a critique of Zionism (1975): 27-28.

(65.) John Quigley, Paletine and Israel (1990): 110.

(66.) Rafik Halabi, The West Bank Story (1982): 245 and 249.

(67.) Ibid. 255.

(68.) Aziz Haidar, On the Margins: The Arab Population in the Israeli Economy, (1995): 2.

(69.) Ibid.

(70.) Charles S. Kamen, "The Arab Population in Palesitne and Israel, 1946-1951, "New Outlook (October and Novemebr 1984): 36 and 39.

(71.) Tom Segev, 1949: The First Israelies (1986): 69-79.

(72.) Ibid.

(73.) Henry Cattan, The Palestine Question (1988): 84.

(74.) Avraham Cohen, "The Arab Population of Israel, 1950-1980," New Outlook (October-November 1984): 43.

(75.) Yossi Amitay, "A Question of Identity: Like an Uprooted Tree," New Outlook (October-November 1984): 12 and 15.

(76.) Nawaf Masalhah, "Israeli Arabs: Equal Economic Development," New Outlook (May-June 1985): 35.

(77.) Davis and Mezvinsky, Documents from Israel 1967-1973: Readings for a critique of Zionism (1975): 28.

(78.) Ian Lustick, Arabs in the Jewish State (1980): 164.

(79.) Ibid., 188-189; David Kretzmer, The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel (1990): 106; Elia T. Zuriek, The Palestinians in Israel: A Study in Internal Colonialism (1979): 133-136

(80.) David Shipler, "Israeli Arabs: Scorned, Ashamed, and '20th Class," New York Times, 29 December 1983.

(81.) Davis Kretzmer, The Legal Satatus of the Arabs in Israel (1990): 109-111; Ian Lustick, Arabs in the Jewish State (1980): 168.

(82.) Laws of the State of Israel, vol. 13 (1959): 258.

(83.) Yosef Goell, "Where Israel's Union Fails," Jerusalem Post, international edition, week ending 14 February 1987: 10.

(84.) Yitzhak Oked, "The Survival Factor," Jerusalem Post, international edition, week ending 26 March 1988, supplement, p. II.

(85.) See, Walter Lehn, The Jewish National Fund. London: Kegan Paul, 1988; Chana Sosevsky, Attitudes of Zionist Intellectuals to the Arab Population in Palestine as Expressed in the Literature before the Young Turk Revelution of 1908. Ph.D. Dissertation, New York University, 1980; Alan Tylor, The Zionist Mind: The Origins and Development of Zionist Thought. Beirut: Institute of Palestine Studies, 1974; The Richard P. Stevens, American Zionism and the U.S. Foreign Policy: 1942-1947. Beirut: Institute of Palestine Studies, 1970; Alfred Lilienthal, What Price Israel? Beirut: Institute of Palestine Studies, 1969 and the Zionist Connection II. New Brunswick and New Jersey: North American Publishers, 1982, Fayes Sayegh, Zionist Colonialism in Palestine, Beirut: Palestine Research Center, 1965.

(86.) Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, paras. 10-11, Laws of the State of Israel, vol. 1 (1948): 3; Yehuda Savir, "The Definition of a Jew under Israel's Law of Return," Southwestern Law Journal, vol. 17 (1963): 123, at p. 124; David Kretzmer, The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel (1990): 1 and 17-19.

(87.) Izhak Englard, "Law and Religion in Israel," American Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 35 (1987): 185, and 187; see David Kretzmer, The Legla Status of the Arabs in Israel (1990) in particular, chapter two entitled "The Jewish State: Constitutional and Implication," :17-34.

(88.) Flag and Emblem law, Law of the State of Israel, vol. 3 (1949): 26.

(89.) Ibid.

(90.) Claude Klein, Le caractere juif de l'etat d'Israel (1977): 25.

(91.) Ibid.

(92.) Fouzi El-Asmar, To Be an Arab in Israel (1978): 137.

(93.) Law of Return, Laws of the State of Israel, vol. 4 (1950): 114.

(94.) David Kretzmer, The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel (1990): 43.

(95.) David Shipler, "Israeli Arabs: Scorned, Ashamed, and '20th Class," New York Times, 29 December 1983.

(96.) Foundations of Law, Laws of the State of Israel, vol. 34 (1980): 181.

(97.) David Kritzmer, The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel (1990): 28.

(98.) Izhak Englard, "The Problem of Jewish Law in a Jewish State," Israel Law Review, vol. 3 (1968): 268.

(99.) Menachem Elon, "The Sources and Nature of Jewish Law and Its Application in the State of Israel," Israel Law Review, vol. 4 (November 1969): 80, at 82.

(100.) W. Thomas Mallison, "The Zionist-Israel Juridical Claims to Constitute 'the Jewish People' Nationality Entity and to Confer Membership in It: An Appraisal in International Law," George Washington Law Review, vol. 32 (1964): 1039-1043.

(101.) Sally V. Mallison and W. Thomson Mallaison, "Zionism, Freedom of Information, and the Law," in Roselle Tekiner, Samir Abed-Rabbo and Norton Mezvinsky (eds.), Anti-Zionism: Analytical Reflections (1988): 153, at 159.

(102.) Walter Lehn, The Jewish National Fund (1988): 97.

(103.) John Quigley, Palesitne and Israel (1990): 119.

(104.) W. Thomson Mallaison and Sally V. Mallison, The Palestine Problem in International Law and World Order (1986): 131.

(105.) Hasan Amun, Uri Davis, and Nasr San'allah, "Deir Al-Sad: The Destiny of an Arab Village in Galilee: A Case Study Towards a Social and Political Analysis of the Palestinian-Arab Society in Israel," in Hasan Amun, (ed.), Palestinian Arabs in Israel: Two Case Studies (1977): 1, at 59.

(106.) World Zionist Organization-Jewish Agency for Israel (Status) (Amendment) Law, art. 7, Laws of The State of Israel, vol. 30 (1975): 43.

(107.) Planning and Building Law, art. 1, sec. 2 (b) (II), Laws of the State of Israel, vol. 19, (1965): 330.

(108.) Planning and Building Law, First Schedule, sec. 2 (5), Laws of the State of Israel, vol. 19 (1965): 330 and 390.

(109.) The national water authority, Mekorot, managed Israel's water, a scarce and critical resource. It was founded in 1937 by the Jewish National Fund, me Jewish Agency and a subsidiary company of the Histadrut, to supply water to Jewish settlements, and under the Water Law it is owned by the government and three founders. See Water Law, art. 1, 36, and 126, Laws of the State of Israel, vol. 13 (1959): 173. In that 1959 Water Law the Kneset declared all water in Israel "public property" and authorized the minister of agriculture to designate rationing areas. Under the 1976 Regulation the minister's Water rationed water to the entire country. The regulation gave only 2 percent of the water allotted for agriculture to arabs, though they farmed 20 percent of the cultivated land. The rationing system deprived Palestinian farmers of water they needed to compete with Jewish agriculture. See David Kretzmer, The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel (1990): 120.

(110.) Aziz Haidar, Social Welfare Services for Israel's Arab Population (1987): 54.

(111.) David Kretzmer, The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel (1990): 108-109.

(112.) Claude Klein, Le caractere juif de l'etat d'Israel (1977): 22.

(113.) David Kretzmer, The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel (1990): 71.

(114.) Ian Lustick, Arabs in the Jewish State (1980): 106.

(115.) Sabri Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel (1976): 58.

(116.) Law of Return, art. 1, Laws of the State of Israel, vol. 4, (1950): 114.

(117.) L. Warsoff, "Citizenship in Israel--A Comment," New York University Law Review, vol. 33 (1958): 857-861; Haim Margalith, "Enactment of a Nationality Law in Israel," American Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 2 (1953): 63-66.

(118.) Nationality Law, art. 3, Laws of the State of Israel, vol. 6, (1952): 50.

(119.) Claude Klein, Le caractere juif del'etat d'Israel (1977): 93.

(120.) Ibid.

(121.) Haim Margalith, "Enactment of a Nationality Law in Israel," American Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 2 (1953): 63-66.

(122.) Israeli League for Human and Civil Right, "Citizenship in the State of Israel Today" (August 1971), in Uri Davis and Norton Mezvinsky, Documents from Israel, 1967-1973: Reading for Critique of Zionism (1975): 88.

(123.) Nationality (Amendment No. 2) Law, art. 3, Laws of the States of Israel, vol. 22 (1968): 241.

(124.) David Kretzmer, The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel (1990): 54-55.

(125.) Ibid. p. 55.

(126.) Ibid.

(127.) Uri Davis, Israel: An Apartheid State (1987): 37-38.

(128.) Roselle Tekiner, "On the Inequality of Israeli Citizenship," Without Prejudice, vol. 1 (1987): 48, at 51-54.

(129.) Uri Davis, Israel: Utopia Incorporated (1977): 96.

(130.) Maxim Ghilan, How Israel Lost Its Soul (1974): 174.

(131.) Claude Klien, Le caractere juif del'etat d'Israel (1977): 34.

(132.) Asa Kasher, "Justice and Affirmative Action: Naturalization and the Law of Return," Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, vol. 15 (1985): 101-112.

(133.) Moshe Gabai, "Israeli Arabs: Problems of Identity and Integration," New Outlook (October-November 1984): 18 and 22-23.

(134.) Abba Eban, Voice of Israel (1969): 76.

(135.) Alfred Witkon, "Elections in Israel," Israel Law Review, vol. 5, (1970): 42-52.

(136.) Ori Stendel, The Minorities in Israel: Trends in the Development of the Arab and Druze Communities, 1948-1973 (1973): 116-148.

(137.) Ian Lustick, The Arabs in the Jewish State (1980): 115.

(138.) Simha Flapan, Integration or Alienation," New Outlook (October-November 1984): 33 and 34.

(139.) Walter Schwarz, The Arabs In Israel (1959): 118.

(140.) Ian Lustick, The Arabs in the Jewish State (1980): 91.

(141.) George Jabbour, Settler Colonialism in South Africa and the Middle East (1970): 81.

(142.) Jacob M. Landau, The Arabs in Israel: A Political Study (1969): 191; "Israel's New Parliament: Distribution of Seats in Israel's 120-member Parliament," New York Times, 3 November 1988.

(143.) Elia Zureik, The Palestinian in Israel: A Study in Internal Colonialism (1979): 120.

(144.) Sabri Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel (1976): 50-51.

(145.) Tom Segev, 1949: The First Israeli (1986): 66.

(146.) Ibid.

(147.) Walter Schwarz, The Arabs in Israel (1959): 67; Maxim Ghilan, How Israel Lost Its Soul (1974): 197-198.

(148.) Jacob M. Landau, The Arabs in Israel (1969): 108-155.

(149.) Ibid, 156-178; Sabri Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel (1976): 248.

(150.) Ian Lustick, The Arabs in the Jewish State (1980): 142-143.

(151.) Tom Segev, 1949: The First Israelis (1986): 64.

(152.) Uri Avnery, My Friend, the Enemy (1986): 334.

(153.) David Kretzmer, The Legal Statuts of the Arabs in Israel (1990): 41.

(154.) Tom Segev, 1949: The First Israelis (1986): 65.

(155.) Meron Benvenisti, West Bank Data Project: A Survey of Israel's Policies (1984): 44.

(156.) Michael Palumbo, The Palestinian Catastrophe (1987): 150.

(157.) David Gilmour, Dispossessed: The Ordeal of the Palestinians (1982): 112.

(158.) Walter Schwarz, The Arabs in Israel (1959): 148-149.

(159.) Sabri Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel (1976): 201.

(160.) Nafez Nazzal, The Palestinian Exodus from Galilee 1948 (1978): 32-33; Benny Morris, the Birth of the Palestinian Rejugee Problem, 1947-1949 (1987): 225.

(161.) Nathan Weinstock, Zionism: False Messiah (1979): 239; Sabri Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel (1976): 199; Gabriel Ben-Dor, The Druzes in Israel: A Political Study (1979): 129-130.

(162.) Nafez Nazzal, The Palestinian Exodus from Galilee 1948 (1978): 65-66.

(163.) Ian Lustick, The Arabs in the Jewish State (1980): 133.

(164.) Sabri Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel (1976): 48.

(165.) Gabriel Ben-Dor, The Druzes in Israel (1979): 131.

(166.) Ibid.

(167.) "To Serve or Not to Serve: Palestinian Druze Caught in Controversy over Israeli Draft," Al-Fajr, 20 December 1985.

(168.) Yossi Amitay, "A Question of Identity Like an Uprooted Tree," New Outlook (October-November 1984): 12 and 14.

(169.) "Yale Kan, first-year student of physics, interview a Druze conscientious objector," in Israel Shahak, The Non-Jew in the Jewish State: A Collection of Documents (1975): 118-120.

(170.) Ian Lustick, The Arabs in the Jewish State (1980): 133 and 210; Ella Zuriek, The Palestinians in Israel (1979): 138.

(171.) Walter Schwarz, The Arabs in Israel (1959): 65.

(172.) Ori Stendel, The Minorities in Israel (1973): 46.

(173.) Ian Lustick, The Arabs in the Jewish State (1980): 133; Sabri Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel (1976): 200; Walter Schwarz, The Arabs in Israel (1959): 148.

(174.) Sarah Graham-Brown, Education, Repression and Liberation: Palestinians (1984): 42.

(175.) Al-Fajr, 20 December 1985.

(176.) Sabri Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel (1976): 2001; Gabrial Ben-Dor, The Druzes in Israel (1976): 110-111.

(177.) Al-Fajr, 20 December 1985.

(178.) Salman Falah, "The Druze community in Israel," New Outlook (June 1962): 30-35, 53.

(179.) Walter Schwarz, The Arabs in Israel (1959): 156.

(180.) Sabri Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel (1976): 202.

(181.) David Kritzmer, The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel (1990): 67-70.

(182.) Jewish Agency, Proposal for a General Development Program in the Galilee Hills (Safad, August 1973), in Noam Chomsky, Towards a New Cold War: Essays on the Current Crisis and How We Got There (1982): 436.

(183.) Atallah Mantzur, "Equality and the Fear of Precedent," Ha'aretz, 19 January 1986.

(184.) Abraham Rabinovich, "The Two Nazareths: Too Close for Comfort," Jerusalem Post, International edition, week ending 5 March 1988: 13.

(185.) Akiva Orr, "Socialism and the Nation-State," in Fouzi el-Asmar, Uri Davis, and Naim Khader (eds.), Debate on Palestine (1981): 40 and 41.

(186.) David Kretzmer, The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel (1990): 83-85.

(187.) Sarah Graham-Brown, "The Economic Consequences of the Occupation," in Naseer Aruri, Occupation: Israel Over Palestine (1983): 167, 205.

(188.) Rafik Halabi, The West Bank Story (1982): 42.

(189.) Randijo Land, "Changing Its Role," Jerusalem Post, International edition--Keren Kayemeth supplement, week ending January 31, 1987: 4.

(190.) Aziz Haidar, Social Welfare Services for Israel's Arab Population: 52.

(191.) Hubert Law-Yone, Technion, Haifa, in Jerusalem Post, International edition, week ending 1 November 1986.

(192.) Kol Ha'ir, 15 February 1985, in Palestine/Israel Bulletin (February 1986): 5-6.

(193.) David Kretzmer, The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel (1990): 45-46.

(194.) Dyanim Law, Laws of the State of Israel, vol. 9 (1955): 74 [dayan is rabbinical court judge]; Chief Rabbinate of Israel Law, Laws of the State of Israel, vol. 34 (1980): 97; Izhak Englard, "Law and Religion in Israel," American Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 35 (1987): 185, 187.

(195.) Dina Goren, "Rumblings from the Temple Mount," New Outlook (January-February 1986): 7.

(196.) David Shipler, Arab and Jew: Wounded Spirits in a Promised Land (1986): 442.

(197.) Lotte Salzberger and Dan Schnitt, "Social Welfare Legislation in Israel," Israel Law Review, vol. 8 (1973): 550-579.

(198.) U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1983 (1984): 1289.

(199.) David Kretzmer, The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel (1990): 163.

(200.) Elia Zuriek, The Palestinians in Israel (1979): 155.

(201.) Henry Rosenfeld, The Condition and Status of the Arabs in Israel (1985): 53-54.

(202.) "Racist' Tuition Ruling Sparks Uproar," Jerusalem Post, International edition, week ending 30 May 1987.

(203.) David Kretzmer, The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel (1990): 117.

(204.) Ibid.: 116.

(205.) Order by the minister of interior to Canon Riah Abu al-Assal, rector of Christ Evangelican Anglican Church, Nazareth, 1 August 1986.

(206.) Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (Amendment) Law, arts. 1, 8, Laws of the State of Israel, vol. 34 (1980): 211.

(207.) David Kretzmer, "National Security and Draconian Law," Jerusalem Post, 1 July 1980.

(208.) Jerusalem Post, international edition, week ending 14 February 1987.

(209.) Ibid., week ending 7 February 1987.

(210.) David Kretzmer, The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel (1990): 5-7; Izhak Englard, "Law and Religion in Israel," American Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 35, (1987): 185, 190.

(211.) David Kretzmer, The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel (1990): 12.

(212.) Ibid., 123, 134; Sabri Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel (1976): 20-23, 33.

(213.) Emergency Powers (Detention) Law, arts. 6, 9, Laws of the State of Israel, vol. 33 (1979): 89.

(214.) Rafik Halabi, The West Bank Story (1982): 235-236.

(215.) Maxim Ghilan, How Israel Lost Its Soul (1974): 165; Shawky Zeidan, "A Human Rights Settlements: The West Bank and Gaza," in George W. Sheperd and Ved P. Nanda, Human Rights and Third World Development (1985): 170.

(216.) Max Planck Institute, "Apartheid," Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol. 8 (1985): 37, 39.

(217.) Fayes A. Sayegh, Zionist Colonialism in Palestine (1965): 21.

(218.) Maxime Rodinson, Israel: A Colonial-Settler State? (1973): 77.

(219.) Leften Stavrianos, Global Rift: The Third World Comes of Age (1981): 784.

(220.) Ali Mazrui, "Zionism and Apartheid: Strange Bedfellows or Natural Allies?" Alternatives, vol. 9, no. 1 (1983): 73, 92.

(221.) C. L. Sulzberger, in New York Times, April 30, 1971: A39.

(222.) For more details please see Richard P. Stevens and M. Elmessri, Israel and South Africa: A Progression of Relationship (1979).

(223.) "Arnold Toynbee on the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Interview," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 2, no. 3 (1973): 3, 11-12.

(224.) Aziz Haidar, On the Margins: The Arab Population in Israeli Economy (1995): 179.

Labeeb Ahmed Bsoul is an assistant professsor of History, United Arab Emirates University.