The sound of thunder: VCA in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

In October of 2002, the soldiers of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery (HHB), V Corps Artillery (VCA), began deploying to the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility to train and prepare for possible hostilities with Iraq. VCA soldiers and leaders worked tirelessly to create a corps fire support annex and an FA support plan (FASP) that would meet the objectives of V Corps' Contingency Plan Cobra II.

In addition, the unit simultaneously conducted many training exercises to hone warfighting skills and improve teamwork with headquarters that would interface with the corps. VCA had been in a high state of training for months before it deployed. (See the sidebar "V Corps Artillery Training for War" on Page 36.)

Throughout all phases of the operation--pre-war planning and training, hostilities, and post-hostility stability and support operations (SASO)--VCA units displayed a great deal of flexibility and adaptability in conducting both artillery missions and a variety of nonstandard missions.

During combat, V Corps units fired 414 Army tactical missile system (ATACMS) missiles, 857 multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) rockets and more than 18,500 projectiles in support of a wide range of missions. VCA's 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) fired the first sense and destroy armor munitions (SADARM) in combat while VCA FA brigades fired the first ATACMS Block IA and ATACMS unitary rounds in combat with devastating effects.

Starting in early April and continuing after the President declared an end to major hostilities on 10 April, V CA faced the challenge of hauling captured enemy ammunition (CEA). Again, VCA excelled at accomplishing a difficult, nonstandard mission, hauling more than 22 million pounds of CEA during post-hostility operations.

VCA derived a number of significant lessons from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). This article describes each phase of VCA operations, the obstacles encountered and lessons from combat operations in Iraq.

Organization for Combat. The first challenge was the FA organization for combat. As the start of hostilities neared, there were fewer units in theater than the initial plan stipulated. For example, we did not have six FA brigades and 18 FA battalions in theater to provide fires for maneuver units. In early February the only FA units in theater were organic to the 3d Division, so building combat power was of paramount importance.

First to arrive was 2-4 FA (MLRS) part of the 214 FA Brigade, from Fort Sill, Oklahoma. VCA coordinated closely with the reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI) cell and port authorities, thus providing command and control ([C.sup.2]) as well as critical logistical support for incoming units The rapid influx of personnel severely tested the infrastructure and often resulted in resource shortfalls. 2-4 FA reported combat ready 72 hours after its equipment was downloaded at the port.

With hostilities imminent and an uncertain timeline, VCA's planners worked furiously to adapt to an ever-changing task organization. With every new timeline and time-phased force deployment listing, VCA planners reworked the FASP. VCA had to develop a plan to satisfy all corps-level fire support requirements with a single FA battalion.

VCA, again, modified the master plan just days before the line of departure (LD), incorporating the newly arrived 1-27 FA (MLRS) of the 41st FA Brigade from Germany. This unit reported combat ready less than 48 hours before executing its first fire mission.

Each of the two divisions--the 3d Division and 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)--received a reinforcing FA brigade, each had a brigade headquarters with one MLRS battalion. The original plans envisioned six FA brigades to provide supporting fires.

Changes were not limited to task organization, however. Each alteration of the plan had a ripple effect, creating a new set of problems and an increasing amount of coordination to accommodate the revised scheme of maneuver. Target sets changed daily, and the G2 (intelligence section) worked with the fires and effects coordination cell (FECC) to update existing fire plans based on the latest intelligence reports. The G3 (operations section) continued to update the FASP, relentlessly tracking changes to the corps plan. The G4 (logistics section) constantly revised the allocation of limited resources with each change. The G6 (communications section) faced perhaps the greatest challenge: determining voice and digital communications for a variety of units spread over a battlefield hundreds of kilometers in size.

VCA Communications. Communications were a restrictive factor throughout the planning process.

Mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) networks required units establish [C.sup.2] nodes within line-of-sight distance no greater than 30 kilometers from established node centers across the battlefield. These MSE "lily pads" allowed units to establish connectivity and served as the primary means of communication within the corps. Each FA brigade maneuvered from one lily pad to another, thus retaining MSE connectivity. Terrain and airspace management in the vicinity of these node centers became quite a challenge as units converged on them.

In the case of the 214th FA Brigade, it moved farther and faster than the node centers supporting it. Only by using the attached TSC-93C satellite communications team was the 214th FA Brigade able to maintain MSE communications on the battlefield independently of the node centers.

Assigning one TSC-93C team to each FA brigade would prove extremely valuable in operations requiring rapid maneuver over extended distances. Additionally, assigning two small-extension node (SEN) teams to each FA brigade and at least one SEN team per FA battalion in future conflicts would greatly facilitate the continuity of digital communications over a large battlefield. Integrating these assets into peacetime training events would enhance the effectiveness of this organization for combat.

V Corps used PRC-150 high-frequency (HF) radio systems as an alternate means of long-range communications. Many of the challenges associated with the HF radios resulted from the late fielding of the system and the inexperience of soldiers using them. The dipole antenna, which was the most effective antenna for the HF radios, required a large amount of space to erect. This required us to reconfigure the corps main command post (CMAIN) antenna farm.

The HF radios with the dipole antenna allowed the force FA headquarters in Camp Virginia, Kuwait, to communicate with the 214th FA Brigade Headquarters at the Baghdad International Airport, more than 540 kilometers away. Employing HF radios and developing the means to transmit data via such systems would improve future corps artillery [C.sup.2] options on distant and expansive battlefields.

VCA also used single-channel tactical satellite (TACSAT) communications when MSE was not established. This system worked well but was susceptible to interference, which made positioning the antenna critical. Competition for space in the immediate vicinity of the CMAIN frequently inhibited positioning the antenna most effectively.

V Corps deep operations validated the requirement for a reliable, corps-level fires single-channel TACSAT net. Any effort to obtain the ability to pass digital advanced FA tactical data system (AFATDS), Version 7.0, traffic reliably over TACSAT would improve the Army's [C.sup.2] in deep operations significantly.

Coordination for Land and Airspace. Position areas for artillery (PAA) presented a unique set of challenges and illustrates the coordination inherent in every facet of the operation.

Each PAA was developed with a specific target set in mind and, thus, required close coordination with the G2. The MSE lily pad approach to communications severely restricted maneuver and PAA choices because the G6 could only support a PAA if it were close enough to a node center.

Army airspace command and control ([A.sup.2][C.sup.2]) cleared the airspace, while the division terrain manager cleared maneuver space. Each time a clearance conflict arose, the process began anew with the VCA G3's selecting a new area and, in turn, each section's reworking the plan. This iterative revising process consumed precious time, while VCA kept subordinate units apprised of the changes to the plan using tenuous long-range communications.

Throughout all phases of the operation, the close interaction between the FECC, force FA headquarters and [A.sup.2][C.sup.2] cell proved invaluable. Several situations arose that required immediate ATACMS fires in support of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and corps-level high-payoff targets (HPTs). These situations called for setting up a PAA restricted operating zone (ROZ) over the firing unit and ensuring the airspace was cleared to fire. The units were overwhelming successful in delivering ATACMS in a safe and timely manner because of several months of training with [A.sup.2][C.sup.2] leading up to OIF and familiarity with the personnel and TTPs to clear the fires.

With airspace clearance procedures in place and the communications network with the FA brigades set, VCA was poised to shape the battlefield with lethal ATACMS fires and place the operations plan into action.

VCA planners worked vigorously to determine the most effective means to incorporate the FA brigades into the V Corps plan. The revised plan had the 214th FA Brigade general support reinforcing (GSR) to the 3d Division, so the brigade participated in the corps artillery time-on-target (TOT) and crossed the LD the following day with the 3d Division in the east. The 41st FA Brigade provided reinforcing fires to the 101st Division Artillery (Div Arty), participating in the TOT and then crossed the LD with the 101st Division in the west.

FA units began to occupy attack positions on 18 March under the careful direction of the VCA staff. The VCA G2 continued to work an aggressive counterfire plan, developing extended-range radar coverage in support of the corps requirement for a "Hot" ATACMS battery that could respond in 15 minutes.

The VCA G4 began pushing ammunition forward, even before the first shot w as fired. It was a well-coordinated logistical plan that kept the batteries armed.

With the two FA brigades in position and ready to provide synchronized fires from different PAAs, VCA conducted final preparations for A-Day fires.

Combat Ops. On 201519ZMAR03, 2-4 FA (MLRS) executed fire plan "Unitary." The 13 unitary ATACMS fired represented V Corps' opening salvo in OIF, which was synchronized with CENTCOM's initial cruise missile strikes into Baghdad. The targets were corps, division, corps artillery and division artillery command posts from Al Basrah to An Nasiriyal to Al Amarah--some 210 kilometers away. (See the map on Page 3.)

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Hours later, 2-4 FA unleashed fire plan "Cherry": 24 Block 1 ATACMS fired at 1930Z. The targets were 11th Infantry Division air defense artillery (ADA) assets and the division's counterbattery assets (preemptive) 140 to 180 kilometers away near An Nasiriyah.

2-4 FA then executed suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) plan "Carrot" at 2016Z against 11th Division ADA and ground forces' fighting positions, launching 24 missiles (23 Block 1 and one Block 1A) up to 180 kilometers. This completed the 214th FA Brigade's opening fires. 2-4 FA returned to its previous attack position thus permitting the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) to preposition breach assets in the battalion's former firing position.

Finally, the 41st FA Brigade and 1-39 FA executed fire plan "I MEF" at 2026Z, which were preemptive counterbattery strikes against the Iraqi's 11th and 14th Infantry Division Artilleries and the 6th Tank Division Artillery positioned from Al Basrah to An Nasiriyah, 60 to 125 kilometers away. 1-27 FA fired 22 Block 1 missiles from its firing point, while 1-39 FA, the 3d Division's MLRS battalion, fired six Block 1 missiles. After executing this plan, the 41st FA Brigade prepared to move the next morning.

A-Day fires shaped Iraq's 11th Infantry Division by disrupting its command and control and denying it the ability to mass indirect fires above the battery level--the MLRS and ATACMS fires' effectiveness are unquestionable. By the next day, the division had ceased to exist as a coherent fighting force.

V Corps maneuver units crossed the LD at 0300Z on 21 March with FA assets trailing closely behind. Coalition units put several months of planning into action and were on their way to Baghdad. The move toward Baghdad was slowed due to the poor road network, frequent chokepoints and large volume of vehicles moving along and through the chokepoints. These constraints forced the force FA headquarters to create hasty firing points along the route and deconflict air routes and land management with other units on short notice.

One effective means to work around the movement problem was to echelon the batteries moving north. This required a battalion [C.sup.2] node to remain with the firing battery in a hasty PAA created by the force FA headquarters while the remainder of the FA brigade continued on to the predetermined firing position.

In the first 36 hours of the operation, positioning the force FA ATACMS forward in zone to support setting the conditions against the Medina Division took precedence over guaranteeing a continuous firing capability during movement. After that, VCA ensured continuous ATACMS fires by echeloning firing units along a series of cleared corps PAAs.

Revised corps plans called for a deep attack the evening of 23 March. It was clear the 214th FA Brigade could not reach its designated firing point in time to support the SEAD plan. The staff set to work planning a series of PAAs progressively farther south for the 214th to occupy, but, given existing target sets, the PAAs soon reached the maximum range of the Block 1 missile.

Per guidance from the VCA G3, the brigade commander estimated his limit of advance (LOA) based on accelerated movement and radioed the proposed grid location of the PAA to VCA operations. The VCA staff worked rapidly and soon cleared the airspace over the position that was within Block 1 range of all but one target.

As a result, the brigade successfully executed SEAD plan "Beet" at 2100Z, firing 29 Block 1 and 3 Block 1A missiles in support of the 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment's (AHR's) deep attack. The 214th FA Brigade fired at Medina Republican Guard Division maneuver and artillery assets between Hillah and Al Haswah, some 140 to 165 kilometers away from the brigade's positions 65 kilometers west of As Samawah.

The 214th FA Brigade remained in position that night, and the Hot battery delivered four Block 1 and five Block 1A missiles in support of immediate targets before midnight.

On 25 March, the 214th FA Brigade continued to execute immediate targets and, by just after noon, had fired 16 Block 1 and four Block 1A missiles. VCA responded to ammunition shortages by shifting responsibility for planned fires to the 41st FA Brigade.

1-27 FA combined with 2-4 FA, both several miles south of An Najaf, to fire plan "Mango" at 1245Z; the former fired 12 Block 1 missiles, while the latter fired six Block 1 missiles. The targets were Medina Division maneuver and artillery.

The 41st FA Brigade executed SEAD fire plan "101SEA01" at 2055Z, firing 10 Block 1 missiles in support of the 101st Division's attack aviation. The missiles struck Medina Division ADA systems and visual observation posts 125 to 195 kilometers away in the vicinity of Karbala, Al Hillah and Al Haswah.

Both brigades then received a change of mission. The 214th FA Brigade assumed a reinforcing role to the 3d Div Arty and moved to PAA Jackson in the 3d Division's zone north of the escarpment and 30 kilometers south of Karbala. The 41st FA Brigade reverted to GSR and occupied the 214th's PAA 53, 15 kilometers west-northwest of An Najaf, after the 214th FA Brigade moved forward.

Both brigades were positioned forward in support of the LD planned for 30 March. 2-4 FA fired seven immediate targets with Block 1 missiles striking two radars in An Najaf, one ADA system 10 kilometers southeast of Markab Airfield and one surface-to-surface missile 15 kilometers southwest of Baghdad International Airport. These were the only ATACMS fired that day before the battalion moved forward.

The day ended with the 214th FA Brigade in its 3d Division attack position, green on ammunition, and the 41st FA Brigade's completing final preparations for movement and ammunition resupply. With the change in mission, the 214th FA Brigade had to maintain one Hot ATACMS battery.

2-4 FA moved forward from PAA Jackson into attack positions 15 kilometers southwest of Karbala, and VCA synchronized follow-on movement and positioning with the 3d Division. At day's end, the battalion was poised at the Karbala Gap, ready to provide reinforcing fires in support of 3d Division attacks.

The 41st FA Brigade remained in PAA 53 to provide ATACMS fires. 1-27 FA executed fire plan "FP8IMEF," a preemptive strike against Medina Republican Guard Division Artillery 55 kilometers southeast of Baghdad at 0505Z. The brigade fired four Block 1 missiles in support of these MEF deep targets. Later in the day, the brigade executed fire plan "FP9IMEF," firing 11 more Block 1 missiles for I MEF preemptively against the Baghdad Division Artillery and the remnants of the Al Nida Division Artillery 30 kilometers east of Baghdad. 1-27 FA fired at these targets 125 to 140 kilometers from its position 60 kilometers south-southwest of An Najaf.

On 5 April, the 214th FA Brigade occupied a position at the Baghdad International Airport as the 3d Division secured the airport; B/2-4 FA was the designated Block 1A Hot battery.

VCA had committed the 214th FA Brigade to the counterfire fight while the 41st FA Brigade focused on ATACMS fires. The 41st Brigade executed SEAD plan "Lemon" at 0745Z in support of the 11th AHR; it fired 10 Block 1 missiles at ADA systems and visual observation posts 40 kilometers southwest of Buhayrat Ar Razzazah Lake 87 kilometers away. SEAD plan "Dest04" followed at 1357Z; the 41st Brigade fired 15 Block 1 missiles in support of the 101st Division, attacking Medina Division ADA and maneuver assets southwest of Al Fallujah 100 to 120 kilometers away. Six more Block 1 missiles in support of 101st immediate targets closed out the fires.

The VCA headquarters then directed the 41st FA Brigade to push a firing battery and radar forward to an airfield nine kilometers north of Iskandariyah, posturing the brigade to provide counterfire in support of the 101st Division's forward operating base in the same vicinity. Both brigades were set, and VCA planned no movements for the next 24 to 48 hours.

On 7 April, the 3d Division battled for control of key government buildings in Baghdad's center. The 214th FA Brigade continued to provide reinforcing fires and counterfire from the Baghdad airport, and the 41st FA Brigade remained in position. As the city tell to Coalition Forces, VCA's planning shifted much farther to the north. With organized resistance all but eliminated, VCA still was responsible for ATACMS fires in support of Coalition Forces, but no more were executed.

Lessons of OIF. Throughout the operation, both FA brigades executed fire missions flawlessly and engaged several CFLCC and corps-level targets. From the time the 3d Division began offensive operations until the fall of Baghdad, VCA units fired 414 ATACMS and numerous rockets, helping to bring about the regime's collapse and annihilation of the Iraqi army. The result was overwhelming success. We learned several fire mission processing techniques and standing operating procedures (SOPs) along the way to streamline and enhance the corps artillery's effectiveness in engaging targets.

Close Air Support (CAS) for Counterfire. A few key issues arose as VCA began executing fire plans and engaging various targets of opportunity. One issue was the reliance on CAS for counterfire rather than the more responsive ATACMS. Contrary to recent reports that stated CAS was more timely for counterfire, it often took too long to be very effective in engaging targets. CAS typically took 30 minutes to attack the targets that were handed off to them for prosecution. These targets could have been serviced much more quickly with ATACMS.

ATACMS would have been effective against the large number of towed artillery systems on the battlefield; however, ATACMS requires a dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) payload to provide deep counterfire capabilities against the armored and self-propelled artillery systems.

ATACMS should be employed as a first option against enemy indirect fire assets when the acquiring system provides the necessary target location error.

Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS). To process targets and create missions, the V Corps FECC experienced success in employing ADOCS, an advanced concept technology demonstration (ACTD) software. ADOCS provides a suite of tools that works in conjunction with AFATDS to allow the commander to visualize the battlefield in near real-time.

ADOCS is not a stand-alone system. Its information is only as good as the information within the systems that it draws from: global command and control system-Army (GCCS-A), AFATDS the Air Force's theater battle management core system (TBMCS), all-source analysis system (ASAS), etc.

Using ADOCS, the VCA commander and the corps chief of staff visualized target sets from the air tasking order (ATO), discussed ATACMS targeting viewed the counterfire battle and saw the corps focus of fires.

Some of the most powerful uses of ADOCS during the war included aviation fire support officers' (FSOs') building SEAD plans, Judge Advocate General (JAG) lawyers' advising commanders and in association with unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) feeds. The JAG section used ADOCS to cross reference the no-strike list (NSL) with satellite imagery and then discuss collateral damage estimate concerns with the commander before fires were executed.

The aviation FSO built SEAD plans based on real-time electronic intelligence (ELINT) acquisitions plotted against the aviation routes and then built the fire plans into ADOCS. The fire plans were passed to the air defense artillery (ADA) liaison officer (LNO) for analysis and the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) for collateral damage estimate analysis.

Once the fire plan was in the system, the air support operations center (ASOC) could view the impact points and adjust the CAS stack accordingly. The visualization of the impact points and route also helped the fire support NCO (FSNCO) coordinate closed kill boxes with the battlefield coordination detachment (BCD) to clear air interdiction (AI) traffic out of the airspace.

Because the information resided on a server, each section could coordinate its piece of the SEAD plan simultaneously. In addition, SEAD plans remained in the system to track the areas that might have unexploded ordnance later.

Clearing ATACMS Fires. Upon receiving the mission and before executing fire plans, clearance of ATACMS fires with the Air Force was important. Again, training and practicing together paid off as the interaction between the two was very effective. Instances where interaction between the ASOC and the FECC were critical were supporting the attack aviation deep attacks and fighting within Baghdad.

During the 101st Division's armed reconnaissance, the assistant fire support coordinator (AFSCOORD) coordinated directly with the air boss to keep CAS orbiting in close proximity to the target area while outside of the hazard area for ATACMS. Normally, the airborne warning and control system (AWACS) cleared the airspace between the firing platoon and the target hazard area. The close coordination permitted the ASOC to push aircraft into the airspace immediately after the mission to attack the suppressed target while maintaining spatial separation from the AH-64 helicopters.

ATACMS Range Limitations and Effects. Another issue that VCA faced was the constant planning for the range limitations and effects of Block 1 and Block 1A munitions around friendly troops and civilian targets. Current MLRS range and precision limitations did not allow units to fire close to friendly troops or in areas of potential collateral damage.

On three separate missions, VCA units were tasked to support maneuver divisions with rocket fires. During these missions, rocket fires were not employed because of the collateral damage implications of DPICM. Additionally, due to range limitations, more precise cannon units were not in position to engage ground targets. The range of the M26 also placed M270 units at a disadvantage when encountering enemy long-range artillery.

If the artillery is to make itself a viable option for close support missions, the production and delivery of guided multiple-launch rocket system unitary needs to be expedited to provide commanders increased range and precision.

Conclusion. The corps artillery worked closely with corps planners to ensure all CFLCC and corps essential fire support tasks (EFSTs) were achieved. The FA played an integral part in the regime collapse and reduced the number of American soldiers subjected to attack by Iraqi artillery, armor and air defense assets. Artillery effects on these targets as well as the demoralizing effects of barrages of artillery on the enemy's morale and will to fight were an extremely lethal and effective combination. Maneuver units were rarely subjected to enemy indirect fire and both Army aviation and fixed-wing aircraft received negligible anti-aircraft fire throughout the campaign. We were able to use the UAV to watch the lethal effects of our ATACMS fires on Astro IIs and other targets.

However, the greatest testament to the power and effectiveness of artillery on the battlefield may have come from an intelligence intercept of an Iraqi soldier professing that artillery fires had discouraged the Iraqi forces' will to fight and man their air defense systems--when they light up their ADA, it tended to be their last act.

With the cessation of hostilities, V Corps units quickly transitioned to conducting SASO operations across Iraq. Initial corps long-term planning focused on using FA assets as the nucleus of humanitarian assistance teams by capitalizing on the [C.sup.2] and line-haul capacities in FA battalions. VCA units prepared to fulfill a distinctly different and challenging role as the corps artillery headquarters took the lead in hauling enemy ammunition and arms out of Baghdad to keep it out of enemy hands.

The FA community must consider nonstandard missions as routine. SASO is a large part of the Army's worldwide missions and both direct support battalions and general support brigades are being assigned those missions.

VCA deployed to Iraq well-trained and ready. An outstanding team was assembled from units in III Corps, V Corps, and XVIII Airborne Corps to form V Corps Artillery during OIF. The flexibility and forward thinking of VCA soldiers provided leaders the ability to quickly adapt to a very fluid plan once ground hostilities commenced.

OIF is one likely template for how America will wage modern war: months of planning, days of hostilities and years of SASO to rebuild the former enemy nation.

RELATED ARTICLE: V Corps Artillery Training for War.

The V Corps Warfighter exercise in March-April 2002 used the same terrain and possible combat scenario as in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The exercises continued in August with a corps artillery command post exercise (CPX) driving a maneuver rights exercise (MRE) for the 41st Field Artillery Brigade in the vicinity of the Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany.

One month later, V Corps Artillery (VCA) deployed for victory Strike, a corps-level exercise in Poland. Victory Strike provided an external evaluation (EXEVAL) for the 11th Attack Aviation Regiment (AHR) and the 1st Battalion, 27th Field Artillery (1-27 FA), the multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) battalion in the 41st Field Artillery Brigade. It was a simulations-driven exercise that had a deep operations battle rhythm.

While still executing Victory Strike, the VCA began deploying a robust package of support personnel and equipment to Kuwait for the Coalition Forces Land Component Command's (CFLCC's) exercise Lucky Warrior in October; the force FA Headquarters, and fires and effects coordination cell (FECC) followed in late November for the Central Command's (CENTCOM's) exercise Internal look. Both exercises were conducted in Camp Virginia, Kuwait, to refine tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for the combined arms team that had never worked together.

While leaving a functioning corps headquarters with its fire support systems in place at Camp Virginia, the majority of VCA redeployed with the corps staff to Germany in late December in preparation for exercise Victory Scrimmage scheduled for late January. This exercise focused on building the future corps combat team and validating TTPs the Victor. Corps would use. Within days of completing the Battle Command Training Program- (BCTP)-driven exercise, the VCA staff began redeploying to Kuwait to man the corps FECC and force FA headquarters in response to the growing threat of hostilities.

Colonel Theodore J. Janosko commanded V Corps Artillery (VCA) during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and has been extended in command for a third year. He is also the Victory Corps Fire Support Coordinator (FSCOORD). In addition to VCA, he commanded the 30th Field Artillery Regiment in Training Command, Fort Sill, Oklahoma; the 1st Battalion, 319th Field Artillery (1-319 FA), 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; and two batteries. He has worked in every level of fire support elements (FSEs) from company to corps. He also served as the Executive Officer of 2-41 FA, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) in the Persian Gulf during Operation Desert Storm, and later commanded the battalion during its deactivation.

Lieutenant Colonel Robert G. Cheatham, Jr., is the Chief of Staff of VCA and served as the Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, for VCA during OIF. In addition, in the 1st Armored Division in Germany, he was the S3 of the 1st Armored Division Artillery; S3 of 2-3 FA, deploying with the battalion in Kosovo Force Rotation 2A (KFOR2A); and the Division Fires Planner. In the 2d Infantry Division in Korea, he was in 1-15 FA as the Fire Support Officer for the 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry and as a Battery Commander.