The siege of Yorktown: joint and multinational operations in the American revolution. (Revolutionary War).

Currently and perhaps even more in the future, the US finds itself at the center of a coalition to fight a war against the enemies of freedom. Our military adheres to four basic tenets of multinational operations: respect, rapport, knowledge of partners and patience. (1) The Yorktown campaign in 1871 during the American Revolution provides the modern Redleg an excellent example of these principles and the effects that successful implementation can provide.

Background. General George Washington fretted in camp outside of New York. Although the French had promised men and money, they had not arrived. His army was dwindling. Completely frustrated with the lack of pay and supplies, his troops were near mutiny.

Meanwhile, a large British Army still held one of the most important cities in America, the port city of New York. Sir Henry Clinton, the Commander-in-Chief of British forces in America, remained in the New York harbor. There he indulged in the good graces of his mistress and argued through letters with General Charles Cornwallis over the conduct of the war in the south.

Cornwallis had convinced the high command in Great Britain, largely through his political connections, that the focus of the British effort should be in the southern colonies. Despite several battlefield victories, he had been ineffective.

After the disastrous American defeat at Camden and recognizing the shift in British strategy, Washington had replaced Horatio Gates with his best general, Nathaniel Greene, as commander of American forces in the south. Greene took full advantage of the terrain and guerrilla warfare to delay, attrit and stifle Cornwallis' Army.

Cornwallis was dumbfounded with the efforts of Greene's militia under Thomas Sumter and Francis Marion against his supply lines, communications centers and isolated garrisons. He decided the best course-of-action was to march to Virginia.

To Cornwallis, Virginia was the center of the colonial war effort. Left untouched by the war, except for a few raids from the traitor General Benedict Arnold and the British artillerymen General Phillips, Virginia was the heart of the revolution.

Suffering from battlefield losses and detached garrisons, Cornwallis sought to link up with the forces of Arnold and Phillips that had been operating in Virginia. After inspecting the Virginia coast, he found a suitable and somewhat defensible port at Yorktown, a few miles from the old Virginia capital of Williamsburg.

Washington's young, confident and able subordinate, General Marquis de Lafayette, had done an admirable job of shielding the interior of Virginia from Cornwallis. Lafayette had learned from Washington's Fabian tactics and avoided and shadowed the British Army, steering it to the coastline. Meanwhile, the French Army under Rochambeau had arrived at Newport to reinforce Washington's Army in front of New York.

Lafayette and his troops were successful in protecting Virginia from attack by Cornwallis' Army. Cornwallis stalled in Yorktown. The rigorous tussles with General Greene in the south, the demonstrations of Lafayette, the ever-arriving orders from General Clinton and the need to resupply and refit his army with provisions via the British Navy all prevented Cornwallis from conducting offensive operations.

Initial Movements. Washington wanted nothing more than to act against New York, believing the British Army under Clinton was the enemy center of gravity. Understanding the intentions of the French Fleet, his French counterparts urged an attack into the south. Respectfully demurring, Washington abandoned his ideas against New York and built a deceptive plan to begin his march south without revealing his hand to Clinton in New York.

General Clinton realized too late that Washington and Rochambeau moved the American and French Armies south into Virginia with Cornwallis' Army as its objective. He promised Cornwallis reinforcements that would arrive much too late.

Washington understood the importance of the relationship with his French allies, particularly how the French warships would play an essential role in local naval superiority. Consequently, he fostered a brilliant relationship with the Count de Rochambeau, who was his superior in military experience. Because of Rochambeau's admiration for Washington and his appreciation of his abilities, he subordinated the French to American command.

Rochambeau was a man who was very intimate with the siege and the artillery. He had been a hero at the battle of Laufeldt, where he was wounded by grapeshot at the siege of Maestrich. He masterfully handled the siege artillery during the capture of Fort St. Philip at Port Mahon. (2) Washington wisely and respectfully listened to the advice and counsel of the French, including Rochambeau, who were much more experienced with the complexities of naval/land combined operations.

Washington sent Colonel John Lamb's artillery from its station at Dobb's Ferry to King's Ferry on the west bank of the river and then to Philadelphia. Washington wrote in his diary, "As our intentions could be concealed one march more (under the idea of marching to Sandy Hook to facilitate the entrance of the French Fleet within the Bay), the whole Army was put into motion in three columns; the left consisted of the Light Infantry, First York Regiment and the Regiment of Rhode Island; the middle column consisted of the Parke, Stores and Baggage, Lambs Regiment of Artillery, Hazens and the Corps of Sappers and Miners; the right column consisted of the whole French Army, Baggage, Stores.... This last was to march by Rout of Morristown...." (3)

On 31 August 1781, the artillery companies from West Point, under Major Sebastian Bauman, joined the main artillery train.

Fortunately, the alliance with France paid huge dividends with the French Naval victory over the British at the Battle of the Capes on 5 September 1781. This action pushed the British Fleet back to New York for repairs. With naval superiority achieved on 10 September, the heavy artillery was loaded onto Admiral de Battas' Fleet in order to link up with the main force farther south. (4)

Leaders and Guns. General Fredrich yon Steuben, the hero and drillmaster of Valley Forge, was the American officer with the most siege experience under Washington at Yorktown. Well-rehearsed officers of the engineers and artillery also surrounded him. Such veterans of the sieges of Boston and Quebec included General Henry Knox, Washington's Chief of Artillery, and Colonel Lamb. Also present was the notable engineer, Louis Duportail.

Knox and Duportail formed an excellent liaison team with the French Naval forces under Admiral De Grasse. In fact, they and Washington persuaded the French admiral to stay in the York River, effectively sealing off the seaward route of retreat, despite the Admiral's worries of an attack by a combined British Fleet.

The force of allied artillery under Washington and Rochambeau was considerable. General Henry Knox commanded two regiments of Continental Artillery consisting of 91 officers and 711 other cannoneers. The French train had six artillery companies. (5)

Lieutenant Colonel D'Aboville commanded the French Artillery. He was a seasoned veteran of the War of Austrian Succession and had proven his ability by being particularly distinguished during the Seven Years War.

Captain George Rochfort commanded the British Artillery at Yorktown. He had served near New York under General James Pattison, commander of the Royal Artillery in America, until his battery was selected to go south with General Cornwallis. He was a veteran of the most important British victory so far, the successful siege of Charleston. At Yorktown, Rochfort commanded 11 officers and 226 enlisted men in 14 batteries with 65 guns. Some of these pieces were iron naval 18-pounders served by officers and men of the Charon, notably British Navy Lieutenant Bartholomew James. (6)

The Action. Unfavorable winds delayed the small French Fleet that sailed from Philadelphia under de Barras. However, the fleet with the siege guns arrived on the James River on 25 September 1781. Colonel Lamb quickly surveyed and selected the disembarkation site at Trebel's Landing. On 27-28 September 1781, the American and French Armies arrived and established themselves within a mile of the British prepared fortifications. This effectively sealed off the British from the landward avenues of retreat. (7)

Because of his relatively few troops and the difficulty of defending extended lines, Cornwallis, over the objection of some of his officers, withdrew from his outer works and closed in on the town of York.

Many historians and even some of his general officers criticized this move. However, considering the number of cannons at his disposal and, more importantly, the limited number of trained crews to operate the pieces, holding the outer works would not allow the mutually supporting cannon fires required to protect each battery along the line.

The outer works were arranged in a convex arc. On these outer works, the British Army stretched across frontal field works covering approximately 5,000 yards.

Enfilade fires were required for defensible batteries. Each battery needed at least six guns, each within a supportable range of at least 500 yards of another. This requirement alone created a minimum need for 10 cannon batteries of six guns each--60 cannons--to simply cover the main works. Redoubts and outer works also required cannons.

When the British withdrew to the inner works (approximately 2,000-yard frontage), they erected 14 batteries for its defense. They only had pieces and crews to service a total of 65 guns, which included the iron naval 18-pounders stripped from ships.

Cornwallis' withdrawal was most likely decided with advice from his artillerists and engineers and allowed the British Army to mount a much stronger defense against both assault and siege. It provided the best opportunity for his works and batteries to be effectively covered and supported by cannon fire. He must have counted on the howitzers and mortars to cover the dead space and main avenues of approach.

It is unlikely that the British had 60 12-pound cannons. Many of Cornwallis' cannons were probably smaller field guns with a less effective range, which increased the enfilade fire requirements and left batteries and works uncovered.

Knox wrote to his wife, "Yesterday [31 September 1781] the enemy evacuated their outposts, which gives us a considerable advantage in point of time. Our prospects are good, and we shall soon hope to impress our haughty foe with a respect for the continental arms." (8)

The first battery to open on the British works was a French battery Of four 12-pounders and six mortars and howitzers. They pummeled the extreme right of the British line. The fusiliers' redoubt was a strong defensive work that anchored the British fortifications to the York River. The fusiliers began bombarding the British from a tree line at about 400 yards, within point blank range of 12-pound cannons. (9)

The effectiveness of the French 12-pounder at this range must have been tremendous. It would have fired a solid shot, a heavy case shot or a combination of both on the redoubt. (10)

A contemporary British artillerist and mathematician, John Muller, measured the effectiveness of a British 12-pounder at 600 yards range, using round shot, to hit its target (a screen six feet high; the rough equivalent of the redoubt height) and found it hit 100 percent of the time. (11) Therefore, it would be safe to assume that the French 12-pounder, at roughly 400 yards, with round shot would have a very high probability of hit. (12)

The gunner would have slightly elevated his piece to aim his round shot to land just over the top of the work (parapet). This allowed the remaining momentum of the cannonball to bounce and do hideous damage to heads poking up for a peek and possibly ricocheting into the redoubt itself before impacting the inside wall of the opposite face. (13)

The French Lieutenant Wiolhelm Graf von Schwerin, serving in the German contingent of the Royal Deux-Ponts Regiment wrote, "When we opened our first line of entrenchment, a lot of cannons were fired at us which did not do great damage ..." (14)

In contrast, the French fire was effective, requiring the British to abandon the position. The French also succeeded in setting several British ships on fire in the harbor with red hot shot, a devastating blow to soldiers' morale.

In his general orders, Washington maintained patience and excellent control over his guns to ensure that no ammunition was wasted. He further insisted that all fire be held until all guns could be brought up and readied for action.

The officers personally sited the pieces for the greatest accuracy. Additionally, senior American artillerists rotated duty as artillery officer of the day. Colonel Lamb's day on watch was the day that General Washington lowered the slow match over the porthole and initiated the first American fires on the British works. (15)

Observing the effectiveness of American artillery fires, perhaps General Knox remembered his pre-war readings; therefore, he knew the increased effectiveness of mortars on fortifications if the angle of fire was increased. The British Artillery theoretician, John Muller, ironically suggested this technique, (16) and Knox took advantage by constructing mortar carriages that allowed them to be fired at a higher angle than the normal 45 degrees. These modified mortar carriages provided more downward force upon impact because of the increased angle of fall. (17)

The British Army desperately held to its works, bottled up in Yorktown by land and sea and suffering the effects of overwhelming Allied firepower. On 11 October 1781, General Cornwallis wrote to his superior commander in New York, "The enemy made their first parallel on the night of the 6th at the distance of 600 yards and have perfected it and constructed places of arms and batteries with great regularity and caution. On the evening of the 9th, their batteries opened and have since continued firing without intermission with about 40 pieces of cannon, mostly heavy, and 16 mortars ... many of our works are considerably damaged; with such works on disadvantageous ground against so powerful an attack, we cannot hope to make a very long resistance." (18)

On the left side of the British lines were two advanced redoubts, Numbers 9 and 10. These redoubts anchored the left side of the British works to the York River. In order to force the British position, the Allied leaders knew they would have to take the redoubts. Furthermore, the redoubts quickly could be added to a second parallel siege line much closer to the main British works. This second parallel would make Allied artillery fire more effective at only 300 yards, (19) Therefore, Washington decided that a limited assault could secure this important objective.

Understanding the need to share the glory with his French allies, Washington picked troops from both armies to conduct the assault. On the designated night, Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Hamilton, a former artillery officer and the aide to Washington, was the field officer of the day and insisted on a command in the assault. General Washington granted the request. Hamilton would lead one of the battalions under Lafayette's overall command.

The rapid fire from six howitzers signaled the attack, and nighttime covered the movements. Bayonets were fixed, hearts were thumping and each man was straining his eyes to maintain sight of the soldier in front of him. They knew their mission was a difficult one, a "forlorn hope."

But it was a quick affair with few losses by the Allies and many British prisoners captured. The French and Americans celebrated their mutual victories over Redoubts 9 and 10 by working overnight to incorporate them into the Allied parallel.

With the addition of these positions, the noose had tightened on the British in Yorktown. Cornwallis knew his position was untenable. The British did salvage some of their honor by coordinating an effective assault to spike French guns under the cover of darkness. The guns were back into action almost immediately.

The British would not surrender without attempting an escape onto boats into the York River under the cover of darkness. Nevertheless, the winds and rain of a wonderful storm prevented their success. Under a slow drumbeat and a single British officer waving a white kerchief, a meeting was arranged, and the beginning of the end had arrived. Colonel Lamb commanded the artillery the day that Cornwallis beat a parley and signaled the ending of hostilities. (20)

Lessons for Today. What lessons can the Battle of Yorktown offer artillerymen today?

Exploitation, Liaison and Unity of Command. First, modern artillerymen can realize through an examination of the Battle of Yorktown the importance of effective joint and allied operations. Yorktown provides a great example of their effectiveness. This effectiveness can be summarized in three points: exploitation of advantages, effective use of liaison and the principle of unity of command.

Joint/allied operations capitalize on the capabilities and advantages that each arm of service and (or) allied force can provide. In the case of Yorktown, it was the naval superiority of the French that provided Washington the opportunity to trap Cornwallis' Army on the banks of the river at Yorktown.

The mobility and protection of transport vessels provided by the French Fleet allowed Washington to move many of his heavy siege guns by water. This allowed a speedy arrival of artillery material in theater and bypassed the enumerable problems associated with ground transportation over rough roads.

The understanding of cultural differences by the use of effective liaison teams and the stress on the unity of effort established by Washington mirrors current US Army doctrine on multinational operations. (21)

The Battle of Yorktown illustrates the importance and effectiveness of unity of command. It would have been easy for Rochambeau to control and coordinate the operational movement of his forces. However, he chose to place himself completely under the command of General Washington. When the British General O'Hara, out of shame, attempted to surrender to Rochambeau after Yorktown, he simply directed him to Washington, reflecting professionalism and the respect essential for unity of command.

General Knox wrote after the siege, "This important affair has been affected by the most harmonious concurrence of circumstances that could possibly have happened: a fleet and troops from the West Indies, under the orders of one of the best men in the world; an army of American and French troops marching from the North River--500 miles--and the fleet of Count de Barras, all joining so exactly in point of time as to render what has happened almost certain." (22)

Artillery and Engineer Efforts. The Battle of Yorktown, indeed the entire American Revolution, provides the modern Redleg numerous examples of the close coordination needed between engineering efforts and artillery fires. On both sides of the conflict, particularly at Yorktown, fields of fire were clear; embrasures, gabions, fascines, escarpments and platforms were constructed in order to bring the most effective fire against enemy positions.

Engineers designed and supervised the construction of the works. Artillerymen designed and supervised the destruction of those works--material and troops through cannon, mortar and howitzer fire. Engineers and artillerymen won the Battle of Yorktown, and consequently, the American Revolution, through effective synchronization and coordination of works and fires.

Urban Warfare. Perhaps most imminently applicable lesson we can learn from the Battle of Yorktown is Washington's approach to conducting warfare in and around cities. Washington, as it has been shown, used a detailed and systematic approach to the siege of Yorktown. His most important approach was to use well-coordinated and overwhelming firepower with limited, well-planned and well-lead assaults to seize key terrain. Firepower supported these assaults, and the terrain was then incorporated into the larger system of works.

It also should be noted that Washington assembled a massive force overwhelming in its numbers and strength at Yorktown. (23) In fact, this alone significantly contributed to the eventual capitulation of Cornwallis.

Particularly hopeful, recently our military leaders have expressed their reliance on such techniques. (24) Perhaps they've been studying their history as well.

Endnotes:

(1.) Joint Publication (JP) 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, 14 November 2000), vii.

(2.) Albert Durfee McJoynt, "Rochambeau," Gorget & Sash: Journal of Early Modern Warfare, 3 (1990). Available online at http://www.xenophongroup.com/mcjoynt/rochamb.htm.

(3.) John C. Fitzpatrick, Editor The Diaries of George Washington 1748-1799: Vol. II, 1771-1785 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1925), 257.

(4.) Isaac O. Leake, Memoir of the Life and Times of General John Lamb (New York: Da Capo, 1971), 277.

(5.) Robert K. Wright, Jr., The Continental Army (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2000), 168.

(6.) James Pattison, "Official Letters of Major General James Pattison, as Commandant of the Royal Artillery in North America," Collections of the New York Historical Society (New York: 1875), 218. Brendan Morrissey, Yorktown 1781: The World Turned Upside Down (Oxford: Osprey, 2001), 26, 34. Burke Davis, The Campaign that Won America: The Story of Yorktown (Eastern National, 2000), 143.

(7.) Leake, 277-78.

(8.) Francis S. Drake, The Life and Correspondence of Henry Knox (Boston: Samuel G. Drake, 1873), 69-70.

(9.) The measurements of this approximate range were taken from Plan de l'Armee de Cornwallis attaquee et faitte prisoniere dans York Town, le 19 8bre par l'Armee Combinee Francaise et Americaine ... Paris, Le Rouge, December 1781.

(10.) Major General Hughes shows that French guns would use both round and heavy case at ranges from 250 to 500 yards in Diagram 8; B.P. Hughes, Firepower: Weapons Effectiveness on the Battlefield, 1630-1850, Diagram 8 (New York: Sarpedon, 1997), 41.

(11.) Ibid., 37.

(12.) Ibid, 38. Hughes further shows that French pieces were considered more accurate than British ones due to the decreased windage. Muller's experiments with British six pounders on small targets (embrasures) at short ranges are particularly applicable. His findings show a 50 percent hit probability at 520 yards.

(13.) John Muller, A Treatise of Artillery (Ottawa, Ontario: Museum Restoration Service, 1965), 163.

(14.) Robert A. Selig, "Eyewitness to Yorktown," Military History (February 2003), 60.

(15.) Leake, 278.

(16.) Muller, 153-54. Muller also mentions that the French exercised this practice regularly. Knox may have learned it from them.

(17.) Burke Davis, The Campaign that Won America: The Story of Yorktown (Eastern National, 2000), 217.

(18.) Jeremy Black, War for America: The Fight for Independence 1775-1783 (Stroud, Gloucester, Great Britain: Sutton, 1998), 270.

(19.) 300 yards was the estimate of Dr. Thatcher, an American surgeon in Richard Wheeler, Voices of 1776: The Story of the American Revolution in the Words of Those Who Were There (New York: Meridian, 1991), 400.

(20.) Leake, 280.

(21.) JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, 10 September 2001), vi-2.

(22.) Drake, 70.

(23.) Washington had approximately 16,000 soldiers, not including militia, as compared to the 7,000 of the British, well over two-to-one odds in manpower alone.

(24.) Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, "US Refines Plan for War in Cities," New York Times (22 October 2002), 1.

Captain W. Cochran Pruett is the Battalion Fire Support Officer, 1st Battalion, 101st Aviation Brigade (Attack), 101st Airborne Division (AAslt) at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, currently deployed to Iraq in Operation Iraqi Freedom. His other assignments include Commander of A Detachment and Executive Officer of the 1st Battalion, 19th Field Artillery, both in the Field Artillery Training Center, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and Company Fire Support Officer (FSO) for the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry Battalion, 2d Infantry Division in Korea. Captain Pruett holds a BA in History from Middle Tennessee State University.