The recognition-primed decision model: an alternative to the MDMP for GWOT.

The 3rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (3rd IBCT), 10th Mountain Division, was activated on 16 September 2004 at Fort Drum, New York. The brigade's 4th Battalion, 25th Field Artillery Regiment (4-25 FAR), organized along modular lines, is its organic fires battalion.

Soon after activating with the brigade, the fires battalion leaders realized they needed a planning process that could leverage the battalion's modular capabilities and enable them to develop plans and orders rapidly in the current operating environment: the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT). The battalion commander agreed to an experiment with a new planning model, the recognition-primed decision model, to determine if it could provide the fires battalion enough agility to be effective in GWOT.

Since 4-25 FAR stood up more than a year ago, we have used this model very successfully to prepare for a future deployment to Afghanistan--including during a rotation to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana. We recommend the model as an alternative to the traditional military decision-making process (MDMP) for GWOT.

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The Army's needs in GWOT require rapid planning to produce agility and flexibility. The MDMP does not produce plans and orders quickly enough for the GWOT environment.

This article describes the recognition-primed decision model and how other battalions can use this model.

Recognition-Primed Model and MDMP Research. The recognition-primed decision model is a new planning methodology for standard orders development that is gaining a foothold in the Army. This model allows units to develop feasible plans and orders in time-constrained environments and enables friendly forces to act faster than the enemy.

As described in FM 5-0 Army Planning and Orders Production, the MDMP has been the Army's decision-making model for more than two decades. With seven steps and 117 sub-steps, it is an analytical process designed to generate the best solution from a series of options. Theoretically, the MDMP enables a commander to employ tactically sound plans that result in success on the battlefield. (1)

However, recent research reveals that the MDMP actually has the opposite outcome in many cases. The MDMP is a staff-driven regimen that inadvertently isolates the commander from developing the plan.

A group of research scientists from Klein Associates in Fairborn, Ohio, conducted studies of military organizations and planning. It made some startling discoveries.

First, the group found that, with its focus on the staff process, the MDMP separated the commander from planning in most of the reviewed cases. Thus, junior staff officers, the least experienced individuals, had to conceive a workable plan.

Second, contrary to conventional thought, the MDMP produced cautious plans that were poorly suited to the demands of the situation. Researchers attributed this to slavish compliance with the doctrinal planning template.

Lastly, the MDMP slowed an organization's operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and stifled its ability to react to rapidly changing situations. (2)

By contrast, the Klein researchers observed that the recognition-primed decision model is a dynamic alternative that can produce solutions adapted to the situation.

Model Overview. This planning model is based on a theory known as "recognition-primed decision making," which is an intuitive process through which leaders naturally make decisions. The recognition-primed decision model leverages the experience of seasoned commanders whose education and training enable them to assess situations rapidly through pattern recognition, mentally wargame courses of action (COAs) and make timely decisions.

Dr. Gary Klein and Klein Associates have conducted research for military organizations for more than two decades, focusing on how individuals and organizations make decisions. To begin his research, Dr. Klein's premise was that organizational decision making works best when systematically staffed and developed within a group. But his research led to a different conclusion, shattering preconceived views. Here is what Klein Associates found.

First, intuitive decision making uses experience to recognize the patterns in a given situation, such as for example, terrain and an enemy defensive position. Based on pattern recognition gained through training, education and experience, the leader quickly develops a COA in his head to reduce the enemy position.

Through mental wargaming, decision makers usually search for the first COA that will work in a given situation. It is experience--intuition--that enables the leader to imagine how solutions will work.

The Klein researchers found that this is a natural mode of decision making for most individuals. In contrast, the MDMP makes many leaders uncomfortable with making decisions because its formalization tends to shield the leader from the process. (3)

In light of these findings, Dr. Klein sought to develop a method of military decision making that leveraged natural human tendencies. The result was the recognition-primed decision model outlined in Figure 1.

The recognition-primed decision model is a four-step process driven by the commander. The staff helps ensure the plan is feasible, acceptable and suitable to the situation. Steps 1, 3 and 4 are similar to the respective steps of mission analysis, wargaming and orders production in the MDMP. The difference is in Step 2. As a tactical planning model, the recognition-primed decision model depends on the commander's input to push the process and save time.

Step 1. Identify the Mission and Conceptualize the COA. In this step, the traditional MDMP mission analysis remains critical to the planning process because it provides the organization and commander an understanding of the situation and the ability to visualize how to win. Based on this analysis and then his visualization of the end-of-mission, the commander can provide a single, directed COA to solve the problem at hand and press planning forward.

At the conclusion of mission analysis, the commander must provide guidance to the staff as to his vision of the battlefield. The commander's mission analysis worksheet (visualize, describe and direct) shown in Figure 2 is a tool to help him do that.

This worksheet provides the framework to help guide the commander's thoughts so he can present them in a coherent manner that makes it easy for his staff to understand. Armed with a clear statement of intent and proposed action, the staff then can move forward to Step 2.

Step 2. Test and Operationalize the COA. This step is a major departure from MDMP. Rather than the staff developing and comparing COAs, which is the major time-consumer of the MDMP, the staff adds details to the directed COA to make execution possible and then tests its validity.

Also, instead of the least-experienced leaders in the unit struggling to develop COAs, they work to operationalize the plan. (4) The staff members gain experience vicariously through observation and analysis, thus building their abilities to recognize patterns and devise solutions to complex problems.

The initial COA presented by the commander necessarily will be a skeleton and lack details. Therefore, the staff fleshes out the skeleton with details, such as timing, logistical support, decision points (DPs) and troop-to-task analysis.

It is during the development of the intricacies that the staff identifies flaws in the plan and refines it to ensure it works.

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At the conclusion of Step 2, the staff tests the COA against the "feasible, acceptable and suitable" criteria. This is the same test used in the MDMP to determine the validity of a COA.

If at this time the staff cannot reconcile the plan, it develops a workable alternative to satisfy the commander's intent. If the plan is satisfactory, the staff presents it to the commander in a COA briefing with an updated enemy situation, to include most likely and dangerous COAs; a COA sketch; a written concept statement and concept of support; a command and control architecture; and task and purpose for each subordinate unit.

Step 3. Wargame the COAs. The recognition-primed decision model progresses to wargaming in Step 3 to test the validity of the detailed COA against a thinking enemy. This step is virtually no different than wargaming in the MDMP. The key is to conduct a thorough evaluation of the COA with an unbiased enemy.

Wargaming identifies the DPs, branches and sequels to the plan. Using one of the standard methods in doctrine--box, belt or avenue-in-depth--the staff ensures the COA stands up against enemy actions.

The current environment sometimes makes it difficult to wargame because of the varied nonlinear nature of the enemy and the slow, unpredictable environment. To deal with these challenges, our experience in GWOT and planning operations has led us to recommend the DP method of wargaming, as shown in Figure 3.

In this construct, the staff uses the DPs identified in Step 2 to refine the COA. The facilitator, together with the S2, uses the If-And-Then methodology to detail the potential situations in the execution of the COA and determine the information required for the commander's decisions in each of those situations.

As the staff conducts this drill, all members synchronize and integrate their operating systems and begin building the products that will be incorporated into the operations order (OPORD), such as the synchronization matrix.

Step 4. Develop the Orders. This is the final step. The staff has steadily developed its products during the process, so by Step 4, the final order is easily collated and formulated. The assistant S3 assembles the parts into a coherent, doctrinal five-paragraph order with applicable annexes for issue at the orders briefing

The studies Klein Associates conducted have demonstrated that the recognition-primed decision model increases the tempo of developing plans and orders by about 20 percent over the MDMP. (5) The four-step recognition-primed decision model should take about six to eight hours and, under constrained conditions, four hours.

GWOT is forcing the Army to become more agile and flexible as a force. The force requires a planning process that meets those needs and enables rapid development of feasible plans and orders.

We believe that the recognition-primed decision model is a practical solution that can be implemented immediately by any unit. This model compresses planning timelines, gets the commander involved and better facilitates the natural human approach to decision making. Therefore, we offer the recognition-primed decision model as an alternative to the MDMP that can help units become more agile and flexible in prosecuting GWOT.

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Endnotes:

1. Department of the Army, FM 5-0 Army Planning and Orders Production (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2003), 3-1-3-4.

2. Karol G. Ross, Gary A. Klein, Peter Thunholm, John F. Schmitt and Holly C. Baxter, "The Recognition-Primed Decision Model," Military Review (July-August 2004), 6.

3. Ibid. and Gary Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), 30.

4. Ross, 7.

5. Ibid., 6.

Lieutenant Colonel David A. Bushey commands 4th Battalion, 25th Field Artillery Regiment (4-25 FAR), 3rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (3rd IBCT), 10th Mountain Division, at Fort Drum, New York. Among other assignments with the 10th Division, he was the Chief of Fires for the Combined Joint Task Force 180 (CJTF-180) in Bagram, Afghanistan; the Division Artillery S3; Battalion S3 for 3-6 FA; Brigade Fire Support Officer (FSO); and Assistant Fire Support Coordinator. He also was a Fire Support and Battery Observer/Controller (O/C) at the Joint Readiness Training Center, (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana. Additional deployments include Operations Hurricane Andrew Relief at Homestead, Florida; Uphold Democracy in Haiti; Joint Forge in Bosnia; and Joint Guardian in Kosovo.

Major (Promotable) Michael J. Forsyth is the Effects Coordinator for the 3rd IBCT in the 10th Division. Until recently, he had been serving as the Executive Officer and, before that, S3 for 4-25 FAR. Among other assignments, he was a Plans Officer for CJTF-180 during Operation Enduring Freedom IV; Small Group Instructor at the Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma; Fire Support and Battery O/C at the JRTC; and Battalion FSO and Battery Commander in the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky.

By Lieutenant Colonel David A. Bushey and Major Michael J. Forsyth

Input

* Situational Awareness
* Brigade Cdr's Guidance
* Mission from Higher HQ

1 Identify the mission & conceptualize COA. (1)

Bn Cdr and Staff Process:
* Staff sends alert WARNO #1 to the batteries.
* Cdr & Staff conduct full blown MA. (2)
* Cdr guides the entire process.

Staff Tools:
* Facts & Assumptions
* Limitations & Constraints
* IPB
* MCOO
* Etc.

Products:
* Restated Mission
* Directed Friendly COA
* WARNO #2 with MA Slides & Cdr's Guidance
* Enemy COA

2 Test & operationalize the COA.

Staff Process:
* Refine the details of the COA.
* Identify the flaws and correct them through analysis.
* Test the COA using "feasible, acceptable and
  suitable" criteria. (3)
* Brief the commander on the refined COA.

Products:
* Graphics
* Support Matrices
* Task Organization
* Sub-Unit Tasks
* Skeleton OPORD
* WARNO #3 with the COA Sketch

3 Wargame the COA. (1)

Planners and All Cdrs Process:
* Determine if the COA satisfies the Cdr's vision.
* Analyze whether or not the plan will hold up to enemy action.

Products:
* Synchronization Matrices
* Execution Checklists
* WARNO #4 with the Refined COA

4 Develop the orders.(1)

Staff Process:
* Write the OPORD.
* Backbrief the Cdr.

Products:
* Five-Paragraph OPORD
* Execution Matrix
* Verbal Notification of Battery Cdrs via Radio

Output

* Rehearsals
* Execution of the COA
* Assessment of the Effects

(1) Steps 1, 3 and 4 are similar to the respective steps of Mission
Analysis, Wargaming and Orders Production in the MDMP.
(2) This is critical; the commander and staff must understand the
problem to develop an effective solution.
(3)If the COA fails the "feasible, acceptable and suitable" test, then
the process loops back to Step 1 to determine an alternative COA.
Legend:
Cdr = Commander
COA = Course of Action
HQ = Headquarters
IPB = Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
MA = Mission Analysis
MCOO = Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay
OPORD = Operations Order
WARNO = Warning Order

Figure 1: Recognition-Primed Decision Model. This model is an
alternative to the more complex and time-consuming military
decision-making process (MDMP) in the Global War on Terrorism.

Visualize
 1. Enemy COA and Current Friendly Disposition (Sketch of Situation)
 2. Requirements (What We Must Do)
 3. Limitations/Constraints (What We Cannot Do or Restraints on Our
    Freedom of Action)
 4. Capabilities (What We Can Do)

Describe
 5. Commander's Battlespace--Description of What is Envisioned (Endstate
    Graphic with Decisive, Shaping and Sustaining Operations
    Descriptions)
 6. Commander's Intent: Purpose, Key Tasks (3-5 Max) and Endstate
    (Enemy, Friendly, Terrain)

Direct
 7. Mission (Directed COA Sketch with Deployments, Dispositions, T & P)
 8. Task
 9. Purpose
10. CCIR: Info the Cdr Must Have to Make Decisions (PIRs and FFIRs)

Legend:
CCIR = Commander's Critical Information Requirements
FFIR = Friendly Force Information Requirements
PIR = Priority Intelligence Requirements
T & P = Task and Purpose

Figure 2: Commander's Mission Analysis Worksheet

Decision Point    Event/Conditions                If

Commit SSE force  Event:                          PIR 1. The HVT
to HVT.           ID HVT in accessible location.  security is less than
                                                  20 fighters.
                  Conditions:                     PIR 2. There is no SAM
                  Intel                           threat at the HVT
                  1. Established special SIGINT   location.
                  pattern was executed on
                  signature less than 24 hours
                  ago with 8-digit grid.
                  or
                  2. HUMINT information from
                  source assessed with moderate
                  reliability is less than 48
                  hours old.

                  Lift Avn -- QRF is available.
                  Man -- QRF is available.
                  Fires -- Assets are readily
                  available or easily shifted to
                  cover the mission; tanker
                  support is available.
                  Assumable Risk--
                  * Illum window is below 30%.
                  * Shift air QRF pilots to
                    day/night.
                  * Reconstitution of QRF is not
                    required.
                  * Weather is marginal.

Decision Point    And                          Then

Commit SSE force  FFIR 1. Friendly force is    Decision:
to HVT.           postured for the operation.  Commit SSE force to
                  FFIR 2. ISR elements/        target.
                  platforms are available or   Effects:
                  easily re-tasked to          * Capture or destroy HVT.
                  support.                     * Exploit for intel
                  FFIR 3. CAS/EA-6B/AH-64s       value.
                  are available or easily
                  repositioned.
                  FFIR 4. Weather minimums/
                  illumination is acceptable
                  below 30%.
                  FFIR 5. Target is within
                  150 NM of BAF, KAF or FOB
                  Salerno.

Legend:
Avn = Aviation
BAF = Bagram Airfield
CAS = Close Air Support
DP = Decision Point
FOB = Forward Operating Base
HUMINT = Human Intelligence
HVT = High-Value Target
ISR = Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
KAF = Kandahar Airfield
Man = Maneuver
NM = Nautical Miles
QRF = Quick-Reaction Force
SAM = Surface-to-Air Missile
SIGINT = Signals Intelligence
SSE = Sensitive-Site Exploitation

Figure 3: Decision Support Matrix