The re-imagined Aristotelianism of John Henry Newman.IN DEFENSE OF TRADITION, "Burke theorized shoddily shod·dy adj. shod·di·er, shod·di·est 1. Made of or containing inferior material. 2. a. Of poor quality or craft. b. Rundown; shabby. 3. " and should be remembered as "an agent of positive harm." (1) This is the judgment of Alasdair MacIntyre Alasdair Chalmers MacIntyre (born January 12, 1929 in Glasgow, Scotland) is a philosopher primarily known for his contribution to moral and political philosophy but known also for his work in history of philosophy and theology. , no shoddy shod·dy adj. shod·di·er, shod·di·est 1. Made of or containing inferior material. 2. a. Of poor quality or craft. b. Rundown; shabby. 3. theorist of tradition himself. Questioning the wisdom of Burke's "wisdom without reflection," MacIntyre argues that a healthy tradition is always vitally dialectical, "a socially embodied argument." For Burke, by contrast, tradition is valued for its stability and so is set against reason and the conflict inherent in dialectics. Accordingly, MacIntyre finds in Burke neither the resources for a philosophical defense of tradition nor an accurate portrayal of the health of actual traditions. "Indeed," says MacIntyre, "when a tradition becomes Burkean, it is always dying or already dead." (2) If he finds Burke's concept of tradition theoretically wanting, MacIntyre does recognize its political advantages, both in the eighteenth century and more recently. MacIntyre distances himself from "the ideological uses to which the concept of a tradition has been put by conservative political theorists A political theorist is someone who engages in political theory, the activity of constructing and evaluating theories of politics. Political philosophy is one, but only one, of the many species of political theory. ." As a defender of tradition in the modern academy, MacIntyre may at first appear to be simply engaged in some politically correct politically correct Politically sensitive adjective Referring to language reflecting awareness and sensitivity to another person's physical, mental, cultural, or other disadvantages or deviations from a norm; a person is not mentally retarded, but triangulation triangulation: see geodesy. The use of two known coordinates to determine the location of a third. Used by ship captains for centuries to navigate on the high seas, triangulation is employed in GPS receivers to pinpoint their current location on earth. . But MacIntyre believes he is more truly conservative, more fundamentally opposed to modern liberalism, than Burke. What is more, as an alternative to Burke, MacIntyre points to "a far more important theorist of tradition," (3) one who "theorized with insight" (4) and to whom MacIntyre acknowledges "a massive debt" (5): John Henry Newman. What makes Newman so superior a theorist of tradition? MacIntyre does not explain how he comes to this judgment, nor does he indicate what it is about Newman's reflection on tradition that is so important. After acknowledging his debt to Newman, MacIntyre insists that he will "proceed independently," and the reader is left to judge for himself what MacIntyre may have found so valuable in Newman's thought. Ironically, one of the founding texts of contemporary Burkean conservatism, Russell Kirk's Conservative Mind, may help point us to the philosophical insight of Newman's that is so appreciated by MacIntyre. To be sure, Kirk more often portrays Newman as a defender of particular traditional elements of civilization--especially liberal education and religious faith--than as a "philosopher of tradition." Nonetheless, Kirk does locate Newman's importance in his role as a philosopher, (6) praising him for articulating the value of knowledge, the limits of reason and science, the danger of utilitarianism utilitarianism (y  'tĭlĭtr`ēənĭzəm, y and rationalism rationalism [Lat.,=belonging to reason], in philosophy, a theory that holds that reason alone, unaided by experience, can arrive at basic truth regarding the world. , the nature of
intellectual virtue Intellectual virtues are character traits necessary for right action and correct thinking. They include: a sense of justice, perseverance, integrity, humility, empathy, intellectual courage, confidence in reason, and autonomy. , and the necessity of such virtue for the grasp of
first principles.These emphases point to the connection between Newman's philosophy of tradition and one venerable, pre-modern tradition of philosophy. A fundamental feature of Newman's defense of tradition is an appreciation for, and natural deference to, classical Greek philosophy on modern philosophy, as well as modern science. Clear unbroken lines of influence lead from ancient Greek and Hellenistic philosophers, to medieval Muslim philosophers and scientists, to the European Renaissance and Enlightenment, to the secular sciences of the modern day. , and here, one philosopher in particular stands out. Newman conceives of and defends tradition with a mind formed and disciplined by a study of Aristotle. I Scholars have attempted to classify Newman's philosophy in relation to various familiar categories and figures in the history of philosophy. (7) Classification is complicated by the fact that most of his writings are occasional and theological, rather than systematic and philosophical, but the one exception, A Grammar of Assent (1870), advances a detailed epistemology epistemology (ĭpĭs'təmŏl`əjē) [Gr.,=knowledge or science], the branch of philosophy that is directed toward theories of the sources, nature, and limits of knowledge. Since the 17th cent. worked out over a lifetime and central to the argument of such works as the Tracts, the Oxford sermons (1826-1843), The Arians of the Fourth Century (1833), and An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine (1845). Thus, while Newman's thought is marked by both originality and eclecticism eclecticism, in art eclecticism (ĭklĕk`tĭsĭz'əm), art style in which features are borrowed from various styles. , it also displays a remarkable coherence, and a consistency over the course of his long life. Sometimes described as an empiricist em·pir·i·cism n. 1. The view that experience, especially of the senses, is the only source of knowledge. 2. a. Employment of empirical methods, as in science. b. An empirical conclusion. 3. , it is uncertain when or how seriously Newman read Locke. (8) He has reminded other commentators of Hume, with his insistence on the limits of speculative reason In theory, there is no difference between theory and practice. But, in practice, there is.and the necessity of practical certainty. For placing the burden of theological argument on practical reason rather than speculative metaphysics metaphysics (mĕtəfĭz`ĭks), branch of philosophy concerned with the ultimate nature of existence. It perpetuates the Metaphysics of Aristotle, a collection of treatises placed after the Physics [Gr. , he has even been compared to Kierkegaard. (9) In basing a proof for the existence of God on the experience of conscience, Newman seems closer to Augustine than Aquinas, and a case can be made for Newman's Platonism. (10) The influence of Aristotle--especially the Nichomachean Ethics, Rhetoric, and Poetics--is widely acknowledged but nonetheless usually underestimated. It is assumed that because Newman's exposure to Aristotle was early, it does not give us much insight into Newman's mature thought. Such an assumption counts against both the consistency of Newman's intellectual career and the implicit Aristotelianism of the central features of Newman's philosophy. It also counts against Newman's explicit professions of Peripatetic allegiance. The strongest of these occurs in The Idea of a University (1852/58), where Newman goes so far as to argue that everyone is, or should be, an Aristotelian. "While the world lasts," says Newman, "will Aristotle's doctrine on these matters last, for he is the oracle of nature and truth." Of immediate concern were topics central to the Idea: the order of knowledge and the good of liberal learning. But the praise for Aristotle does not end there. "While we are men," Newman continues, we cannot help, to a great extent, being Aristotelians, for the great Master does but analyze the thoughts, feelings, views, and opinions of human kind. He has told us the meaning of our own words and ideas, before we were born. In many subject-matters, to think correctly, is to think like Aristotle; and we are his disciples whether we will or no, though we may not know it. (11) This encomium en·co·mi·um n. pl. en·co·mi·ums or en·co·mi·a 1. Warm, glowing praise. 2. A formal expression of praise; a tribute. to Aristotle cannot be dismissed as an empty piety, a superficial deference to classical authority. Aristotelianism saturates The Idea of a University: in Newman's defense of liberal as opposed to servile ser·vile adj. 1. Abjectly submissive; slavish. 2. a. Of or suitable to a slave or servant. b. Of or relating to servitude or forced labor. arts; in the treatment of intellectual disciplines as "sciences," which are not only interrelated in·ter·re·late tr. & intr.v. in·ter·re·lat·ed, in·ter·re·lat·ing, in·ter·re·lates To place in or come into mutual relationship. in but ordered in a hierarchy; in the notion of "the philosophical habit of mind," that intellectual virtue which Newman says is the fruit of genuine education--in each of these subject matters, to understand Newman accurately is to think like Aristotle. Nor is that all. None of these memorable, isolated themes of Newman's Idea can properly be understood apart from the argument of the whole, and that argument itself makes clear that the Aristotelianism of the Idea is not just a recurring trope trope n. 1. A figure of speech using words in nonliteral ways, such as a metaphor. 2. A word or phrase interpolated as an embellishment in the sung parts of certain medieval liturgies. but an organizing principle. The argument of the Idea can be summarized in three theses: that the university must serve intellectual truth as its end; that theology is not only a proper science but the highest science, and must be included in, and allowed to govern, the university curriculum; and that knowledge of truth, while a good in itself, is not the highest good for man, and so the university must be ordered toward the Church. Thus, the agenda of Newman's occasional lectures--to defend the founding of a new Catholic university--is fulfilled only within the framework of the Aristotelian notion of a hierarchy of human knowledge and a hierarchy of human goods. Neither the Catholic end nor the Aristotelian means of Newman's argument have rendered it useless to theorists of the modern secular university. As Newman himself acknowledged and intended, the Catholicism is contingent to the main argument about the nature and purpose of a liberal education. (12) The Aristotelianism, integral to Newman's argument, is harder to ignore, but easy to misunderstand mis·un·der·stand tr.v. mis·un·der·stood , mis·un·der·stand·ing, mis·un·der·stands To understand incorrectly; misinterpret. . Some interpreters believe that Newman's conception of a "liberal" education, in which knowledge is pursued as its own end, lends support to the relativistic rel·a·tiv·is·tic adj. 1. Of or relating to relativism. 2. Physics a. Of, relating to, or resulting from speeds approaching the speed of light: relativistic increase in mass. elective system, in which the content of education is considered less important than the opportunity to develop "critical thinking skills" by exercising the mind on whatever interests it. Yet Aristotelian reason, even more than Catholic faith, led Newman in the opposite direction, to insist that a university must teach the truth and form minds--that is, must bring minds into conformity with genuine objects of knowledge. A university, says Newman, "by its very name professes to teach universal knowledge ... to set forth the right standard and to train according to according to prep. 1. As stated or indicated by; on the authority of: according to historians. 2. In keeping with: according to instructions. 3. it." (13) In articulating a "universal knowledge" over and above the specialized sciences, Newman has recourse to the Aristotelian notion of a "science of sciences." This should not be conflated with theology, the science whose inclusion in the curriculum Newman is concerned to justify. Theology is a particular science, which is sovereign because it treats the highest things and is concerned with our ultimate end. The "science of sciences" is philosophy, sovereign insofar in·so·far adv. To such an extent. Adv. 1. insofar - to the degree or extent that; "insofar as it can be ascertained, the horse lung is comparable to that of man"; "so far as it is reasonably practical he should practice as it provides the underlying principles of all reasoning, and so is presumed or presupposed in the exercise of any particular science. (14) Newman's contemporaries, unlike his readers a century and half later, could be expected to retain some confidence in the unity and universality of knowledge. Newman can almost take it for granted that the business of an institution committed to teaching universal knowledge would include philosophy. This is part of the reason why Newman does not say much about what it means to study philosophy; at times, he seems to imply that it will be acquired indirectly. But it is clear that Newman's "philosophy," as the science of sciences, includes both metaphysics and logic. (15) Like Aristotle, whose Metaphysics argued that first philosophy must treat not only first principles of substance but also first principles of rationality, (16) Newman discerned the necessary connection between architectonic ar·chi·tec·ton·ic also ar·chi·tec·ton·i·cal adj. 1. Of or relating to architecture or design. 2. Having qualities, such as design and structure, that are characteristic of architecture: wisdom and the science of reasoning. Although Newman exploits this Aristotelian notion of a universal science of sciences to defend the inclusion of theology in a university curriculum, he still locates the purpose of a liberal education not in religious or theological knowledge, but in "a philosophical habit of mind." Roughly speaking, this is an ability to understand all things in their proper perspective. In an oft-quoted passage, Newman characterizes the habit by describing its operation: [I]f we would improve the intellect, first of all, we must ascend; we cannot gain real knowledge on a level; we must generalize, we must reduce to method, we must have a grasp of principles, and group and shape our acquisitions by means of them. (17) The phrase "a philosophical habit of mind" describes what Newman had originally struggled to name, a "perfection or virtue of the intellect," which he first called simply "philosophy." (18) So philosophy is not just a science, but a virtue, and this in the specifically Aristotelian sense of an acquired capacity or "habit." Like Aristotle, Newman emphasizes both the intellectual dimension of the virtue--the power by which one "apprehends the great outlines of knowledge"--and the moral and affective dimension--its fostering of "freedom, equitableness, calmness, moderation." (19) In describing this "philosophical habit of mind," Newman is articulating what Aristotle simply called "wisdom" or sophia, the highest of the virtues of speculative intellect. Aristotle says that sophia is "the most finished of the forms of knowledge," explaining that it includes both the apprehension of first principles (by intuition or nous) and the grasp of what follows from first principles (by "scientific" knowledge or episteme). It is "knowledge of the highest objects" with "its proper completion." (20) The ability of the Idea of a University to communicate a notion of philosophy or "wisdom" as both a science and a virtue makes clear not only the fact, but also the subtlety, of Newman's Aristotelianism. This subtlety, in turn, accounts for its being so often overlooked. The Aristotelianism of Newman's argument is unadvertised un·ad·ver·tised adj. Not having been advertised to the public: unadvertised sale merchandise. and vernacular. Newman offers a translation of Aristotle so natural and unobtrusive that we need not look behind it for sources. This "translation" of Aristotelian intellectual virtue is carried out further in Newman's most properly philosophical work, A Grammar of Assent. Commonly treated as a work within the philosophy of religion, or religious epistemology, religion is actually treated there almost as an epilogue ep·i·logue also ep·i·log n. 1. a. A short poem or speech spoken directly to the audience following the conclusion of a play. b. The performer who delivers such a short poem or speech. 2. . The reasonableness of Christian faith is defended only as an application of a general epistemology which is worked out over eight of the ten chapters. Even when Newman considers Christianity explicitly, he claims to speak not as a Christian but as a philosopher--and as an Aristotelian. Asserting that among all the candidates for revealed religion, Christianity alone fulfills "the aspirations, needs, and foreshadowings of natural faith and devotion," Newman denies that this conclusion is based on his own Christian faith. He cites sociological and ethical considerations independent of his religious belief. But most importantly Adv. 1. most importantly - above and beyond all other consideration; "above all, you must be independent" above all, most especially , he insists, "as to the intellectual position from which I have contemplated the subject"--that is, as to the principal epistemological e·pis·te·mol·o·gy n. The branch of philosophy that studies the nature of knowledge, its presuppositions and foundations, and its extent and validity. [Greek epist considerations which occupy the bulk of the Grammar of Assent--"Aristotle has been my master." (21) Aristotle is clearly the master even of what is taken to be most original in the Grammar of Assent, Newman's notion of "the Illative Sense (Metaph.) the faculty of the mind by which it apprehends the conditions and determines upon the correctness of inferences. See also: Illative ." First introduced as a kind of "faculty," (22) a power of discernment and judgment, Newman also defines it as a "perfection or virtue" (23) of that faculty. In both senses, what Newman is describing recalls Aristotle's phronesis--practical reasoning, or its virtue, prudence. Newman himself makes the connection to phronesis, arguing that the Illative Sense only extends to matters of reasoning about truth what the Aristotelian virtue provides for reasoning about conduct. (24) A note makes clear that Newman recognizes that Aristotelian phronesis already included what he means by the Illative Sense, but that given the context of the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle did not develop his account of it with respect to intellectual assent, only with respect to action. (25) Newman has rightly perceived that he is developing the virtue of phronesis in a direction that Aristotle had already indicated. Introduced as a virtue for guiding action, for Aristotle it is primarily an intellectual virtue (a perfection of thought), not a moral virtue (a perfection of desire). Aristotle likens it to "perception" and "judgment," and it is clear that phronesis includes nous ("intuition," "understanding," sometimes simply "sense"), the virtue--which is also a part of sophia or wisdom--by which the intellect is able to grasp undemonstrable truths. (26) Newman originally described his project in the general terms of classical or "virtue" epistemology: "My book is to show that a right moral state of mind germinates or even generates good intellectual principles." (27) As it turned out, Newman's Grammar of Assent can properly be read as an extension of Aristotle's theory of intellectual virtue in Book VI of the Nichomachean Ethics, making clear the limitation of scientific reasoning, and establishing the intellectual and moral requirements of a virtue of right discernment. II As one commentator has put it, A Grammar of Assent "moves toward ... the enthronement of phronesis." (28) As we have seen, the Grammar and the Idea together move toward the enthronement of phronesis and sophia. In his two most philosophical works, Newman offers a reinvigorated re·in·vig·o·rate tr.v. re·in·vig·o·rat·ed, re·in·vig·o·rat·ing, re·in·vig·o·rates To give new life or energy to. re articulation of the two central Aristotelian intellectual virtues. (29) And the significance of this for our understanding of Newman as a critic of liberalism must be highlighted. Newman is not just, as some conservatives have appreciated, a critic of false philosophies--of utilitarianism, rationalism, and skepticism. Newman is a promoter of true philosophy, combining what so many modern philosophers had viewed as opposed: epistemological modesty, and metaphysical and ethical realism. Newman offers an account of how genuine knowledge is possible, but depends as much on properly formed habits as on scientific procedure. True wisdom, for Newman, is not the product of a rigorous method, but the prize of a disciplined soul. Newman's philosophy is thus marked, on the one hand, by confidence in the power of reason and the order of sciences; and on the other hand, by attention to the limitations of reason, and to the need for principles and virtues which are beyond the reach of demonstrative LEGACY, DEMONSTRATIVE. A demonstrative legacy is a bequest of a certain sum of money; intended for the legatee at all events, with a fund particularly referred to for its payment; so that if the estate be not the testator's property at his death, the legacy will not fail: but be payable reason. Many criticisms of Newman are born of a failure to hold both of these aspects of his thought together. Two recent critics are illustrative. In a couple of essays on education, Edward Tingley has argued that Newman is an advocate of Enlightenment ideals. (30) Tingley rightly distinguishes between genuine initiation into Aristotelian sophia and phronesis, and "knowledge" as a commodity derived from technique. But Tingley finds Newman's conception of education dependent on the latter rather than the former. According to Tingely, Newman's understanding of "knowledge" concedes too much to the Enlightenment conception of reason. In Newman's characterization of the philosophical habit of mind, Tingley finds not a description of the virtue whereby one may grasp first principles, but a rationalist ra·tion·al·ism n. 1. Reliance on reason as the best guide for belief and action. 2. Philosophy The theory that the exercise of reason, rather than experience, authority, or spiritual revelation, provides the primary method for efficient production in the knowledge industry. Newman, for Tingley, is thus not a true defender of classical liberal education, but a modern "technician of learning." Why Tingley insists on interpreting Newman's sense of "universal knowledge" as if it expressed Cartesian evidentialism as opposed to Aristotelian wisdom is not clear, but in supposedly defending a more Aristotelian view of wisdom, Tingley is farther from Aristotle than he realizes. Tingley takes Newman to task for advocating the idea of "knowledge as its own end"--but this is one of the rare occasions where Newman's use remains faithful not just to the sense but to the letter of Aristotle. Aristotle's Metaphysics begins with a reflection on the nobility, sovereignty, and value of knowledge (episteme, not sophia) "for its own sake." (31) If Tingley gives us the rationalist Newman, the recent biographical study by Frank Turner Frank Turner is a musician born in Bahrain and educated at Eton College, and studied History at the London School of Economics . He has toured the UK extensively, and has completed several tours of Central and Eastern Europe since the demise of his former band Million Dead. offers us Newman the irrationalist. (32) Turner begins by questioning the continuity of Newman's intellectual life. According to Turner, the supposedly unifying factor--the critique of liberalism--is in fact a self-serving later interpretation, invented by the Catholic Newman to justify the behavior of the Anglican Newman, and more useful for hagiographers than for historians. Thus, Turner confines his study to the Anglican Newman of the Tractarian movement Tractarian movement: see Oxford movement. , attempting to discern what actually motivated Newman at the time. He finds in the Tractarian Newman not a man moved primarily by ideas, but a man of complex psychological and political motives, and more opposed to Protestant faith than to "liberal" thought. Despite the posture of objective historiography historiography Writing of history, especially that based on the critical examination of sources and the synthesis of chosen particulars from those sources into a narrative that will stand the test of critical methods. , Turner's study is more postmodern than scientific. Originating with an incredulity towards Newman's meta-narrative, it consistently finds political and psychological motivations for theological positions. At his worst, Turner descends to puerile puerile /pu·er·ile/ (pu´er-il) pertaining to childhood or to children; childish. psychopathography, with almost parodic speculation about death fixations, eating disorders eating disorders, in psychology, disorders in eating patterns that comprise four categories: anorexia nervosa, bulimia, rumination disorder, and pica. Anorexia nervosa is characterized by self-starvation to avoid obesity. , and (of course) sexual orientation sexual orientation n. The direction of one's sexual interest toward members of the same, opposite, or both sexes, especially a direction seen to be dictated by physiologic rather than sociologic forces. . Those of Newman's ideas that cannot be deconstructed are simply ignored (e.g., Turner's treatment of Newman's Oxford sermons on faith and reason (33)). Turner's simplistic sim·plism n. The tendency to oversimplify an issue or a problem by ignoring complexities or complications. [French simplisme, from simple, simple, from Old French; see simple historiography rules out coherence of thought and action as implying a "teleology teleology (tĕl'ēŏl`əjē, tē'lē–), in philosophy, term applied to any system attempting to explain a series of events in terms of ends, goals, or purposes. " and "inevitability" supposedly opposed to true historical "contingency." In its barest form, Turner's interpretation of Newman is merely circular: beginning with the assumption that Newman's actions cannot be understood in terms of philosophical motives, he "concludes" that Newman's philosophical arguments were mere "universalist rhetoric" (34) in the mercenary mercenary Hired professional soldier who fights for any state or nation without regard to political principles. From the earliest days of organized warfare, governments supplemented their military forces with mercenaries. service of his emotional and political interest. It is not a surprise then, when Turner pronounces Newman a Nietzschean irrationalist, a skeptic about knowledge, and a relativist rel·a·tiv·ist n. 1. Philosophy A proponent of relativism. 2. A physicist who specializes in the theories of relativity. about good and evil. (35) Tingley's Enlightenment Newman or Turner's Postmodern Newman? There is a third rival version of John Henry Newman, a version that resolves the dialectic between, and gives us perspective on, the other two: Newman the Aristotelian, aware of both the power and limits of theoretical reason, neither relativist nor rationalist. Newman's criticism of rationalism was consistent, and consistently Aristotelian. As an Anglican, Newman wrote: To Rationalize is to ask for reasons out of place; to ask improperly how we are to account for certain things, to be unwilling to believe them unless they can be accounted for, i.e. referred to something else as a cause, to some existing system as harmonizing with them or taking them up into itself. (36) Aristotle identified this same mistake, and expressed it in the same language. In discussing first principles of reason, he argued that not everything can be demonstrated, because there are no prior principles from which first principles can be demonstrated. Those who deny the principle of non-contradiction, for instance, demand a reason for everything. They want a starting point, and want to grasp it by demonstration; while it is obvious from their actions that they have no conviction. But their case is just what we have stated before; for they require a reason for things which have no reason. (37) For Newman, opposition to this philosophical mistake remains a thread running through his intellectual life. The mistake becomes, indeed, the central feature of liberalism, as Newman defined it most completely in a note to his Apologia ap·o·lo·gi·a n. A formal defense or justification. See Synonyms at apology. [Latin, apology; see apology. : Whenever men are able to act at all, there is the chance of extreme and intemperate action; and therefore, when there is exercise of mind, there is the chance of wayward or mistaken exercise. Liberty of thought is in itself a good; but it gives an opening to false liberty. Now by Liberalism I mean false liberty of thought, or the exercise of thought upon matters, in which, from the constitution of the human mind, thought cannot be brought to any successful issue, and therefore is out of place. Among such matters are first principles of whatever kind. (38) Liberalism, then, is a philosophical error, an epistemological heresy. Denying first principles amounts to a kind of rationalism. It also amounts to relativism relativism Any view that maintains that the truth or falsity of statements of a certain class depends on the person making the statement or upon his circumstances or society. Historically the most prevalent form of relativism has been See also ethical relativism. : as Aristotle had already explained, the demand to justify first principles most commonly arises from a Protagorean epistemology which, aware of its own inability to completely justify anything, locates truth in appearances. In that case, all opinions are true, and truth is relative. (39) Newman could almost be expounding ex·pound v. ex·pound·ed, ex·pound·ing, ex·pounds v.tr. 1. To give a detailed statement of; set forth: expounded the intricacies of the new tax law. 2. on Book IV of the Metaphysics when he, too, notices the essential link between rationalism and a relativizing empiricism empiricism (ĕmpĭr`ĭsĭzəm) [Gr.,=experience], philosophical doctrine that all knowledge is derived from experience. For most empiricists, experience includes inner experience—reflection upon the mind and its : in Tract 73 he noted that rationalism, characterized by "its love of systematizing," often ends up "basing its system upon personal experience, on the evidence of sense." (40) III This brings us to Newman's theory of tradition, which is part of his positive epistemology and continuous with the critique of liberalism. If we cannot demonstrate, or derive from our senses, all the truths that we ought to know, we will need to apprehend these truths from some source other than argument or "objective" evidence. It is tempting to appeal here to automatic "intuition" or to universally "innate" ideas. But we are talking about human epistemology, not a theory of knowledge for disembodied intellects, and we cannot ignore the fact that human beings live in relation to other human beings. Learning is not a relation between one man and his ideas, but between one man and other men. Welearn from others by acquiring the virtues of successful individuals and growing into the patterns of life embodied by the community. In this sense, the "intuition" of principles is informed by authority--the implicitly or explicitly claimed privilege of a person or institution already better informed. As Aristotle said, "We are bound to give heed to the undemonstrated sayings and opinions of the experienced and the aged, not less than to demonstrations; because, from their having the eye for experience, they behold the principles of things." (41) This passage was a favorite of Newman's; he cites it in A Grammar of Assent, setting up his introduction of the "Illative Sense." (42) He draws out the implications of Aristotle's insight: "Instead of trusting logical science, we must trust persons, namely, those who by long acquaintance with their subject have a right to judge." (43) This requires us to attend to such persons, to "follow their history," and to "learn as they have learned," so that we may "make ourselves of their number." (44) Knowledge depends on personal testimony; prudence defers to history; learning is joining a tradition. Newman's explicitly traditionalist epistemology provides the background not only of his general understanding of the relationship between faith and reason, but of his particular theory of the development of Christian doctrine. But note that it is not an ad hoc For this purpose. Meaning "to this" in Latin, it refers to dealing with special situations as they occur rather than functions that are repeated on a regular basis. See ad hoc query and ad hoc mode. traditionalism; nor is Newman simply offering an anti-theoretical critique of liberal epistemology. Rather, he is articulating an alternative, positive theory of knowledge--a theory which he finds already "stated in substance" in Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics. (45) By contrast, Burke's more rhetorical defense of tradition might occasionally defer to Greek philosophy for its antiquity and authority, but not for its argument. If one sought to discover a philosophy underlying Burke's defense, it would be easy to dismiss as a kind of pragmatism--or, perhaps, to dignify dig·ni·fy tr.v. dig·ni·fied, dig·ni·fy·ing, dig·ni·fies 1. To confer dignity or honor on; give distinction to: dignified him with a title. 2. it a bit, a "common sense" philosophy: tradition is beneficial, a fact recognized by those uncorrupted by ideology or (in Burke's tellingly pejorative pejorative Medtalk Bad…real bad sense) "metaphysics." The problem with this view is not that it is wrong, but that it offers no account of why it is right--and it includes no philosophical framework (no metaphysics) that could support such an account. In Aristotelian terms, Burke's defense of tradition begins and ends at an argument quia (establishing the fact that). This is an important project, but it is natural to inquire further for the argument propter quid (explaining the reason why). It has been the abiding philosophical challenge of conservatism to ground its appeal to tradition on something more solid than pragmatic calculation or personal faith, to articulate "traditionalism" as a principled view that does not reduce to one of its historic enemies: utilitarianism on the one hand, or subjectivized irrationalism ir·ra·tion·al·ism n. 1. Irrational thought, expression, or behavior; irrationality. 2. Belief in feeling, instinct, or other nonrational forces rather than reason. irrationalism 1. on the other. In short, if "the conservative mind" was born in reaction to Enlightenment innovation, and that innovation could be traced to an epistemological prejudice against tradition, then the project of the conservative mind could not be complete without a positive, counter-Enlightenment epistemology. Newman recognized this challenge, and no doubt this is one reason MacIntyre preferred him to Burke as a theorist of tradition. A further reason is that Newman appreciated the important role that Aristotle could play in meeting this challenge. MacIntyre was drawn to Aristotle not just because Aristotle was an exemplar ex·em·plar n. 1. One that is worthy of imitation; a model. See Synonyms at ideal. 2. One that is typical or representative; an example. 3. An ideal that serves as a pattern; an archetype. 4. of the "virtue" tradition that MacIntyre wanted to rehabilitate re·ha·bil·i·tate v. 1. To restore to good health or useful life, as through therapy and education. 2. To restore to good condition, operation, or capacity. . Aristotle helped MacIntyre to articulate the very notion of a "philosophical tradition," and to account for the rationality of arguments within and between traditions. In Aristotle's conception, philosophy is a dialectical activity, an activity that takes place over time, a "practice" which both produces and is produced by a habit of the soul, the acquired perfection of wisdom "Perfection of Wisdom" is a translation of the Sanskrit term prajñā pāramitā (Devanagari: प्रज्ञा पारमिता, Tibetan: Shes-rab-pha-rol-phyin . The activity or practice of philosophy is thus necessarily historical--and Aristotle's awareness of this is evident from his subtle use of intellectual history at the beginning of his major philosophical works. It is Aristotle, as much as Nietzsche, who informs MacIntyre's strategy of "arguing with" philosophers by "outnarrating" them. IV In any effort to revive an Aristotelian alternative to Enlightenment ideas it is essential that Aristotle be re-narrated. To be an Aristotelian is not to commit oneself to a set of doctrines, but to habituate ha·bit·u·ate v. 1. To accustom by frequent repetition or prolonged exposure. 2. To cause physiological or psychological habituation, as to a drug. 3. To experience psychological habituation. one's mind to a way of thinking. A modern Aristotelian must be what Newman called a "learned Aristotelian": one who can answer any whatever philosophical questions in the way that Aristotle would have answered them. If they are questions which did not occur in Aristotle's age, he still answers them.... In one respect he knows more than Aristotle; because, in new emergencies after the time of Aristotle, he can and does answer what Aristotle would have answered, but for the want of the opportunity did not. (46) Newman himself was just such a "learned Aristotelian." But more importantly, in Newman we have the valuable reminder that such an identity is not a merely academic alternative, that the exercise of Aristotelian ideas need not take place within the technical vocabulary of medieval scholasticism scholasticism (skōlăs`tĭsĭzəm), philosophy and theology of Western Christendom in the Middle Ages. Virtually all medieval philosophers of any significance were theologians, and their philosophy is generally embodied in their or Anglo-American analytic philosophy analytic philosophy Philosophical tradition that emphasizes the logical analysis of concepts and the study of the language in which they are expressed. It has been the dominant approach in philosophy in the English-speaking world from the early 20th century. . After all, the context of Newman's primary intellectual battles--the "new emergencies" of his time--were not primarily philosophical and scholarly, but religious and personal. Moreover, the ethos of Victorian England and ecclesiastical politics set uniquely demanding rhetorical standards. One of the reasons that Newman's Aristotelianism is so easily overlooked is that he met the challenge of this rhetorical context so successfully; his literary talent disguises his philosophical pedigree. Newman communicates Aristotelian ideas, not hardened and familiar in the technical terminology Technical terminology is the specialized vocabulary of a field. These terms have specific definitions within the field, which is not necessarily the same as their meaning in common use. of scholastic manuals, but renovated and re-imagined in the vigorous language of his personal style. Newman's learned Aristotelianism is a re-imagined Aristotelianism. But even effective re-imagination is essentially Aristotelian. As Newman well knew, Aristotle held that sense and intellect are mediated by imagination. (47) Hence, Aristotle takes rhetoric and poetry quite seriously, and in an early essay, Newman relates Aristotle's "most true and philosophical" (48) theory of poetry. There, Newman notes that "the greatest of analytical philosophers" also understood that "a word has power to convey a world of information to the imagination, and to act as a spell upon the feelings." (49) Newman not only appreciated this point, he made it a central feature of his Grammar of Assent: mere ideas tend to be "abstract" and "notional," but vivid thought, and effective communication, makes use of images, concrete and "real." (50) Like poetic masters, who have "subjected metaphysics to their art," (51) Newman was not content to rehearse Aristotelian terms, but felt compelled to revivify Aristotle's concepts in creative language that would capture the imagination. Not only is this authentically Aristotelian, it is authentically traditionalist, in the sense described by MacIntyre: old truths kept current in socially embodied argument, creatively reinvigorated in new dialectical contexts. As a theorist of tradition, Newman does not just point us back to philosophical sources; he models the virtues which allow those sources to speak anew in subsequent ages. 1. Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame Notre Dame IPA: [nɔtʁ dam] is French for Our Lady, referring to the Virgin Mary. In the United States of America, Notre Dame , 1988), 8, 353. 2. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame, 1984), 222. 3. MacIntyre, Whose Justice?, 353. 4. MacIntyre, Whose Justice?, 8. 5. MacIntyre, Whose Justice?, 354. 6. Russell Kirk Russell Kirk (19 October 1918 – 29 April1994) was an American political theorist, historian, social critic, and man of letters, best known for his influence on 20th century American conservatism. , The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Eliot, 7th revised edition (Washington, 1987), 266. 7. For a detailed account and discussion of sources, see Edward Sillem, ed., The Philosophical Notebook of John Henry Newman, Vol. 1: General Introduction to the Study of Newman's Philosophy (Louvain, 1969). For a briefer and more recent account of Newman's place in the history of philosophy, see Fergus Kerr Fergus Kerr OP is a Dominican friar teaching Philosophy and Theology at Blackfriars Hall in Oxford University and Edinburgh University. He is the author of the works Theology after Wittgenstein, Immortal Longings, and After Aquinas. , "'In an Isolated and, Philosophically Uninfluential Adj. 1. uninfluential - not influential influential - having or exercising influence or power; "an influential newspaper"; "influential leadership for peace" Way': Newman and Oxford Philosophy." in Newman and the Word, ed. Terrence Merrigan and Ian T. Kerr (Louvain, 2000), 155-179. 8. Sillem, 191-203. 9. Ralph McInerny, Characters in Search of Their Author: The Gifford Lectures The Gifford Lectures were established by the will of Adam Lord Gifford (d. 1887). They were established to "promote and diffuse the study of Natural Theology in the widest sense of the term — in other words, the knowledge of God. , 1999-2000 (Notre Dame, 2001), 100-108. 10. Louis Dupre Catholic phenomenologist and religious philosopher. He is the T. Lawrason Riggs Professor Emeritus in Yale University's religious studies department. His work generally attempts to tie the modern age more closely to medieval and classical thought, finding precursors to Enlightenment and , "Newman and the Neoplatonic Tradition in England," in Newman and the Word, 137-154. 11. John Henry Newman, The Idea of a University, ed. Martin J. Svaglic (Notre Dame, 1982), 82-83 (Discourse V, [section] 5). 12. Newman, Idea, 6 (1.3). 13. Newman, Idea, 115 (VII.1). 14. Newman, Idea, 38 (III.4). To be sure, Aristotle ultimately identifies theology and first philosophy in the Metaphysics, but it takes many pages before it is clear that the science of being qua being is best pursued as the science of separate, immaterial substance. Newman must keep the two separate, beginning, to an even greater degree than Aristotle did, with an audience that is not yet convinced that divinity is the primary concern of the philosopher. 15. As for logic, the method of the sciences, Newman clearly sides with Aristotle. "The boldest, simplest, and most comprehensive theory which has been invented for the analysis of the reasoning process, is the well-known science for which we are indebted to Aristotle...." John Henry Newman, "Implicit and Explicit Reason" [1840], Sermon XIII in John Henry Newman, Fifteen Sermons Preached before the University of Oxford [3rd edition, 1872] (Notre Dame, 1997), 258. 16. Aristotle, Metaphysics, IV. 17. Newman, Idea, 105 (VI.7). 18. Newman, Idea, 94 (VI.1). 19. Newman, Idea, 76 (V.1). Cf. xlii, xliii (Preface), where Newman describes the virtue in terms of "the force, the steadiness, the comprehensiveness and the versatility of intellect, the command over our own powers, the instinctive and just estimate of things as they pass before us ..." and "the good sense, sobriety of thought, reasonableness, candour candour or US candor Noun honesty and straightforwardness of speech or behaviour [Latin candor] Noun 1. , self-command, and steadiness of view...." 20. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, VI.7. 21. John Henry Newman, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent (Notre Dame, 1979), 334. 22. Newman, Grammar, 262. 23. Newman, Grammar, 271. 24. Newman, Grammar, 277-279. 25. Newman, Grammar, 277, n. 1. After defining phronesis in a stricter sense as right reasoning about conduct (Nichomachean Ethics, VI.8-9), Aristotle discusses right reasoning about truth in terms of the analogous virtues synesis syn·e·sis n. A construction in which a form, such as a pronoun, differs in number but agrees in meaning with the word governing it, as in If the group becomes too large, we can split them in two. ("understanding" or "intelligence") and gnome ("sense" or "judgment"), and goes on to argue that these intellectual virtues cannot be separated (Nichomachean Ethics, VI.10-11). 26. Newman's interest in rehabilitating the faculty and virtue of nous is also evident in his explicitly theological writings, where he once describes the apprehension of revelation as "supernatural nous." John Henry Newman, "Papers of 1860 on the Evidence for Revelation," in The Theological Papers of John Henry Newman on Faith and Certainty, ed. Hugo M. de Achaval and J. Derek Holmes Derek Holmes (born 11 October 1978 in Lanark, Scotland) is a Scottish footballer who currently plays for the English Football League Two club Rotherham United. An experienced player whose best role is that of a target man, Derek is exceptional in the air and is a handful for (Oxford, 1976), 88. 27. From a letter to Newman's publisher, published in Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman, ed. C. S. Dessain and Thomas Gornall (Oxford, 1973), Vol. 25, 51; cited in Nicholas Lash, "Introduction" to Newman, Grammar, 11. 28. Joseph Dunne, Back to the Rough Ground: Practical Judgment and the Lure of Technique (Notre Dame, 1993), 55. 29. For Aristotle, phronesis is the highest virtue of the deliberative de·lib·er·a·tive adj. 1. Assembled or organized for deliberation or debate: a deliberative legislature. 2. Characterized by or for use in deliberation or debate. or calculative part of the soul (logistikon), more important than "art" (techne), while sophia is the highest virtue of the "contemplative" part of the soul (epistemonikon), a union of both "science" (episteme) and "intuition" (nous). Nichomachean Ethics, VI.1-7. 30. Edward Tingley, "Technicians of Learning," First Things First Things is a monthly ecumenical journal concerned with the creation of a "religiously informed public philosophy for the ordering of society" (First Things website). 105 (August/September 2000), 29-35; Edward Tingley, "Knowledge for the Sake of Knowledge," First Things 119 (January 2002), 15-17; cf. Edward Tingley, Correspondence [reply to John Crosby People with the name "John Crosby" can be found as follows:
adj. Contrary to nature, reason, or common sense; absurd. See Synonyms at foolish. [From Latin praeposterus, inverted, unseasonable : prae-, pre- + , that Newman would have been a better philosopher if only he had read more German idealism German idealism was a philosophical movement in Germany in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It developed out of the work of Immanuel Kant in the 1780s and 1790s, and was closely linked both with romanticism and the revolutionary politics of the Enlightenment. , which would have given him "more dynamic philosophical presuppositions" and a more secure "metaphysical foundation." Turner, 599. 36. John Henry Newman, Tract 73 ("On the introduction of Rationalistic ra·tion·al·ism n. 1. Reliance on reason as the best guide for belief and action. 2. Philosophy The theory that the exercise of reason, rather than experience, authority, or spiritual revelation, provides the primary Principles into Religion"), quoted in Turner, 239. This passage does not appear in the version published as Essay II in John Henry Newman, Essays Critical and Historical, Vol. 1 (London, 1907), 30-99. 37. Aristotle, Metaphysics, IV.6 (1011a8-13). 38. "Note A: Liberalism," in John Henry Newman, Apologia Pro Vita Sua Apologia Pro Vita Sua (Latin: A defence of one's life) is the classic defence of the religious opinions of John Henry Newman, published in 1864 in response to what he saw as an unwarranted attack on Roman Catholic doctrine by Charles Kingsley. (Boston, 1956), 271. This passage, together with the criticism of rationalism from Tract 73, would seem to be sufficient to establish the continuity thesis In the history of ideas, the continuity thesis is the hypothesis that there was no radical discontinuity between the intellectual development of the Middle Ages and the developments in the Renaissance and early modern period. that Turner denies. 39. Aristotle, Metaphysics, IV.5. 40. Newman, Tract 73, quoted in Turner, 239. 41. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, VI.11 (1143b11-14). 42. Newman, Grammar, 268; Newman quoted the same passage in his "Assent and Intuition," in Newman, The Theological Papers ... on Faith and Certainty, 74. 43. Newman, Grammar, 268-269. 44. Newman, Grammar, 269. 45. Newman, Grammar, 269. 46. From a paper on doctrinal development, 1868, published in The Theological Papers of John Henry Newman on Biblical Inspiration Biblical inspiration is the doctrine in Christian theology concerned with the divine origin of the Bible and what the Bible teaches about itself. Etymology The word inspiration comes by way of the Latin and the King James translations of the Greek word and on Infallibility infallibility (ĭnfăl'əbĭl`ətē), in Christian thought, exemption from the possibility of error, bestowed on the church as a teaching authority, as a gift of the Holy Spirit. , ed. Derek Holmes (Oxford, 1979), quoted in Ian Ker, "Forward" to John Henry Newman, An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine (Notre Dame, 1989), xxiv. 47. Aristotle, De Anima anima /an·i·ma/ (an´i-mah) [L.] 1. the soul. 2. in jungian terminology, the unconscious, or inner being, of the individual, as opposed to the personality presented to the world (persona); by extension, used to , III.3,8. 48. Newman, "Poetry, with reference to Aristotle's Poetics po·et·ics n. (used with a sing. or pl. verb) 1. Literary criticism that deals with the nature, forms, and laws of poetry. 2. A treatise on or study of poetry or aesthetics. 3. " (1829), in Newman, Essays Critical and Historical, vol. 1, 9. 49. Newman, "Poetry," 8-9. Yet for some reason Sillem, who noted much of Aristotle's influence on Newman, finds "no traces of the Aristotelian ideas ... of the intellect and imagination in any of [Newman's] works." Sillem, 157. 50. On Newman's distinction between notional and real assent, cf. Newman, Grammar, 49-92. 51. Newman, "Poetry," 18. JOSHUA P. HOCHSCHILD is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Wheaton College Wheaton College may refer to:
Western culture Fellow during his doctoral studies in medieval philosophy medieval philosophy: see scholasticism. at the University of Notre Dame. |
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