The raid on Jifjafa -- April 1916 (Part 1).

From 11-14 April 1916 a small British Imperial force, the main combat element of which was drawn from the 9th Australian Light Horse Regiment, conducted a long-range raid against the Turkish post at Jifjafa. (1) Jifjafa, located in the Sinai Desert 84 kilometres (52 miles) east of Ismailia on the Suez Canal, was the site of drilling for water by the Turkish Army. In this operation, the first offensive action by the Australian Light Horse in the Sinai campaign, (2) the raiding force covered some 260 kilometres (160 miles) in three and a half days over largely unknown territory much of it by night; fought a sharp action in which it overwhelmed the Turkish post, killed or captured the entire garrison, destroyed the bores and drilling equipment, secured valuable documents; and on their return to base endured a fierce sand storm and narrowly avoided a mass drowning when the wadi in which troops were resting was flooded in a sudden spate. During this `stunt' most of the force managed less than twelve hours sleep!

Aim

The aim of this paper is to examine the planning and conduct of the Jifjafa raid. The raid was not simply a Light Horse squadron riding off into the desert and attacking the Turkish post; but rather a carefully planned and well executed minor operation specifically ordered by General Headquarters, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, Cairo.

The Jifjafa raid is of particular interest because it was the first demonstration in the Sinai campaign of a swift and successful attack across many kilometres of waterless desert by mounted troops cooperating with Royal Flying Corps (RFC) reconnaissance aircraft and logistically supported by the newly raised Camel Transport Corps. The Turkish High Command had believed that the Jifjafa post was beyond the striking range of British ground forces defending the Suez Canal and it was therefore only lightly garrisoned. From early April to mid-July 1916, British mounted troops, principally Australian Light Horse, conducted 16 of these operations with the strike force varying in size from one squadron to two brigades. The objectives of these operations were: to destroy water resources on the Central Route across the Sinai Desert which could be used by Turkish forces in a new attack against the Suez Canal, to gain information on the terrain features of the Sinai Desert and the Turkish troops operating there, and to deny information on the Canal defences to the enemy. (3)

Part 1 examines the operational setting, composition of the force, the military experience of several of the key commanders prior to the Jifjafa raid and the preparations for the raid. Part 2, which will appear in the next issue of Sabretache will cover the conduct of the raid and its aftermath.

The Operational Setting (Map 1)

During the early months of 1916 the British High Command in Egypt expected the Turkish Army in Palestine, reinforced with troops released from the Gallipoli campaign, to mount a second major attack against the Suez Canal. Three main routes of advance across the Sinai Desert were available to the Turkish force:

Northern Coastal Route -- from Gaza through El Arish and Katia (Qatiya) to Kantara;

Central Route -- through the Sinai hills from Beersheba via Auja, Kossaima, Hassana and Jifjafa to Ismailia; and

Southern Route -- from Akaba or Kossaima through Nekhl to Suez.

In the first unsuccessful Turkish attack against the Suez Canal in February 1915 all three routes were used; but the main body of the Turkish force advanced along the Central Route.

A significant factor in the conduct of operations throughout the Sinai campaign was the availability of water. Water dictated the scale, location and duration of operations. While ample supplies of brackish water were available from wells and by digging in the sand along the Northern Coastal Route, this route was vulnerable to interdiction from the sea in its northern sector between Gaza and El Arish. Furthermore, the soft sand over which it ran for most of its length made movement by Infantry very slow and exhausting and severely reduced the mobility of mounted troops and horse drawn artillery and vehicles. Katia Oasis, some 40 kilometres (25 miles) east of the Suez Canal on the Northern Route, was the only reliable water supply where a significant enemy force could be maintained within striking distance of the Canal and, beginning in April 1916, the British Command took steps to garrison the oasis. At the same time ground operations were commenced to deny water supplies to any Turkish advance along the Central Route. (Several air attacks had been conducted in February and March 1916 on Turkish water supplies on the Central Route but with limited results due to the small bomb load carried.)

The Central Route -- the Darb el Maghaza -- was the historical high road between Palestine and Egypt. From Beersheba it traversed central Sinai by way of Auja, Kossaima, Hassana and Jifjafa, usually following the beds of wadis. Jifjafa is located in a broad saddle in the Sinai Hills at an altitude of 1,000 feet. West of Jifjafa, the track descended towards Ismailia by the bed of the Wadi um Muksheib which could be followed to within a day's march of Ismailia. Although the track was rough and broken with many steep gradients, the surface was generally passable to wheeled vehicles. During the February 1915 attack on the Canal, the Turkish Army had been able to move 15 cm howitzers and pontoons along this route.

The Southern Route -- part of the old Pilgrim's Way -- was the longest and least desirable of the three avenues of advance. It wound its way through desolate rugged mountains, passable only to animals and impractical for wheeled vehicles.

Water is scarce on the Central and Southern Routes but during the period of winter rains from January to April the ancient rock cisterns are full and substantial pools of water remain in the wadis. Turkish preparations for a new invasion included the development of reliable water supplies on the Central Route; hence, the commencement of well boring activity at Jifjafa in December 1915. By April 1916 three bores had been sunk in the vicinity of the post.

Aircraft from 14 Squadron, RFC based at Ismailia regularly monitored the activity at Jifjafa. On 10 March 1916, a BE 2c reconnaissance aircraft was hit several times by small arms fire. On 11 March, a retaliatory raid was carried out in which seven 20 pound bombs were dropped on the post, including one bomb which landed close to one of the well-boring plants. (4) On 26 March, Jifjafa was again attacked with bombs and machine gun fire from 200 feet. The garrison scattered into the low scrubby hills to the north and west of the post and returned fire hitting the aircraft, but in doing so sustained three casualties from machine gun fire. (5) Other reconnaissance flights were conducted in late March and early April. During these flights the RFC pilots and observers noticed that the Turkish garrison followed a pattern of scattering into small groups when their aircraft approached the post. This enemy habit of dispersing into the nearby hills on the approach of an aircraft was to be put to good use by the Light Horse in their attack on Jifjafa.

On 3 April 1916, General Headquarters, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, Cairo (General Sir Archibald Murray) directed II Anzac Corps (Lieutenant General Sir A J Godley) -- then controlling the central Ismailia sector of the Canal defences -- `to prepare a suitable column to complete the destruction of JIF JAFFA'. (6) The organisation of this operation was passed to Headquarters 4th Australian Infantry Division (Major General Sir H V Cox) for implementation. Major General Cox nominated the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade (Brigadier General J M Antill) to conduct the raid. (The Brigade was temporarily under command of the 4th Division. (7)) In turn, Brigadier General Antill selected Major H W Scott, acting Commanding Officer 9th Australian Light Horse Regiment, to command the column that would undertake the Jifjafa operation. (8)

3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade Operation Order No 6

On 7 April 1916, Brigadier General Antill issued Operation Order No 6 to mount the Jifjafa raid. (9) The mission laid down in this order was:

To verify the reports of Agents and the Air Service as to the existence of a small Turkish post at JIFJAFA (not exceeding 40 men, including workmen).

To destroy at least two wells over which gins have been erected, and if possible capture the Post.

To report further upon:

* Water in vicinity of country traversed.

* Works and defences if any.

* Further information of military value.

* Effect capture if possible of enemy personnel or inhabitants. (10)

The operation was planned for 11-14 April in order to use the full moon period to facilitate night movement. Movement by night was cooler for men and animals, and enabled the force to make a coven approach to Jifjafa. The force detailed to undertake the operation is shown in Table 1.

Headquarters

The following officers were appointed to the Headquarters of the force:

Commanding Officer -- Major W H Scott, 9th Australian Light Horse Regiment;

Staff Officer -- Captain A E Wearne, 8th Australian Light Horse Regiment;

Intelligence Officer -- Captain T C Macaulay, Royal Field Artillery, British Army;

Attached -- Captain E B Ayris, ADC to GOC 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade.

Major Scott -- a civil engineer of Preston, Victoria -- had been commissioned into the Victorian Mounted Rifles in 1903. At the outbreak of the war he was a Captain commanding G Company 58th Infantry Regiment (Essendon Rifles), Australian Military Forces (AMF). He enlisted in the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) on 11 November 1914 and was appointed Second in Command of C Squadron 9th Australian Light Horse Regiment. Headquarters, A and B Squadrons of this Regiment were raised in South Australia and C Squadron in Victoria. He was appointed Officer Commanding C Squadron on 1 February 1915. The Regiment departed Australia on 11 February 1915 and disembarked at Alexandria on 15 March. On 21 May, the Regiment landed on Gallipoli and remained there until 19 December 1915. In June 1915 Captain Scott was promoted Major. He was appointed Second in Command of the Regiment in August 1915. At Gallipoli the 9th Light Horse Regiment was engaged in heavy fighting at Walker's Ridge, Russell's Top, Chessboard, Hill 60 and Rhododendron Spur. Two Commanding Officers were killed during the Regiment's time there. For a short while in August and September 1915, Major Scott was acting Commanding Officer until he was evacuated to England with dysentery on 6 September. He rejoined the Regiment in Egypt in January 1916. In February and March he was again acting Commanding Officer and was in this appointment when he was called upon to lead the Jifjafa force. The raid commenced on his 35th birthday. (12)

Captain Wearne -- an experienced scout, Boer War veteran and, prewar, the Reuters correspondent in China -- enlisted in the AIF on 6 October 1915 at the age of 44 years and was immediately commissioned as a 2nd Lieutenant. He was initially posted to the 11th Reinforcements 6th Light Horse Regiment. He departed Australia on 23 October 1915 and arrived in Egypt on 24 November. On 28 January 1916, he was promoted Lieutenant and transferred to the 8th Light Horse Regiment. On 20 February 1916, he was promoted Captain. (13)

Captain Wearne had previously served in the New South Wales Mounted Rifles from 1889-1894 and was first commissioned as a 2nd Lieutenant in 1892. He was a Lieutenant when he resigned in 1894. He was one of the first to volunteer for the New South Wales contingent to the Boer War enlisting as a Trooper in A Squadron, New South Wales Mounted Rifles in October 1899. He arrived in South Africa in December 1899 and remained there until August 1900 when he was invalided back to Australia. At this time he held the rank of Sergeant. He returned to South Africa in March 1901 as a Lieutenant in the 2nd New South Wales Mounted Rifles. In 1902 he served as the Adjutant of the 3rd New South Wales Imperial Bushmen in South Africa. (14)

Captain Wearne had commanded the squadron of the 8th Light Horse Regiment which carded out the first Light Horse reconnaissance into the Sinai Desert from 21-23 March. This force reconnoitred the water sources in the vicinity of the Bedouin camp of Moiya Harab some 56 kilometres (35 miles) south east of Serapeum on the Canal. Water was found in a number of cisterns and pools in the Wadi um Muksheib. In this operation the squadron covered 130 kilometres (80 miles) of desert in 37 hours, including halts. The men and horses finished strong and fresh, but the pace they set was excessive for the supply camels which accompanied the column. While no contact was made with the enemy, many useful lessons were learned on this reconnaissance which were incorporated into the preparation of the Jifjafa force. (15)

Captain Macaulay's normal appointment was General Staff Officer Grade 3 (GSO 3) on Headquarters II Anzac Corps. He was an Arabic speaker. He had accompanied Captain Wearne on his reconnaissance to Wadi um Muksheib. He had also flown over the proposed route of the Jifjafa raid as an observer in an RFC aircraft in early April.

Captain Ayris, a 39 year old Perth accountant, enlisted in the AIF on 10 December 1914 and was posted initially to the 6th Reinforcements 10th Light Horse Regiment. As he had had 15 years service in the British Army, he was immediately promoted to Sergeant. On 1 May 1915, he received his commission as a 2nd Lieutenant and was then posted to the 8th Reinforcements 10th Light Horse Regiment. He was promoted Lieutenant on 1 June 1915. He embarked Fremantle on 2 September 1915 and arrived in Egypt on 25 September. He remained with the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade details at Heliopolis Camp, Cairo, until he joined the 10th Light Horse Regiment on its return from Gallipoli in December 1915. On 5 January 1916, he was posted as ADC to GOC 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade and was promoted Captain on 10 March 1916. (16)

Light Horse Squadron

As noted in Table 1, the Light Horse squadron consisted of seven officers and 122 other ranks. The other ranks included 12 members of the 8th Light Horse Regiment who had accompanied Captain Wearne on his reconnaissance to Moiya Harab and four members of the 9th Light Horse Regiment machine gun section to man the Vickers-Maxim gun carried by the force. The squadron included three signallers equipped with a heliograph, Begbie lamp and flags. As this was the first offensive action undertaken by the Australian Light Horse in the Sinai Desert, it was imperative that it be carried out to an entirely successful conclusion. Squadron personnel were specially selected for the operation. Only the lightest men and the fittest horses in the Regiment were taken. All non-essential gear was stripped from personal equipment to lighten the horse's load. The following 9th Light Horse Regiment officers were included in this composite Light Horse squadron: (17)

Officer Commanding   Major K A McKenzie
Second in Command    Captain B B Ragless
A Troop Leader       Lieutenant A H H Nelson
B Troop Leader       Lieutenant W S Pender
C Troop Leader       Lieutenant J M McDonald
D Troop Leader       Lieutenant F J Linacre
Machine Gun Office   Lieutenant L W Jacques

Major McKenzie was a graduate of the second class of the Royal Military College (RMC), Duntroon. He was commissioned as a Lieutenant on 3 November 1914 and posted to the 9th Light Horse Regiment. He was promoted Captain on 14 September 1915 and Major on 19 March 1916. He served at Anzac from May to September 1915, including some two months as Staff Captain on 3rd Light Horse Brigade Headquarters. At the time of the Jifjafa raid he was 22 years old and a squadron commander in the Regiment. (18)

Engineer Detachment

An Australian Engineers detachment, under command of Lieutenant J Coghlan and consisting of nine other ranks drawn from 4th Field Company, 4th Infantry Division, accompanied the raiding force. This detachment had two main duties: provision of water from the cisterns near Moiya Harab and demolition of the drilling plant and bores at Jifjafa.

Lieutenant Coghlan -- a 34 year old electrical engineer of Melbourne -- enlisted in the AIF on 8 September 1914 and was posted as a sapper to the 3rd Field Company. He was promoted Lance Corporal on 20 March 1915. He served at Gallipoli from 25 April -- 25 July 1915. On 26 July 1915, he was transferred to the 4th Field Company and promoted Sergeant. He was commissioned as a 2nd Lieutenant on 19 November 1915 and promoted Lieutenant on 17 March 1916. (19)

All personnel of this Engineer detachment were mounted on horses provided by the 10th Light Horse Regiment. The detachment's stores were carried on four camels provided by the Camel Transport Corps. It is presumed that these camels travelled with the main camel train. To undertake the field water duties, the detachment carried a hand-operated rotary pump, 20 feet (6 metres) of hose and 40 feet (12 metres) of canvas troughing as the animals were unable to drink directly from the cisterns. Ten shovels and one bale of sandbags were also carried. Gun cotton and other stores for the demolition of the drilling plant and bores were carried on two camels.

Royal Engineers Wireless Detachment

A self-contained Royal Engineers wireless station consisting of five British other ranks and three Sudanese camel drivers under command of Lieutenant Eggar was provided by General Headquarters, Cairo to enable the raiding column to communicate with Headquarters, 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade at Serapeum. The wireless station, rations and water for the detachment were carried on fifteen camels provided by the Camel Transport Corps. A riding horse for Lieutenant Eggar was provided by 10th Light Horse Regiment. Presumably, the British other ranks rode camels or walked with the Sudanese camel drivers.

Royal Flying Corps Liaison Party

A Royal Flying Corps detachment of two officers -- Lieutenants Snooks and Pitman -- and two other ranks was allocated to the raiding column for liaison purposes and to man the `ground signal apparatus' used to communicate with the supporting aircraft from 14 Squadron RFC. Two horses were provided for the officers by 10th Light Horse Regiment. Two riding camels for the other ranks and two pack camels to carry the signalling equipment were provided by the Camel Transport Corps.

Medical Support

Medical support for the operation was provided by a detachment of the 3rd Light Horse Field Ambulance. Personnel consisted of one medical officer, Major E Rowden-White, four mounted bearers and four drivers. Major Rowden-White -- a 32 year old Melbourne surgeon -- was commissioned as a Captain in the AIF on 2 October 1914 and posted to the 3rd Light Horse Field Ambulance. Prewar, he had served for three years as a Captain in the 14th Field Ambulance, AMF. He arrived in Egypt on 9 March 1915 and deployed to Lemnos on 21 July 1915. He served at Gallipoli, attached to the 4th Infantry Brigade, from 4 August to 11 September 1915 when he returned to the 3rd Light Horse Field Ambulance on Lemnos. He returned to Egypt on 24 December 1915 and was promoted Major on 1 January 1916. (20)

The medical detachment included two sand-carts -- light two-wheeled ambulances fitted with wide tyres -- each drawn by four horse teams. Six camels completed the medical detachment. One camel was fitted with a lying down cacolet capable of carrying two patients. Four camels were fitted with sitting up cacolets capable of carrying a total of eight patients. The sixth camel carried medical supplies. (21) Cacolets were canvas supports, stiffened with bamboo, wooden or metal struts and slung one on each side of a camel. Evacuation by cacolet was an experience to be dreaded by a wounded soldier.

   The tortures of this mode of conveyance to a wounded man have to be
   experienced to be believed. When the animal having received its double
   burden, rises with its peculiar jerk forward, it nearly pitches the
   patients out of the cacolets. Thereafter, each lurching step of the long,
   agonising march stretches the unhappy victims upon a species of rack
   comparable to that of a medieval torture chamber. (22)

Camel Transport Corps

A Camel Transport train consisting of one British officer, two British warrant officers, 95 Egyptian drivers and 195 camels was included in the force to carry supplies. Also included in this train for its protection and as additional camel drivers were 29 troopers drawn from the 9th Light Horse Regiment. The Egyptian drivers had to walk the whole distance but the Light Horsemen -- who did not bring their horses -- were permitted to ride the spare camels and those whose loads had been expended if they had the urge and the skill to do so. However, no riding saddles were provided. It can only be conjectured what the thoughts of this group were. While they trudged along with the camel train; their mounted colleagues were taking part in a free-ranging raid! The 195 camels in the train were allocated loads as follows:

Water          88

Forage --      78

Rations --     15

Ammunition --  4

Spare          10

The large number of camels needed to carry water and forage for a relatively small force on a short duration raid highlights the logistical burden of supporting horse-mounted units in desert warfare. The camel carried a maximum load of 350 pounds (159 kilograms) although 300 pounds (136 kilograms) was the preferred tactical loading. (23) A camel train marched at a pace of 2-2 1/2 miles per hour (3-4 kilometres per hour) depending on the terrain and the threat from enemy aircraft. (24) After six hours marching the loads were taken off the camels and they were rested. Any attempt to force the pace caused an unacceptable rate of casualties to the camels. Care had also to be taken that the load was evenly balanced on each side of the pack saddle and that the load did not sit too low causing injury to the camel's ribs or hips.

Water. The 88 water camels carried approximately 2,640 gallons (12,000 litres). This water was carried in copper or galvanised iron tanks (called fanatis) holding 15 gallons (68 litres), one being hung on each side of the pack saddle. These tanks had a hole, fitted with a screw plug, at the top for filling and, initially, a small tap at the bottom rear end to facilitate filling water bottles. Later versions of the fanatis dispensed with this tap as it contributed to significant leakage.

The water carried was based on the scale of four day's supply for all Australian and British personnel plus one day's supply for the Egyptian camel drivers and horses. The Egyptian drivers, horses and camels had to depend on the water in the cisterns in the Wadi um Muksheib near Moiya Harab after the first day. (25) All horsemen deployed with one filled water bottle, one emergency ration and one horse feed.

Forage. 78 camels were allocated to carry the forage used during the operation. At this time, the daily ration for horses and camels was 10 pounds (4.5 kilograms) of grain, usually Egyptian maize, millet or barley, and 12 pounds (5.4 kilograms) of tibben -- barley straw chopped into a coarse chaff and compressed. For the Jifjafa raid, the only forage carded was good quality Australian oats and chaff in preference to the local product. (26)

Ammunition. Each rifleman deployed with 200 rounds of ammunition. 1,500 rounds in belts were carried for the Vickers-Maxim machine gun. 10,000 rounds of reserve ammunition were carried by four camels in the train.

Bikaner Camel Corps 

The raiding force included a detachment of one officer (Lieutenant Bhir Singh) and 24 other ranks from the Bikaner Camel Corps (Ganga Risala) as escort to the Camel Transport train and for despatch riding. This detachment was drawn from a company of the Corps (four officers and 127 other ranks) which was then under command of the II Anzac Corps. The Bikaner Camel Corps were Imperial Service Troops (27); that is, an Indian State unit trained and equipped to a standard that enabled it to takes its place in a regular Indian Army force. Bikaner was one of the Rajputana States in north west India -- it is now part of Rajasthan. It is renowned for the best riding camels in the world.

Immediately after the outbreak of the war in August 1914, the Maharaja of Bikaner -- Colonel His Highness Sir Ganga Singh Bahadur -- placed the Bikaner Camel Corps at the disposal of the King-Emperor. (The Maharaja had commanded the Camel Corps himself when it formed part of the British contingent in China in 1901.) The Corps, consisting of a headquarters and eight companies and numbering some 1,000 men, was quickly deployed to Egypt. It had the distinction of being the first Imperial troops to engage the enemy in the Egyptian theatre when, on 20 November 1914, a patrol of 20 men was attacked by 200 Turkish Bedouin some 30 kilometres east of Kantara in the Sinai Desert. The Corps continued to serve in Egypt until the end of the war being mainly involved in patrolling in the Western Desert and in the Sinai.

For the Jifjafa operation the Bikaner Camel Corps detachment was self-contained, deploying with five days rations and water carried on the 12 additional camels (28) included with that unit.

Supplementary Operation Order

On 9 April, Headquarters 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade issued a supplementary operation order. (29) The key elements of this order were:

* Aerial reconnaissance of Jifjafa on 7 and 9 April had failed to detect any enemy troops but tents and stores remained in the vicinity of the post.

* Enemy garrisons which could react to the raid were reported as follows:

900 troops at Hassana -- 65 kilometres east of Jifjafa

50 troops at Berthel Hegaiib -- 6 kilometres north of Jifjafa

50 troops at Rodh Salem -- 20 kilometres north east of Jifjafa

50 troops at Bir el Hamma -- 40 kilometres north east of Jifjafa

200 troops at Nekhl -- 80 kilometres south east of Jifjafa

* A good motor road ran from Hassana to a roadhead approximately 15 kilometres north east of Jifjafa.

* IX (British) Corps, holding the southern sector of the Canal defences, would provide a column based on a squadron of Middlesex Yeomanry to patrol east and north east of Suez during the Jifjafa operation with a two-fold aim: to deceive the enemy as to British intentions if either column was sighted by Bedouin agents or Turkish patrols and to protect the southern and rear flanks of the raiding force.

* Wells and other installations considered to be of use for subsequent British operations were to be left undamaged but all moveable stores were to be destroyed or recovered.

* Accurate information on the location and capacity of all wells and other sources of water was to be recorded and samples of water from each were to be brought back. The former task was the responsibility of the 4th Field Company detachment; the latter the responsibility of the Medical detachment.

* 10th Australian Light Horse Regiment was ordered to hold one squadron (120 all ranks) at Serapeum as a ready reaction force should the raiding force require assistance.

Finally, the operational plan called for the force to move initially in two echelons. The slower moving camel train to depart the Railhead Camp five miles (eight kilometres) east of Serapeum after last light on 10 April and to move at best pace to establish a bivouac on the Wadi um Muksheib near Point 850 some 20 kilometres north west of the Moiya Harab cisterns. The faster moving Light Horse squadron and the other horse-mounted elements to depart Railhead Camp mid afternoon 11 April and to rendezvous with the camel train about midnight on the night of 11/12 April at its bivouac near Point 850.

Table 1. Composition - Jifjafa Force (11)

Unit                      Officers   ORs   Horses   Camels

Force Headquarters               4              5
Light Horse Squadron             7   122      137
Engineer Detachment              1     9       10        4
Wireless Detachment              1     8        1       15
(Royal Engineers)
Royal Flying Corps               2     2        2        4
3 ALH Field Ambulance            1     8       13        6
Camel Transport Corps            1     2        3
Camel Transport Corps                 95               195
(Egyptian drivers)
ALH Personnel attached                29
Camel Transport Corps
Australian Army Service                1        1
Corps
Bikaner Camel Corps              1    24       37
Guides                                 2        2
Interpreter                            1        1
Total                           18   303      175      261

Unit                      Comments

Force Headquarters
Light Horse Squadron      Incl 12 ORs from 8 ALH
                          Regt, 1 Offr and 4 ORs --
                          MG detchment
Engineer Detachment       Australian Engineers
Wireless Detachment       Provided by GHQ, Cairo
(Royal Engineers)         ORs incl 3 Sudanese camel
                          drivers
Royal Flying Corps        Liaison party
3 ALH Field Ambulance     Incl 2 sandcarts
Camel Transport Corps     2 WOs
Camel Transport Corps
(Egyptian drivers)
ALH Personnel attached    For escort duty
Camel Transport Corps
Australian Army Service   WO
Corps                     For distribution of rations
                          and forage
Bikaner Camel Corps       Indian State troops For
                          escort and despatch riding
Guides                    Egyptian Coastguard
Interpreter               French and Arabic
Total

(1) Jifjafa ia variously spelt Jifjaffa, Jif-Jaffa, Jif Jaffa, Jif Jafa, Jiff Jaffa, Bit el Jifjafa, Bir el Jifjaffa and Gifgaffa in contemporary documents and maps. Jifjafa is used in the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade Operation Order No 6 mounting the operation and in the Australian Official History.

(2) However, this was not the first offensive action by the Australian Light Horse in Egypt. In December 1915 and January 1916, a composite Light Horse Regiment formed from details remaining in Egypt when the Light Horse Brigades deployed to Gallipoli had seen action against the Senussi forces in the Western Desert of Egypt.

(3) The Marquess of Anglesley, A History of the British Cavalry 1816 to 1919, Volume 5, Egypt, Palestine and Syria 1914 to 1919, London, Leo Cooper, 19 ,p. 33.

(4) AWM25 Item 423/1 Part 2: Intelligence Sunnnary 16 March 1916 -- General Headquarters Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

(5) AWM25 Item 423/1 Part 3 Intelligence Summary 31 March 1916 -- General Headquarters Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

(6) AWM4 Item 1/6/1 Part 1 -- War Diary, General Headquarters, Egypt 1-14 April 1916.

(7) Headquarters Anzac Mounted Division (Major General H G Chauvel), 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade and the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade remained west of the Canal concentrating in the area to the west of Kantara. The remaining brigade of the division, 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade, was on detached duty in southern Egypt engaged in the Senussi campaign in the Western Desert.

(8) AWM45 Item 7/9 2nd Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, Report -- Raid on Jifjafa dated 18 April 1916.

(9) AWM4 Item 10/3/5 War Diary: 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade -- April 1916.

(10) ibid.

(11) Abbreviations: ALH = Australian Light Home; Offr = Officer; WO = Warrant Officer; OR = Other Rank.

(12) AWMI83 Item 41: Biographical Details of Lt Col William Henry Scott.

(13) National Archives of Australia: World War I Service Record -- Major A E Wearne.

(14) Ibid.

(15) H S Gullet, The Australian Imperial Force in Sinai and Palestine 1914-1918, Sydney, 1923, pp 68-70.

(16) National Archives of Australia: World War I Service Record -- Major E B Ayris.

(17) Major T H Darley, With the Ninth Light Horse in the Great War, Adelaide, 1924, p 33.

(18) AWM43 Item Biographical Details -- Major K A McKenzie.

(19) National Archives of Australia: World War I Service Record -- Major J Coghlan.

(20) National Archives of Australia: World War I Service Record -- Lieutenant Colonel E R White.

(21) AWM11 Item 1522/2/77 3rd Light Horse Field Ambulance Medical Report on Jif Jaffa Expedition.

(22) Lt Col R M P Preston, The Desert Mounted Corps, London, 1921.

(23) Later in the war, transport camels were classified Heavy Burden and Light Burden, capable of carrying a maximum load of 350 pounds (159 kilograms) and 250 pounds (113 kilograms) respectively. This weight is the useful cargo carried and does not include the pack saddle, some forage and the driver's kit.

(24) Where the threat from enemy aircraft was high the camels moved in single file well dispersed. This formation slowed the pace of the train. Where the air threat was low the camels marched in a closer block with up to eight camels abreast.

(25) 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade Operation Order No 6.

(26) AWM224 MSS36 -- 9th Light Horse Regiment Narrative, October 1914-November 1918, p. 8.

(27) In 1922 the title was changed to Indian State Forces.

(28) See Table 1.

(29) AWM4 Item 10/3/5 War Diary: 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade -- April 1916