The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: Egypt.

EGYPT'S NUCLEAR POSTURE IS AN interesting case. Certainly, Egypt has strong incentives to "go nuclear." In the three decades following the Second World War, the Egyptian government perceived Israel as a sworn enemy and engaged in major military confrontations with Tel Aviv in 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973. Besides these major wars, the two sides were involved in other military skirmishes and broad economic and diplomatic warfare. These security concerns were further heightened by the fact that Israel was developing nuclear weapons capability.

Other important motives for Egypt to pursue nuclear weapons are leadership and prestige. Egypt is the most populous country in the Arab world and has always claimed, with strong justifications, a leadership role. This perception is based on demographic, political, economic, and cultural factors. Egypt's soft power (teachers, television programs, movies) has played a significant role in shaping Arab societies. This claimed leadership status has been challenged by Cairo's nuclear inferiority to Israel and, to a lesser degree, to other regional potential proliferators such as Iraq under Saddam Hussein and Iran.

At least for these two powerful reasons--security concerns and prestige --Egypt should have vigorously sought to acquire nuclear weapons. This, however, is not the case. Rhetoric aside, there are no indications that the Egyptian leaders have ever made a strong commitment to pursue such an option. Building a nuclear weapon program takes a long period of time and requires substantial financial and human resources. These investments have to be backed by a determined political will. The Egyptian case suggests that this necessary strong political determination was lacking. Instead, it seems that the Egyptian leaders (Gamal Abd al-Nasser, Anwar al-Sadat, and Hosny Mubarak) have never been convinced that acquiring nuclear weapons would serve Egypt's national interests. Consciously or otherwise, it seems that the Egyptian leaders have reached the conclusion that a nuclear option was too costly and the benefits were too little. Accordingly, after some unsuccessful efforts to build a nuclear weapons program in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Egyptian leaders abandoned this strategy. There are no indications that Egypt would consider the nuclear option in the foreseeable future.

Instead, the Egyptians have pursued several other options that might improve their security and enhance their national prestige. These include building a strong conventional weapons capability, stockpiling chemical weapons, and championing the call for making the entire Middle East a nuclear weapons free zone. Furthermore, Egyptian leaders have always asserted that they would acquire nuclear weapons if the need arises. These assurances seem to satisfy domestic public opinion.

This essay examines Egypt's chemical, biological, and nuclear programs and the efforts to build a missile capability. It analyzes the forces that have shaped Egypt's strategic planning including leadership perception, war and peace with Israel, relations with the United States, and economic and financial restraints. The argument is that despite strong incentives and potential capabilities to initiate a nuclear program, Egyptian leaders have pursued a low utility of nuclear weapons in the overall national security strategy. The combination of economic predicaments, close ties to the United States, and changing security dynamics suggests that the government in Cairo is highly unlikely to seek nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future.

NON-CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES--HISTORY AND ASSESSMENT

Like many countries Egypt openly denies the possession of any Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). However, Egypt is believed to have invested substantial resources in developing missiles, chemical weapons capability, and, to a less extent, biological and nuclear weapons.

Chemical Weapons: Since the late 1950s, Egypt's interest in Chemical Weapons (CW) was, to a great extent, in response to Israel's efforts to build nuclear weapons. Interestingly, despite possessing CW in both 1967 war and 1973 war, Egypt refrained from employing these weapons against Israel. Tel Aviv's capability to retaliate in kind in both wars and nuclear deterrent in the later one might explain the Egyptian choice.

Egypt appears to have "inherited stocks of phosgene and mustard agents left behind by British forces when their occupation of Egypt ended in 1954." (1) In the following years Egypt expanded this nascent chemical weapons capability and aggressively pursued scientific research and production. During the civil war in Yemen (1963-67) Egyptian troops used CW. This was the first time CW had been employed in the Middle East. In the following two decades Egypt shared its chemical expertise with other Arab countries. Cairo was reported to have supplied Damascus with CW prior to the Yom Kippur war of 1973. (2) Egypt also is alleged to have supported the Iraqi chemical weapons program in the 1980s. (3)

These Egyptian efforts to stockpile CW and to work with other Arab countries should be seen as a part of broader stand on the proliferation of WMD in the Middle East. Egyptian leaders have perceived CW as a means to pressure Israel to give up its nuclear weapons. Indeed, Cairo has refused to join the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) until Israel sign the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT). There are no indications that Egypt would give up its CW option any time soon.

Biological Similar to CW, Egypt has perceived biological weapons (BW) as a counterbalance to Israel's nuclear capability. In 1970, President al-Sadat stated that "Egypt has biological weapons stored in refrigerators and could use them against Israel's crowded population." (4) This declaration apparently was meant to warn Israel from a potential nuclear attack on Egyptian cities. Two years later (April 1972), Egypt acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). However, Egypt links its ratification of the BWC to Israel's signature of the NPT. In other words, Cairo views the BWC as an integral part of a comprehensive agreement for the elimination of all WMD from the Middle East. (5) Accordingly, Egypt has not ratified the BWC. (6)

Despite refusing to ratify the BWC and the fact that Egypt is believed to have developed a strong technical base in applied microbiology, there are no indications that the country has pursued an offensive BW capability. (7)

Missiles: Egypt was one of the first developing countries to develop serious interest in acquiring missile capabilities. Cairo's efforts to acquire such capability started shortly after its defeat in the 1948 war with Israel. These efforts were driven by at least two incentives--security concerns and national prestige. Four characteristics of Egypt's missile program can be identified.

First, the initiation and development of a missile program had been in response to regional security concerns particularly with regard to the conflict with Israel and the Iran-Iraq war. Egypt's humiliating defeat to Israel in 1948 prompted the leadership to embark on an ambitious program to modernize its armed forces. Missiles were an important component of this program. These efforts however, were briefly interrupted when the monarchy was toppled in the 1952 military coup. In the following two decades military confrontations and arms races with Israel had dominated Egypt's national security and strategy. Both Cairo and Tel Aviv engaged in serious efforts to build missile capability that could reach each other's territory. The 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty has slowed down the arms race between the two adversaries, but both have sought to maintain their missile programs to face other potential regional threats.

The eight year long Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s had a significant impact on the strategic landscape of the entire Middle East. Among other lessons, the war underscored the military and psychological impact of missile attacks. The effective use of Iraqi missiles against Iranian targets forced Tehran to accept a cease-fire under conditions favoring Baghdad. Other regional powers reacted by initiating and expanding missile and missile-defense programs. Egypt supported Iraq against Iran and in the mid-1980s was involved, along with Argentina and Iraq, in a joint scheme called Badr-2000 or Condor II to manufacture two-stage and solid-fuel ballistic missiles. By the late 1980s Egypt withdrew from the project but it is likely that the knowledge the Egyptians had gained from this collaboration enhanced their indigenous capabilities.

Second, like many other countries, Egypt had relied, to a great extent, on foreign powers to build its missile capabilities. The initial stage of Egypt's missile program started in collaboration with German scientists and engineers. These German technicians were veterans of the Second World War. Their expertise had fallen behind in the rapidly advanced rocket science. Thus, under their guidance, Egypt's missile program made only modest progress. Furthermore, Israel launched an aggressive campaign to halt this German-Egyptian cooperation and to disrupt the missile program. This campaign included bombings, kidnappings and assassinations. By 1964 the Israeli efforts resulted in "the mass exodus of German scientists and engineers." (8) This exodus in conjunction with the lack of indigenous technological infrastructure dealt a heavy blow to the Egyptian efforts to build missile capabilities.

In the mid-1960s Egypt's relations with most Western powers had deteriorated and Cairo adopted a socialist pro-Soviet stand in both domestic and foreign policies. Not surprisingly, Egypt turned to the Soviet Union for military assistance, including missile capability. Moscow supplied Cairo with short-range FROG-7As artillery rockets and Scud B ballistic missiles. However, the pro-Western Egyptian policy since the mid-1970s has significantly slowed down cooperation with the Soviet Union. Instead, Egypt requested and received assistance from both China and North Korea. This collaboration has continued till the present time. Finally, Egypt received technical assistance from France to manufacture a new missile system to replace the aging FROG ones. (9)

Third, the Egyptian efforts to build a viable indigenous missile program have always been restrained by lack of necessary funding. This lack of financial resources had substantially hindered real progress and prompted Egypt to seek financial cooperation with Arab countries to build a military industry. The Arab Organization for Industrialization, created in the mid-1970s, embodied this collaboration. (10)

Fourth, despite these financial restraints, Egypt is believed to have developed the capacity to indigenously manufacture Scud-B and there are reports on cooperation with North Korea on medium-range Nodong missiles. Concerning missile proliferation, Egypt is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), but there are no indications that Egypt is supplying other parties with missiles or their components.

Nuclear weapons: A nuclear weapon capability can be acquired through several avenues. A primary one is what Shai Feldman calls, "the quick fix approach", namely, "the purchase of fissile material or nuclear warheads from a state that already possesses nuclear weapons." (11) Another avenue is the gradual accumulation and development of indigenous technological infrastructure that would allow, in due time, the production of nuclear devices. Egypt, like other countries, had pursued the two options with little success. It sought cooperation and assistance from several countries including Argentina, China, Germany, India, the Soviet Union, and the United States. In the early 1960s the Egyptian government tried to train scientists and engineers in nuclear technology and to acquire the know-how.

In the spirit of President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace initiative, Egypt started its own nuclear program in the mid-1950s when President Nasser created the Atomic Energy Authority and established the Center for Nuclear Research. Another step was the inauguration of a two-megawatt reactor at Inchas, on the Nile Delta in 1961. The Soviet Union supplied the reactor and controlled the disposal of spent fuel, which "was not capable of producing a significant amount of weapons-grade material." (12) Upon request, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provided Egypt with technical assistance and equipment to update the reactor and improve its safety procedures in the early 1980s.

Egypt's second nuclear reactor was provided by Argentina. In September 1992 Cairo signed a contract with Invap, Argentina's leading nuclear organization to build a 22-megawatt research reactor at Inshas. (13) The reactor went critical in 1997 and was officially inaugurated in February 1998 by President Mubarak and his Argentina counterpart Carlos Meneim. It is important to point out that the two reactors have been used for scientific research and peaceful purposes and have been subject to IAEA safeguards.

In addition to these two reactors, there have been several attempts to expand the country's nuclear infrastructure in collaboration with foreign powers. In the early 1960s American and German companies placed bids for a 150-megawatt plant. (14) The deteriorating relations between Egypt and Western powers prompted Western banks to refuse providing the necessary funding and consequently, the project was abandoned. During this time Egypt was particularly interested in acquiring nuclear weapons to counter Israel's nascent and growing nuclear program in Dimona. (15) Thus, Egypt requested nuclear arms from both the Soviet Union and China. The two requests were denied. The 1967 humiliating defeat dealt a deadly blow to Egypt's ambition to counter Israel's nuclear weapons. Since 1967, there are no indications that Egypt has sought to purchase or build nuclear weapons capability.

Several factors can explain Egypt's failure to acquire nuclear weapons in the decade prior to the 1967 war. In addition to economic constraints and lack of technological infrastructure, the Egyptian leadership had never made the strong commitment necessary to carry out a such huge undertaking. Human and financial resources have never been adequately mobilized to achieve this goal. Finally, foreign powers rejected Egypt's somewhat naive request to buy nuclear devices. Furthermore, the foreign assistance Egypt received was not adequate to lay the foundation for a vibrant nuclear program.

Acknowledging these hurdles, Egypt decided to sign the NPT in July 1968, hoping to put pressure on Israel to follow suit. Egypt however, delayed ratifying the NPT as leverage in arms reduction negotiations in the Middle East. After making peace with Israel and adopting a pro-Western foreign policy, the Egyptian leadership decided to ratify the treaty in February 1981. This step was also taken to enhance the country's chances of receiving foreign technology needed to expand a civilian nuclear program. According to the NPT, state-members are eligible for technical assistance. Thus, in the second half of the 1970s Egypt negotiated the purchase of nuclear power reactors with the Nixon and Carter administrations. The United States however, was reluctant to supply Egypt with nuclear technology without then ratifying the NPT. (16)

Despite its accession to the NPT, Egypt's access to foreign nuclear technology remained limited, suggesting that other reasons may have been behind the slow progress in the country's nuclear program. In the early 1980s shortly after the NPT ratification, Egypt negotiated agreements to buy eight nuclear power reactors from Canada, France, Germany, and the United States. These agreements were never implemented. Lack of funding and safety concerns in the aftermath of the 1979 Three Mile Islands accident in the United States and the 1986 Chernobyl accident in the Soviet Union were cited as reasons for the suspension.

This discussion of Egypt's nuclear program suggests three conclusions. First, despite acceding to the NPT, Egypt has refused to join the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and has been a vocal opponent of the additional protocol on the ground that it imposes more restrictions on peaceful nuclear programs. Egypt has been a strong critic of the international community and particularly the United States for not exerting pressure on Israel to join the NPT. Second, although Cairo has started a peaceful nuclear program in the mid-1950s, it has achieved very modest progress. Its nuclear infrastructure and capabilities remain "extremely limited." (17)

Third, in the mid-2000s there were allegations that the Pakistani nuclear scientist Abd al-Qader Khan visited Egypt on several occasions there were reports of clandestine nuclear cooperation between Egypt and Libya, and rumors that Muhammad ElBaradei, the IAEA chief, was engaged in a cover-up of a secret Egyptian nuclear program. All these allegations have not been substantiated. There are no indications that Egypt has violated any of the obligations it has undertaken as a signatory of the NPT.

EGYPT'S STAND ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Egypt's approach to nuclear weapons started in the mid-1950s. Initially Egypt sought nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and since the early 1960s tried unsuccessfully to develop nuclear weapons capability. Egyptian nuclear strategy was transformed following the 1967 war. Since then, Cairo has shown very little interest, if any, in acquiring nuclear weapons. The combination of four forces: 1). Leadership, 2). Israel, 3). Economic Restraints, and 4). Relations with the United States--has shaped Egypt's stand on the nuclear issue.

1). Leadership: Given Egypt's history, military power, cultural dominance, and political weight, Egyptian leaders have always claimed a leadership status in the Arab world. Probably more than any other leader, President Gamal Abd al-Nasser (1954-1970) articulated this perception in his declaration, The Philosophy of the Revolution. Nasser mentions that Egypt has a vital role to play in three main arenas: Arab, African, and Islamic. In almost a novelist style, Nasser wrote,

   For some reason it seems to me that within the Arab circle
   there is a role, wandering aimlessly in search of a hero. And I
   do not know why it seems to me that this role, exhausted by its
   wanderings, has at last settled down, tired and weary, near the
   borders of our country and is beckoning to us to move, to take
   up its lines, to put on its costume, since no one else is qualified
   to play it. We alone, by virtue of our place, can perform the
   role. (18)

For most of his reign, Nasser sought to present this image of Arab leadership and unity. In his drive for leadership in the Arab world, Nasser could not be indifferent to the issue of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. Hostility to Israel had united Arab states more than any other cause in the early decades following the creation of the Jewish state in 1948. When leaks on Israel's nuclear program were reported in the early 1960s, Nasser had to respond. To admit inferiority in the nuclear race would have meant the loss of considerable prestige both at home and on the Arab stage.

As has been discussed earlier, Egypt sought unsuccessfully to acquire nuclear weapons. But rhetoric aside, Nasser did not show the strong determination needed to achieve this goal. Other Middle Eastern leaders such as Ben-Gurion in Israel in the 1950s and 1960s, Saddam Hussein in Iraq in the 1970s and 1980s, and Iranian leaders (including the Shah) had been more committed to pursue a nuclear option than Nasser. The 1967 defeat shattered the image of leadership and ended Egypt's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.

Nasser's successors, al-Sadat and Mubarak, had to deal with other challenges to nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, particularly Iraq and Iran. Egyptian officials have repeatedly confirmed their perception of nuclear weapons as a threat to peace and stability in the region. The Egyptians do not make any distinction between nuclear Iran or nuclear Israel. They call for a Middle East free of nuclear weapons.

Under President Anwar al-Sadat (1970-81), Egypt's strategic posture had drastically changed. Four parameters with significant impact on the country's approach to nuclear weapons can be identified. First, unlike his predecessor Nasser, al-Sadat did not see the Arab circle as the main domain for Egyptian policy. Projecting the image of leadership in the Arab world took a back seat under al-Sadat. Instead, Egypt's economic recovery and development became the main priorities. Second, the close alliance Nasser had established with the Soviet Union came to an end under al-Sadat. Most Egyptian communists were jailed and restrictions were imposed on leftist ideas and movements. In July 1972 Soviet advisors were expelled from Egypt. Indeed, al-Sadat never trusted the Soviets. He once stated that they (the Soviets) "make my blood boil."

Third, al-Sadat did not see Israel as a sworn enemy that should be eliminated. The Yom Kippur was not aimed at threatening the existence of the Jewish state. Rather, al-Sadat wanted to regain the territory Egypt lost in the 1967 war. In return, he was willing to make peace with Israel. Al-Sadat's 1977 peace initiative and the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty were milestones to achieve this strategy. Fourth, al-Sadat believed that close alliance with the United States would enhance Egypt's chances to regain Sinai from Israel and improve the prospects for domestic economic prosperity.

In the light of these four parameters, it became apparent that nuclear weapons had no place in Egypt's strategy under al-Sadat. Thus, Robert J. Einhorn concludes, "although the period of most active Egyptian interest in nuclear weapons had ended by the time of the Six Day War in 1967, al-Sadat's strategic choice over a decade later codified Egypt's nuclear abstinence, reinforced it, and placed it in a coherent strategic context." (19)

President Hosny Mubarak (1981-), like his two predecessor, has never been enthusiastic about nuclear power. Under his leadership, Egypt has continued its slow and limited cooperation with foreign powers to acquire nuclear technology. Indeed, President Mubarak highlighted two reasons for his reluctant endorsement of nuclear power--alternative sources of energy and heavy debt. In 2001 the president stated, "Egypt does not have a need for a nuclear-power plant in a country that is full of natural gas reserves." (20) It is important to point out that Egypt's share of the world's proven natural gas reserves is about one percent, while that of Iran, which has aggressively pursued nuclear energy, is 15.3 percent. (21)

In 1992 President Mubarak explained why Egypt had not embarked on a nuclear power program by pointing out to the high cost of nuclear energy. He estimated that the construction of three or four nuclear plants would cost $18-20 billion. He concluded, "Frankly, I would be leaving a debt for the citizens, a burden on the people. I cannot do this ... I do not want to add more burdens than the people can endure." (22)

These two considerations among others have convinced the Egyptian leadership not to aggressively pursue nuclear energy. Still, given national prestige and Israel's nuclear capability, Egyptian leaders feel the need to close this nuclear asymmetry. The strategy under Mubarak has been to exert pressure on Israel to give up its nuclear weapons and join the NPT. The Egyptians also claim that Israel's nuclear weapons prompt others to follow suit. The solution, the Egyptians argue, is to make the entire Middle East free of nuclear weapons.

2). Israel: Shortly after the 1952 coup, Nasser was able to consolidate his power base by ousting his rivals including more senior officers like General Muhammad Nagib. This was followed by the 1956 Suez crisis in response to Nasser's decision to nationalize the Suez Canal. Politically, Nasser emerged from this crisis victorious and started building and consolidating his, and Egypt's, image as the leader of the Arab world. Egypt supported several "revolutionary" and anti-West movements in Algeria, Yemen, and other Arab states. Cairo also championed the conflict against Israel. Within this context, the reports in the early 1960s that Israel had launched a nuclear program and was pursuing nuclear weapons alarmed the Egyptian leadership. Since then, Egypt "has been struggling to come to terms with the regional implications of this development." (23) Accordingly, Egypt has pursued different strategies to balance Israeli nuclear power.

One of the earliest strategies was to threaten a preventive war against Israel's nuclear installations. In 1960 President Nasser said that if it were certain that Israel was building a bomb, "it will mean the beginning of war between us and Israel, because we cannot permit Israel to manufacture an atomic bomb. It is inevitable that we should attack the base of aggression, even if we have to mobilize four millions to destroy it." (24) Given Israel's military superiority, such a preventive strike was never launched. A second strategy was to build a nuclear infrastructure in collaboration with foreign powers that would lay the foundations for a nuclear weapons program. As discussed above, these efforts did not succeed. Egypt attempted to secure a Soviet nuclear guarantee against possible Israeli use of nuclear weapons. (25) The Soviets did not agree. These repeated failures left Egypt with two other options--to lobby Israel to sign the NPT and dismantle its nuclear weapons and/or to pursue other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, particularly chemical weapons.

Egypt's response to Israel's nuclear capability suggests several conclusions. First, several Israeli scholars and military analysts have explained the country's need for nuclear deterrence by its unique security posture. Israel, the argument goes, is a small country surrounded by hostile Arab states, some of them deny the Jewish state the right to exist. The Egyptians have never accepted this logic. Instead, they claim that given Israel's military superiority, the Arabs are more vulnerable to and threatened by Israel's military might (conventional and non-conventional).

Second, the 1967 war "was not linked to the nuclear issue in any way." (26) The goal of the war was not to attack Israel's nuclear facilities. Similarly, the following major Arab-Israeli conflict, the 1973 Yore Kippur war, was not connected to the nuclear issue. Instead, Egypt and Syria launched the war to regain the territory they lost to Israel. This suggests that nuclear weapons did not prevent Arab armies from attacking the Jewish state.

Some military analysts argue that Israel's nuclear weapons meant that it cannot be defeated and left Arab states with no other option but to accommodate the Jewish state politically. In other words, some scholars contend that nuclear weapons brought the Arabs to the negotiation table and contributed to stability and peace in the Middle East. Despite the appeal of this argument, the fact that some Arab leaders, including Nasser, had sought peaceful negotiations with Israel long before it possessed nuclear weapons casts doubt on the connection between nuclearization and the peace process. (27)

3). Economic Restraints: Two interrelated developments in the Egyptian economy--low economic growth and increasing integration in the global system--have had significant impact on the country's stand on the nuclear weapons issue. For most of the past half century, Egypt has grown poorer. Many forces contributed to this poor economic performance, including population explosion, political corruption, and mismanagement of natural and human resources. Low economic growth rates, a huge national debt, and overall deteriorating economic conditions meant that allocating massive resources to build a nuclear program has become a luxury Egypt cannot afford.

Since the mid-1970s, Egypt has grown more dependent on and vulnerable to the international economic system. Labor remittances, tourism, the Suez Canal, and oil and natural gas have been the four major contributors to the national income since al-Sadat initiated the Infitah (open door policy) shortly alter the Yom Kippur war. Equally important, this Infitah has coincided with the reception of massive American economic and military aid. For the last three decades, Egypt has been the second largest recipient of American foreign aid after Israel. These increasing links to, and dependence on, foreign sources of national income mean that Egypt's freedom of choice has been restrained by norms and rules dictated by the international system and the United States. Any challenge to these rules would raise concern over the continuation of these foreign sources of income and jeopardize the country's economic and political stability. In other words, due to vulnerability to external sources, Egypt is under increasing pressure to "play by the rules" of the international community, including those of nuclear non-proliferation.

For many decades prior to the 1952 military coup, the Egyptian economy was dominated by private enterprises. Exporting raw cotton was a major characteristic of the country's economy. After toppling the monarchy, Nasser and his colleagues initiated several large schemes such as the High Dam at Aswan in Upper Egypt and an iron and steel complex at Helwan. These schemes meant that the government was increasingly assuming a leading economic role at the expense of the private sector. The nationalization of foreign assets, including banks and insurance companies, had further strengthened the momentum toward state intervention in the economic system. Eventually, Egypt adopted national planning and moved closer to the socialist model of economic development.

This gradual transformation to central planning and a state-led economy had an impact on Egypt's foreign economic relations with Western powers and international financial institutions. Egypt's requests for loans and other financial assistance from American and European banks and governments were delayed or rejected and were replaced by Soviet financial aid. The domestic environment proved hostile to foreign investment. The volume of trade with Western countries decreased while Egypt's trade with socialist countries went up, particularly in the form of barter trade.

These economic policies in conjunction with the costly involvement in the Yemeni war (and support to other "liberation movements" around the world) led to fiscal crisis. The 1967 war was not only a military and political disaster, but an economic one as well. In addition to added defense expenditures to rebuild the army, Egypt lost some of its major economic resources. "Oil fields in the Sinai Peninsula were lost, the Suez Canal was closed to traffic, and tourism was badly disrupted." (28) This economic pressure led to a re-assessment of the state-led economic strategy and paved the way for a gradual departure from this policy toward a market-economy policy. These changes started in Nasser's waning years. (29)

Shortly after defeating his political rivals and consolidating his power-base at home, as well as earning legitimacy by changing the parameters of the Egyptian-Israeli conflict following the 1973 Yom Kippur, President al-Sadat embarked on a new economic policy. Infitah, or economic liberalization, had a two-fold goal. First, it aimed at alleviating the burdens of statist policy pursued by his predecessor, particularly addressing the high rate of unemployment, low rate of productivity, and public sector inefficiency. Second, Infitah aimed at attracting Arab and foreign investments, particularly in light of the availability of billions of dollars following the skyrocketing of oil prices in the mid-1970s.

Four characteristics of al-Sadat's Infitah should be highlighted. A) The president's focus on economic prosperity at home and establishing close strategic relations with major Western powers and international financial institutions meant less emphasis on building the image of Egypt as the main military leader of the Arab world and overall reduced interest in pursuing foreign policy adventures. The priority was economic recovery at home. B) AlSadat did not embark on a "full-fledged" economic liberalization. His survival strategy was meant to "fix the system" not to change it. Thus, despite the growing role the private sector came to play, the public sector had maintained its domination over major economic sectors. The state continued to play a leading role in the economic system, particularly in the areas of public employment and government subsidies of basic commodities.

C) The re-integration of Egypt in the regional and global systems has substantially increased the country's dependence on and vulnerability to external changes. Egypt's economic development and prosperity reflected positive or negative regional and international changes more than domestic ones. D) Like the experience in other countries, the introduction of economic liberalization opened the door for cronyism, political corruption and deepening class divisions. Accordingly, by the early 1980s there was a growing realization that a fresh assessment of the Infitah policy was needed. This assessment was undertaken by al-Sadat's successor, Hosny Mubarak.

Following the assassination of President al-Sadat by Muslim extremists in October 1980, Mubarak (1980-) was elected president. He tried to achieve a "balance between the socialist economic rigidity of Nasser and al-Sadat free economy." (30) Some corrections of al-Sadat's liberalization policy have been taken, without returning to Nasser's command economy. President Mubarak has remained committed to Egypt's integration in the global system and attracting Western capital and technology. Furthermore, Egypt's close ties to the United States have continued to grow under Mubarak's leadership.

4). Relations with the U.S.: Since the late 1970s, when Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel ending the state of war between the two nations and establishing economic and diplomatic ties, Cairo has been the second largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid after the Jewish state. This massive aid as well as Washington's support of Egypt's request for other forms of financial assistance in international financial institutions has consolidated a strategic partnership between the two nations. Within this context, any Egyptian attempt to consider a nuclear weapons option would greatly jeopardize this strategic relationship.

Given Egypt's economic, political, military, and cultural weight in the broad Middle East, the United States has valued domestic stability in Cairo for decades. The United States has used financial assistance as leverage to support pro-Western domestic and foreign policy in Cairo. The history of U.S. assistance to Egypt is closely tied to the ups and downs in the relations between the two nations.

The United States planned to grant Egypt technical assistance under the auspices of President Harry Truman's Point Four Program following anti-foreigner riots in Cairo in early 1952. (31) The toppling of the monarchy had complicated the early efforts to forge close economic ties between Cairo and Washington. American officials were concerned about containing communism and preventing the Soviets from penetrating the Middle East, while the Egyptians were concerned about expelling the British out of their country and addressing the perceived Israeli threat. (32)

Egypt's close relations with the Soviet Union and its anti-Israel and anti-West stand during most of the 1960s and early 1970s took relations with the United States to one of its lowest levels. After Nasser's death, al-Sadat drastically changed Egypt's domestic and foreign policy orientation. Al-Sadat strongly believed that there would be no peace in the Middle East without American mediation and that Egypt's economic prosperity dependent on close ties to the United States. On the other hand, subsequent U.S. administrations have appreciated the stabilizing role Egypt plays in the region and the domestic risks Egyptian leaders have taken allying themselves with the United States, championing peace with Israel, and largely promoting a pro-Western agenda.

Accordingly, Washington has provided an average of $1.3 billion in yearly defense-procurement credits since 1979 (33) in addition to millions of dollars in economic assistance. Often, the two sides have disagreed on the priority, speed, and efficiency of U.S. aid funded program. Still, the huge volume of assistance (over $2 billion annually) for more than two decades demonstrates how high the stakes are for the United States in ensuring domestic stability in Cairo. It also shows how dependent Egypt has become on American aid. It is highly unlikely that Egypt would adopt any policy that would seriously threaten the continuation of this aid in the foreseeable future.

CONCLUSION

The discussion of Egypt's stand on nuclear weapons capability since the early 1960s suggests that Egyptian leaders have never assigned a great value to nuclear weapons in the overall military strategy. Accordingly, no serious commitments were made to build such capability. Limited economic sources and close relations with the United States have reinforced this perception of low utility of nuclear weapons. Equally important, Egypt's security environment has drastically changed since the late 1970s. Egypt seems to have seriously committed herself to peace with Israel. Despite the so-called "cold peace" (i.e., small volume of trade and little cultural interaction), the peace treaty between Cairo and Tel Aviv has survived serious challenges. There is no reason to believe that this will change in the foreseeable future.

Since 1979 Egypt has enjoyed a prolonged period of peace. The government maintains a large and strong army, but Egypt has not been involved in a large-scale war since the 1973 Yum Kippur war against Israel. For the foreseeable future, it is hard to imagine a scenario in which Egypt might need nuclear weapons. Egypt has been at peace with all its neighbors for decades and even if this peace were to collapse, there will not be a need for nuclear weapons to settle a conflict with Israel in the east, Libya in the west, or Sudan in the south.

Some analysts contend that despite technological and economic hurdles, Egypt still can pursue a nuclear option. Ahmed Hashim, for example, argues that the lack of an effective research and development program should be considered a "hindrance, but not a serious obstacle, if the Egyptians had set their minds and energies to attempting a nuclear program." (34) The argument in this essay is that the Egyptian leaders have never committed to pursue nuclear weapons and are not likely to consider this option in the foreseeable future.

ENDNOTES

(1.) Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Egypt Profile: Introduction, on line at <http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Egypt/print/index.prt> accessed 1 January 2006.

(2.) Federation of American Scientists, Egypt: Chemical Weapons Program on line at <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/egypt/cw/indes.html> accessed 1 January 2006.

(3.) Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Egypt: Chemical Overview, on line at <http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Egypt/print/3370.prt> accessed 1 January 2006.

(4.) Cited in the Federation of American Scientists, Egypt: Biological Weapons Program, on line at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/egypt/ bw/index.html> accessed 1 January 2006.

(5.) Dany Shoham, "Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 5, No.3, spring-summer 1998, 48-58, 55

(6.) Israel has neither signed nor ratified the BWC. For a list of the signatory states see the organization's website at <http://www.opbw.org> accessed 14 January 2006.

(7.) Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Egypt: Biological Overview, on line at <http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Egypt/print/3438.prt> accessed 1 January 2006.

(8.) Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Egypt: Missile Overview, on line at <http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Egypt/Missile/index.html> accessed 1 January 2006.

(9.) Federation of American Scientists, Egypt: Missile Programs, on line at <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/egypt/missile/index.html> accessed 1 January 2006.

(10.) The Arab Organization for Industrialization was established in cooperation between Egypt and oil Arab states on the Persian Gulf. Political disagreements due to Egyptian efforts to make peace with Israel and Arab opposition brought an end to this experiment.

(11.) Shai Feldman, "Middle East Nuclear Stability: The State of the Region and the State of the Debate," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 49, No. 1, summer 1995, 205-230, 205.

(12.) Federation of American Scientists, Egypt: Nuclear Weapons Program, on line at <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/egypt/nuke/index.html> accessed 1 January 2006.

(13.) Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, "Egypt's Budding Nuclear Program," The Risk Report, Vol. 2, No.5, September-October 1996, on line at <http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/egypt/nuke.html> accessed 1 January 2006.

(14.) Muhammad al-Sayed Selim, "Egypt and the Middle Eastern Nuclear Issue," Strategic Analysis, Vol.15, No.1, January 1996, on line at <http://www.nti.org/db/nuclear/1996/n9614112.htm> accessed 1 January 2006.

(15.) In December 1960 the Israeli Prime Minister acknowledged for the first, and only, time that Israel was building a nuclear reactor at Dimona in the Negev Desert.

(16.) Shai Feldman, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997, 59

(17.) Barbara M. Gregory, "Egypt's Nuclear Program: Assessing Supplier-Based and Other Developmental Constraints," Nonproliferation Review, Vol.3, No.1, fall 1995, 20-27, 22.

(18.) Gamal Abd al-Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution, Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1955, 87-88.

(19.) Robert J. Einhorn, "Egypt: Frustrated but Still on a Non-Nuclear Course," 43-82, 51 in Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss (eds), The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004.

(20.) World Tribune, "Egypt Vague on Mubarak's Nuclear Deal with Russia, Early Exit from Moscow," on line at <http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/Archive_2001/me_egypt_05_ 01.html> 1 May 2001, accessed 16 January 2006.

(21.) The two figures are from British Petroleum, BP Statistical Review of World Energy, London, 2005, 20.

(22.) Cited in Barbara M. Gregory, "Egypt's Nuclear Program: Assessing Supplier-Based and Other Developmental Constraints," Nuclear Proliferation, Vol.3, No. 1, fall 1995, 20-27, 25.

(23.) Emily B. Landau, "Egypt's Nuclear Dilemma," Strategic Assessment, Vol.5, No.3, November 2002, on line at <http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/v5n3p5Lan.html> accessed 3 January 2006.

(24.) Cited in William Bader, The United States and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, New York: Pegasus, 1968, 96.

(25.) Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s, New York: Columbia University Press, 1982, 68.

(26.) Yair Evron, "The Arab Position in the Nuclear Field: A Study of Policies up to 1967," Cooperation and Conflict, Vol.8, No.1, January 1973, 19-31, 26.

(27.) Zeev Maoz, "The Mixed Blessing of Israel's Nuclear Policy," International Security, Vol.28, No.2, Fall 2003, 44-77, 65.

(28.) Alan Richards, and John Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle East: State, Class, and Economic Development, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990, 196.

(29.) Marvin G. Weinbaum, "Egypt's Infitah and the Politics of U.S. Economic Assistance," Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.21, No.2, April 1985, 206-222, 212.

(30.) Davut Ares, "Economic Liberalization and Changes in Fundamentalism: The Case of Egypt," Middle East Policy, Vol. 12, No.4, winter 2005, 133-145, 139.

(31.) Jon B. Alterman, "American Aid to Egypt in the 1950s: From Hope to Hostility," Middle East Journal, Vol.52, No. 1, winter 1998, 51-69, 52.

(32.) Despite lack of consensus between Cairo and Washington on the source of threat to stability in the Middle East, Egypt received $10 million of American aid for a joint US-Egyptian program of land reclamation and resettlement. See Alterman, 54.

(33.) Joseph Kechickian and Jeanne Nazimek, "Challenges to the Military in Egypt," Middle East Policy, Vol.5, No.3, September 1997, 125-139, 126.

(34.) Ahmed Hashim, "The State, Society, and the Evolution of Warfare in the Middle East: The Rise of Strategic Deterrence?" Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No.4, August 1995, 53-76, 67.

Gawdat Bahgat is the Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Indiana University of Pennsylvania, Indiana.